Employee voice, equal opportunities and workplace outcomes:

an analysis of UK workplaces by Allen, Maria Lucy
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employee Voice, Equal Opportunities and Workplace Outcomes:  
An Analysis of UK Workplaces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M L ALLEN 
 
 
PhD            2015  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employee Voice, Equal Opportunities and Workplace Outcomes: An Analysis of UK Workplaces 
 
 
 
Maria Lucy Allen 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
of the 
Manchester Metropolitan University for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Management 
the Manchester Metropolitan University 
2015 
  
2 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………….   6 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction…………………………………………………………………….  8 
1.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………...  8 
1.2 Employee Voice ……………………………………………………………  9 
1.3 Women, BME and Disabled People …...…………………………………..  10 
1.4 Equal Opportunities ………………………………………………………..  13 
I Equal Opportunity Law ……………………………………………. 13 
1.5 Diversity Management …………………………………………………….. 14 
1.6 Differences and Similarities between Equal Opportunities and Diversity 
Management ……………………………………………………………….. 16 
1.7 Overview of Data and Methods ……………………………………………  20 
1.8 Structure of Thesis …….…………………………………………………...  20 
 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review……………..……………………………………………….  23 
2.1  Introduction ………………………………………………………………..  23 
2.2 Voice ………………………………………………………………………. 24 
2.3 Hirschman’s Framework …………………………………………………..  26 
I Voice and the Exchange of Information …………………………... 27 
II Power and the Concept of Voice …………………………………..  29 
2.4 The Forms that Employee Voice Can Take ………………………………..  32 
2.4.1 Indirect Voice ……………………………………………………… 33 
2.4.1.1 Indirect Voice and Measures of Performance……………………… 35 
I Unions and Quits and Absenteeism ……………………………….. 35 
II Unions and Financial Performance ………………………………... 38 
III Unions and Productivity …………………………………………...  40 
2.4.2 Non-Union Indirect Voice …………………………………………  41 
2.4.2 Indirect Joint Consultative Committee Voice and Performance …..  43 
I Joint Consultative Committees, Quits and Absenteeism …………..  43 
I Joint Consultative Committees, Quits and Productivity  …………..  44 
2.4.3 Direct Voice ……………………………………………………….  44 
2.4.3.1 Direct Voice as a HRM Practice, EO and DM Policies, Absenteeism 
and Quits ……………………………………………….………….  47 
 2.4.4  Dual-Voice Systems ……………………………………………….  49 
2.4.4.1 Dual-Voice Systems, EO and DM Policies, Absenteeism and 
Quits ……………………………………………………………….  50 
 I Dual-Voice Systems and Firm Performance ………………………  52 
  2.4.5 Partnership and ‘Co-Existence’ Approaches within  
Dual-Voice Systems ……………………………………………….  52 
2.4.6 Minimalist Voice Systems …………………………………………  54 
2.4.6.1 Limited Voice Approach and ‘Bleak Houses’……………………..  54 
2.5 Employee Voice – Forms, Systems, and Approaches …………………….  55 
2.5.1 Voice: the Analytical Framework …………………………………  55 
2.6 Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management …………………………..   58 
2.6.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………….  58 
2.6.2 Equal Opportunity Policies ……………………………………………….  59 
2.6.3  Diversity Management ……………………………………………………  60 
3 
 
2.6.4 Equal Opportunities and Diversity Management …………………………  61 
2.6.5 Equal Opportunities and Diversity Management and the Law ...…………  63 
I The Origins of Anti-Discrimination Law …………………………………  63 
II The Equality Act 2010 …………………………………………………….  65 
III Benefits and Weaknesses of the Equality Act 2010 ………………………  66 
2.6.6 Difference Approaches to Equal Opportunities and Diversity Management  68 
I The Liberal Approach/Sameness/Individuals ……………………………...  69 
II The Radical Approach/Difference/Groups ………………………………...  70 
2.6.7 The Business Case and Social Justice ……………………………………..  71 
2.6.8 Equal Opportunities, Diversity Management, and  
Workplace Outcomes ……………………………………………………...  75 
2.6.8.1 Empirical Studies on Equal Opportunities, Diversity Management and 
Workplace Outcomes ………………………...………................................  77 
2.7 Voice and Diversity ………………………………………………………..  83 
2.8 Chapter Conclusion ………………………………………………………..  93 
 
Chapter 3 - Data and Research Methodology ……………………………………………..  96 
3.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………..  96 
3.2 The Data: Workplace Employment Relations Study 2011 ………………..  97 
3.2.1 The Use of WERS 2011 in this Thesis ……………………………………  97 
3.3 Bias ………………………………………………………………………..  99 
3.4 Data Set ……………………………………………………………………  99 
3.4.1 The Dependent Variables ………………………………………………….  99 
3.4.1.1 Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies: Operationalisation100 
3.4.2 The Independent Variables ………………………………………………..  101 
3.4.2.1 Voice Variables: Classification and Operationalisation ……………..........  101 
I Indirect Voice …………………………………………………………….. 102 
II Direct Voice …...………………………………………………………….. 102 
III Dual Voice …...………………………………………………………….. 104 
IV Minimal Voice …...……………………………………………………….. 105 
3.4.3  Control Variables …………………………………………………………. 105 
3.4.4 Dependent Variables, Second Stage of Analysis:  
Absenteeism and Labour Turnover Quits ………………………………… 111 
I Absenteeism ………………………………………………………………. 112 
II Quits or Voluntary Labour Turnover ……………………………............... 112 
3.5 Logistic Regressions ………………………………………………………. 118 
 
Chapter 4 - Voice and Equal Opportunity Policies: An Empirical Analysis with Minimal 
Voice Workplaces as the Reference Category ……………………………………………. 121 
4.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………….. 121 
4.2 The Results ……………………………………………………………….. 122 
4.3       Chapter Conclusion ………………………………………………………. 167 
 
Chapter 5 - Voice and Equal Opportunity Policies: An Empirical Analysis with  
Direct Voice Workplaces as the Reference Category ……………………………………. 168 
5.1  Introduction ………………………………………………………………. 168 
5.2 The Results ……………………………………………………………….. 169 
5.3       Chapter Conclusion ………………………………………………………. 201 
 
4 
 
Chapter 6 - The Links between ‘Partnership Workplaces’ and Equal Opportunity and 
Diversity Management Policies: An Empirical Analysis …………………………………. 202 
6.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………. 202 
6.2  The Results ……………………………………………………………….. 202 
6.3       Chapter Conclusion ………………………………………………………. 235 
 
Chapter 7 - The Links between ‘Bleak Houses’ and Equal Opportunity and Diversity 
Management Policies: An Empirical Analysis ………..…………………………………. 236 
7.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………….. 236 
7.2 The Results ……………………………………………………………….. 236 
7.3  Chapter Conclusion ………………………………………………………. 272 
 
Chapter 8 - The Links between Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies 
and Absenteeism: An Empirical Analysis ………………………………………………… 273 
8.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………….. 273 
8.2 Minimalist Voice Workplaces ……………………………………………. 274 
8.3 Direct Voice Workplaces ………………………………………………… 277 
8.4 Indirect Voice Workplaces ………………………………………………. 279 
8.5 Dual Voice Workplaces …………………………………………………. 282 
8.6 Chapter Conclusion ……………………………………………………… 285 
 
Chapter 9 - The Links between Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies and  
Quit Rates: An Empirical Analysis ……………………………………………………… 286 
9.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………… 286 
9.2 Minimalist Voice Workplaces …………………………………………… 287 
9.3 Direct Voice Workplaces ………………………………………………… 291 
9.4 Collective Voice Workplaces ……………………………………………. 294 
9.5 Dual Voice Workplaces ………………………………………………….. 297 
9.6 Chapter Conclusion …………………………………………………...….. 300 
 
Chapter 10 – Conclusion …………………………………………………………………. 301 
 10.1 Findings …………………………………………………………………… 302 
 10.1.1 Voice Mechanisms and EO and DM Policies …………………………….. 302 
 I Direct Voice Workplace ………………………………………………….. 302 
II Indirect Voice Workplace ……………………………………………….. 304 
III Dual Voice Workplaces, Including ‘Partnerships’……………………….. 305 
IV Minimal Voice Workplaces, Including ‘Bleak Houses’………….……….. 306 
10.1.2 Voice and Workplace Performance………. …………………………….. 307 
10.1.2.1EO and DM Policies and Absenteeism and Quits ……………………… 308 
I Direct Voice …………………………………………………………….. 308 
II Indirect Voice …………………………………………………………… 309 
III  Dual Voice Workplaces, Including ‘Partnerships’ ……………………… 309 
IV Minimal Voice Workplaces, Including ‘Bleak Houses’ ………………… 310 
10.2 Implications ……………………………………………………………… 311 
10.2.1 Implications for Theory ………………………………………………….. 312 
10.2.1 Implications for Practitioners…………………………………………….. 315 
10.3 Weaknesses and Limitations of this Research …………………………… 317 
10.4 Future Research …………………………………………………………… 319 
 
References ………………………………………………………………………………… 323 
5 
 
 
Appendix A ……………………………………………………………………………….. 346 
Appendix B ……………………………………………………………………………….. 358 
Appendix C ……………………………………………………………………………….. 377 
  
6 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Equal opportunity (‘EO’) policy, practice and legislation has existed for a long time in 
the UK. Diversity Management (‘DM’), seeing diverse workforces as a competitive strength, 
covering everyone in the workforce, being more gender neutral and inclusive of those 
traditionally excluded from organisations, has also come to the fore. However, discrimination 
within companies continues. Amongst the groups most affected are women, those from a  BME 
background, and disabled people. 
This thesis draws on an analytical framework that enables a holistic approach to 
studying the links between voice and EO and DM policies. This thesis incorporates four main 
types of voice workplace – minimal voice, dual voice, direct voice and indirect voice. It also 
disaggregates two of these four main types of voice workplace. Within the minimal voice 
category, this thesis distinguishes between the ‘bleak house’ approach and the ‘limited 
approach’ and within the dual voice category, this research differentiates between the ‘co-
existence approach’ and the ‘partnership approach’. This enables this thesis to take a fine 
grained analytical approach of the links between voice and EO and DM policies, as well as the 
links between EO and DM and workplace outcomes, measured by absenteeism and voluntary 
labour turnover (quits), on the other, within the various types of voice workplace. Voice is 
relevant to the debate because it hasn’t been explored before and they could be an important 
means to covey employees preferences to employers, and can therefore potentially help to 
explain variation in the uptake of EO and DM in different workplaces. 
To ensure that the results of this research reveal the attitude of workplaces to EO and 
DM policies this thesis will analyse EO and DM policies at a disaggregated level, covering not 
only a more diverse set EO and DM policies, but also examining a range of workplaces, not 
only large organisations, as previous studies have often done. The study focuses on three groups 
that are commonly discriminated against: women, BME groups and those with a disability. 
Such discrimination can take direct and indirect forms, therefore, policies monitoring 
recruitment and selection, and promotions for direct and indirect discrimination, and relative 
pay rates will be examined, for each of the three groups.   
This study draws on data from the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS 2011), the largest, most comprehensive study of workplace practices in the UK. The 
survey covers EO and DM policies in detail, enabling a nuanced analysis of both the voice 
factors and the workplace outcomes that they may be associated with. The thesis relies on the 
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management survey in order to capture as many workplaces as possible. The analysis of the 
data relies on logistic regressions, as the outcome variables in both sets of regressions are 
dichotomous. 
The first key finding from this research is that voice is associated with the greater 
adoption of EO and DM policies in workplace: the more voice a workplace has the more likely 
it is to have a range of EO and DM policies. For instance, workplaces with direct voice, indirect 
voice, and dual voice are more likely to have a range of policies compared to those workplaces 
with minimal voice. In addition, dual voice workplaces are frequently more likely to adopt EO 
and DM policies compared to all other types of workplace.   
The second key finding of this research is that EO and DM policies are, on the whole, 
not associated with higher or lower levels of absenteeism and quits, indicating that, in most 
instances, EO and DM neither help nor harm establishments to any great degree. This suggests 
that existing theories could be amended.  
The third important finding is that any statistically significant associations between EO 
and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, depend upon the 
type of workplace within which the policies operate. For instance, the relationship between 
policies and outcomes is sometimes positive and statistically significant (albeit often only at the 
10-per-cent level) amongst minimal voice workplaces. It is occasionally negative and 
statistically significant (at the one-per-cent level) amongst dual voice workplaces. This justifies 
the approach taken here; it also highlights key areas for future research.  
The fourth key finding of this research is that there is a connection between high levels 
of labour turnover, amongst minimal voice workplaces, and the use of EO and DM policies. 
Again, this highlights areas that future research could examine. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis studies the links between voice, EO and DM policies, and workplace 
outcomes. Despite the presence of legislation and calls for businesses to view diverse 
workforces favourably, discrimination within companies continues. Amongst the groups most 
affected are women, black minority ethnic (BME) groups, and disabled people. These are the 
groups that will be examined in this thesis. All of these groups are at a disadvantage compared 
to men or to the dominant ethnic group within society, leading not only to lower salaries and 
worse promotional opportunities for these groups, but also, potentially, to poor performance 
and a loss, overall, of economic output.  
Examining the causes of this discrimination is, therefore, an important issue  justifying 
the two-stage assessment in this thesis of the links between 1) different forms of ‘employee 
voice’ and equal opportunity (EO) policies, including diversity management (DM), and 2) EO 
and DM policies and workplace outcomes, as measured by absenteeism and quits. 
Existing research has shown that voice can influence workplace policies (e.g. Bryson, 
2004); however, there are a limited number of existing studies that examine links between 
voice and EO and DM. In addition, work that assesses the links between EO and DM policies 
and workplace outcomes, such as quits and absenteeism, largely focuses on one type of voice 
(e.g. Guest et al., 2003; Guthrie, 2001). This thesis draws on an analytical framework that 
enables a more holistic approach to studying the links between voice, EO and DM policies, 
and workplace outcomes. It also, due to the practical difficulties of separating EO and DM 
policies, combines these two areas, even though, theoretically, they are distinct, as will be 
shown. 
Using a framework that captures a range of voice mechanisms is important for two 
interrelated reasons. First, existing research in this area tends to focus on unions as voice 
mechanisms and does not consider other voice mechanisms. Second, as Greene and Kirton 
(2009) argue, industrial relations research has, on the whole, been conducted by white men 
who examine white, male union leaders and has focused on structures and systems rather than 
processes and practices. Together, these result in the general neglect of other stakeholders 
within companies, such as women and BME groups and disabled people. This thesis seeks to 
include these often neglected workers by incorporating a range of voice mechanisms into the 
research. For instance, the thesis include direct-voice mechanisms into the analysis, meaning 
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that individual workers' opinions are not mediated by unions or other worker representatives 
This thesis also incorporates unions and other collective voice mechanisms into the research.  
 
1.2 Employee Voice 
 
This thesis examines the links between various voice mechanisms, EO and DM 
policies and the effect they have on workplace outcomes, namely labour turnover and 
absenteeism. This thesis distinguishes between the following voice mechanisms: collective 
voice, direct voice, dual voice and minimal voice as well as partnership (as a sub-set of dual-
voice workplaces) and bleak house approaches (as a sub-set of minimal voice workplaces). It 
will examine the links between these voice mechanisms and the presence of a range of EO 
and DM policies in specific areas. In other words, the thesis goes beyond the relatively 
superficial presence of an overarching EO and DM policy to examine whether or not 
establishments monitor, for instance, relative pay rates by gender. This thesis analyses EO and 
DM policies at a disaggregated level, digging deeper to examine whether women, BME 
groups and disabled people are treated as other groups of workers in workplaces, by 
examining whether workplaces monitor recruitment and selection for discrimination against 
these groups, both directly and indirectly. Whether promotions for these groups are monitored 
both directly and indirectly and finally whether pay rates are monitored on the grounds of sex, 
ethnicity and disability. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in detail 
how and why these groups are treated the way they are, the aim of the research is to examine 
which voice mechanisms are most likely to be associated with EO and DM policies and the 
links between these policies and quits and absenteeism in a large scale study. The examination 
of these three groups and the way that various practices are monitored are examined to this 
end. This research draws on a large data set to enable this thesis to identify any patterns 
between voice and EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and EO and DM policies and quits 
and absenteeism, on the other.  
As is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the notion of voice has been used in 
many employment-related studies. It can cover direct voice, in which employees themselves 
convey their views to managers, to indirect voice, in which employee representatives express 
the concerns of employees to managers, to dual voice, which combines direct and indirect 
voice. The voice concept enables this thesis to analyse the links between a range of 
contrasting information-sharing mechanisms and EO and DM measures in a systematic way. 
In addition, by differentiating between different types of ‘voice workplace’, this thesis can 
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undertake a more nuanced assessment of the links between EO and DM, on the one hand, and 
absenteeism and quits, on the other. In other words, the voice construct enables an assessment 
of how varying voice mechanisms may create the conditions for workplaces to lower their 
levels of absenteeism as well as their quit rates.  
Existing studies of the links between EO and DM and workplace outcomes are limited 
in number and do not differentiate between workplaces, potentially downplaying important 
contingent factors that influence how EO and DM  policies shape important outcomes within 
workplaces. Existing studies find no clear relationship between a relatively limited number of 
equal opportunity policies and workplace outcomes (Forth and Ricon-Aznar, 2008), 
suggesting that previous research may have neglected factors that can influence those and 
related outcomes. In addition, existing studies tend to focus on large organisations (Metcalf 
and Forth, 2000; Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 2002), underpinning the need for more 
representative studies to be undertaken that incorporate a broader range of equal opportunity 
measures (Forth and Ricon-Aznar, 2008). This thesis seeks to meet that need. 
 
1.3 Women, BME and Disabled People 
 
There is much evidence to illustrate how women, BME groups and disabled people 
experience inferior employment-related outcomes compared to dominant social groups. Full-
time male workers earn more than full-time female workers, leading to a full-time gender pay 
gap in 2012 of 9.6 per cent of hourly earnings (excluding any overtime payments). If overtime 
is included in the assessment, the pay gap increases to 17.8 per cent of gross weekly earning 
(Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2013). The discrepancy in earnings is greater for 
the weekly figures compared to the hourly data, as men who work full time tend to work 
longer total paid weekly hours than women (median data: 38.8 hours for men; 37.3, for 
women). In addition, men tend to receive higher overtime payments compared to women 
(£64.20 for median earnings for men compared to £33.50 for women) (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, 2013). If mean data are used to calculate the gender pay gap, the 
discrepancies between earnings for men and women are greater, as 1) some men receive very 
large remuneration packages and 2) women are often employed in the low paid jobs (Equality 
and Human Rights Commission, 2013). Although the gap between the employment situations 
of men and women has declined, a discrepancy remains (Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2006; 
Platt, 2011).  
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Such data underlines the necessity of examining various aspects of equality between 
men and women within workplaces. The gender pay gap is likely to be influenced not just by 
pay rates for men and women within establishments, but also the types of jobs (and the 
attendant pay) that women and men are recruited for, and the promotional prospects of men 
and women who carry out similar jobs within establishments. Discrimination may be direct or 
indirect (direct discrimination is treating someone less favourably because of a particular 
attribute. Indirect discrimination is when there is a practice, policy or rule that applies to 
everyone but puts some people at a particular disadvantage). It is for these reasons that this 
thesis examines whether workplaces monitor recruitment, promotions, and pay for direct and 
indirect forms of discrimination.  
Analysing data from the UK, Berthoud and Blekesaune (2006) found that 
disadvantages in employment are, in many instances, related to disability and ethnicity. For 
instance, BME workers are often at a disadvantage in employment compared to white 
employees. Similarly, disabled employees are paid less than employees without a disability 
(Bardasi and Jenkins, 2000; Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2006). Longhi et al (2012) believe that 
pay differentials between disabled and non-disabled men are strongest at the top of the wage 
distribution, at 2.3 per cent at the mean and rising to 11.3 per cent and 6.8 per cent at the 75th 
and 90th percentiles respectively. 
Discrimination within workplaces can lead to those from BME groups or disabled 
employees being disadvantaged in two ways. Firstly, they may not be promoted within the 
organisation by their current employer, reducing pay levels. Secondly, they may be perceived 
as lacking skills that enhance their employment prospects with other organisations (Schroeder 
et al., 2008).  
Ethnic penalties exist in employment in Britain. Heath and Cheung (2006) found that 
BME groups had higher rates of unemployment, more limited promotional opportunities, and 
lower pay. Carmichael and Woods (2000) and Wood et al. (2009) found that recruitment 
decisions were, at least in part, influenced by discriminatory selection practices among 
employers (see also Booth et al., 2009; Riach and Rich, 2002).  
Collectively, this evidence supports the rationale to examine the policies that firms 
adopt to monitor recruitment and selection, promotion and relative pay levels for potential 
discrimination against workers from BME groups. Different voice mechanisms may influence 
the adoption of such policies in different ways and the policies may help to increase job 
satisfaction amongst employees, including those from BME groups. 
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Berthoud (2008) found that the employment rates of disabled people are low 
compared to those who are not disabled. The overall reduction in the employment rate was 
found to be 40 percentage points. Berthoud’s (2008) analysis confirmed that disability is 
associated with employment disadvantage, independently of demographic and labour market 
characteristics, and shows how important the disability penalty is. He also found that this 
penalty has been increasing over the past three decades. 
Bell and Heitmueller (2009) found that the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) has 
had no impact on the employment rate of disabled people and possibly even worsened it. The 
potential reasons for this, according to Bell and Heitmueller (2009), are higher uncertainty 
around litigation costs by employers, low levels of general awareness about the Act among 
disabled people and employers, and a lack of financial support. Employers will hire or retain 
an employee if the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs. Hence, at least theoretically, the 
DDA may have increased employment costs of disabled people by shifting discrimination and 
adjustment costs from the employee to the employer. Unless the legislation is fully enforced, 
this may lead to lower rather than higher employment rates. 
For these reasons, it is important to examine whether firms monitor recruitment and 
selection as well as promotions and pay levels for discrimination. It is important, for instance, 
to examine whether workplaces monitor pay for indirect discrimination, as it may be an 
indicator of the perceived contribution that employees are making to the organisation. Lower 
pay levels for certain groups may not, therefore, just be a signal of their perceived worth to an 
organisation, but may also indicate the likelihood of those in lower paid work being promoted 
within the firm or being recruited by another employer. On the issue of organisations 
recruiting applicants from certain groups - the evidence suggests that although discrimination 
has declined for those with BME backgrounds, applicants with BME backgrounds are 
indirectly discriminated against (Esmail 2004; Cook et al., 2003). 
Employers may often re-grade specific roles within the organisation to overcome 
equalities legislation, but do so in a way that indirectly separates highly skilled jobs into those 
performed largely by men from low skilled ones that are mainly done by women (Crompton 
and Sanderson, 1990; Snell et al., 1981).  
These forms of discrimination have implications not just for the individuals involved, 
but for the wider economy and society (Platt, 2011). They also, potentially, have 
consequences for the performance of businesses (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Noon and 
Hoque, 2001), which is the focus of this thesis. Importantly, the links between EO and DM, 
on the one hand, and workplace outcomes, on the other, represent a relatively overlooked 
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factor that could help to explain the performance of different businesses (Forth and Rincon-
Aznar, 2008). The number of large quantitative studies is limited (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 
2008). In particular, existing research has tended to downplay the links between EO and DM 
policies relating to employees from BME groups and disabled people and business 
performance (Schroeder et al., 2008). Some of the potential benefits to business of enhancing 
EO and DM within workplaces can be improved supply of labour that does not discriminate 
against suitable applicants from different groups, improved employment relations, increased 
employee commitment to the organisation, and a heightened ability to meet diverse market 
needs (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008). 
As analyses often draws a distinction between ‘EO’ and ‘DM’, it is important to set 
out key positions within the literature and to establish how EO and DM will be interpreted 
and used in this thesis.  
 
1.4 Equal Opportunity  
 
EO policies are there to ensure that all individuals are treated in the same way. Liff 
(1999) states that EO policies can be seen as an attempt to eradicate considerations of social 
differences from organisational decision making through bureaucratic means. The liberal 
approach advocates the philosophy of ‘sameness’ (Jewson and Mason, 1986). Anti-
discrimination legislation has interpreted this as people being judged independently of their 
gender and focusing instead on job-related characteristics (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 81). In 
practice EOs mean techniques should be developed to ensure that individuals are assessed in 
the same way and that differences between individuals on characteristics that are not job 
related should not be considered. EO, therefore, focus on individuals rather than groups. EO 
policies are underpinned by equality law in the UK. 
 
I Equal Opportunity Law 
 
Equality law in the UK says that people should not be treated differently in the 
workplace and in wider society on the grounds of specified ‘protected’ characteristics. The 
Equality Act 2010 bans unfair treatment in the workplace and wider society by prohibiting 
unfair treatment or access to employment as well as private and public services on the ground 
of age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and 
maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. The Equality Act 2010 largely 
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‘tidies up’ and, in a few instances, replaces previous legislation, such as the 1976 Race 
Relations Act and the 1995 Disability Discrimination Act (ACAS, 2014).  
However, legislation differs from EO practices within organisations. For instance, the 
law is not very prescriptive in terms of which areas, such as recruitment, pay and promotional 
opportunities, need to be legally monitored. For instance Daniels and Macdonald (2005: 126) 
note that: ‘It is generally considered to be good practice for employers to monitor their 
recruitment processes in order to promote equality’. Firms and workplaces are not, however, 
legally obliged to collect this information. In addition, legislation does not currently require 
firms or workplaces to monitor any area for direct and/or indirect discrimination against those 
with ‘protected characteristics’ covered by the 2010 Equality Act, such as gender, disability, 
and ethnicity. Companies will be required to report pay by gender from 2018. 
Legislation does, however, enable individual employees to take their employer to a 
tribunal if that employee feels he or she is being discriminated against on the basis of gender, 
disability or ethnicity. For instance, an individual can make a case for wage inequality on the 
basis of, say, gender by comparing his or her pay to a real or ‘imagined’ person in a similar or 
the same role (ACAS, 2014). In order to reduce the possibility that an individual may take 
legal action against their employer, companies may initiate policies to monitor policies in a 
range of areas in order to be able to demonstrate that no discrimination exists against any 
particular group of employees, such as female employees, disabled people or those from an 
BME group. Policies within establishments that monitor recruitment, promotion and pay may, 
then, help companies to reduce the risk of going to a tribunal. 
 
1.5 Diversity Management 
 
In recent years, ‘diversity’ has gained increasing interest from academics and 
practitioners. Although there is no consensus on what DM is (Kirton et al., 2007), a useful 
definition comes from Cornelius et al. (2000: 67):  
 
Diversity management is concerned with the promotion of equality through valuing 
difference between individuals and groups, particularly those who have traditionally 
experienced disadvantage. In addition, good diversity management should seek a strong 
‘business case’, which encourages inclusiveness and marshals difference. 
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The quotation indicates that DM is associated with a positive view of differences 
within workplaces, that diversity can add value to the workplace and business. The object of 
EO policies is to treat individuals the same whatever their characteristics, so that individuals 
or groups of individuals are not treated favourably or unfavourably. The proponents of the EO 
approach have assumed an operational approach to equality, supported and monitored by EO 
units, which are staffed by specialists (Mulholland et al, 2005). 
DM differs in important respects, to EO in a number of ways. Barak (2014: 218) 
contends that, although EO policies underpinned by EO legislation has been beneficial to 
individuals and groups of individuals that have, in the past, been discriminated against, such 
as women, BME workers and disabled people, these groups of individuals have not been 
given the same treatment as other, more privileged groups of individuals. For instance, they 
have been able to gain access to jobs that, in the past, they would not have been able to do, 
and they have also been able to access better paid jobs. They have not, however, been 
promoted to very senior positions within many firms in representative proportions. 
Proponents of DM policies would contend that DM policies are designed to overcome this 
deficit (Barak, 2014). 
DM seeks to achieve these objectives on the basis of a ‘business case’. For instance, 
the CIPD (2012) found that the business benefits for a more diverse workforce are: a more 
engaged and, therefore, productive workforce; a route to fresh thinking, creativity and, hence, 
market competitiveness and innovation; and the strengthening of corporate reputation, an 
important aspect of employer brand management (see also, Kreitz, 2008; Orlando, 2000). The 
CIPD (2012) reported that diversity policies were put into practice by HR professionals, 
consulting directly with the board or senior executives to scope out objectives and 
deliverables. The CIPD (2012) also noted that, once support from senior managers was in 
place, HR professionals embed diversity into the business through specific projects and 
initiatives aimed at creating an inclusive culture through training and development. The 
CIPD’s (2012) work is underpinned by the notion that it is managers who decide when to 
implement diversity policies and what form they will take, reflecting a broader shift away 
from normative notions associated with equal opportunities towards a voluntaristic, business-
focused paradigm (Barak, 2014; Cox and Blake, 1991). The DM management paradigm is, 
therefore, more concerned with individuals and their contribution to the organisation rather 
than broader employee rights within workplaces (Kirton and Greene, 2000, 2010).  
Similarly, Hollinshead, Nichols and Taliby (1999) differentiated between EO that are 
externally driven, focus on operational issues, potentially cost money, and for which there is 
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an ethical, moral and social case, on the one hand, and DM policies, on the other, that are 
internally driven, have a strategic purpose, potentially provide financial benefits to firms 
rather than cost money, adopt an individualistic approach rather than a group one, and focus 
on outcomes for which there is a business case. This can have a detrimental impact on gender 
equality (Kirton and Greene, 2000, 2010; Webb, 1997). 
 
1.6 Differences and Similarities between Equal Opportunities and Diversity Management 
 
An alternative to providing equality involves recognising and building on differences 
between people. In order to reduce inequalities in outcomes, therefore, certain groups should 
be treated differently. The radical approach, therefore, not only recognises the need for 
equality of opportunity, but also the need for equality of outcome. 
These differences between EO and DM also reflect contrasting approaches to equality. 
In a seminal article, Jewson and Mason (1986) distinguish between different approaches to 
equality that they term ‘liberal’ and ‘radical’, even though these two approaches can be 
difficult to distinguish in practice. The liberal approach is based around the idea that men and 
women should be treated the same and sex equality is achieved when policies and procedures 
are identical for both sexes (Cockburn, 1989). Each individual, therefore, should be treated in 
the same way as any other individual. The basis of the liberal approach is, consequently, the 
philosophy of ‘sameness’, the idea that individuals have the right to be treated the same as 
another person of a different sex in the same circumstances (Liff and Wajcman, 1996).  
The principles that underpin the liberal approach means that policy should relate to 
fair procedures, equality of opportunity, and the equal treatment of people. However, the 
principles for a radical approach aim to achieve a fair distribution, the attainment of equal 
outcomes, and the possibility to treat people differently according to their characteristics. The 
radical approach to promoting EO was adopted by individuals who held strong political and 
ethical values and recognized the historical disadvantage that certain groups, such as women, 
ethnic minorities and disabled persons, experienced in employment (Jewson and Mason 
1986), and that EO would not rectify these differences.  In the liberal approach, the successful 
implementation of policies requires a bureaucratic process in which rules are established and 
followed; in the radical approach, a process of politicisation should accompany or precede the 
implementation of policies so that employers and employees follow the policies for normative 
reasons. Consequently, the success of a liberal approach to equality might be measured by the 
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positive actions that are taken, whereas a radical approach might be measured by a set of 
beliefs amongst a population (Kirton et al., 2007). 
The role of government can also be expected to vary within liberal and radical 
approaches to equality (Kirton and Greene, 2005). In the liberal approach, policy should 
promote ‘fair’ competition for jobs, promotion, and financial rewards. An assumption that fair 
procedures will lead to fair outcomes, demonstrated, for instance, in the provision of 
subsidised childcare facilities to enable mothers to compete for jobs on an equal basis to men 
(Kirton and Greene, 2005). By contrast, radical approaches to equality are associated with 
policies that intervene directly in order to achieve a reduction in outcome inequalities, 
resulting, for instance, in measures to promote positive discrimination in employment 
relationships. 
Traditionally, the British state has pursued an approach to equality that is more aligned 
to the liberal perspective than it to the radical one. For instance, policies have been 
implemented that seek to establish a ‘level playing field’ for all applicants and employees. 
This approach is clearly illustrated by the Conservative-led coalition between 2010 and 2015. 
Amongst the measures that the government adopted to prevent discrimination were 1) funding 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and making sure it does its job well, by 
appointing the board and monitoring its work, and 2) providing information, advice and 
support on discrimination through the Equality Advisory and Support Service (EASS) 
(Department for Education, 2013). Both of these measures illustrate the UK government’s 
desire to create fair procedures by providing information to employers and employees about 
how discrimination can be overcome; these measures do not impose a strict set of conditions 
on employers in order to intervene directly in their recruitment, pay and promotion decisions. 
The then government’s approach adhered more to the liberal than to the radical paradigm of 
EO. 
The ability of both approaches to achieve the desired results has been criticised 
(Kirton and Greene, 2005). For instance, the liberal approach may be too ‘weak’ to overcome 
deep-seated prejudices as it does not require firms to make changes to their procedures. By 
contrast, the radical approach may result in ‘reverse discrimination’ as it requires certain 
groups to be treated favourably compared to others (Kirton and Greene, 2005). This thesis 
does not examine these arguments directly, but assesses the links between EO and DM 
policies together, as defined in the WERS dataset, and various types of voice.  
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It should not be forgotten that the distinction between EO and DM is not always that 
great in practice. The conflation of EO policies with DM precepts is illustrated by the 
following statement from a Department for Education (2013) publication: 
  
We want the UK to be a leader in equality and human rights. At our best, we are 
defined by our tolerance, freedom and fairness. There is also a strong economic 
argument for equality. If people are not able to reach their full potential, the economy 
suffers. 
 
The above quotation helps justify combining EO and DM policies. The focus on 
equality, is supported by EO laws and regulations, equality based on economics is highlighted 
in the business case argument for DM policies. The Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey, which is used in this thesis, has a key question which combines EO and DM. That 
question asks:  
 
Does this workplace have a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing 
diversity? 
 
As can be seen in this question, the WERS data set combines EO and DM. Liff and 
Wajcman (1996) acknowledge that initiatives exist which aim for equality despite difference 
and many policies within organisations combine the two approaches. The two approaches, 
may be seen as contradictory. However, their interaction may be productive (Furguson, 1993). 
This thesis will combined EO and DM policies as the WERS data set does.  
In addition, Kirton and Greene (2009) discuss how diversity specialists have, in 
general, replaced equality officers. They suggest that doing diversity work in the 2000s is a 
different experience from doing equality work in the 1980s/1990s and that the rise of the 
business case and relative decline in emphasis on, and resultant de-politicisation of, equality 
led to an increase in the legitimacy and respectability of DM. This, combined with the 
changing backgrounds and characteristics of diversity practitioners, means that diversity work 
usually carries lower costs and potentially offers more opportunities than equality work. 
However, Kirton and Greene’s (2009) study finds that despite DM being a more business-
friendly paradigm, some of the potential costs historically associated with equality work, 
including isolation, stress, marginalisation and career jeopardy remain significant for at least 
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some practitioners, particularly specialists. Consequently, business-friendly DM might be 
more fiction than reality (Kirton and Greene, 2009).  
This position is also taken by Prasad and Mills (1997) who argue that, despite the 
rather glossy, upbeat veneer projected by organisational DM statements, some of the changes 
have actually only been superficial. Similarly, Kirton and Greene (2009) find that the 
willingness of mainstream managers to champion diversity can be explained by the legitimacy 
accorded to DM. Most practitioners drew support from the diversity and equality structures 
within their organisations and wanted to dissociate themselves from the negative image of EO 
(Kirton and Greene, 2009). DM arguably provides that opportunity with business-friendly 
objectives and language, making it more legitimate and respectable (Kirton and Greene, 
2009).  
Combining, in practice, EO and DM enables this thesis to undertake a large-scale 
study of the links between voice, EO and DM and workplace outcomes. It is the first study to 
do so, helping to explain why the incidence of EO and DM varies between workplaces and 
helps to reveal any links that EO and DM have with key workplace outcomes, absenteeism 
and quits. It is important to analyse the links between voice and EO and DM measures as the 
EO and DM literature often assumes, as the above discussion shows, that these policies are 
determined by managers alone. This neglects the possibility that managers respond to the 
preferences of employees that are expressed via voice mechanisms. As I argue below, the 
existing literature that examines the links between voice and EO/DM often focuses one type 
of voice, be it direct or collective voice. This research takes a more holistic view, drawing on 
an analytical framework that enables four different main types and four further sub-types of 
voice and their links to EO/DM to be examined.  
These two approaches are linked to the rationale for EO and DM – the business case 
and social justice case, which will now be outlined. The theoretical base upon which to build 
policy that alleviates inequality and unfair discrimination have two potentially competing 
solutions, one focuses on equality of opportunity and the other on the management of 
diversity (Noon and Ogbonna, 2001). These solutions are underpinned by two different 
rationales: the need for social justice (the moral case) or the needs of the organisation (the 
business case) (Noon and Ogbonna, 2001). This is echoed by Miller (1996) who observes that 
the diversity approach has an emphasis on the ‘business case’ which is in contrast to the 
‘equal opportunity’ approach that emphasises social justice and fairness. The moral case 
suggests that powerful voice mechanisms should be present in workplaces to ensure workers’ 
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rights are protected. By contrast, the business case suggests that managers should be free to 
decide which, if any, voice mechanisms should be present in workplaces.  
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1.7 Overview of Data and Methods 
 
This study draws on data from the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS 2011), which is the largest most comprehensive study of workplace practices in the 
UK (Timming, 2009; Whitfield and Hoque, 2008; Whitfield and Huxley, 2007). Importantly, 
the survey covers EO and DM policies in detail, enabling a nuanced analysis of both the voice 
factors and the workplace outcomes that they may be associated with. The thesis relies on the 
management survey in order to capture as many workplaces as possible in the analysis and, 
thereby, contribute to the literature by incorporating small and medium-sized enterprises as 
well as large ones (Forth and Ricon-Aznar, 2008). There are 1946 workplaces in the complete 
samples used in this thesis. If I had used either the employee representative or the employee 
survey, the sample size would be much lower and those surveys pose a different set of 
questions that do not address the specifics of EO and DM policies, making the assessment of 
the links between voice, EO and DM, and workplace outcomes and the use of regression 
analysis, impossible. I reduced the complete sample in order to examine differences amongst 
those workplaces that have both direct and indirect forms of voice as well as amongst those 
workplaces that have no or very low levels of direct voice and no collective voice.  
The analysis has two stages. The first examines the links between different types of 
voice and EO and DM policies. The EO and DM policies concentrate on three categories of 
discrimination sex, BME and disability. Sex is the protected characteristic outlined in the EqA 
2010. Sex relates to the biological differences between men and women, gender is more 
concerned with sociocultural factors that contribute to sex difference (Unger, 1979). The 
second assesses the associations between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and 
absenteeism and quits, on the other. Both steps rely on the use of logistic regressions as the 
outcome variables in both sets of regressions are dichotomous.  
 
1.8 Structure of Thesis 
 
The thesis has nine more chapters. The next chapter sets out the analytical framework 
that will guide the research. That framework distinguishes between different forms of voice 
and enables a holistic, nuanced analysis of the links between different forms of voice, on the 
one hand, and various EO and DM policies, on the other. It then goes on to discuss EO and 
DM in more detail and the different approaches to EO and DM. The chapter then goes onto 
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examine EO, DM and workplace outcomes followed by a review of the voice and diversity 
literature. 
Chapter 3 details and justifies the data used in this research as well as the methods 
used in the analysis of that data. The chapter also specifies how key variables, such as direct 
and indirect, dual (including partnership) and minimal (including bleak house) have been 
operationalised. Chapter 4 is the first of six empirical chapters. Chapter 4 assesses if there are 
any differences between the different types of ‘voice workplace’ in terms of the likelihood of 
them adopting various EO and DM policies. The reference category is the ‘minimalist’ type of 
voice workplace. Chapter 5 performs the same analysis, but uses ‘direct voice’ workplaces as 
the reference category in order to examine more closely any differences between direct voice 
workplaces, on the one hand, and indirect, dual and minimal voice workplaces, on the other. 
This enables a thorough analysis of key arguments within the theoretical literature. Chapter 6 
draws on distinctions between workplaces with a ‘partnership’ approach and those with a ‘co-
existence’ model within dual voice workplaces to assess whether the former are more likely 
than the latter to adopt EO and DM policies. Chapter 7 draws a distinction between ‘bleak 
house’ and ‘limited’ voice workplaces to examine whether those establishments that have a 
limited direct voice are more likely than those that have no (or very few) direct voice policies 
(that is, bleak houses) to adopt the range of EO and DM policies adopted within the 
workplace.  
The second stage of the analysis within this thesis begins in chapter 8. In the second 
stage of the analysis in this thesis, the links between EO and DM and two key workplace 
outcomes, absenteeism and quit rates, are examined within each type of ‘voice workplace’. 
Chapter 8 concentrates on absenteeism, chapter 9, quit rates. The analysis is carried out within 
each category of ‘voice workplace’ in order to assess how EO and DM policies may influence 
those outcomes, depending upon the type of ‘voice workplace’ that they are implemented 
within. If different types of voice differ in their links to EO and DM policies, then it is 
important to assess whether more (or fewer) EO and DM policies are associated with varying 
outcomes. For instance, it could be the case that those workplaces with indirect voice are 
more likely to implement EO and DM policies than those establishments that only have direct 
voice mechanisms in place. However, this result may be shaped by unions’ desire to recruit 
more female workers in the establishment; yet these policies may not have any benefits to the 
workplace itself. It is, therefore, important to understand how the associations between EO 
and DM policies and workplace outcomes may depend upon the type of voice workplace 
23 
 
within which those EO and DM policies are implemented. Finally, chapter 10 concludes the 
thesis.  
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on voice, EO and DM 
policies and performance and their links. There are two main sections to this chapter: voice 
and EO, and DM. 
The first section begins by reviewing the literature on voice, introducing the main 
themes and perspectives on voice and examines the forms that employee voice takes 
theoretically and empirically and examines these forms of voice against various workplace 
outcomes. In addition, it sets out an analytical framework that distinguishes between 
workplaces that have different voice mechanisms within them and enables this thesis to adopt 
a nuanced approach to the study of the links between voice and EO and DM policies.  
The chapter argues that 1) different forms of voice are associated with varying degrees 
of power and 2) EO and DM policies can, by increasing employee morale and commitment, 
help to reduce absenteeism and quits. The chapter also reviews the empirical literature that 
examines these theoretical arguments. It reviews the major empirical studies in order to assess 
the importance of voice on EO and DM policies and appraises the evidence with regard to 
practices effects on key establishment outcomes that are the focus of the current study: 
absenteeism and labour turnover (quits). 
The links between union and other forms of collective voice and various 
workplace/company outcomes are examined. It is important to examine these links in order to 
highlight the effect they have on a range of outcomes. It should be noted that 1) that the links 
between union and other forms of collective voice and equal opportunities and DM policies 
have been examined extensively before and 2) that this thesis, by assessing the links between 
EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, within 
particular types of ‘voice workplace’, overcomes the potential problem of ignoring different 
forms of voice influencing the outcomes.  
The next section examines direct voice both theoretically and empirically; it is then 
followed by a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on dual voice systems. There 
is a dearth of empirical work in the area of voice and EO policies, helping to justify the 
approach adopted in this thesis.  
Section 2.6 examines the empirical literature on voice and DM. It reviews a number of 
empirical studies and explores the effects on different forms of voice on DM policies and the 
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effects on various groups in a range of empirical settings. This is following by a discussion on 
EO and DM policies: these are defined and the differences and similarities are explored, the 
law on Equal Opportunities and how it has evolved to the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 is also 
examined. There is then a discussion of the different approaches to equal opportunities and 
DM and a discussion on the business case and social justice case for equal opportunities and 
DM policies. Finally, there is a review on the theoretical and empirical literature on EO and 
DM policies and workplace outcomes examining the links between various types of diversity 
and various differing outcomes.  
 
2.2 Voice 
 
Very little work has been done on the link between voice and EO and DM policies 
(Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Noon and Hoque, 2001). Some studies have examined the 
links between EO and/or DM policies and outcomes. However, there has been no work done 
on the links between voice, EO and/or DM and outcomes (quits and absenteeism). This thesis 
will be the first to link these factors together in one study. It is important to do this as it could 
reveal a neglected influence on firm outcomes and could highlight a role for different voice 
measures not just in promoting equal opportunities, which may be an ‘end in themselves’, but 
also in helping companies attain improved outcomes. 
The ‘voice’ concept underpins the analysis of several studies on employment relations 
(Barry and Wilkinson, forthcoming; Bryson et al., 2006; Budd et al., 2010; Dundon et al., 
2005; Lavelle et al., 2010; Wilkinson and Fay, 2011; Wilkinson et al., forthcoming; Wood et 
al., 2009). The term ‘voice’ can be traced back to Hirschman (1970), who first used the 
concept, and who focused mainly on customers within competitive markets and ‘customer-
members’ of clubs or club-like organisations. He did not apply the concept to employees 
within firms. It is important to point this out as the dynamics between customers and firms are 
different compared to those between employees and employers (Tüselmann et al., 2007). For 
instance, power, which is a key issue within the employment literature (Ackers, 2012; 
Johnstone et al., 2010; Wilkinson et al., forthcoming), is even more important in the 
relationship between employees and employers than it is between customers and firms. The 
links between power and the ability of employers and employees to build co-operative 
workplace relations is of particular importance, as it can create the conditions in which greater 
trust between employees and employers is established. More specifically, the willingness and 
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ability of companies to respond to the wishes of their employees is likely to differ to firms’ 
responses to consumer demands for a number of reasons that are set out below.  
Employees are firms’ key assets (Pfeffer, 1997). They ultimately are the basis upon 
which firms build their success. Therefore, attracting and retaining appropriately skilled staff 
is a prerequisite for firm success. Whilst many studies have examined voice and wider HR 
practices in relation to various workplace outcomes, such as quit rates, absenteeism, and 
financial performance (Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Hoque, 
1999; Wood, 1999; Wright et al., 1999, 2003; Guest et al., 2003; Datta et al., 2005; Wood et 
al., 2006; Wood and de Menezes, 2008), relatively little has been written on the links between 
voice and equal opportunities or managing diversity as a potential mediating outcome on the 
links, if any, between voice and outcomes (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Noon and Hoque, 
2001).  
The evidence that does exist often examines the associations between the use of equal 
opportunity measures and outcomes, such as share prices (Hersch, 1991; Wright et al., 1995). 
Equal opportunity measures are not the only influences on such outcomes: share prices can be 
influenced by a wide array of factors, such as company investments, comparatively poor sales 
figures, and unexpected events, undermining the strength of the studies’ findings (Forth and 
Rincon-Aznar, 2008). Case studies have focused on outcomes that can be more readily 
attributed to equal opportunity policies. However, such studies are usually restricted to 
relatively large organisations (Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 2002; Metcalf and Forth, 2000). 
There is, therefore, a need to conduct a large-scale representative study of the links between 
voice, EO and DM, and workplace outcomes. To be sure, quantitative studies exist that 
examine part of this chain. For example, Forth and Rincon-Aznar (2008) examined the link 
between equal opportunities and labour productivity and financial performance outcomes. 
They do not, however, examine the antecedents of equal opportunities. Similarly, in case 
study research, Metcalf and Forth (2000) have examined EO and performance, but do not 
assess the reasons for the variation in the adoption of EO measures across establishments.  
It is also important to examine these links for practical reasons. The UK’s labour force 
is becoming increasingly diverse. More women are in employment than ever before. Ethnic 
minorities make up a larger proportion of the workforce (Metcalf and Forth, 2000). Product 
markets are becoming increasingly diverse, too. Customers come from diverse ethnic 
backgrounds (Metcalf and Forth, 2000). How to best achieve adequate levels of EO and DM 
policies is, however, unclear. Whilst unions are less prevalent in the private sector in the UK 
than they once were, data from WERS 2004 indicates that direct communication has 
27 
 
increased. Just over 82 per cent of workplaces in the private sector had meetings for the whole 
workforce or held regular team briefings in 1998; in 2004, the figure was 90 per cent (Kersley 
et al., 2005). Overall, the incidence of regular team briefings more than doubled between 
1980 and 2004: some 70 per cent of British workplaces had adopted this practice by 2004 
(Bryson et al., 2013). Their links to equal opportunities are, however, unclear. It should be 
noted at the outset that this study relies on ‘formal’ measures of voice rather than ‘informal’ 
mechanisms that are in place. For instance, managers may frequently speak to other 
employees to gain their opinions as part of their general style of management rather than use, 
say, formal employee surveys (Marchington and Suter, 2013). 
This chapter discusses the use of the term ‘voice’ by Hirschman’s (1970) and others in 
order to arrive at a holistic analytical framework that will guide the research. The framework 
will also enable this thesis to compare the links between EO and DM policies, on the one 
hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, to establish if the relationship between EO and 
DM policies and these outcomes depend upon the type of workplace within which they 
operate; previous research has not explored this possibility. 
 
2.3  Hirschman’s Framework 
 
Hirschman’s (1970: 2) aim was to understand how firms could learn about a 
‘repairable lapse’ in their performance and mainly focused on consumers and firms in 
competitive markets. Within such a setting, firms generally will be willing to improve their 
performance if that repairable lapse in performance is criticised by existing consumers or 
consumers stop buying products or services. It will be shown that this focus has implications 
for Hirschman’s general assumptions. Such assumptions are not always valid when the term is 
transferred to the employment context (Tüselmann et al., 2007). If firms suffer a loss of 
customers, companies are likely to try to overcome their shortcomings in order to remain 
competitive – or, at least, not fall behind their rivals (Hirschman, 1970). Through voice 
companies may also learn about a deterioration in their performance that they can rectify. This 
occurs when customers voice their dissatisfaction with a product to the firm. Specifically, 
Hirschman (1970: 30-31) viewed voice as ‘any attempt at all [by customers or ‘customer-
members’] to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs ... through 
appeal to a higher authority [that is, usually, managers] with the intention of forcing a 
change.... The initial assumption is a decline in the performance of a firm or organisation, 
which is remediable provided the attention of management is sufficiently focused on the task.’ 
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As shown below, this definition is quite broad. This thesis maintains the two key elements of 
Hirschman’s voice – information sharing and power (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007; Tüselmann 
et al., 2007) – but refines his definition. For this thesis, voice will be defined as the general 
ability of employees to influence decisions within a workplace (or company) that better match 
their preferences. This does not mean, as is discussed in greater detail below, that all of the 
firm’s decisions fully comply with employees’ wishes (Tüselmann et al., 2007). Voice can be 
expressed either individually or collectively.  
 
I Voice and the Exchange of Information 
 
Hirschman (1970) implicitly emphasised the importance of information sharing within 
his concept of voice. For example, Hirschman (1970: 33) noted that: ‘Voice has the function 
of alerting a firm or organization to its failings …’ In other words, voice helped consumers to 
share information with managers. More specifically and applying Hirschman’s key ideas on 
voice to the work setting, voice in companies involves the ‘upward’ communication of 
information to managers from employees. An assumption is that employers, in this instance, 
do not have perfect information; in other words, workers within companies have information 
that managers do not and that voice can help to reduce these information asymmetries, 
resulting in managers who are better informed and who can then implement appropriate 
changes within the organisation. Of course, the information that employees have that is useful 
to the organisation will depend upon the characteristics of the work carried out by the 
company and the firm’s strategic objectives (Brewster et al., 2007; Hotho et al., 2013). This 
variation is likely to result in lower-level employees being given contrasting ‘amounts’ of 
discretion within their work, as well as control over the pace at which they work. In addition, 
the willingness of workers to share that information with managers will depend upon the 
employer’s commitment to employees and previous responses from managers (Bryson et al., 
2006; Whitley, 1999). 
For Hirschman (1970: 4, emphasis in the original), one way that management could 
find out about the company’s poor performance was voice. Voice occurred when:   
The firm’s customers or the organization’s members express their dissatisfaction 
directly to management or to some other authority to which management is sub-
ordinate or through general protest address to anyone who cares to listen: this is the 
voice option. As a result, management once again engages in a search for the causes 
and possible cures of customers and members’ dissatisfaction.  
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The definition of voice used in this thesis differs from those that see voice as ‘two-
way communication’ between employees and managers (see, for instance, Willman et al., 
2006). Defining voice as two-way communication is problematic because firstly, two-way 
communication could cover protests as well as, say, legal proceedings – it also assumes that 
managers enter into a dialogue with employees; however, ‘managerial response’ (Freeman 
and Medoff, 1984) may depend upon the power of voice mechanisms, which depends on the 
form of voice. Secondly, two-way communication assumes that employees will be both 
willing and able either directly or indirectly to voice their opinions. This may not, however, 
be true if employees are worried about being punished in some way by managers for doing so; 
direct voice may not offer workers sufficient protection (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Whitley, 
1999).  
Finally, defining voice as two-way communication between employers and employees 
identifies neither the up-wards or down-wards flow of information nor the degree to which 
employees’ views are taken into consideration. Put differently, managers may tell employees 
or their representatives that the firm is not prepared to change company policies and practices, 
even though employees have expressed their disapproval of them. This, arguably, is two-way 
communication, but not voice. Logically, this suggests that the fundamental issue of power is 
ignored in definitions of voice as two-way communication. Power will shape the exchange of 
information, in terms of its level and nature, within the context of employment (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984; Wilkinson et al., 2010). As discussed in the next section, the power of any 
particular voice mechanism is likely to be related to its form. 
The emphasis is on workers conveying their opinions to mangers and managers then 
responding to those concerns. Assessing this response is an empirical question. This thesis, 
therefore, examines patterns in the data to assess whether different forms of voice are more or 
less likely to be associated with particular EO and DM policies. The main direction of 
information flow for this thesis is up-wards communication; however, employees’ ability to 
make high-quality suggestions to employers that are likely to have an impact on workplace 
decisions will depend upon the information that they receive about the workplace 
(Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005; Wilkinson et al., 2010). Workers, therefore, are likely to 
require information about the workplace’s situation, probably from managers. Consequently, 
it is important for this research to incorporate flows of information from managers to 
employees as this can shape the ability of employees to voice their opinions as well as the 
impact that their views have on workplace decisions (Tüselmann et al., 2007). Information 
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can flow from managers to employees in a number of ways. Notice boards, the management 
chain, newsletters, email, and intranet can all be used to share information with employees. In 
general, such mechanisms do not enable, by themselves, employees to share their opinions 
with managers. However, employees may become more (or be better) informed about 
decisions that have been taken and performance is improved as a result. They may also be in a 
stronger position to contribute in a meaningful way to the organisation. 
A more powerful form of voice is direct consultation. It provides a means by which 
employees can voice their opinions directly to employers. Direct consultation can include 
attitude surveys, suggestion schemes, and meetings with the workforce. The views of 
employees can be communicated directly to managers in these ways. Attitude surveys and 
meetings with the workforce may enable employees to share their views on the general 
running of the establishment. Suggestion schemes may lead to changes in workplace 
practices, helping to improve employees’ commitment to the organisation and their job 
satisfaction. 
Employees may be able to have more of a direct impact on elements of their work 
through direct-participation measures. Such measures include partly autonomous teamwork 
and quality circles/problem-solving groups. They involve the sharing of decision-making 
responsibilities, in certain areas, by employers with employees. Thus, employees can 
influence certain decisions directly. They are, therefore, a powerful form of voice as they 
potentially enable employees to shape workplace practices in some areas. 
 
II Power and the Concept of Voice 
 
Hirschman’s (1970) term ‘voice’ is predicated, implicitly, upon a notion of power. See 
also Butler, 2005; Dundon and Gollan, 2007; Dundon et al., 2004; Poole, 1978; Marchington 
and Wilkinson, 2000; Tüselmann et al., 2007; and Wilkinson et al., 2010 for other discussions 
of power in relation to different voice mechanisms and workers’ voice. For instance, 
Hirschman (1970: 4, 40-1) contended that, once consumers of an organisation had voiced 
their misgivings, decision makers would, by and large, seek to remedy the situation. 
Hirschman bases this argument on the assumption that consumers have some degree of 
influence over the focal organisation and that consumers could expect to ‘marshal some 
influence’ (Hirschman, 1970: 41).  
Hirschman (1970: 45-46 and 59) did note that there would be times when consumers 
were unlikely to have any real influence over firms. Importantly, this insight provides an 
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important starting point for an analysis of the application of the voice concept to the 
employment relationship. Within the context of employment, power plays an even more 
important role in influencing how much voice an individual can exercise than it does within 
the context of consumers purchasing particular products. For example, employees are likely to 
be in a weaker position than consumers within competitive retail markets (Hyman, 2005; 
Tüselmann et al., 2007). Power and the assumptions that are made about the ability or 
inability of employers/employees to enter into a non-conflictual and co-operative relationship 
is of cardinal significance within a number of studies of, and perspectives on, employment 
(Ackers, 2012; Ackers et al., 2005; Edwards and Belanger, 2006; Johnstone et al., 2010). 
However, the argument that companies will, on the whole, seek to react favourably to 
customers’ concerns within competitive markets is, perhaps, more readily accepted. For a 
contrary view, see Crouch, 2011. This may be especially true if the concerns raised by 
employees are construed either as irrelevant by managers or as a threat to their authority 
within organisations that can be seen, in fundamental terms, as hierarchies with enforceable 
collective rules in which it may not be possible to question either directly or indirectly the 
authority of managers (Hamilton and Feenstra, 1997; Whitley, 2003).  
It is argued, in this thesis, that for a mechanism to be considered to be ‘voice’, it must, 
fundamentally, enable employees or their representatives to stay within the firm to make their 
views known and to influence workplace policies or practices. Logically, then, voice is, in 
practice, a matter of empirical assessment. If voice were defined in a way that ignored 
influence, researchers would not be able to differentiate between forums that enable 
employees to voice their opinions that are then side-lined by managers and mechanisms that 
lead to some alteration in workplace policies or practices. Different forms of voice must, 
therefore, be assessed empirically to evaluate which one(s), if any, are linked to particular 
outcomes. If expressions of employees’ preferences do not have any impact on workplace 
policies or practices, it is unlikely that the firm will be able to reap any of the advantages that, 
theoretically at least, stem from voice. It should be noted here, however, that this definition of 
voice does not mean that all workplace practices must be completely in alignment with 
employees’ wishes; they should, however, either have been changed in some notable way or 
have received extensive explanations as to why changes are not possible. It is difficult to 
assess influence empirically; this thesis attempts to do so by examining the associations 
between four main different categories of voice and EO and DM policies. If, for example, 
dual voice systems are associated with a higher incidence of EO and DM policies, this will 
suggest that dual voice systems are more influential than other forms of voice on the presence 
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of EO and DM policies. The analytical approach adopted here cannot prove definitively that 
different voice mechanisms result in contrasting patterns of EO and DM policies; it can, 
however, identify important associations between voice and EO and DM policies, helping to 
shed light on theoretical and empirical debates and identifying areas for future, case study-
based research to examine. The methodology chapter and the conclusion discuss the issue of 
causality in more detail.  
This definition of voice may appear to place a highly restrictive condition on what 
does and what does not constitute voice. Other analysts, however, have defined voice in a 
similar way. For instance, Marchington (2007: 234) has written that voice provides workers 
with a ‘direct say’ in how the work they perform is organised. Strauss (1998: 779) has gone a 
little further; he notes that ‘voice is meaningless if the message is ignored’. This key aspect of 
voice is also present in Freeman and Medoff’s (1984: 21) writing; they stated that ‘[t]o be 
effective, voice must be heard’, suggesting not only that managers listen to employees’ views, 
but also seek to address any concerns that employees may have. See also Bailey, 2009; 
Bryson et al., 2006; Butler, 2005; Hyman, 1997; Kaufman, 2005: 568. 
Indeed, this definition of power corresponds to one of the aspects of voice highlighted 
by Marchington and Wilkinson (2005; see also Poole, 1978; Wilkinson et al., 2010). That 
framework differentiates between voice in terms of degree, form, level and scope 
(Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005). ‘Degree’ refers to the extent to which employees can 
influence workplace decisions. In some instances, employees may be informed about 
decisions, whilst, in other situations, they may be the ones actually taking decisions. This is 
the key empirical question for this study: are different forms of voice able to influence the 
provision of EO and DM policies and practices to varying degrees. The ‘form’ that voice 
takes is also a core part of this research. Voice can take many forms. It can be expressed 
directly by individual employees through a range of channels, such as suggestion schemes, or 
meetings with managers. Alternatively, it could be expressed indirectly by employee 
representatives. Unions may represent workers’ views to managers or employees’ preferences 
may be communicated via joint consultative committees. The different forms of voice are 
discussed in greater detail below. In the first stage of the analysis, this thesis examines 
whether these different forms of voice are more or less likely to be associated with EO and 
DM policies. 
Marchington and Wilkinson’s (2005) work also refers to ‘level’, which indicates the 
position within the company/workplace that voice is exercised. It could range from the task 
that employees are carrying out to the department, workplace, or the company as a whole. As 
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is discussed in greater detail below, this research examines the ‘workplace’ level as well as 
the ’largest occupational group’ level. ‘Scope’ covers the issues that are the subject of 
employee voice (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005). This can range from the relatively 
unimportant, such as the quality of workplace meals, to more substantive issues, such as 
investments relating to strategic objectives (Wilkinson et al., 2010). This research focuses on 
the scope of employee voice in relation to equal-opportunity policies and practices.  
 
2.4 The Forms that Employee Voice Can Take 
 
Voice can be expressed in various ways: it can be expressed directly by workers 
themselves or indirectly by employee representatives. Obviously, the two forms of voice are 
not mutually exclusive (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). The issue of who can or should voice 
the opinions of employees is a highly important one within the literature. It provides a useful 
way of distinguishing between different perspectives in the literature, as explicitly or 
implicitly there is an emphasis on direct voice or indirect voice or a combination of the two in 
their writings (Tüselmann et al., 2007). 
There are some major differences between analysts on the effectiveness of different 
forms of voice (Benson, 2000; Dundon et al., 2004; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Hirsch and 
Addison, 1986; Delaney and Godard, 2001; Tüselmann et al., 2007; Wood and Fenton-
O’Creevy, 2005). Arguably, there are two main divisions between analysts in terms of the 
form of voice (Tüselmann et al., 2007). The first is between indirect and direct voice; the 
second is, within indirect voice, between independent channels (trade unions or non-union 
structures, such as works councils) or ‘employer-sponsored structures’ (Gollan, 2002: 325), 
such as joint consultative committees (JCCs). Pluralists argue in favour of union forms of 
voice, whilst unitarists emphasise direct forms (Barry and Wilkinson, forthcoming; Delaney 
and Godard, 2001; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Ichniowski et al., 1996; Wood and Fenton-
O’Creevy, 2005). Unitarists argue that unions may lead to rent-seeking behaviour by 
employees and/or their representatives. This, in turn, will have an adverse effect on workplace 
performance (Addison and Belfield, 2004; Siebert, 1997). Pluralists contend that direct forms 
of voice that are initiated by management are unlikely to have sufficient power to lead to a 
change in workplace practices (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
 As noted above, however, different forms of voice are not mutually exclusive: 
different voice forms can be combined (Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Tüselmann et al., 2015). 
Moreover, one form of voice may be able to supplement or overcome any deficiencies of the 
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other form(s) of voice (Gollan, 2000, 2001; Gollan and Markey, 2001; Kim et al., 2010; 
Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Marchington, 2001; Sako, 1998). Different forms of voice may 
create diverse advantages for firms that help to alleviate asymmetric problems. Combining 
different voice mechanisms may, therefore, enhance the performance of employees and, 
hence, firms (Tüselmann et al., 2007).  
This research will, as a consequence, not prejudge the influences of any of the voice 
mechanisms nor will it preclude from the outset the possibility that direct and indirect forms 
of voice can be combined. To be sure, that combination may be disaggregated further. Such a 
disaggregation is detailed below. The point here is that research should adopt a holistic view 
of voice, taking into consideration the various forms that voice can take. This research does 
that. 
 
2.4.1 Indirect Voice 
 
Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) study is a high-profile and early application of 
Hirschman’s (1970) framework to the employment relationship (Barry and Wilkinson, 
forthcoming). They chose to focus on unions as voice mechanisms within firms. One of the 
reasons they did so was because unions, they argued, provided employees with a degree of 
protection from managers. If employees individually voice their concerns with workplace 
practices, this could be seen as a criticism of managers. This could result in the individual 
worker being fired (Freeman and Medoff 1984: 9). By highlighting such concerns that 
employees may have, they acknowledged that power was a key issue within the employment 
relationship (Barry and Wilkinson, forthcoming). For example, Freeman and Medoff (1984: 
107, emphasis not in the original) argued that ‘one reason for the lower quits under unionism 
is the dilution of managerial authority’.  
Freeman and Medoff (1984) did not define explicitly what they meant by power. It is 
useful to examine their analysis of unions as voice mechanisms in terms of the voice elements 
noted above. Those are the degree of influence, the form that voice takes, its scope, and the 
level at which it is raised. For this thesis, the first two elements are the most important, as the 
scope and level at which voice operates are restricted, respectively, to EO and DM issues and 
the workplace for the purposes of this thesis. Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) perspective rests 
on the theoretical and empirical arguments that unions will have more influence over certain 
workplace practices than other forms of voice. They argued that aggregating employees’ 
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concerns would enable individual employees to be protected from any detrimental actions that 
managers may take. Organisations can be thought of as hierarchies in which managers have a 
certain degree of authority to enforce their decisions by coercive means (Hamilton and 
Feenstra, 1997; Whitley, 2003). Consequently, those who are opposed to policies and 
practices within workplaces could be deemed to be critical of managers, limiting employees’ 
willingness to express their concerns (Barry and Wilkinson, forthcoming; Tüselmann et al., 
2007). If workers do express their opinions, employers may sanction them in some way 
(Wilkinson et al., forthcoming). As noted above, dismissal could be one outcome, but it is not 
the only one. Employees who are critical of workplace policies and practices may be less 
likely to be promoted, more likely to be given onerous activities, or side-lined (Wilkinson et 
al., forthcoming). By, in effect, anonymising individual employees’ concerns, unions can 
protect individual workers against negative consequences (Barry and Wilkinson, 
forthcoming).  
Unions were seen by Freeman and Medoff (1984) both theoretically and empirically 
as the most effective form of voice. Other forms of indirect voice, such as joint consultative 
committees, were not discussed. This may, in part, reflect the difficulty of establishing non-
union forms of indirect voice in the US. However, some analysts see the emphasis on 
collective wage bargaining as collective voice in much of the traditional industrial relations 
literature as excessively narrow and advocate including both union and non-union voice 
(Budd, 2014). Freeman and Medoff (1984) focused on the US in their research. In that 
country, non-union forms of collective voice, such as joint consultative committees and works 
councils, are often not permitted or are limited in scope (Brickley, 1992; Campolieti et al., 
2013; Freeman et al., 2007; LeRoy 1997, 2000, 2006). Indeed, even for other countries, 
Freeman and Medoff (1984: 8) noted:  
In modern industrial economies, and particularly in large enterprises, a trade union is 
the vehicle for collective voice – that is, for providing workers as a group with a 
means of communicating with management. 
 
In terms of the scope of union voice, Freeman and Medoff (1984) examined the wage-
bargaining responsibilities of unions, grievance procedures, and the potential productivity 
benefits of unions. It is the latter that is particularly important for this study. The logic behind 
Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) arguments is that unions would be able to ensure that workers, 
collectively, would be able to benefit from any employee suggestion to improve productivity. 
If that suggestion increased productivity, employees would be protected from dismissal by 
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unions: if more or the same can be produced with less, employers have an incentive to reduce 
the headcount (Wilkinson et al., 2010). It is possible to extend this line of reasoning to 
suggestions that are not directly related to production: employees may put forward 
suggestions, such as more extensive equal opportunity measures, that help to improve their 
working conditions, but that may be seen as being costly or irrelevant by the employer. 
Freeman and Medoff did not explicitly state the level at which they analysed voice; however, 
their framework can, clearly, incorporate a number of levels into analyses. For instance, 
measures to improve productivity may take place at the task, departmental, or workplace 
level. This thesis examines voice within workplaces. 
 
2.4.1.1 Indirect Union Voice and Various Measures of Performance 
 
The effect that unions have on performance is a contentious issue and has been 
measured in many ways within the empirical literature (Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Timming, 
2005, 2007; Tüselmann et al., 2015). First, the literature on the effect of unions on labour 
turnover and absenteeism will be examined, the performance measures used in this research. 
The wider literature on the effects of unions on financial performance and productivity will 
then be examined. The review focuses mainly, but not exclusively, on studies at the 
workplace level rather than at the corporate or head-office level as the empirical work for this 
thesis focuses on the former rather than the latter; other studies do, of course, focus on the 
latter (Timming and Whittall, 2015). 
 
I Unions and Quits and Absenteeism  
 
In general, lower labour turnover and absenteeism can help to increase productivity. 
For instance, Freeman and Medoff (1984) highlighted lower labour turnover and improved 
personnel policies as key to increased productivity. This research does not examine 
productivity, as it is very difficult to compare productivity across different types of industry. 
Moreover, around 10 per cent of the workplaces in the sample used in this thesis refused to 
answer the question on productivity or did not know how to estimate the productivity of their 
workplace compared to others in the industry.  
This thesis, instead, focuses on absenteeism and quits, as these relate more to human 
resource management issues, including the use of equal opportunity measures. They are more 
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proximal to the policies that this thesis focuses upon. For example, Addison (2005) 
highlighted the importance of ‘quit behaviour’, outlining how quit behaviour can provide 
information either inferentially or directly (via exit interviews) on worker preferences or 
discontent. Information from any exit interviews will not be used here, as they can be affected 
by problems resulting from employees’ lack of motivation to disclose information when there 
is no benefit from doing so. Collective voice is expected to reduce exit behaviour, such as 
absenteeism and quits, resulting in lower hiring and training costs and potentially increased 
investments in firm-specific human capital (Addison, 2005). Reduced exit behaviour is, 
potentially, the most tangible source of potential efficiency gain. 
Similarly, Allen (1984) points out that one reason absenteeism is an important 
measure of performance is that absenteeism can reduce productivity as it disrupts production 
plans and requires an increase in the use of substitute workers who are less efficient. 
However, absenteeism does not fit neatly into the exit-voice paradigm because absence can 
result from illness or family problems rather than from job dissatisfaction (Allen, 1984). This 
is undoubtedly true. Indeed, women may be more likely than men to take unofficial absences 
from work to deal with a family member’s ill health (Liff and Wajcman, 1996). This research 
will, therefore, include the percentage of female workers in the establishment’s workforce to 
capture this aspect. It cannot capture the possibility that absenteeism may result from factors 
other than job dissatisfaction, as there are no variables in the questionnaire that measure this. 
Indeed, it is difficult to see how this possibility could be operationalised in a piece of 
quantitative research that relies on a large sample. 
Even when job dissatisfaction is reported to be the cause of absence, uncertainty 
remains about whether absenteeism is a form of voice or exit behaviour (Allen, 1984). On the 
one hand, absenteeism caused by job dissatisfaction involves an employee escaping 
unsatisfactory conditions temporarily rather than trying to change them. Absenteeism can, 
therefore, be seen as exit rather than voice. On the other hand, if a union member were 
dissatisfied with his or her job, then that worker would voice their concerns and pressure the 
union and the employer to change conditions at the workplaces rather than try to escape from 
them. Allen (1984) examines three data sets, two cross-sectional and one longitudinal and 
finds that, other things being equal, union members are at least 29 per cent more likely to be 
absent than workers who do not belong to union. One interpretation is that there is greater job 
dissatisfaction among union members and that union voice may not be effective in influencing 
many aspects of the employment relationship. Alternatively, dissatisfied employees may join 
a union in order to try to remedy the situation, potentially helping to reduce what would be 
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even higher rates of absenteeism. This research will examine different forms of voice against 
each other as well as against a ‘minimalist’ category to assess the associations with 
absenteeism. By comparing these different voice forms, it will be possible to discern which 
one(s), if any, are linked to lower levels of absenteeism. 
Abraham et al. (2005) test the influence of collective voice on workplace outcomes by 
investigating whether employees who are members of unions have less intention to leave their 
firms than non-members do. A regression analysis was carried out using data from the 
national Harris Poll 2001 on employee satisfaction. Their study revealed significant 
interactions between union membership and job satisfaction and between union membership 
and organisational commitment. Dissatisfied non-union members are much more likely to 
intend to leave their jobs than union members, similarly non-union member with low 
organisational commitment were much more likely to intend to leave their jobs than union 
members.  
Boroff and Lewin (1997) examine employee voice and intent to exit the firm using 
data from a sample of non-management employees of a large multinational 
telecommunications firm. They examine whether employees’ loyalty and their perception of 
the grievance procedures influence 1) workers’ decisions to voice their concerns and 2) intent 
to exit the firm. The study concentrated on employees who had reported having been treated 
unfairly by their employer at some time. Unfortunately, data availability means that questions 
relating to an employee’s intent to leave the workplace are not available in the survey that 
underpins the research in this thesis. In addition, the intention to leave a workplace is likely to 
be related to the availability of suitable jobs within the labour market, including the labour 
market within the vicinity of the employee’s current workplace. 
Addison and Belfield’s (2001) study replicates the work of Fernie and Metcalf (1995). 
Fernie and Metcalf (1995) used data from the 1990 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
and Addison and Belfield (2001) drew on Workplace Employment Relations Survey 1998 
data. Addison and Belfield (2001) find that only the weakest form of unionism (union 
recognition alone) was associated with a statistically significant reduction in quits. They also 
found that unions were associated with higher rates of absenteeism, possibly indicating that 
unions may attract disgruntled employees as well as help to reduce levels of dissatisfaction, as 
measured by quits, but not when measured by absenteeism. Fernie and Metcalf’s previous 
(1995) study found all union measures reduce quit rates (pre-entry closed shop, post-entry 
closed shop, management-recommended membership and union recognition only) and were 
not associated with higher rates of absenteeism. 
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Although this thesis examines cross-sectional data, it is important to remember that 
voice within a workplace is likely to change over time, albeit slowly. Using WERS data from 
1980 to 2004 from the management survey Willman et al. (2008) mapped the presence of 
different forms of voice within establishments over time. They also analysed the presence of 
voice types and how they link to outcome measures, including quits. They found that for a 
decade the relative quit rate between union only and no voice workplaces did not change with 
a gap of 6 percentage points in 1990 and 6.5 percentage points in 2004, showing that union 
voice was consistently linked to lower quit rates when compared to ‘no voice’ (Willman et al., 
2008).  
 
II Unions and Financial Performance 
 
An area that has been extensively debated in the literature is the effect that trade 
unions have on financial performance. Trade unions can influence profits by extracting their 
share of any rents in the form of higher wages. The level of wages unions can extract for their 
members is dependent on the extent of potential rents within the firm and the union’s ability 
and strength in bargaining over them. However, as Freeman and Medoff (1984) noted, unions 
may also increase productivity and, as a result, profitability, by encouraging skilled 
employees to stay with employers and to increase their skills. This thesis will not examine the 
links between unions and financial performance, as the financial performance of a workplace 
can be influenced by a range of factors beyond voice and EO and DM policies. For instance, 
if a workplace is part of a larger company with several other workplaces, transfer pricing may 
inflate or deflate the workplace’s financial performance. In addition, workplace-related 
financial data are often difficult to obtain, as managers are likely to be reluctant to reveal such 
information. Although managers may give subjective opinions about the financial 
performance of a workplace, this still does not overcome the distal aspects of financial 
measures. However, it will be important to review this literature here as it can provide 
important insights into the broader context within which unions operate. 
A large body of literature exists indicating that trade unions are associated with lower 
profitability or financial performance (Clark, 1984; Freeman, 1983; Karier, 1985; Voos and 
Mishel, 1986). Although these measures are not included in this thesis, it is important to 
review this literature in order to highlight its key findings as this will help to inform 
interpretations of the findings of this research. Machin and Stewart (1990) consider the 
relationship between unions and financial performance; they conclude that unions are linked 
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to lower levels of profitability. Using data from the 1980 and 1984 Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey, Machin and Stewart (1990) find that in British establishments, trade unions 
are associated in a statistically significant way with lower financial performance, particularly 
in establishments that have a larger share of their market. This result implies that unions are 
able to secure significant financial gains for their members as a result of the establishment’s 
high market share. In a further study, Machin and Stewart (1996) investigated the relationship 
between trade unions and financial performance using establishment-level data from the 1990 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. The study suggests a rough halving of the overall 
union effect between 1984 and 1990. They attribute this finding to the decline in traditionally 
unionised employment and anti-union legislation that placed restrictions on unions. The 
results suggest that in 1990 only those establishments with a closed shop or where union 
membership was recommended were associated with lower financial performance. The effect 
in the remainder of unionised establishments has collapsed completely, leading to the 
conclusion that stronger unions can still extract a share of the rents, but weaker unions cannot 
(Machin and Stewart, 1990).  
Overall, then, the links between unions and financial performance are weakening, 
suggesting that unions cannot impose policies against the will of managers. For this research, 
this finding indicates that unions may not be able to mobilise managers to implement EO and 
DM policies ‘needlessly’ or in situations where they benefit union members rather than the 
establishment. It remains to be seen if this is the case, though. By examining collective voice 
and equal opportunities as well as the links between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, 
and absenteeism and quits, on the other, within ‘collective voice only’ workplaces, this 
research will be able to analyse the possibility that EO and DM policies are introduced where 
they are ‘not warranted’, from the perspective of improving workplace performance. 
Bryson, Forth and Laroche (2011) compared union performance in Britain and France. 
Their research found that union bargaining is detrimental to workplace performance in both 
countries; however, in Britain the effect was confined to a declining proportion of unionised 
workplaces engaged in active collective bargaining. This, again, illustrates the declining 
association between unions and financial performance. The effects that unions have on 
establishment performance should, therefore, be sought elsewhere.   
Another area where unions may influence establishment performance is through 
collective bargaining. Collective bargaining can have a profound effect on workplace 
outcomes (Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001: 3). During the 1990s, there was a major switch away 
from separate bargaining to joint bargaining in workplaces where collective bargaining was 
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the dominant form of pay determination (Millward et. al, 2000: 203). Bryson and Wilkinson 
(2001) found no statistically significant association between union recognition and bargaining 
arrangements, on the one hand, and financial performance, on the other. Again, this 
strengthens the need to look for any union effects in other areas besides financial 
performance.    
These findings strengthen the argument for further investigation into the effects of 
unions on EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes, in terms of labour turnover and 
absenteeism. These studies assess the links between indirect voice and financial performance. 
Financial performance is, however, a difficult output to assess as establishment outcome, as 
many other factors, such as market conditions, maturity of market, etc., can influence 
financial performance. Moreover, when looking at performance measures, such as labour 
turnover and absenteeism, Freeman and Medoff (1984) found that unions can enhance 
productivity by improving communication between workers and management. By providing a 
means of ‘voicing’ discontent, unions can indeed reduce labour turnover and absenteeism by 
removing the need to ‘exit’. This in turn can enhance productivity, as firm specific skills are 
not being lost. This justifies the choice of performance measures in this study of labour 
turnover and absenteeism. 
 
III Unions and Productivity 
 
Addison and Hirsch (1989) examined the literature on the union effects on 
productivity and found a small overall impact. Where these effects were positive, they were 
attributed to management’s response to decreased profit expectations and from a selection 
process. Addison and Barnett (1982) found that unions did not necessarily have a negative 
link to productivity. Freeman and Medoff (1984: 170) emphasised that union effects on 
productivity vary with respect of the labour relations environment and degree of competition, 
but they concluded that ‘current empirical evidence offers little support for the assertion that 
unionisation is associated with lower (or higher) productivity advance’. Empirical studies on 
unions and productivity have shown positive effects; for example, Brown and Medoff (1978) 
estimated a union effect on total factor productivity (depending on assumptions regarding 
capital usage) of either 20-25 per cent or 10-15 per cent. Another example is Clark (1984) 
who found a union productivity advantage of 6-8 per cent. However, Bryson, Charlwood and 
Forth (2006) find that managerial responsiveness to worker voice leads to superior 
productivity, but only in non-union workplaces and that there is little relationship between 
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formal voice regimes and productivity. Although this research does not examine productivity, 
the results of studies reviewed here do have implications for this thesis. For instance, if unions 
are associated with lower levels of productivity, one means by which this may occur is 
through the imposition of policies that do not help to enhance the overall performance of the 
workplace. For instance, unions may seek to see the introduction of EO and DM policies that 
affect women, those from BME groups, and those with a disability in order to boost 
recruitment from those groups. The introduction of those policies may not, however, improve 
productivity. Conversely, the presence of unions (and other forms of voice) may help to bring 
about the implementation of policies that reduce absenteeism and quits and, thereby, increase 
productivity. This research will be able to examine these possibilities. 
 
2.4.2 Non-Union Indirect Voice 
 
Unions are, of course, not the only form of indirect voice. Other forms include works 
councils, staff associations, representative forums, and joint consultative committees. Within 
the UK, there is no legislation to support works councils that are akin to those in Continental 
Europe. Whilst interest in JCC-type bodies within organisations was at one time growing 
(Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007), their prevalence would appear to be on the wane. The 
WERS2011 survey indicates that around 13 per cent of workplaces with 10 or more 
employees have a JCC-type forum. This represents a decline from previous surveys. In 
WERS2004, the equivalent figure was 14 per cent; in WERS1998, the figure was 20 per cent 
(Kersley et al., 2005). Despite EU regulations on the information and consultation of 
employees, employers are not required to establish JCCs, but can use one-to-one meetings or 
the internet to inform and consult employees. This may explain the decrease in JCC numbers 
over successive rounds of WERS. 
In the UK, the presence of these forms of non-union indirect voice is frequently 
determined by managers (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007). If one of these forms of indirect voice 
is present within a firm, it will usually have been established by managers. Consequently, the 
degree to which these forms of indirect voice can influence decisions and the scope of issues 
over which they may exert some influence are usually defined by management (Tüselmann et 
al., 2007). Managers can often unilaterally dissolve them (Bartram and Creegan, 2003). In 
addition, this form of voice is often associated with the lack of an independent mandate, with 
managers appointing employee representatives, and with limited or no negotiating powers and 
restricted agendas for consultation (Cully et al., 1999; Gollan, 2005b; Terry, 2003a; 
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Tüselmann et al., 2007). In other words, it is the employer who will be able to determine the 
degree of influence and scope of this form of employee voice (Marchington and Wilkinson, 
2005). Indeed, case studies indicate that, for many firms, the primary purpose of these forms 
of non-union indirect voice is to increase the flow of information and levels of 
communication within the firm rather than to allow employees a substantive influence over 
major workplace decisions (Wilkinson et al., 2004). Consequently, within JCCs, staff 
associations, and representative forums, employees may actively influence decisions in 
certain areas, respond to proposals by managers, or have no influence at all over certain 
decisions (Donaghey et al., 2011).  
Gollan (2002) examined non-union workplaces and found the degree of influence that 
non-union voice mechanisms have within firms to be ineffective. Case study research by 
Gollan (2000, 2001, 2002) and Terry (1999) found that a large number of non-union firms see 
collective consultation as a way to increase information and communication rather than as a 
way of negotiating or bargaining (Gollan, 2003), leading to a stress, in general, on 
‘harmonious’ and less ‘conflictual’ relations in the workforce that do not incorporate unions 
(Gollan, 2003). Non-union firms view collective non-union consultation as a means of 
increasing company productivity and efficiency, and promoting an understanding of company 
policy rather than being an effective forum of collective entity to represent and put forward 
the interests of employees. The conclusions drawn from the case study research are that non-
union collective consultation structures have limited access to resources, such as training, 
making them unable to effectively evaluate information at meetings and thus represent the 
views of employees in an effective manner. Most consultation bodies are structured with 
some elected representatives and some representatives appointed by management and, 
therefore, were not considered or found to be independent (Gollan, 2003). Managers also 
frequently structure and control the agenda of meetings, making them susceptible to 
management influence and liable to management interference. Management has the right to 
veto decisions made by non-union employee representatives. Few committees have 
negotiation and bargaining rights and indeed do not have experience in negotiating, therefore, 
they and do not fulfil the role of resolving conflict, negotiating or bargaining; this leads to 
conclusions that non-union forms of collective voice are relatively weak (Kaufman and 
Kleiner, 1993). 
In contrast to traditional indirect voice mechanisms, such as trade unions or 
continental-style works councils, management-initiated voluntaristic structures, such as JCCs 
in the UK, are at best, then, considered as a weak form of indirect involvement and as 
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management-dominated bodies (Benson, 2000; Delaney and Godard, 2001; Gollan, 2007; 
Heery and Noon, 2001). To be sure, not all non-union forms of employee representation are 
the same and there is considerable variation amongst them in terms of the influence that 
representatives have, the range of issues discussed, and the level that the forum operates at 
(Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007; Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005: 284-285; see also Burns 
2000 and Grattan, 2003).  
In order to address these concerns, this research only includes non-union forms of 
employee representation as a collective form of voice if both a joint consultative body and a 
non-union employee representative are present within the workplace. This follows the work of 
Guest and Conway (1999), Lavelle et al., (2010), and Tüselmann et al. (2015). More details 
on the operationalisation of key measures in this research are provided in the methodology 
chapter. In this research, it should be noted that non-union employee representation will be 
examined at the workplace level, not at the firm or the industry level, as different forms of 
representation may be present at various levels within the same firm.  
 
2.4.2.1 Indirect Joint Consultative Committee Voice and Performance 
 
This research does not just examine unions as collective voice. It also analyses those 
workplaces that have a joint consultative body and a non-union employee representative 
present within the workplace as collective voice. This review, therefore, examines those 
studies that assess joint consultative bodies, such as joint consultative committees. Though a 
relatively weak form of collective voice, as they generally involve consultation rather than 
negotiation (Fernie and Metcalf, 1995), their presence can help to improve the industrial 
relations climate, aid productivity growth, and, overall, have no detrimental effects on 
workplace performance (Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Gregg, Machin and Metcalf, 1993). They 
are, therefore, incorporated into the analysis here. 
 
I Joint Consultative Committees, Quits and Absenteeism 
 
Fernie and Metcalf (1995) found that JCCs had only a weak or a non-significant 
relationship to quits and absenteeism, matching Tüselmann et al.’s (2015) findings of no 
statistically significant association between JCCs, on the one hand, and quits, on the other, in 
their surveyed firms. By contrast, Heywood and Mille’s (forthcoming) results that are based 
on WERS 2004 data suggest a positive association between JCCs and absenteeism that is 
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statistically significant at the one-per-cent level, as do Addison and Belfield (2001) who draw 
on WERS 1998 data (see also Deery et al. 1999). Addison and Belfield (2001) do not, 
however, find any statistically significant link between JCCs and quit rates.  
 
II Joint Consultative Committees and Productivity 
 
Fernie and Metcalf (1995) found a weak, positive relationship between JCCs and 
productivity growth. In other words, the presence of a JCC was associated with higher levels 
of productivity growth. They contended that the existence of a JCC makes it easier to change 
working practices or introduce new technology leading to faster productivity growth (Fernie 
and Metcalf, 1995). Tüselmann et al. (2015) find a positive association between JCCs and 
labour productivity that is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level amongst the firms 
that they analyse. This research does not examine productivity or productivity growth, as it is 
a distal measure of HRM rather than a proximal one; both can, for instance, be influenced by 
‘non-HRM factors’, such as workplace investments. It is, however, interesting to note that 
JCCs can, in conjunction with unions, be associated with higher levels of workplace 
investment (Denny and Nickell, 1991). 
 
2.4.3 Direct Voice 
 
Over the last twenty years, research on employee involvement and voice has been a 
major growth area in employment relations, coinciding with (and perhaps related to) 
reductions in collective bargaining. Despite the decline in union membership the overall 
incidence of employee voice has remained consistent over time, which can been attributed to 
greater emphasis on direct voice and non-union representative channels (Wilkinson et al., 
2013). 
Important elements of voice can be found within the HRM literature. In particular, the 
work on high-performance workplace systems – or high-involvement or high-commitment 
workplace practices, as they are sometimes known (Wall and Wood, 2005; Wilkinson et al., 
2010) – incorporates direct voice into their models. To be sure, these models cover more than 
just voice; however, voice is an indispensable part of them (Becker and Huselid, 1998; 
Benson and Lawler, 2003; Buchanan, 1987; Edwards and Wright, 2001; Emmott, 2007; 
Huselid and Becker, 1996; Lawler, 1986; Mueller, 1994; Walton, 1985; Womack et al., 
1990). For instance, some of these models stress financial participation and selective hiring in 
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addition to voice elements. Walton (1985: 79; emphasis added), an early proponent of high-
commitment HRM, argued that work enrichment should be a key element of management’s 
approach to their employees:  
Jobs are designed to be broader than before, to combine planning and 
implementation, and to include efforts to upgrade operations, not just maintain 
them. Individual responsibilities are expected to change as conditions change, and 
teams, not individuals, are often the organizational units accountable for 
performance. With management hierarchies relatively flat and differences in 
status minimized, control and lateral coordination depend on shared goals. 
Expertise rather than formal position determines influence. 
 
This indirect emphasis, inter alia, on employee voice in Walton’s (1985) model 
contrasted with previous paradigms that relied more on bureaucratic forms of control 
(Wilkinson et al., 1993, 2010; Wood and Wall, 2007; Wright and Gardner, 2003). Such a shift 
is designed to elicit commitment and trust between employees and employers (Applebaum 
and Berg, 2000; Bailey et al., 2001; Guest, 1999a; Wood and Albanese, 1995). By doing so, 
such measures aim to improve HRM and firm-performance outcomes (Wood and Wall, 
2007). A key assumption that underpins this emphasis on direct voice mechanisms is often 
that employees are regarded as key assets by firms (Becker and Huselid, 1998; Cappelli and 
Neumark, 2001; Wood, 1999a). Some research indicates that direct voice forms have replaced 
more indirect ones (Millward et al., 2000), suggesting that employers prefer direct to indirect 
voice. 
Other models of high-involvement HRM, similarly, rest upon, amongst other things, 
employee involvement, team working, and work enrichment (Applebaum et al., 2000; Lawler, 
1986; see also Benson and Lawler, 2003). In particular, Lawler’s (1986) model includes a 
‘power’ dimension that relates to decentralised decision making, employee suggestion 
schemes, and employee voice. Lawler’s (1986) model also includes information sharing from 
managers to employees. This helps to improve not only the willingness of employees to share 
their ideas, but also the quality of their contributions (Lawler, 1986; Wood and Wall, 2005). 
Once again, such policies are argued to lead to increased firm performance, including lower 
absenteeism rates and lower quit rates (Benson and Lawler, 2003; Lawler, 1991; Patterson et 
al., 1997; Wood and Wall, 2005; cf. Barker, 1993; Boxall and Purcell, 2003; Hutchinson et 
al., 2000; Legge, 2005).  
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Such arguments helped to shape ideas that people are companies’ most valuable asset 
(Pfeffer, 1998). Therefore, alongside selective hiring and employment security, companies 
should implement policies that enable the extensive sharing of financial and performance 
information throughout the organisation, that decentralise decision making, that create self-
managed teams, and that give employees a voice in company decision making (Pfeffer, 1998). 
Evidence from the USA and the UK suggests that direct-voice mechanisms can help to 
improve organisational performance (Becker and Huselid, 2009; Huselid, 1995; Patterson et 
al., 1998; Wood, 1999). Although the evidence is not always clear-cut, findings often show a 
link between direct-voice practices and superior organisational outcomes (Banker et al., 1996; 
Batt, 2004; Cordery et al., 1991; Guthrie, 2001; Hunter et al., 2002; Vandenberg et al., 1999). 
However, there is a danger that these HRM policies are viewed only in a positive 
light, and this may not always be the case. For instance, greater employee autonomy and self-
management may lead to work intensification, higher levels of stress, and lay-offs (Boxall and 
Purcell, 2003; Hutchinson et al., 2000; Ramsay et al., 2000; Wilkinson, 2002). They may also 
only be prevalent in certain ‘high-tech’ industries with more traditional forms of control 
common in ‘low-tech’ industries (Lewin, 2002, 2005b, 2008). Such direct-voice initiatives 
may, in comparison to union forms of indirect voice, be ‘weak on power’ (Marchington and 
Wilkinson, 2005: 283; see also Marchington et al., 2001: 24). Several studies have found that 
many new employee participation initiatives that focus on direct voice measures lack 
sufficient structure and scope (Gollan, 2007; Gollan and Markey, 2001; Kessler et al., 2000). 
Direct voice can operate at a number of levels within an organisation: department 
level, establishment level, company level; this research will concentrate on voice at the 
establishment level, as a large-N study at the departmental level across several firms and 
industries is likely to be impractical. Direct voice measures can have an influence on various 
parts of the organisation, and this influence may be strong or it may be weak.  This research 
will concentrate on the links between direct, and other forms of voice and EO and DM 
policies and the strength of these voice mechanisms in influencing these policies. When 
assessing direct voice measures, the strength of these measures will be determined by 
category.  Information sharing such as the use of notice boards, management chain, 
newsletters, e-mail and intranet will be categorised as weak direct voice.  Stronger forms of 
voice, in this study, are those that can be described as direct consultation such as attitude 
surveys, suggestions schemes and meetings with the workforce.  The strongest forms of direct 
voice, in this study, are those that can be categorised as direct participation such as partly 
autonomous teamwork and quality circles/problem solving groups.   
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 Voice also is a significant element of broader and important HR frameworks 
(Marchington and Wilkinson, 2008; Pfeffer, 1998). These frameworks include a wider range 
of practices, such as internal labour markets and job security. This research does not include 
these as they lie beyond its remit. There is paucity of research linking voice, and key HR and 
industrial relations concepts, to equal opportunities; it is this gap that this research seeks to 
fill.  
Such frameworks form the basis of ‘high performance work systems’ (HPWS). These 
systems encompass a wider range of policies than considered here, for instance, they often 
include, performance-related pay, team work and job security (Applebaum et al., 2000; Black 
and Lynch, 1997, 2001; Lawler, 1996; Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Pfeffer, 1998). However, 
they also include voice related items such as employee attitude surveys and information 
sharing policies e-mails.  This thesis will review the relevant studies that analyse in part the 
empirical links between these voice related aspects of HPWS and EO and DM policies, 
below. 
 
2.4.3.1 Direct Voice as a HRM Practice, EO and DM Policies, Absenteeism and Quits 
 
Direct voice often forms part of  the HPWS. However, there is variation in how voice 
is operationalised in studies of HPWS. There is, in other words, no consensus on what direct 
voice looks like in HPWS (Tüselmann et al., 2007). However, there is agreement within the 
HRM literature that HPWS will help to improve organisational performance (Applebaum et 
al., 2000; Black and Lynch, 1997, 2001; Guest et al., 2003; Nolan and O’Donnell, 2003; 
Pfeffer, 1998; Wood and Wall, 2007). As direct voice, in particular, is a key element within 
HPWS (Godard, 2004; Lawler, 1987; Walton, 1985), voice should also be associated with 
superior workplace outcomes (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004; Marchington, 2001). This section 
of the literature review focuses on those elements that could be construed as direct voice; 
however, it is important to note that these often form parts of studies that include a range of 
other, varying HR practices (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Vandenberg et al., 1999). 
Publications on participation emphasise the importance of enabling employees to use 
their discretion to contribute to the workplace; this is true in both union and non-union 
settings (Marchington et al., 2001). Union voice is a minority phenomenon with many of the 
sectors that dominate the economy. Indeed, many sectors of the UK economy do not have a 
tradition of union representation and demonstrate little immediate prospect of a return to 
union-centred forms of participation (Dundon et al., 2005). Consequently, direct voice is an 
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important part of the UK economy, and its influence on the performance of organisations 
requires scrutiny (Tüselmann et al., 2007). In addition, despite the broad agreement within the 
HRM literature on the various benefits of direct voice as part of  the HPWS, the emphasis on 
non-union forms of voice has been criticised by others (Clegg et al., 1978; Kessler and 
Purcell, 2003; Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005; Marchington et al., 2001). 
Although a large number of studies assess the impact of high performance workplace 
systems on various measures of firm performance, such as labour productivity and financial 
outcomes, the majority of these examine firms or workplaces in the US (Applebaum and 
Berg, 2000; Batt, 2002; Black and Lynch, 2001; Freeman et al., 2000; Grant et al., 2002; 
Kleiner et al., 1999; Wolf and Zwick, 2002a; Wood, 1999a). There is, of course, some 
evidence available for UK workplaces (Guest et al., 2003; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Peccei et 
al., 2002; Ramsey et al., 2000; West, 2003; Wood and de Menezes, 1998). There is, however, 
relatively limited evidence that 1) assesses the links between direct voice and EO and DM 
policies and 2) examines the links between direct voice as an HRM practice, on the one hand, 
and quits and absenteeism, on the other. This thesis defines direct voice as measures that 
cover direct participation, direct consultation, and information sharing. Direct participation 
encompasses partly autonomous teamwork and quality circles/problem-solving groups. Direct 
consultation covers attitude surveys, suggestion schemes and meetings with the workforce. 
Information sharing includes the use of notice boards, the management chain, newsletters, 
emails and the intranet to convey information to employees within a workplace. This thesis, 
therefore, reviews the major studies that include some of these measures within their analyses.  
For instance, the measure of direct voice, here, includes teamwork. A stream within 
the HRM literature views teams favourably, as they can help to improve communication, 
workplace trust and innovation (Pfeffer, 1998). However, this perspective is not accepted by 
all analysts. Teams may also intensify work and increase social control within workplaces 
(Barker, 1993; Knight and McCabe, 2000; Mueller, 1994). Consequently, there are theoretical 
reasons to expect teams, which form part of the direct voice measure in this thesis, to have 
both positive and negative associations with organisational performance.  
Only very few studies have examined the links between direct voice and EO policies. 
There is some evidence to support the link between the use of participation, information and 
attitude surveys, on the one hand, and lower quit rates, on the other (Guest et al., 2003; 
Guthrie, 2001). However, these findings reveal an association rather than a causal link from 
the former to the latter (Guest et al., 2003). Teamwork has also been found to be associated 
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with lower quit rates (Guthrie et al., 2009; cf. Way; 2002). Moreover, the studies contain a 
number of other HRM practices, ranging from recruitment and selection to appraisal systems.  
On other outcome measures that this thesis does not include, the evidence points to a 
small, but often insignificant, relationship between high-performance workplace practices, 
which include direct voice, and productivity (Freeman et al., 2000; Ichniowski et al., 1997; 
Kleiner et al., 1999; MacDuffie, 1995). A similar pattern emerges for financial performance 
(Becker and Huselid, 1998; Cappelli and Neumark, 1999; Huselid, 1995; Staw and Epstein; 
2000). It should be noted that a major assessment by Cappelli and Neumark (1999) revealed 
that high-performance workplace systems may be associated with heightened levels of labour 
productivity, but they are also linked to higher labour costs, resulting in no overall differences 
in firms’ profits. Similarly, UK studies have revealed a mixed set of results for positive 
associations between high-performance workplace systems and various measures of 
performance; sometimes these associations are strongly statistically significant and at other 
times they are only weakly significant or, indeed, are not statistically significant (Ahmad and 
Schroeder, 2003; Banker et al., 1996; Batt, 1999; Bryson et al., 2005; Datta et al., 2005; 
Guest et al., 2003; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Guthrie et al., 2009; McNabb and Whitfield, 
1997; Wood and de Menezes, 1998). These studies do not, however, examine the associations 
between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and labour turnover, on the 
other, highlighting the need to fill this gap.  
 
2.4.4  Dual-Voice Systems  
 
A dual-voice system is, in effect, a hybrid that combines direct and indirect voice 
mechanisms. Direct and indirect forms of voice are not mutually exclusive: the use of one 
form does not rule out the use of the other. Indeed, the use of both forms of voice could lead 
to ‘mutual gains’ (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). In other words, one form of voice may 
complement – or make up for any deficiencies in – the other form of voice. If both forms of 
voice are used constructively, this is a partnership approach. A partnership approach is 
defined here as having both forms of voice in place and management having a positive 
attitude towards unions (cf. Tüselmann et al., 2015). (The operationalisation of the concept of 
‘partnership’ is discussed below and in the methodology section.) Workplaces that have a 
partnership approach can be expected to integrate both forms of voice in a meaningful way. In 
other words, direct forms of voice are not used to undermine or side-line the indirect forms of 
voice. By contrast, a co-existence approach suggests that direct and indirect forms of voice 
51 
 
operate independently and that there is no meaningful interaction between the two forms of 
voice (Bryson, 2004). It is, therefore, possible to distinguish between workplaces that operate 
with a partnership approach and those that adopt a ‘co-existence’ approach (Tüselmann et 
al., 2015).  
 
2.4.4.1 Dual-Voice Systems, EO and DM Policies, Absenteeism and Quits 
 
Recent years have seen the introduction of a wide range of innovative human resource 
management practices by firms in their attempt to attain and sustain competitive advantage in 
increasingly complex product markets (McNabb and Whitfield, 1997). This has led to a need 
to integrate different forms of voice within analytical studies (Tüselmann et al., 2015). 
Indeed, workplace representation and innovative workplace practices, such as direct-voice 
measures, have often been studied separately; however, in recent years, the two have 
frequently been assessed in an integrated way (Addison, 2005). Although most analyses of 
worker representation and employee involvement/high performance work practices have been 
conducted in isolation, whilst sometimes including the other as a control (e.g. Timming, 
2007), research is beginning to consider their interaction and how the two forms of voice can 
be combined and may lead to outcomes different to those associated with the separate forms 
of voice (Addison, 2005; Tüselmann et al., 2015). 
There are contrasting views on the presence of unions and their role of inhibiting or 
supporting the introduction and continued existence of innovative workplace practices. For 
example, Guest (2011) suggested that the presence of unions within a workplace constrains 
the ability of management to develop functional flexibility and job redesign. However, Eaton 
and Voos (1992) see unions as playing a positive role in the successful introduction of new 
work practices. This thesis differentiates between those workplaces that have both direct and 
indirect forms of union voice present –and within that group of workplaces – between those in 
which employers view unions favourably and those in which employers view unions either 
neutrally or negatively. The former sub-group of workplaces adopt a ‘partnership approach’ 
and the latter pursue a ‘co-existence approach’ (Tüselmann et al., 2015). 
A partnership approach is underpinned by pluralistic rather than unitaristic 
assumptions, as employers view unions as legitimate and as playing a potentially beneficial 
role within the workplace (Tüselmann et al., 2007). In contrast to both direct voice alone and 
indirect voice alone, a partnership approach can potentially enhance outcomes for employees 
and employers to an even greater degree (Guest and Peccei, 2001; IPA, 1997; Kochan and 
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Osterman, 1994). In such a model, employers and employees, both individually and 
collectively, co-operate extensively to benefit the organisation. Trust, a long-term perspective 
amongst employers and employees, and a symbiotic relationship are at the centre of a 
partnership, creating the conditions that can lead to beneficial results for the workplace 
(Dundon et al., 2004; Guest and Peccei, 1998, 2001, Hollingshead et al., 2003). For instance, 
the key characteristics of partnerships, the exchange of information and a degree of influence 
for employee representatives, may help to improve quit rates and absenteeism (Tüselmann et 
al., 2007). One mechanism that this might happen through is the implementation of EO or 
DM policies. For instance, if either individual workers or employee representatives or both 
raise concerns about potential discrimination within the workplace, the company may respond 
by implementing various policies to address direct and indirect discrimination in different 
areas, such as recruitment, pay, and promotion. This may, in turn, lead to an improved 
working environment for employees, and help to lower absenteeism and quit rates.  
The presence of both forms of voice offers particular advantages to firms as they are 
used, in partnerships, to complement one another (Bryson, 2004; Bryson et al., 2005; Dundon 
et al., 2004; Kessler et al., 2004). By having both direct and indirect voice within a 
workplace, the issues that can be voiced may be greater than if only one form of voice is 
available to employees, making it easier for workers to raise concerns about potential 
discrimination. For instance, indirect voice may be better suited to addressing issues that may 
be perceived as a threat to the authority of managers within the establishment. This will 
depend upon managerial response. Employee calls via representatives for measures to 
enhance EO and DM may be reinforced by individual voice. This process may happen in the 
same way that the productivity benefits of indirect voice can be enhanced by the productivity 
advantages associated with direct voice (Bryson, 2004; Dundon et al., 2004). Direct voice 
may also, however, enable employees to raise other concerns associated with discrimination 
that are less threatening, such as how to improve recruitment and selection procedures to 
ensure as wide a range of applicants apply for jobs and are considered for them. Indeed, direct 
voice may overcome any principal-agent problems connected to unions and their potential to 
represent the concerns of the ‘median worker’ rather than those of ‘marginal’ employee 
groups. Unions may, however, help to enhance trust between employees and employers 
within partnership models (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001). Unions can be a source of credible 
information for workers, helping to allay any concerns that employees may have about the 
intensification of work as a result of the introduction of direct-voice measures (Edwards and 
Wright, 2001). 
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I Dual Voice Systems and Firm Performance 
 
There is only a limited amount of evidence available on the links between dual voice 
systems and firm performance. Much of the evidence that does exists relates to either 
financial performance or productivity. For instance, McNabb and Whitfield (1997) found that 
the joint effect of union presence and flexibility in the assignment of workers and greater team 
working among employees had a positive effect on financial performance. Unions, therefore, 
can be regarded as facilitators of the introduction of new work practices (McNabb and 
Whitfield, 1997). 
Bryson et al (2005) focus on the economic impact of trade unions, together with the 
impact of ‘bundles’ of what they label high-involvement management practices (HIM). The 
data used in the study was WERS 1998. They found that in regression models of workplace 
productivity and financial performance that HIM has a positive impact on labour productivity; 
however, this effect is restricted to unionised workplaces and seems more readily explained 
by concessionary wage bargaining then ‘mutual gains’, given the absence of any association 
with financial performance Bryson et al (2005).  
 
2.4.5 Partnership and ‘Co-Existence’ Approaches within Dual-Voice Systems 
 
Within a dual-voice system, it is possible for unions to be viewed positively or 
negatively. In order to provide a better understanding of the impact of dual-voice systems on 
EO and DM policies and practices, this research will disaggregate that system into a 
‘partnership’ and a ‘co-existence’ approach. To do this, the employer’s attitude towards 
unions will be taken into consideration (cf. Tüselmann et al., 2015). In those workplaces with 
a dual-voice system, if employers are positive towards unions, this will be treated as a 
partnership approach. Employers who are indifferent or negative towards unions will be said 
to pursue a co-existence approach. Employers’ attitudes towards unions will be measured by 
their response to the statement that ‘unions help find ways to improve workplace 
performance’. (For alternative definitions of ‘partnership’, see Involvement and Participation 
Association (IPA), 1997; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002; Taylor 
and Ramsay, 1998; Trades Union Congress (TUC), 1999; Tüselmann et al., 2007.) In general, 
the literature on partnerships argues that a combination of indirect and direct voice 
mechanisms provides a better means for employees to convey their ideas to employers 
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compared to either indirect or direct voice mechanisms individually. Moreover, extensive 
direct and indirect voice influence employees’ commitment to the organisation; this is 
especially true for indirect voice in firm policy making (Guest and Peccei, 1998; Hyman, 
1997; Kochan and Osterman, 1994).  
In contrast to more unitaristic assumptions that underpin much of the HRM literature 
that emphasises direct voice, a pluralistic perspective supports a partnership approach as 
employers view unions and other forms of collective voice as legitimate and as having a 
potentially beneficial role to play in the workplace (Bryson, 2004; Dundon et al., 2004; Wood 
and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005). Partnership approaches, in effect, rely on co-operation and trust 
between employers and employees (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Dundon et al., 2004; Guest 
and Peccei, 1998, 2001, Hollingshead et al., 2003). Within partnership workplaces, direct and 
indirect voice complement one another, potentially enabling a combination of the two to be 
more effective in meeting the needs of employees than either individually (Bryson, 2004; 
Bryson et al., 2005; Dundon et al., 2004; Edwards and Wright, 2001; see also Hyman, 1997; 
Kelly, 2000; Kessler et al., 2004; Waddington, 2003). ‘Total voice’ increases, therefore, 
within partnership establishments, and the two voice mechanisms may address different 
employment-related issues, creating the conditions in which employees’ preferences on EO 
and DM measures are better addressed (Edwards and Wright, 2001). Whilst indirect voice 
may be better suited to raising broader issues related to employment, such as grievances, 
dispute resolution, and equal treatment of employees, direct voice may ensure that the 
heterogeneous concerns of a diverse workforce are heard (Tüselmann et al., 2007)  
 However, direct voice measures may also be used to undermine or side-line unions: 
direct voice mechanisms can represent ‘a significant challenge to the traditional influence of 
trade unions in the workplace’ (Beale 1994: 120; see also Kelly, 1996). Such a situation may 
arise when a union exists within a workplace and employers do not wish to force the 
immediate removal of unions, but aim to do so over a longer period of time by using direct 
voice measures to make unions superfluous.  
Within empirical studies, there is no commonly accepted definition or 
operationalisation of what a ‘partnership’ is, rendering the interpretation of the results difficult 
(Guest and Peccei, 2001; Cooke, 1994; Sako, 1998; Tüselmann et al., 2007). Moreover, 
whilst there are several studies that examine the links between partnerships and labour 
productivity (Batt and Applebaum, 1995; Black and Lynch, 1997; EIRO, 2005; Green and 
McIntosh, 1998; Pencavel, 2003; Metcalf 2003a) as well as financial performance (Batt and 
Welbourne, 2002; Dundon et al., 2004; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Waddington, 2003), there is 
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very limited evidence on the associations between partnerships, on the one hand, and quits 
and absenteeism, on the other. The evidence that does exist for the UK suggests that 
partnerships are associated with higher labour productivity compared to those that recognise 
unions but that do not have a partnership model; this association is statistically significant at 
the five-per-cent level. There is no statistically significant difference between these two 
groups in terms of their quit rates and levels of absenteeism (Tüselmann et al., 2007). 
 
2.4.6 Minimalist Voice Systems 
 
It is possible to distinguish between workplaces within another voice system 
(Tüselmann et al., 2015), workplaces that have neither indirect nor significant direct forms of 
voice in place; in other words a minimalist voice system: those workplaces that have a 
‘limited voice’ approach and those that adopt a ‘bleak house’ approach to voice.  
 
2.4.6.1 Limited Voice Approach and ‘Bleak Houses’ 
 
Workplaces that operate a limited voice approach have some, but a below-mean 
number of, direct forms of voice. Workplaces that adopt a bleak house approach have no 
meaningful direct voice forms (Deery et al., 2001; Guest, 1995; Guest and Conway, 1999; 
Sisson, 1993; cf. Wilkinson, 1999). More details on how this distinction is operationalised are 
provided in the methodology chapter. However, it should be noted here that, for the purposes 
of this research, a bleak house approach is defined by a workplace falling within the lower 
quartile of the direct-voice index that is discussed above; no indirect forms of voice are 
present (Guest and Conway, 1999). An establishment with a bleak house approach does not 
necessarily, therefore, have no direct-voice mechanisms present; it may have a few. This will, 
however, be very limited.  
These different voice approaches can help to reveal management’s emphasis on direct 
or indirect forms of voice as well as the ‘no’ voice option. Significantly, even within the 
minimalist voice system, employers can still decide to stress either ‘no voice’ or some direct 
forms of voice. By distinguishing between different approaches to voice within particular 
voice systems, this research can adopt a detailed study of voice within establishments. This 
research should, therefore, be able to identify any important differences between voice 
mechanisms in various workplaces, even when they are subtle. Such differences are often 
overlooked in other studies. In other words, this research goes beyond defining differences in 
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voice based solely on the use or ‘non-use’ of different types of voice channels. It also takes 
into consideration the degree to which certain voice mechanisms are used within particular 
classifications of workplaces based on the prevalence of direct and indirect forms of voice. 
 
2.5 Employee Voice – Forms, Systems, and Approaches 
 
In order to build up a nuanced picture of voice within UK workplaces, this research 
draws on the concepts of ‘voice forms’, ‘voice systems’ and ‘voice approaches’ (Tüselmann 
et al., 2015). See Figure 2.1, which sets out the different aspects of voice that will guide this 
analysis. 
 
2.5.1 Voice: the Analytical Framework 
 
Diverse disciplines draw on the concept of employee voice; this has helped to generate 
an extensive array of research on the issue. It has also resulted in various conceptualisations 
of ‘voice’. This, in turn, has led to a paucity of integrative theories and frameworks on 
employee voice (Mowbray et al., 2015). This classification of different aspects of voice 
within workplaces builds on categorisation used in the literature (Guest and Conway, 1999; 
Lavelle et al., 2010; Tüselmann et al., 2015). In these categorisations, establishments that 
have indirect voice forms are those that either have a recognised trade union or have a JCC 
and non-union employee representatives. The combination of JCC and non-union 
representation that is required for non-union indirect voice reflects the weaker voice that is 
generally associated with management-initiated indirect-voice channels compared to 
independent ones (Allen and Tüselmann, 2009; Gollan, 2007; Gollan and Markey, 2001; 
Kessler et al., 2000; Mowbray et al., 2015).  
This operationalisation is not adopted by all authors who use the concept of voice, 
however. Gollan (2007) for instance, distinguishes between employer-provided voice and 
union-provided voice. This classification clearly distinguishes between forms of voice that are 
or are not established by the employer, but it does have a number of drawbacks. Firstly, it is 
not clear how workplaces are treated that have both employer-provided and union-provided 
forms of indirect voice. The two are not mutually exclusive (Bryson et al, 2013). Secondly, 
and building on the preceding point, it does not enable assessments to be made about how 
employer-provided and union-provided voice interact with one another. Therefore, it does not 
distinguish between different approaches to indirect voice within workplaces. It cannot assess 
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if employer-provided indirect voice is used to undermine or complement union-provided 
voice. Finally, it assumes that the presence of different employer-provide voice forms are 
mutually exclusive. For instance, it does not combine workplaces that have a JCC with those 
that have non-union employee representatives into one category. Given the different levels of 
power associated with non-union indirect voice, combining these two within one category is 
appropriate.  
Workplaces with direct-voice forms are those that have a high number of direct-voice 
practices in place. The range of practices included in this research is influenced by those used 
in previous studies (Lavelle et al., 2010; Marginson et al., 2010, see the methodology 
chapter). 
In order to distinguish between those workplaces that have forms of direct voice 
present, a scoring system is used. Such a system has been drawn on in previous research 
(Lavelle et al., 2010; Tüselmann et al., 2015). This scoring system reflects the power 
associated with these practices (see the methodology chapter). The average score 
distinguishes between establishments as follows: those with an above-average score fall into a 
‘comprehensive direct-voice channel’ category, and those with a below-average score do not 
have a comprehensive direct-voice channel in place.  
A dual voice workplace has both direct and indirect forms of voice. Partnership 
workplaces have both direct and indirect voice mechanisms in place and managers view 
unions favourably. Bleak house workplaces do not have any indirect voice mechanisms in 
place and are in the bottom quartile of workplaces on the direct voice index. 
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Figure 2.1: Forms of Voice 
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2.6  Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management 
 
2.6.1 Introduction 
 
The UK’s workforce has never been as diverse as it is today; there are more women, 
ethnic minorities, and disabled people working than ever before (Kandola, 2006). In the first 
stage of the analysis, this thesis will examine the links between different forms of voice, on 
the one hand, and EO and DM policies in workplaces, on the other. It is, therefore, important 
to define what is meant by EO and DM and identify similarities and differences.  
An Equal Opportunities policy can be defined as ‘a commitment to engage in 
employment practices and procedures which do not discriminate, and which provide equality 
between individuals of different groups or sex to achieve full, productive and freely chosen 
employment’ (Lean Lim, 1996: 34). A DM policy is based around the fact that the workforce 
consists of a diverse population of people. The diversity consists of visible and non-visible 
differences which will include factors such as sex, age, background, race, disability, 
personality and workstyle. It is founded on the premise that harnessing these differences will 
create a productive environment in which everyone feels valued, where their talents are being 
fully utilised and in which organisational goals are met’ (Kandola and Fullerton, 1998: 7). 
However, both the definitions and the merits of these approaches are contested, as will be 
discussed in this thesis.  
More specifically, this research will examine whether firms have an EO or DM policy 
and whether they have policies in place to monitor recruitment and selection for gender 
discrimination, monitor recruitment and selection for discrimination on the grounds of 
ethnicity and monitor recruitment and selection for discrimination by disability. The thesis 
does not differentiate, in terms of the empirical analysis, between EO and DM for reasons that 
are outlined in section 2.6.4 and the research methods section. This research examines the 
links between voice, EO and DM policies, and measures of establishment outcomes, which 
has not been done before, using a large sample in order to draw conclusions about these links 
in workplaces more generally. The research will also examine the monitoring of recruitment 
and selection for indirect gender discrimination, the monitoring of recruitment and selection 
for indirect discrimination of the grounds of ethnicity and the monitoring of recruitment and 
selection for indirect discrimination on the ground of disability. It will also seek to establish 
whether workplaces monitor pay and promotions for discrimination on the grounds of gender, 
disability and ethnicity. 
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2.6.2 Equal Opportunity Policies 
 
Equal opportunity policies can be seen as an attempt to eradicate considerations of 
social differences from organisational decision making through bureaucratic means (Liff, 
1999). In other words, an individual should be treated in the same way as another individual - 
the liberal approach advocates the philosophy of ‘sameness’. Anti-discrimination legislation 
has interpreted this as people being judged independently of their gender and focusing instead 
on job-related characteristics (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 81). In practice EOs mean techniques 
should be developed to ensure that individuals are assessed in the same way. Differences 
between individuals on characteristics that are not job related are not considered. Equal 
opportunities, therefore, focus on individuals rather than groups. 
The law that deals with equality in the UK is the Equality Act 2010; this act legally 
protects people from discrimination in the workplace and in wider society. Before the Act 
came into force, there were several pieces of legislation to cover discrimination, including the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 (Government Equalities Office, 2013). This legislation is translated into action 
within firms through equal opportunities policies. The protected characteristics under the 
Equality Act 2010 are: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, 
pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. This research 
will concentrate on three of these characteristics, sex, disability and race (ethnicity), as these 
are common causes of workplace discrimination. It examines whether or not establishments 
have introduced policies to monitor direct and indirect discrimination along gender, ethnicity, 
and disability grounds in the areas of recruitment and selection, pay rates, and promotion.   
It is important to examine potential discrimination against women for a number of 
reasons. Most notably, full-time male workers earn more than full-time female workers, 
leading to a full-time gender pay gap in 2012 of 9.6 per cent of hourly earnings (excluding 
any overtime payments). Although this difference has declined over time, a discrepancy 
remains (Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2006; Platt, 2011), highlighting the need to examine 
various aspects of gender inequality in workplaces. The gender pay gap is likely to be 
influenced not just by pay rates for men and women within workplaces, but also the types of 
jobs that they are recruited into as well as the practices within the establishment that relate to 
promotions (Crompton and Sanderson, 1990; Snell et al., 1981). Similarly, those with a 
disability or those from BME groups are, in general, at a disadvantage to those without a 
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disability or those who are not from BME groups (Bardasi and Jenkins, 2000; Berthoud and 
Blekesaune, 2006). These disadvantages may result from direct or indirect discrimination that 
decreases promotional prospects within their current establishment, creating the requirement 
to examine whether firms monitor recruitment and selection as well as promotions and pay 
levels for discrimination. Such discrimination can take direct and indirect forms (Esmail 
2004; Cook et al., 2003). These forms of potential discrimination have implications not just 
for the individuals involved, but for the wider economy and society (Platt, 2011). They may 
also have consequences for firm performance (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Noon and 
Hoque, 2001; Schroeder et al., 2008) or workplace-level outcomes, such as absenteeism and 
quits. 
 
2.6.3  Diversity Management 
 
As discussed above, EO policies have a long history in the UK. Traditional EO 
policies, such as gender, disability and ethnicity, cannot be viewed separately from the 
broader issues within DM, such as individual and cultural differences (Kirton and Greene, 
2000), because the two will influence one another. However, the rationale for EO and DM 
policies differs. Whereas EO policies reflect ‘a moral concern for social justice’ (Kirton and 
Greene, 2002) and an attempt to eliminate social group-based discrimination through 
legislation, the diversity approach is based on the belief that heterogeneity in organisations 
brings business benefits, increased performance and indeed competitive advantage to 
organisations (Boxenbaum, 2006; Kelly and Dobbin, 1998; Robinson and Dechant, 1997; 
Özbilgin and Tatli, 2011). The benefits that DM brings in terms of quit rates and absenteeism 
will be the focus of this thesis. Johnston and Packer (1987) first used the term ‘managing 
diversity’ in their influential report Workforce 2000. The report revealed increasing 
heterogeneity in the American workforce with white male employees being in the minority of 
new entrants into the labour force. The report encouraged policy makers and organisations in 
the US to address this phenomenon if the US were to maintain its economic position in the 
twenty-first century, portraying difference amongst the workforce as a strategic asset.  
Definitions of diversity abound (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
2013; Gardenswartz and Row, 1994; Harrison and Klein, 2007). Kandola and Fullerton 
(1998) note that managing diversity means different things to different people. They highlight 
that the basic concept of managing diversity accepts that the workforce consists of a diverse 
population of people and that diversity consists of visible and non-visible differences, 
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including factors such as sex, age, background, race, disability and work style (Harrison and 
Klein, 2007). Mannix and Neale (2005) have put differences into categories and types of 
diversity: social-category differences, differences in knowledge or skills, differences in values 
or beliefs, personality differences, organisational or community-status differences and 
differences in social and network ties. There are, then, many ways to categorise diversity 
within workplaces.  
Kandola and Fullerton (1998) note that managing diversity will create a productive 
environment in which everybody feels valued, where ‘talents’ are fully utilised and in which 
organisational goals are met. A corollary of this argument is that employees will be more 
committed to the organisation, resulting in lower rates of absenteeism and lower quit rates.  
This thesis will test whether, indeed, such benefits can be obtained from EO and DM policies 
by looking at their effect on quit rates and absenteeism.  
DM, therefore, potentially covers a wide range of demographic, employee and 
attitudinal characteristics. This thesis will focus on a selection of some of the demographic 
qualities of a workforce; gender, ethnicity and disability. The reasons for this are threefold. 
Firstly, covering all of the variables listed within equal opportunity legislation and some 
diversity-management frameworks would not be feasible. Secondly, key demographic 
variables, such as gender, ethnicity and physical ability, are at the core of many of EO and 
DM frameworks (Gardenswartz and Rowe, 1994; Mannix and Neale, 2005; Kandola and 
Fullerton, 1998). Finally and most importantly, this is the first piece of research that 
systematically examines the links between employee voice, EO and DM and workplace 
outcomes. It, therefore, seeks to shed light on some of the potential link mechanisms between 
voice and workplace performance. To date, EO and DM policies have been overlooked in the 
extant research on voice and performance, yet different forms of voice may help to promote 
EO and DM policies within workplaces. 
 
2.6.4 Equal Opportunities and Diversity Management 
 
This research analyses the associations between various voice mechanisms, on the one 
hand, and EO and DM policies, on the other, within workplaces. Examining EO and DM 
policies together is supported by Ford (1996), who suggests that equality and diversity need to 
be seen as interdependent for them to be successful. Moreover, whilst DM capitalises on the 
different skills, qualities and viewpoints that a diverse workforce has to offer and equal 
opportunities are based on a legal framework (Cornelius et al., 2000, 2001; Gooch and Todd, 
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2000; Cornelius, Gooch and Todd, 2001; Foster and Harris, 2005; Maxwell, 2004), both 
approaches have to find solutions to the same types of problems (Liff, 1997). Indeed, within 
many UK workplaces, equal opportunity policies are subsumed within DM policies, and 
establishments sometimes use the terms EO and DM policies synonymously (Kirton, 2002; cf. 
Noon, 2007).  
The legal framework stresses the importance of treating people the same, irrespective 
of the protected characteristics outlined in the Act. The objective is that individuals are treated 
the same whatever their characteristics, so that individuals or groups of individuals are not 
treated favourably or unfavourably. The proponents of the equal opportunities management 
approach have assumed an operational approach to equality, supported and monitored by 
equal opportunity units, which are staffed by specialists (Mulholland et al, 2005). 
In contrast, DM policies have moved away from the social justice and legal case for 
equality, towards individualised and performance-driven business case arguments. However, 
both approaches have to find a way of assessing individuals fairly.  They also need to address 
how structures and cultures within organisations favour some and disadvantage others and 
how this can be changed. Diversity complements equal opportunity initiatives because ethical 
and ‘fair practice’ arguments can be combined with the recognition and valuing of difference 
for business benefit (Mulholland et al., 2005). 
The benefits associated with a DM policy in organisations were highlighted by Cox 
and Blake (1991) who proposed six main business benefits to having a diverse workforce. 
The first benefit rests on the cost argument: a DM policy enables organisation to integrate 
workers effectively, reducing the operating costs within firms and workplaces. Second, firms 
can benefit as a result of enhanced ‘resource acquisition’: employers with a favourable 
reputation amongst women workers and minority groups will have an improved chance of 
attracting the best employees across all groups within society compared to those workplaces 
that do not have a strong reputation. The third potential benefit to employers arises from 
stronger marketing: cultural sensitivity can be gained by employing workers with links to 
other cultures and countries, enabling firms to improve marketing. Fourth, firms can benefit 
from improved DM policies as they can lead to enhanced creativity, as the presence of a 
diverse set of perspectives within a workplace should improve creativity. The fifth potential 
benefit to firms arises from a heightened ability to solve problems: heterogeneous groups can 
lead to better decisions being made and improved problem-solving capabilities within firms 
and establishments due to a wider range of range of viewpoints and experiences being 
incorporated into discussion. Finally, there is the potential for benefits from DM that arise 
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from ‘system flexibility’ advantages. Working systems within workplaces with DM policies 
in place are less standardised and, therefore, more fluid, enabling workplaces to respond more 
suitably and quickly to environmental changes (Cox and Blake, 1991).  
Subeliani and Tsogas (2005) support this view on the potential benefits of DM 
policies within firms and workplaces; they suggest that managing diversity can lead to a 
superior understanding of local markets and customers, an increased ability to attract and 
retain the best staff, better creativity and problem solving, and greater flexibility for the 
organisation. However, Kirton and Greene (2010) and Noon (2007) argue that the emphasis 
on DM can detract from, and, indeed, undermine, traditional EO measures. They argue that 
the notion of EO is underpinned by a concern for social justice, whereas DM is based upon a 
focus on the individual and his or her contribution to the organisation, potentially 
downplaying the desire to treat everyone the same. 
In spite of these concerns, this thesis, which is based upon a large-scale study of UK 
workplaces, does not differentiate between EO and DM policies. The reasons for this are 
fourfold. First, as noted above, in practice many managers do not distinguish between the two 
and some have argued that it is not useful to distinguish between the two (Malvin and Girling, 
2000). Second, it is difficult to separate the management of diversity within workplaces from 
the provision of equal opportunities both conceptually and theoretically, as the largely 
legislation-based equal opportunities influence how firms manage diversity (Monks, 2007). 
Third, the aim of this thesis is to examine if various voice mechanisms are associated with 
policies that seek to reduce different forms of discrimination against a diversity of groups 
within establishments. Finally, the research then examines if these have an association with 
important workplace outcomes, regardless of whether they come under the rubric of EO or 
DM. 
 
2.6.5 Equal Opportunity, Diversity Management and the Law  
 
I The Origins of Anti-Discrimination Law 
 
Equality law in the UK states that people should not be treated differently in the UK 
workplace and in wider society because of their characteristics. The Equality Act 2010 (EqA) 
came into force on 1 October 2010 and brought together over 116 separate pieces of 
legislation into one single Act. The purpose of the EqA is to provide a legal framework to 
protect the rights of individuals and advance equality of opportunity (Equality and Human 
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Rights Commission, 2016). The Equality Act 2010 largely ‘tidies up’ and, in a few instances, 
replaces previous legislation, such as the 1976 Race Relations Act and the 1995 Disability 
Discrimination Act (ACAS, 2014). 
According to the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2016), the nine main 
pieces of legislation that the EqA combines are: 
 the Equal Pay Act 1970 
 the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
 the Race Relations Act 1976 
 the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
 the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 
 the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 
 the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 
 the Equality Act 2006, Part 2 
 the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 
 
The Equality Act 2010 covers everyone in Britain and protects people from 
discrimination, harassment and/or victimisation. The Equality Act 2010 prohibits unfair 
treatment in the workplace; when using public services, such as health care or education; 
when using businesses and organisations that provide services and goods, such as shops; 
when using transport; when joining a club or association and when you have contact with 
public bodies, such as the local council or government departments. There are nine protected 
characteristics under the EqA: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil 
partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation.  
The Equality Act 2010 is part of the fifth generation of equality legislation in Britain 
(Hepple, 2010). Hepple (2010) describes the first generation of legislation as one based on the 
notion of ‘formal equality’. The Labour Government’s attempt to address overt discrimination 
against recent immigrants from the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent was the Race 
Relations Act 1965; it was viewed as part of a package along with the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act 1962. The latter Act restricted the ability of Black and Asian immigrants to 
enter the UK. It covered direct racial discrimination, but was limited to places of ‘public 
resort’, such as public houses and hotels (Hepple, 2010).  
The second generation, the Race Relations Act 1968, was also a measure of ‘formal 
equality’. It extended coverage to employment, housing, goods and services. Once again, a 
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piece of legislation that aimed to reduce discrimination was accompanied by another Act that 
tried to restrict the number of immigrants coming to the UK (the Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act 1968) (Hepple, 2010).  
The third generation of equality legislation focused on discrimination on the grounds 
of sex (Equal Pay Act 1970 and Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA)). Trade unions, 
feminists and the Labour and Liberal parties had campaigned for several years for this piece 
of legislation This had long been fought for by the. The unique features of the SDA 1975 
were the introduction of indirect or adverse effects discrimination and conditions that permit 
positive action. These two acts signal the beginning of a transition from formal to substantive 
equality. The acts also enabled individuals to claim compensation for unlawful discrimination 
in industrial (later called employment) tribunals and courts. The then government created the 
Equal Opportunities Commission to undertake strategic enforcement and to assist individuals. 
This model was followed in a new Race Relations Act 1976; the government deliberately 
introduced the RRA after the SDA because women’s rights were more popular than those of 
BME groups (Hepple, 2010). 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the implementation of the Race Directive and 
Framework Employment Directives that covered discrimination on the grounds of age, 
disability, religion or belief, and sexual orientation and the subsequent Equal Treatment 
Directive, covering sex discrimination, led to the fourth generation of equality legislation. 
These Directives which were ultimately transposed into UK law were, in part, a response to 
growing pressures within Britain and elsewhere for an extension of anti-discrimination 
legislation from LGBT groups, religious groups and those concerned with age discrimination 
(Hepple, 2010). 
The fifth generation continues the move towards comprehensive equality and started 
with a period of transformative equality that Kirton and Greene (2016) define as equality 
focused on systemic change rather than on simply formal equality, and equality focused on 
outcomes rather than merely processes. This thesis examines processes within organisation on 
equality and diversity issues; it examines the links between practices within organisations to 
monitor the recruitment and promotion of employees by gender, age and ethnicity. 
 
II The Equality Act 2010 
 
The then Labour government passed the Equality Act in 2010. The Act aims to 
harmonise, simplify and modernise existing equality law and to improve the existing anti-
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discrimination legislation that some saw as out-dated, inconsistent, disjointed, inadequate and, 
in places, incomprehensible (Hepple, 2010). The Equality Act 2010 also mirrors broader 
developments in several developed countries, as governments in Australian, Canadian, Irish, 
New Zealand and the US undertook similar initiatives to up-date equality legislation (Kirton 
and Greene, 2016). 
Several principles underpin the Equality Act 2010; in particular, the Act highlights all 
human beings’ right to equality, equal protection from discrimination regardless of the 
grounds concerned, and a duty on the part of the state in all its activities to provide ‘full 
effect’ to the right to equality (Hepple, 2010). Moreover, Hepple (2010) points out that there 
must be no hierarchy of equality. The same rule should be applied to all areas of possible 
discrimination. The only exception can be if there is a cogent rationale for not enforcing all 
areas of anti-discrimination equally. Hepple (2010) contends that to a large extent, the EqA 
achieves its aims. This means that there are numerous areas that equality can cover. For 
practical reasons, this thesis focuses on discrimination based on gender, ethnic and disability 
characteristics. 
 
III Benefits and Weaknesses of the Equality Act 2010 
 
Hepple (2010) argues that some exceptions remain in particular areas of equality and 
these exceptions are allowed by the EqA; for example, the Act has retained a mandatory 
default retirement age of 65. The Act also excludes some decision on immigrants and limits 
the protection afforded to individuals from discrimination in employment on the grounds of 
religion, belief and sexual orientation. 
Similarly, the EqA established the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED), covering all 
areas of potential discrimination and not just those included in different pieces of previous 
legislation (gender, ethnicity, and disability) (Kirton and Greene, 2016). Private sector 
workplaces are under no obligation to establish an equality duty.  
Principle 11 of the EqA underpins the PSED, and requires the state to ‘take the steps 
necessary to give full effect to the right to equality in all the activities of the State’, in 
particular, to ‘promote equality in all relevant policies and programmes’, and to ‘take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that all public authorities and institutions act in conformity 
with the right to equality’ (Hepple, 2010: 19). One of the key elements of the PSED is to 
eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited 
by the Act. Another is that the PSED should advance equality of opportunity between persons 
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who share a relevant characteristic and persons who do not share it (Hepple, 2010: 18). As the 
PSED only applies to public sector workplaces, they are more likely to monitor practices for 
potential discrimination. For this reason, this thesis expects equal opportunity practices to 
differ between private and public sector workplaces. For this reason, the thesis controls for 
these two types of workplace. 
Kirton and Greene (2016) point out that the PSED is innovative as it extends beyond 
providing additional rights against discrimination; instead, it places the responsibility for how 
organisations can promote equality with public sector officials. In addition, Hepple (2011) 
highlights the power given to the Minister to impose specific duties on the listed authorities 
for the purpose of enabling the better performance of the general duty. It was expected that 
there would be a duty to have arrangements to engage with employees, service users and their 
representatives and other stakeholders. This requirement of consultation and involvement was 
described in the Labour Government’s Discrimination Law Review consultation paper as one 
of ‘the key principles which underpin the effective performance of public sector equality 
duties’ (Hepple, 2011: 318). 
The EqA extended protection to individuals in some groups who had never received 
protection before; moreover, there was additional protection for some groups, such as 
disabled people (Kirton and Greene, 2016). The EqA prohibited pre-employment health 
checks, preventing employers asking applicants about their health before deciding whether to 
employ them. This removed a key element of disproportionate disadvantage for disabled 
people (Lawson, 2011 cited in Kirton and Greene, 2016). Lawson (2011) also discusses 
harmonization within the EqA that means elements of law usually only applied to disabled 
people have the potential to benefit other protected characteristics. The importance placed on 
disabled workers in the legislation justifies the inclusion of these employees in this thesis. 
Kirton and Greene (2011) found the trade unions were able to use the legal 
requirements for an equality impact assessment in redundancy plans to help any BME 
workers, who may have been disproportionately affected by the proposals, being 
discriminated against. Firms viewed the PSED, in general, as less of a burden than preceding 
equality requirement because of the consistent treatment across all groups and the reduction in 
prescribed processes (Arthur et al., 2013 cited in Kirton and Greene, 2016). Other benefits of 
the PSED found by Arthur et al. (2013) were the enhanced status of equalities work and 
improved awareness of equalities issues.  
Critics of the EqA argue that the legislation does not go far enough; in particular, it 
has failed to impose any positive duties to advance equality on the private sector (Hepple, 
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2011). Critics of the Act have also argued that protection offered for different protected 
characteristics is not enough (Kirton and Greene, 2016). Hepple (2010: 16) highlights 
numerous other criticisms that have been raised. For example, the EqA does not mention 
descent (although ethnic descent is included in ‘ethnic origins’). In addition, the Government 
refused to give specific protection to carers on the basis that being a carer was not a ‘status’ 
and is better protected by other legislation. The EqA addresses the issue of ‘multiple 
discrimination’, discrimination on more than one characteristic, only to a limited extent. For 
instance, the EqA allows claims where because of a combination of two relevant protected 
characteristics a person treats another less favourably than they treat or would treat a person 
who does not share either of those characteristics. However, claims can only be made on two 
potential characteristic, but no more than two. The limitation to two grounds was a 
compromise struck between the Equality ministers in the Government and the business lobby, 
who were supported by business minister. In addition, both of these claims must be made on 
the basis of direct discrimination; claims cannot combine one on the basis of indirect 
discrimination and one of the grounds of direct discrimination. 
Criticisms have also been raised about the definition of disability within the EqA. The 
EqA defines disability in a way that focuses on impairments that are of a chronic and 
significant nature. This definition, arguably, reflects a welfarist and medical approach to 
disability rather than a social model of disability (Kirton and Greene, 2016). This empirical 
research within this thesis, because the research seeks to identify patterns, if any, in the 
associations between voice, EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes, cannot capture 
these different perspectives. 
 
2.6.6 Different Approaches to Equal Opportunities and Diversity Management 
 
 
Jewson and Mason (1986) put forward two approaches to equality policy. They 
termed these approaches the liberal and the radical approach. These approaches have become 
influential in analysing and evaluating equality strategies in organisations (Greene and Kirton 
2006). They also have implications for the approach adopted in this thesis and raise important 
issues for the implementation of policies within workplaces. 
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I The Liberal Approach/Sameness/Individuals 
 
 
The liberal approach focuses on the individual. According to Jewson and Mason 
(1986) within the liberal approach, equality exists when all individuals are enabled freely and 
equally to compete for social rewards (Jewson and Mason, 1986: 307). The liberal approach is 
based around the idea that men and women should be treated the same and sex equality is 
achieved when policies and procedures are identical for both sexes (Cockburn, 1989).  
Each individual, therefore, should be treated in the same way as any other individual. 
The basis of the liberal approach is, consequently, the philosophy of ‘sameness’, the idea that 
individuals have the right to be treated the same as another person of a different sex in the 
same circumstances (Liff and Wajcman, 1996). Anti-discrimination legislation has interpreted 
treating ‘like as like’ is that people should be judged independently of their gender and 
focusing instead on job-related characteristics (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 81). What this means 
in practice is the development of techniques to ensure that women and men are assessed in the 
same way. These include reviews of recruitment and selection tests, awareness training for 
selectors and appraisers and reviews of payment structures (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 81). If 
individuals should be treated the same, there is no room or justification to change policies and 
practices for individuals or groups who may be disadvantaged in some way. 
However, others argue that formulating identical policies and procedures for both 
sexes conceals and even institutionalises inequalities (Ferguson, 1984; Acker, 1990; Witz and 
Savage, 1992). Liff and Wajcman (1996) highlight the fact that sameness/equal treatment 
requires women to deny, or attempt to minimize, differences between themselves and men as 
the price of equality; they further argue that this is neither feasible nor desirable. Webb 
(1997), when discussing the debate within feminism on equal opportunities, highlights how 
the critique of equal rights contributed to the growth in interest of a parity agenda. Webb 
(1997) argues that the parity approach overlooks the fact that women can never really work in 
the same way as men and ignoring this can have detrimental effects for women, as, for 
instance, women typically have primary responsibility for the domestic sphere. Treating men 
and women the same can never adequately take account of problems arising from, say, 
women’s domestic responsibilities or their educational disadvantage, which was, at the time 
that Webb was writing, apparent. Nor does it take into consideration how those who want to 
spend time with their children can do so without this reducing their career prospects (Liff and 
Wajcman, 1996: 81). Treating everyone ‘the same’, therefore, may have implications for the 
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morale, turnover, and productivity of those workers who are at a disadvantage to the dominant 
group(s) in society. 
Consequently, Schwartz (1992) points out that CEOs and senior managers should 
support female employees by acknowledging the fundamental difference between women and 
men – the biological fact of maternity. In practical terms this means allowing flexibility for 
women and men who need it, providing training that takes advantage of women’s leadership 
potential, and eliminating the corrosive atmosphere and barriers that exist for women in the 
workplace. By accepting their responsibility to women and working parents, Schwartz (1992) 
predicts that companies will gain tremendous financial benefits. In order to overcome 
inequalities within employment, disadvantaged groups may need to be treated differently. 
Diversity should, in this perspective, therefore, be managed. 
A corollary of the individual approach to DM is that direct/individual voice would be 
favoured. By contrast, as focus on sameness suggests that individual preferences should be 
aggregated, and employee representatives should convey employees’ thoughts to managers. 
 
II The Radical Approach/Difference/Groups 
 
 
Employment practices that focus on EO accept unequal outcomes for individuals, as 
job selection is done on the basis only of those characteristics that are relevant to performing 
the job well, such as experience, education qualifications, commitment etc. and excludes 
characteristics such as race or gender from consideration. This results in a lack of 
representation of groups, as it is only individuals that matter, and all individuals are treated 
the same. Differences between individuals on other, non-job related characteristics are not 
considered. Equal opportunities, therefore, focus on individuals rather than groups. 
An alternative to providing equality involves recognising and building on differences 
between people. In order to reduce inequalities in outcomes, therefore, certain groups should 
be treated differently. The radical approach to promoting equal opportunities was adopted by 
individuals who held strong political and ethical values and recognized the historical 
disadvantage that certain groups, such as women, ethnic minorities and disabled persons, 
experienced in employment (Jewson and Mason 1986), and that equal opportunities would 
not rectify these differences. The radical approach, therefore, not only recognises the need for 
equality of opportunity, but also the need for equality of outcome. 
The objective of the radical approach is to ensure that there is fair distribution of 
rewards by introducing targets or quotas for underrepresented groups, as systemic 
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discrimination is identified at the group level (Kirton and Greene, 2016). Ensuring that all 
groups are representative of all the groups available to it would mean that being a member of 
an underrepresented group would be a deciding or even primary factor over considerations of 
merit (Kaler, 2001). This is in contrast to the liberal approach where selection is purely on the 
basis of merit. Kirton and Greene (2016) discuss how negative value judgements and 
stereotypes are attached to minorities by dominant groups; making minorities less likely to be 
appointed on merit – making discrimination a distortion of the free labour market and a 
socially constructed feature of the market process. The radical approach advocates policies 
that will result in fair distribution of disadvantaged groups in the workplace (Jewson and 
Mason, 1986). 
Özbilgin (2000) cites criticisms levelled at the radical approach. Firstly, members of 
each disadvantaged group experience varying degrees of discrimination due to their 
membership of other disadvantaged groups. Therefore, improving one group’s position 
through radical action does not necessarily provide equal opportunities for all members of the 
same group. Secondly that affirmative action, aimed at promoting the career prospects of a 
disadvantaged group, is ‘reform tokenism’, something that delayed real change towards 
equality. Similarly, Cockburn (1989: 217) asserted that the radical approach was 
‘retrogressive in further dividing the already divided powerless groups’. She also pointed out, 
that, although the use of a radical approach could promote the relative position of one 
disadvantaged group, it did not promise any improvement in the structures that perpetuate 
inequalities at work. Again, the radical approach would appear to indicate that either that 
individual workers or employee representatives for particular groups should voice employee 
concerns.  
 
2.6.7 The Business Case and Social Justice 
 
The theoretical base upon which to build policy that alleviates inequality and unfair 
discrimination have two potentially competing solutions, one focuses on equality of 
opportunity and the other on the management of diversity (Noon and Ogbonna, 2001). 
According to Noon and Ogbonna (2001) these solutions are underpinned by two different 
rationales: the need for social justice (the moral case) or the needs of the organisation (the 
business case). This is echoed by Miller (1996) who observes that the diversity approach has 
an emphasis on the ‘business case’ which is in contrast to the ‘equal opportunity’ approach 
that emphasises social justice and fairness. The moral case suggests that powerful voice 
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mechanisms should be present in workplaces to ensure workers’ rights are protected. By 
contrast, the business case suggests that managers should be free to decide which, if any, 
voice mechanisms should be present in workplaces.  
Some see DM as having evolved from the area of equal opportunities (Cornelius, 
Gooch and Todd, 2001). Dickens (1999) points out one of the strategies of those getting 
employers to see equality as in the interests of business is to highlight the organisational 
benefits. The debate moved away from equality arguments based primarily on appeals to 
social justice or morality, backed by the need for compliance with anti-discrimination 
legislation, to arguments based on pragmatic business self-interest as a rationale for equality 
action. 
Many organisations now claim to have adopted a diversity approach (Kirton and 
Greene, 2016). The shift to ‘diversity’ according to Johnston and Teicher (2010), was seen as 
attractive for three reasons: firstly, as a way of moving beyond the narrower terms of 
affirmative action because it could cover everyone in the workforce – women, men, of all 
ages and all races; secondly, because ‘managing diversity’ was seen to be more gender neutral 
and popular (because it was a more encompassing term); and thirdly because the business 
case argument for diversity programmes drove the need to implement diversity initiatives 
rather than the moral emphasis that permeated affirmative action and equality programmes.  
The concept of diversity was originally created to justify more inclusion of people 
who were traditionally excluded from organisations (Herring, 2009). Herring (2009) found 
that diversity was linked to positive outcomes, in business organizations and that diversity 
was related to business success because it allowed companies to ‘think outside the box’ by 
bringing previously excluded groups inside the box. He found that the process enhanced an 
organization’s creativity, problem-solving, and performance (Herring, 2009). Proponents of 
the ‘business case for diversity’ claim that diversity pays (Hubbard, 2004). Foster and Harris 
(2005) point out potential benefits to employers such as reduction in costs associated with 
staff turnover and reduction in absenteeism as a result of increased employee commitment.  
In addition, some proponents of this approach argue that businesses are limiting 
themselves by continuing to employ only people in same image as those already in place. 
Women and ethnic minorities, it is argued, can bring new strengths to a workforce and help 
organizations maintain their competitive edge. Rather than being rejected, difference should 
be managed effectively and should be seen as a strength (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 83). 
This approach sees difference as an asset (Cornelius, Gooch and Todd, 2001; Gagnon 
and Cornelius, 2000). For instance, mixed work teams will understand a wider range of 
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customer needs and hence help the organization to be more competitive (Gordon et al., 1991; 
Greenslade, 1991). The business case discourse highlights the question of social justice by 
linking it to improved company performance (Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000). Cox and Blake 
(1991) support the view if the ‘business case’ and proposed six main business benefits to 
having a diverse workforce, these are discussed above. Lorbiecki and Jack (2000) summarised 
the main arguments from the practitioner literature of the business case for DM. They have 
separated these into an economic rationale and a morale rationale; however, they 
acknowledge that the economic arguments dominate.  
The economic rationale for DM that Lorbiecki and Jack (2000) have identified by 
looking at the practitioner literature is: an improvement in productivity and the 
encouragement of more innovative solutions. Enhancing the understanding of a greater 
number of customer needs increases the customer base and turnover. In addition, it enhances 
corporate competitiveness and continued survival, helps to lower the likelihood of litigation. 
The moral rationale for DM is that it: promotes interaction between ethnic groups, helps to 
foster culture change within the organisation, facilitates attitude adjustment and thus counters 
prejudice, increases attitudinal commitment especially amongst women, helps organisational 
harmony, and is socially just and morally desirable. Cornelius, Gooch and Todd (2001) list 
four business advantages for a diverse organisation: (1) taking advantage of diversity in the 
labour market (2) maximising employee potential. (3) managing across borders and culture 
and (4) creating business opportunities and enhancing creativity.  
The business case argument for DM; however, can be problematic if there is no 
‘complementary recourse to a broader social justice or moral case beyond direct and 
quantifiable organisational benefits’ (Kirton and Greene, 2016: 131). Critics of the ‘business 
case’, according to Kirton and Greene (2016), warn that the diversity paradigm may ignore 
deep-seated societal discrimination and patterns of disadvantage. Dickens (1994) observed 
that appreciation of the business case can stimulate employer action on equality, but this is 
likely to be partial and contingent and can risk ‘fair weather’ equality. Greene and Kirton 
(2011) highlight a key criticism of the business case: DM is purely voluntary and employer 
led. Despite the changed political context post-1997, Dickens and Hall (2006) still support a 
view stated seven years earlier that the business case is “contingent, variable, selective and 
partial” (Dickens, 1999, p. 10; see also Greene and Kirton, 2011). Consequently, diverse 
management may only arise when there is a business case for doing so. Indeed, DM may only 
be implemented in areas that are easy to tackle. In addition, there is always the danger that a 
business case can be articulated against DM (e.g. that action is too costly or workforce 
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diversity will not add value). Similarly, Kaler (2001) contends that there will all too often be 
instances in which it will not pay business to promote diversity or pursue equal opportunity 
policies: ‘All in all, it can be considered that whether applied to equal opportunity, diversity 
or anything else, business case arguments are going to rest on somewhat shaky foundations. 
They might well apply in particular instances under particular circumstances, but not 
generally and not always (Kaler, 2001 cited in Noon and Ogbonna (2001: 61). Criticising the 
‘business case’, Webb (1997) warned that ‘unfortunately the market model of “diversity” may 
have more to do with corporate image-building than with the kind of interventions designed to 
facilitate more egalitarian work organisation and increased inclusion of women. … Diversity 
is valued only if it offers the employer more efficient, committed labour’. This criticism also 
raises the issue of pluralism and unitarism. The business case is based on a unitaristic 
perspective that assumes that workers and managers share an interest in the success of the 
firm. DM recognises that workers have different perspectives but ultimately managers can 
overcome these differences to enhance business performance. The pluralistic perspective 
emphasises differences between workers and managers. These differences may not always be 
overcome, but policies should be implement that recognise those differences and that may not 
always lead to improved workplace outcomes. 
Noon (2007) argues that ‘the moral case based on the human rights of all employees 
and job seekers must not be abandoned for the current fashion of diversity and the business 
case. (Noon, 2007: 781). Noon (2007) disputes the hypothesis that organisations failing to 
employ a diverse range of people are missing valuable human resources and losing 
opportunities to appeal to a broader range of customers as an alluring argument. Noon (2007) 
asserts that this argument has prompted the call for managing diversity to replace the 
traditional policies of equal opportunities, and a business case rationale to replace arguments 
for social justice. However, Noon (2007) argues that such a policy shift has potentially fatal 
flaws which can undermine equality outcomes and might ultimately prove to be dangerous for 
social justice. One of the problems identified by Noon (2007) is that diversity is essentially a 
concept that marginalizes the importance of equality and suppresses the significance of 
ethnicity in the workplace. Noon (2007) argues that business case arguments are high-risk 
because they provide an economic-based rationale for discrimination in certain contexts. 
Other criticisms of the business case for diversity within workplaces are that it incurs 
significant potential costs (Jehn et al. 1999; Pelled 1996; Pelled et al. 1999). Racial and ethnic 
diversity has been linked with conflict, especially emotional conflict among co-workers, 
undermining the business case (Skerry, 2002). Foster and Harris (2005) discuss the view that 
76 
 
managing a more diverse team is more difficult and too much diversity could be divisive and 
have a negative impact on team cohesiveness. Tsui et al. (1992) suggest that diversity 
diminishes group cohesiveness and, as a result, employee absenteeism and turnover increase. 
In addition, diversity has been associated with lower quality because DM can lead to positions 
being filled by workers who are not qualified to do the job; (Rothman et al. 2003; Williams 
and O'Reilly 1998) again undermining the business case argument. The diversity approach 
has its roots in the USA, but it is clear from the global diversity literature that it has now taken 
hold in Britain, mainland Europe, Scandinavia, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Kirton et 
al, 2007). This thesis examines the possibilities that direct and/or indirect voice may can 
influence workplace outcomes. 
Existing research has tended to present EO and DM policies as being in opposition to 
one another and perhaps even incompatible because of the differing reasons for which they 
are pursued (Lorbiecki and Jack, 1999; Webb, 1995). As Dickens (1999) points out, although 
business case arguments may have a social justice/compliance dimension, in practice these 
approaches were often counter-posed.  
However, it has also been contended, that in some organisations DM is no more than 
EO re-labelled (Cornelius, Gooch and Todd, 2001). In addition, Noon and Ogbonna (2001) 
make the observation that in practice, if not in theory, there may be occasions where both an 
EO approach and a DM approach might be pursued with equal vigour and with some 
complementarity; the social justice and business cases coincide rather than collide (Kirton and 
Greene, 2016). In short, the distinction and dualism between EO and DM that much of the 
existing research presents may not be stark in reality. This research, therefore, combines 
rather than separates EO and DM. This is, indeed, what the WERS dataset does. This thesis 
draws on that data in its empirical analysis. 
 
2.6.8 Equal Opportunity, Diversity Management Policies and Workplace Outcomes  
 
When looking at the effect of EO and DM on performance, there are likely to be costs 
associated with such policies (Dex, 1986; Riley, Metcalf and Forth, 2007). However, the 
focus here will be on any potential benefits of such policies, as the links between voice, EO 
and DM policies and workplace outcomes have not previously been addressed in this way. 
Therefore, it is first necessary to see if there are any potential benefits that arise from different 
EO and DM policies, and, if there are, the types of ‘voice workplace’ within which these 
benefits arise. This thesis will concentrate on two measures of workplace outcome; namely, 
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absenteeism and voluntary labour turnover (quits). As noted above, these proximal measures 
provide a stronger indication of the benefits of different EO and DM measures than more 
distal ones, such as financial performance or productivity, that are likely to depend on a range 
of factors within the establishment, the organisation, more generally; and the economy within 
which the establishment and firm are located.  
EO practices include a range of measures. For instance, they can cover a relatively 
general statement about non-discrimination with company policy through to a comprehensive 
set of measures that 1) monitor potential discrimination against employees from certain 
disadvantaged groups, 2) identify and 3) remedy sources of discrimination and improve the 
opportunities offered to employees from disadvantaged groups. These measures may be 
facilitated through plans that involve extensive training and reorganisation in issues such as 
recruitment, performance appraisal procedures, management evaluation, promotion, benefits 
and grievance procedures (see Hodges-Aeberhard and Raskin, 1997). This thesis examines the 
role of policies that monitor for potential direct and indirect discrimination in the areas of 
recruitment and selection, relative pay rates, and promotions. As noted above, these are key 
areas in efforts to reduce workplace discrimination against women, those from BME groups 
and workers with a disability. 
There are several potential benefits that may arise from anti-discrimination policies 
(Cox and Blake, 1991; Litvin, 1997; Subeliani and Tsogas, 2005; Swann et al., 2004; Urwin 
et al, 2006; White et al., 2004). For instance, ensuring that pay does not lead to discrimination 
for or against certain groups could result in productivity growth (Pérotin and Robinson, 
2000). EO and DM policies may also increase productive efficiency by allocating labour more 
efficiently. In addition, checking for direct and/or indirect discrimination in recruitment 
procedures may lead a larger pool of suitably qualified applicants coming forward, which may 
result in higher levels of human capital within the workplace (Metcalf and Forth, 2000; Welsh 
et al, 1994). It also may reduce the number of disputes between managers and employees, if 
this were to happen it may help to boost morale and encourage knowledge sharing within 
establishments (Metcalf and Forth, 2000). 
Most importantly for this thesis, increased levels of fairness within the workplace may 
also enhance motivation and effort (Metcalf and Forth, 2000), resulting in lower levels of 
absenteeism and quits (Cox and Blake, 1991; Monks, 2007; Shen et al., 2009). This thesis 
focuses on employee morale and retention, as measured by absenteeism and quits, 
respectively. In addition, checking for discrimination in recruitment, pay, and promotion 
procedures can lead to an improved match between individuals and jobs, again, enhancing 
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workplace morale and reducing labour turnover (Blau et al. 1998; Holzer and Neumark 2000). 
Schotter and Wigelt (1992) suggest that improved career prospects for discriminated groups 
improve their incentives to stay with the organisation, helping to reduce absenteeism and 
quits. The motivation they have, due to increased morale (Metcalf and Forth, 2000), may spill 
over to non-discriminated group members who may then compete harder in internal labour 
markets. This, too, may help to reduce absenteeism and reduce employee turnover. 
 
2.6.8.1 Empirical Studies on Equal Opportunities, Diversity Management and Workplace 
Outcomes 
 
The empirical studies that examine the links between EO and DM policies, on the one 
hand, and different workplace outcomes, on the other, will now be examined. 
There is a limited amount of empirical evidence on the links between EO and DM 
policies, on the one hand, and different workplace outcomes, on the other (BIS, 2013). Some 
evidence from the UK suggests that the lack of EO policies is associated with higher labour 
turnover and lower morale (Özbilgin & Tatli, 2011; Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007), and that 
discrimination within workplaces is linked with higher levels of absenteeism (Commission for 
Racial Equality, 1995, cited in BIS, 2013).  
However, using econometric analysis, Riley et al. (2008) find that there was no 
definitive link between EO and company performance. If there was a positive association, this 
tended to be in larger organisations (Riley et al., 2008). Armstrong et al. (2010: 978), 
similarly, do not detect strong evidence in favour of a link between EO and DM policies, on 
the one hand, and performance on the other:  
Concrete evidence that demonstrates the bottom-line effects of diversity and equality 
management ... is much less evident and, when tentative evidence has been found, it 
has tended to be context specific … Relatively little hard data supports the claim that 
diversity and equality initiatives influence firm performance.  
However, it should be noted that these studies did not find any evidence of a cost to 
workplaces of implementing EO and DM policies.  
 
There is some wider data to suggest that EO policies are linked to higher productivity 
levels in Dutch and UK workplaces (Pérotin and Robinson, 2000; Subeliani and Tsogas, 
2005) as well as higher levels of job satisfaction and organisational commitment in Irish 
establishments (O’Connell and Russell, 2005). Evidence from the US indicates that perceived 
discrimination is associated with lower organisational commitment and job satisfaction 
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(Sanchez and Brock, 1996). Policies that aim to reduce any discrimination within workplaces 
may lessen perceived levels of bias, leading to increased organisational commitment and, 
hence, lower labour turnover and absenteeism.  
Studies that examine the links between diversity and workplace performance will now 
be examined. The literature in this area examines various types of diversity and its effects on a 
range of different performance measures. Using a novel and very large German data set, 
Backes-Gellner and Veen (2013) looked at the effects of age diversity on company 
productivity. They argued 1) that the balance between costs and benefits of diversity 
determines the effect of age diversity on company productivity, and 2) that the type of task 
performed acts as a moderator. They found that a more age-diverse workforce provides a 
larger knowledge pool, and can therefore find more creative solutions. However, a more age-
diverse workgroup may also be faced with increasing communication or social integration 
problems. In a company with only standardised tasks, the balance of benefits and costs will 
not be positive. But, a company with innovative tasks, with new and different problems every 
day will gain from a more age-diverse workforce with a broader knowledge pool. Page (2007) 
and Backes-Gellner and Tuor (2010) find a positive link between age-diverse workforces and 
outcomes. However, other studies indicate a negative relationship (Cleveland and Lim, 2007); 
yet other studies find no consistent effects for age diversity (Leonard and Levine, 2006). 
Backes-Gellner and Veen (2013) argue that these inconsistent results are partly due to 
moderators that may differ from study to study, one of the most important moderators being 
task requirements. Although this thesis does not examined age, this thesis builds on this 
literature and examines how employee involvement in determining the speed at which 
employees work and how the work is performed influence voice and workplace outcomes. 
Kochan et al. (2003) conducted a multi-firm study, examining the relationships 
between race and gender diversity and business performance. The study was carried out using 
data from four large firms. Each firm had its own particular way of collecting and storing 
human resource data and three of four firms indicated a strong preference for using their own 
internal survey measures to capture the variables in the model. Therefore, each study draws 
on different kinds of qualitative and quantitative data to address common questions about the 
links between diversity and organizational performance. Kochan et al. (2003) found that there 
were few direct effects of diversity on performance; either positive or negative. However, 
they point out that context is crucial in determining the nature of diversity’s impact on 
performance. They found, for instance, that conditions that exacerbated racial diversity’s 
negative effects on performance included a highly competitive context among teams. They 
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also found evidence to suggest that, under certain conditions, racial diversity may enhance 
performance, namely when organisations foster an environment that promotes learning from 
diversity. This research draws on this literature and includes measures of workforce diversity 
as controls within the analysis. 
Armstrong et al. (2010) examine the effect of a diversity and equality management 
system on firm performance beyond the effects of a traditional high-performance work system 
consisting of bundles of work practices and policies. Diversity and equality management 
systems include diversity training and monitoring recruitment, pay and promotion across 
minority or other disadvantaged groups. Armstrong et al. (2010) carried out a quantitative 
analysis on indigenous and foreign-owned organisations in Ireland in the service and 
manufacturing sectors. They found that high-performance work system practices are 
associated with positive business performance and specifically that diversity and equality 
management system practices are positively associated with higher labour productivity (sales 
revenue and number of employees), workforce innovation (percentage of sales derived from 
recently introduced products and services) and lower voluntary employee turnover. 
Armstrong et al. (2010) advise that high-performance management practices should be 
thought of in a more expansive way and suggest that companies may find competitive 
advantage through more effective approaches to managing employee diversity and equality. 
This thesis extends this analysis to the UK. The thesis adopts subjective measures of 
workplace performance measures, as other measures, such as sales per employee and the 
percentage of sales that is derived from new products, may result from a range of other factors 
that may not be incorporated into the analysis, such as industry-specific shocks and 
remuneration incentives. 
Like Armstrong et al. (2010), Richard (2000) uses productivity to measures the 
influence of diversity on firm performance and return on equity, and market performance. 
Richard (2000) uses quantitative techniques to examine the relationships between racial 
diversity, business strategy, and firm performance in the banking industry in the US. His 
sample consisted of 63 banks from California, Kentucky, and North Carolina. The results of 
Richard’s (2000) study suggest that racial diversity is not positively associated with firm 
performance. However, deeper analysis reveals that, within the proper context, racial diversity 
does in fact add value and contribute to competitive advantage. Similarly, Ng and Tung 
(1998) carried out field research in North America, this time Canada. They examined the 
relationship between ethno-cultural diversity and attitudinal and non-attitudinal measures of 
organizational performance. Like Richard (2000) Ng and Tung’s (1998) research was carried 
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out in the banking industry. They collected data from ninety-eight respondents in seven 
branches of a leading Canadian bank and compared culturally homogeneous branches to 
culturally heterogeneous branches. They found that culturally heterogeneous branches 
experienced lower levels of absenteeism and achieved higher productivity and financial 
profitability despite their lower scores on job satisfaction, organizational commitment and 
workplace coherence, and higher rates of turnover. These relationships were moderated by 
age, job tenure, organizational position, children’s ages, location of education and previous 
employment, birthplace and education level. This thesis complements this research by 
examining absenteeism as a measure of employee morale and examines how organisational 
practices and characteristics have a direct effect on voice and workplace outcomes. 
In her examination of eight multinational corporations with headquarters in the US, 
Wentling (2004) highlighted the importance of corporate strategy. She attempted to identify 
and provide information on the factors that assist and barriers that hinder the success of 
diversity initiatives in multinational corporations. Her study revealed that having a strategic 
plan for diversity initiatives, integrating diversity initiatives into the corporation’s strategic 
plan, recognizing that diversity is a business imperative, having a culture that values diversity 
and having top management support were the factors most likely to assist in the success of 
diversity initiatives. Semi-structured face-to-face interviews with diversity managers/directors 
and document analysis were used to collect the data. The study also disclosed that people do 
not always understand the value of diversity, have competing agendas, and the size and 
complexity of the corporation and economic changes were the barriers most likely to hinder 
the success of diversity initiatives in multinational corporations. Similarly, this thesis 
examines how organisational practices that can be related to strategic objectives influence 
voice and workplace outcomes. Unlike Wentling (2004), this thesis relies on quantitative data 
in order to attempt to provide evidence on the links between organisational characteristics, 
voice mechanisms and workplace outcomes. 
Using US data from the 1996 to 1997 National Organisations Survey, a national 
sample of profit making business organisations, Herring (2009) examines whether a diverse 
workforce, relative to a homogeneous one, is generally beneficial for business. Herring (2009) 
includes, amongst other measures of business performance, corporate profits and earnings. 
This is in contrast to other accounts that view diversity as either non-consequential to business 
success or actually detrimental by creating conflict, undermining cohesion, and thus 
decreasing productivity. Herring (2009) tests eight hypotheses derived from the value-in-
diversity thesis. The results support seven of the eight hypotheses: racial diversity is 
82 
 
associated with increased sales revenue, more customers, greater market share, and greater 
relative profits. Gender diversity is associated with increased sales revenue, more customers, 
and greater relative profits. This thesis builds on this work. This research takes the percentage 
of workers from a black and minority ethnic background into consideration. It extends 
Herring’s (2009) work by incorporating voice into the analysis. As the literature review on 
voice demonstrates, different voice mechanisms are likely to be able to convey employees’ 
opinions to managers to different degrees. The thesis adopts subjective workplace outcomes, 
as other indicators, such as profits, corporate earnings, and market share, relate to the 
organisation as a whole rather than individual establishments within the company. EO and 
DM practices may differ between workplaces in companies. Similarly, some measures, such 
as market share, may be more readily applied to some workplaces in a firm than other ones 
within the same company. 
In contrast to Kochan et al.’s (2003) study, Herring’s (2009) results are consistent with 
arguments that a diverse workforce benefits business, offering a direct return on investment 
and promising greater corporate profits and earnings. Critics assert that diversity is linked 
with conflict, lower group cohesiveness, increased employee absenteeism and turnover, and 
lower quality and performance. However, Herring’s (2009) results show a positive 
relationship between the racial and gender diversity of establishments and their business 
functioning. Therefore, it is likely that diversity produces positive outcomes over 
homogeneity because growth and innovation depend on people from various backgrounds 
working together and capitalising on their differences. Herring (2000) points out that these 
differences may lead to communication barriers and group conflict; however, these tensions 
may result in opportunities for creativity and enhance the quality of group work. This thesis 
incorporates measures of ethnic and gender diversity into its analysis. 
A strand of the diversity literature examines board diversity and its relationship to 
various performance measures. For example, Miller and Triana (2009) investigate mediators 
that explain how board diversity is related to firm performance. Looking at a sample of 
Fortune 500 firms, they found that reputation and innovation both partially mediate the 
relationship between board gender and racial diversity and firm performance. They found a 
positive relationship between board racial diversity and both firm reputation and innovation 
and found a positive relationship between board gender diversity and innovation. The impact 
of share price has been used to assess the impact of diversity at senior manager/board level. 
For instance, Cook and Glass (2009) assess the impact of the announcement of BME groups 
and Caucasian men into senior management positions. Change in share price following the 
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announcement was used as the dependent variable. Market reaction to the naming of 
racial/ethnic minorities into corporate leadership positions was significant and negative, while 
the market’s reaction to the naming of Caucasians was significant and positive. However, the 
negative market reaction to the appointment of racial/ethnic minorities into top management 
positions was mitigated in those firms that had explicitly incorporated diversity into their 
strategic growth plan. Their findings suggest that to successfully introduce diversity into 
upper management, firm decision makers must first signal the importance of diversity to 
market actors.  
Haslam et al. (2010) also used stock-based measures to assess the impact of diversity a 
board level. This time the relationship between women on company boards of directors and 
performance was investigated. In addition to stock based measures, accountancy-based 
measures of company performance were also used. They examined FTSE 100 companies in 
the period 2001–2005, focusing on the relationship between the presence of women on 
company boards and both accountancy-based and stock-based measures of company 
performance. No relationship between women’s presence on boards and ‘objective’ 
accountancy-based measures of performance (return on assets, return on equity) were found. 
However, a negative relationship between women’s presence on boards and ‘subjective’ 
stock-based measures of performance were found. Companies with male-only boards enjoyed 
a valuation premium of 37 per cent relative to firms with a woman on their board. The results 
support claims that women are found on the boards of companies that are perceived to be 
performing poorly and that their presence on boards can lead to the devaluation of companies 
by investors. However, the reality is that company performance does not support this view. 
Analyses of the links between board composition and various firm outcomes are 
important; however, this thesis focuses on how EO and DM policies within workplaces 
influence workers. It, therefore, tackles an equally important area. By doing so, this thesis can 
also examine a greater range of organisations, such as public sector ones, that do not 
necessarily have to publish information about the composition of their boards. This thesis can 
also incorporate measures that relate to employee morale; it does not rely on purely financial 
outcomes. 
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2.7 Voice and Diversity 
 
Employee voice is the means by which employees communicate their views on 
employment and organisational issues to their employers. Voice can be expressed in various 
ways: workers themselves can voice their opinion or employee representatives can do so on 
behalf of individual workers (indirect voice).  
According to Bell et al. (2011), changes in contemporary workforces render traditional 
voice mechanisms ineffective in capturing the demands of workers from diverse backgrounds 
(see also Syed, 2014). In a study of voice and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
workers in organisations, Bell et al. (2011) argue that there is a need to introduce new and 
transformed mechanisms of voice that use systems and structures relevant to both new forms 
of work and increasingly diverse groups of actual and potential workers. Bell et al. (2011) 
contend that employers should go beyond the legal requirements in terms of voice; managers 
should be proactive and implement policies and practices that support equality and that 
include voice. Bell et al. (2011) argue that policies that are enacted without a legal 
requirement to do so will be more meaningful to employees and, hence, effective. Such 
policies will signal the firm’s level of commitment to equality to employees. For instance, an 
obvious expression of commitment to sexual orientation equality is a widely communicated 
non-discrimination policy. In taking a proactive stance for inclusion, leaders can draw on a 
rich repertoire of specific voice techniques from the literature to support EO (Bell et al., 
2011). As workplaces in the UK do not, legally, have to have specific voice mechanisms in 
place, this research will examine a wide array of voluntary voice structures that employers 
may create. 
Syed (2014) reports that traditional voice mechanisms, if they are not supported by 
inclusive policies by managers or employer-promoted LGBT networks, can lead to LGBT 
workers remaining silent rather than voicing their opinions and grievances. LGBT workers are 
particularly likely to think that managers will not take their opinions into consideration or that 
voicing their views is risky if there is a climate of ‘heterosexist’ normality within 
organizations; in other words, if a heterosexual orientation is the only one to have (Colgan 
and McKearney, 2013; Syed, 2014). By extension, workers with disabilities may be more or 
less likely to express their views depending on the culture of the workplace. As the existing 
literature does not indicate if direct or indirect voice mechanisms are likely to encourage 
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workers with a disability to voice their opinions, this research incorporates a wide array of 
voice mechanisms. 
Similarly, traditional voice mechanisms may result in women remaining silent about 
their situations and about the ideas that they have to increase efficiency in organizations. In 
many developed economies, women represent at least a half of all employees, yet their roles 
as senior decision makers in firms is limited (Syed, 2014). Their willingness to voice their 
opinions also differs to that for men (Harlos, 2010). Women are more likely than men to voice 
their views to an internal mediator in order to overcome a disadvantageous situation (Harlos, 
2010); however, women’s willingness to do this is moderated by power relationships. In other 
words, women are less likely than men to voice their concerns when the person who is 
potential in the wrong is a supervisor (Harlos, 2010). Unions, as an important collective voice 
mechanism, could help to alter this situation. However, unions have not been able to draw on 
women’s insights within work to the full extent that is possible (Roberts, 2012). If unions 
were able to represent the views of women to a greater extent, businesses could benefit (Syed, 
2014). 
The voice of black and BME workers has also not been heard via unions (Perrett and 
Lucio Martinez, 2006). In a survey of BME employees in voluntary organisations in the UK, 
Perrett and Lucio-Martinez (2006) found that many BME workers had never been contacted 
by their union for advice and that most of them would not go to the union for employment-
related advice. Similarly, Holgate et al. (2008) found that unions often ignored or downplayed 
the concerns and grievances of BME workers. This reinforces the view of unions, from earlier 
research, as organisations that actively marginalised the views of BME employees 
(Phizacklea and Miles, 1987). 
The research on collective voice, on the one hand, and women and BME workers, on 
the other, indicates that there is a need to incorporate a range of voice mechanisms into 
research in order to capture the possible influence that those voice mechanisms afford to 
different types of workers. If research were to include union voice only, it may implicitly 
downplay the preferences of women and BME workers. This may lead to unreliable results 
about the relationship between voice and workplace policies towards women and BME 
employees. 
In their paper, Bell et al. (2011) draw on and extend Dundon et al.’s (2005) voice 
typology that has four categories. First, voice is an articulation of individual dissatisfaction 
(such as complaints to line managers, grievance procedures, speak-up programmes). Bell et 
al. (2011) argue that multiple mechanisms should exist for both LGBT employees to raise 
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complaints about discrimination, harassment, and exclusion. These mechanisms may be real 
or virtual, anonymous or open. Second, voice can be the expression of collective organization 
(such as union recognition, and collective bargaining). Bell et al. (2011) contend that 
organizations can legitimate the voice of LGBT employee networks in trade unions, works 
councils, and other collective institutions. Third, voice can contribute to management decision 
making (such as upward problem-solving groups, quality circles, suggestion programmes, 
attitude surveys, and self-managed teams); this form of voice is particularly important because 
management decision making plays a key role in behaviours at work. Managers can clearly 
articulate that LGBT employees contribute to organizational success, and that ‘heterosexism’ 
is not tolerated (Waldo, 1999). Fourth, voice as a form of mutuality (such as partnership 
agreements, joint consultative committees, and works councils, which are common in 
Western Europe) could mean bringing in representatives of LGBT internal and external 
networks to build effective ties with the organization. Bell et al. (2011) stress that what 
matters in applying these mechanisms to promote voice is introducing methods that allow 
workers whose voices have previously not been heard to participate. How voice mechanisms 
operate within the context of particular organizations is important, therefore. This thesis 
builds on this research to incorporate different voice forms in a holistic way into the analysis 
in order to identify possible patterns between forms of voice and EO and DM policies. 
However, it should be noted that how operational managers interpret the management 
of diversity in practice is likely to have an important influence over how DM policies are 
implemented. Foster and Harris (2005) conducted in-depth interviews with managers, HR 
specialists and employees in a case study of a long-established major UK retailer. They found 
that while the business benefits attributed to DM are appealing to employers, the concept of 
‘diversity management’ lacks clarity for line managers. Line managers are familiar with the 
established approach to equality of opportunity; the consistent application of employment 
procedures designed to provide ‘sameness’ of treatment. In other words, line managers adopt 
a liberal approach (Jewson and Mason, 1986) to DM and adhere, de facto, to principles that 
underpin equal opportunities both in terms of what it is and how it should be implemented 
within the anti-discrimination legal framework. Line managers, familiar with the value of 
demonstrating a common approach in their decision making as the key means of defence 
against claims of discrimination, regarded a DM agenda concerned with recognising and 
responding to individual differences as more likely to lead to feelings of unfairness and claims 
of unequal treatment.  
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Three main issues emerge from Foster and Harris’s (2005) research. These findings 
are relevant for the practical application of DM. The findings are: managers can hold different 
understandings about the meaning of DM. Managers have great concerns about legal 
compliance and potential litigation resulting from DM. Finally, managers are concerned about 
the confusion that stems from an agenda that appears to require them to deliver sameness of 
treatment on the one hand, but to recognise and respond to individual difference, on the other. 
Line managers may well play the pivotal role in implementing diversity initiatives, but as a 
category of staff, they are also under particular pressure to interpret and apply the practices 
associated with managing diversity.  
Foster and Harris (2005) found the lack of clarity surrounding the concept of 
‘managing diversity’ and the variable mix of contextual influences meant that for many 
operational managers managing diversity became whatever was deemed to be the most 
expedient solution at the time. They found that for line managers the conceptual relationship 
between diversity and equal opportunities is frequently blurred. In practice, this can result in 
inconsistencies of treatment, which undermine the very policy initiatives intended to promote 
diversity and fair treatment. Drawing on Foster and Harris’s (2005) work, this thesis does not 
draw a distinction between EO and DM in the empirical analysis. 
Kirton and Greene (2016) discuss the role of the line manager in DM and 
implementing equality and diversity policy. They discuss how having DM at the heart of the 
line management role and how it overcomes criticisms that were levelled at traditional EO 
approaches that were seen as specialist in nature and little to do with core business concerns. 
However, Kirton and Greene (2016) also recognise the problems of devolving DM to line 
managers, such as lack of buy-in and the potential for them to be scapegoats for problems 
associated with the implementation of DM policies. Greene and Kirton (2009) list five areas 
that can lead to the lack of buy-in from line managers. Kirton and Greene (2016) attempt to 
unpick the reasons for these problems: (1) Line mangers do not clearly understand what 
concepts of equality and diversity actually mean and how this translates into meaningful roles 
for them in DM implementation.  
A lack of understanding of what it means to take responsibility of DM contributes to 
difficulties in interpretation of policy and inconsistency of practices, hence, a lack of effective 
implementation across organisations (Foster and Harris, 2005; Greene and Kirton, 2009). In 
addition, according to the CIPD (2012: 10) there is a significant lack of understanding around 
equality and diversity issues and their link to performance. (2) Line managers are not 
adequately trained for taking on DM responsibilities and (3) line managers are not held 
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accountable for their own DM practice. Kirton and Green (2016) cite the CIPD’s 2012 survey 
that indicates that a substantial proportion of line managers are confident when discussing 
equality and diversity and that line mangers only received limited support for DM activity and 
a lack of training that reinforces line managers’ lack of understanding and buy-in (Greene and 
Kirton, 2009). (4) Line managers are not often involved in the development of DM policy. 
Indeed, a lack of ownership and a feeling that DM is someone else’s problem is evident in 
organisations (Greene and Kirton, 2009; CIPD, 2007). (5) Line mangers do not see DM issues 
as a priority alongside other demands on their time. Foster and Harris (2005) found evidence 
that line managers saw the implementation of diversity initiatives unattractive. In a US study 
Schneider and Northcraft (1999) discuss how line managers are reluctant to engage with DM 
because the costs and disadvantages are immediate and positive benefits take a long time to 
develop which makes it difficult to see past short-term interests. For these reasons, the 
distinction between DM and EO is not as great in practice as it is in the theoretical literature. 
This buttresses the empirical approach taken in this thesis that combines rather than separates 
the two. 
Greene and Kirton (2009) discuss this shift from ‘equal opportunities’ to DM and its 
impact on people who ‘do’ diversity work. Diversity specialists have replaced equality 
officers and Greene and Kirton (2009) suggest that doing diversity work in the 2000s was a 
different experience to doing equality work in the 1980s/1990s. Green and Kirton (2009) 
found the majority of people occupying this post were white women with some BME people 
involved. They had business and managerial experience or HR expertise, and typically had 
one or two assistants. DM has greater legitimacy and respectability than ‘equal opportunities’ 
with senior managers due to the dominance of the business case argument within the former. 
This, combined with the changing backgrounds and characteristics of diversity practitioners, 
means that diversity work usually carries lower costs and potentially offers more 
opportunities than equality work did. Greene and Kirton (2009) found that despite the 
business-friendly paradigm of DM, the potential costs historically associated with equality 
work, including isolation, stress, marginalisation and career jeopardy, remain significant for at 
least some practitioners. Even champions experienced some stress and frustration in their 
roles and some felt that being an advocate for diversity could be potentially damaging for 
mainstream management careers. The implication of this, from an organisational perspective, 
is that the work carries such potentially high costs suggests that the business-friendly DM 
may be fictional. Indeed, Greene and Kirton (2009) had difficulty gaining participants from 
private-sector companies, potentially indicating that DM is often only ‘window-dressing’. 
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Once again, this evidence supports the approach adopted in this thesis to combine rather than 
separate EO and DM.  
The primacy of the business case has also created new opportunities for at least some 
diversity specialists and champions. The opportunities existed in different combinations and 
to different extents, but for specialists opportunities included horizontal and vertical career 
development and the chance to have greater influence and autonomy. Both specialists and 
champions benefited from the opportunity their roles provided to become more influential 
within the organisation. For some senior champions, there was the halo effect of being seen as 
an organisational hero. Several policy implications emanate from the opportunities associated 
with diversity work. Placing DM centre-stage means diversity specialists enjoy higher status, 
compared with the generally lower status of equality officers in the 1980s. Senior diversity 
specialists seemed protected against many potential costs experience by people doing the 
same kind of work at a lower level. Another positive consequence is that they had credibility 
and authority in the organisation and they gained greater respectability and legitimacy 
allowing mainstream managers to champion diversity. Most of the specialists, and all of the 
champions, indicated that they had senior management support and most drew support from 
diversity and equality structures within their organisations. All of these effects are positive for 
the organisation and suggest that diversity champions may gain the consent and commitment 
of line managers. This thesis recognises that the growing influence of diversity specialists 
may signal the growing adoption of DM policies within firms compared to equal 
opportunities. However, overall, the evidence suggests that distinctions between DM and EO 
are not that great in practice. This thesis does not, therefore, differentiate between the two in 
the empirical analysis. 
There is a further reason for not differentiating between DM and EO in the empirical 
analysis. Some HR managers may present some of their work as DM rather than as the 
provision of EO (Greene and Kirton, 2009). The reasons for this are twofold. First, DM is 
likely to be seen as pro-business as it rests on the argument that managing a diverse workforce 
effectively has benefits for the business. Second and consequently, DM is likely to have a 
positive image amongst senior managers, whereas as equal opportunities is likely to have 
negative connotations for senior managers (Greene and Kirton, 2009). HR managers may 
present themselves as managers of diversity rather than as promoters of equal opportunities in 
order to support and increase their positions within companies, as the former has greater 
respect and legitimacy within firms than the later (Greene and Kirton, 2009). Such behaviour 
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makes the distinction between DM and EO less clear in practice than it is in theory, 
supporting the analytical approach adopted within this thesis.  
In a qualitative case study, Greene and Kirton (2011) explore what happened in one 
public service organisation to organisational DM policies when managers had to reduce 
workforce numbers significantly. The case study organisation provides an example of how the 
three mutually supporting equality strategies outlined by Dickens (1999) (business case, legal 
regulation and social (joint) regulation) interact with, and mediate, each other so that together 
they potentially provide a much stronger foundation for the DM agenda within the context of 
a downsizing process. Union representatives were positive about the level of involvement 
they had in the DM policy arena and this was confirmed by post-restructuring documents also 
that demonstrate the continued involvement of unions and the employee groups and some 
evidence of the impact they had in terms of contributing to fairer sets of criteria in the 
downsizing exercise. However, there was a representation gap, alluded to by non-managerial 
employees. Whilst the post-restructuring demographic data at the organisation indicates that 
there had been no adverse changes in overall levels of BME, women or disabled staff (in fact 
ratios had increased from 2006), the reliability and scope of these monitoring data 
(particularly on ethnicity) were acknowledged as weak in some areas to begin with. The cuts 
in absolute numbers of staff may take years to redress, may have diversity implications, and 
will require commitment and resourcing to ensure that progression and promotion will 
continue in the future. Interviews with line managers indicated that the restructuring exercise 
could potentially have meant that diversity issues were pushed even further down their list of 
priorities. Certainly, this was the fear of the union representatives and the majority of the non-
management employees at the time that matches with Dickens’s (1999) view of the business 
case being an insecure foundation for equality action. The context of individual organizations 
will, therefore, have an important influence on outcomes associated with DM. This thesis 
examines general patterns between organizational characteristics, forms of voice, and 
workplace outcomes in order, in part, to identify groups of companies that raise interesting 
empirical and theoretical issues that future research can explore. 
Greene (2015) placed diversity concerns at the forefront of an analysis of employee 
voice and contends that increasing levels of diversity within the contemporary workforce are 
not reflected in the mainstream voice literature which tends to assume that employees are 
homogeneous (Shapiro 2000; Bell et al. 2011; Syed 2014). Building on this critique of the 
extant literature, Greene (2015) examines the what, who, and how of conventional employee 
voice mechanisms within the mainstream Anglo-American industrial relations literature. In 
91 
 
looking at the ‘what’, Greene (2015: 73) observes that WERS 2011 data indicates that the 
most common issues raised by union and non-union employee representatives are discipline 
and grievances, health and safety, and rates of pay. Moreover, there does not appear to be any 
significant increase in the incidence of diversity-related issues, despite the fact that WERS 
2011 also indicates an increase in the status of formal EO/DM policies within workplaces. 
Further observations of the WERS 2011 data referred to by Greene (2015) are that it indicates 
a decline in the extent to which employees in the UK feel they can have an influence over 
decision-making. Evidence from the Employee Outlook Report (CIPD 2013), which shows a 
serious deterioration in employee satisfaction regarding their ability to feed views upwards, 
supports this finding. This thesis complements this research by examining the links between a 
broad array of voice mechanisms, including employee representatives and direct voice 
measures, and EO and DM policies. Incorporating a multitude of voice mechanisms into the 
research also enables this study to examine how different mechanisms might influence 
policies to varying degrees. 
The characteristics of ‘who’ is a typical trade union member have clearly changed 
over time. Greene (2015) points out that in the UK in the 1970s, trade union membership was 
at its peak and typical trade union members were male, full-time, manual workers in the 
production sector. Today, however, the typical trade union member is slightly more likely to 
be female than male, a non-manual rather than manual worker, to work in the service rather 
than in the manufacturing sector, and to be a highly qualified worker in the public sector 
(Kirton and Greene 2010). The relevance of ‘who’ is a union member has an effect on what 
topics union representatives are likely to try to place on the agenda within workplaces. Who 
stands as a representative is also important. Having proportional representation of different 
diversity strands with regard to the bargaining unit/organizational grouping/workforce 
population is important (Greene, 2010), as it may help to put the voices of those who are not 
usually heard forward. This argument also suggests that research, as this thesis does, should 
incorporate other forms of voice that may enable a range of voices to be heard. 
Finally, Greene (2015) highlighted ‘how’ people participate as being important within 
the voice mechanism. The process of participation needs to be inclusive. The time, place, and 
nature of conventional voice mechanisms favour the standard, archetypical worker. To be 
more inclusive and to incorporate a diverse group of representatives, it is important to think 
about the location and nature of participation. For example, can some virtual interactions 
using social technology be utilized rather than relying on meetings that require a physical 
presence? Thought should be given to ensuring that meetings and interactions take place at 
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locations and times that are as inclusive as they can be with regard to diversity characteristics, 
including around non-standard hours of work (Greene, 2015). Greene (2015) highlights the 
need for much future work to be done in terms of the importance of research on employee 
voice that explicitly includes diversity concerns. 
In a study of 14 organisations across eight European Union Members States, Shapiro 
(2000) found that, despite the rhetoric highlighting the importance of employee involvement, 
several company quality and improvement programmes had failed or had not reached their 
full potential. This, Shapiro (2000) speculates, may be due, in part, to problems in gaining and 
sustaining employee involvement. Shapiro (2000) discusses how recent literature has begun to 
link these problems with the tendency for organisations to value, train or communicate with 
some groups of employees more than others and the failure to recognise the various factors 
that will motivate diverse employees to become involved. For example, Shapiro (2000) points 
out that part-time workers, administrative or shift staff often receive less training and 
communication on company performance levels than full-time permanent, professional or 
senior staff.  
Shapiro (2000) argues that high and sustainable levels of employee involvement 
depend on creating an organisational environment that values, develops and motivates all 
employees. Thus, valuing, developing and motivating different individuals or groups of staff 
to varying degrees appears in contradiction to, and may lead to difficulties in achieving, 
involvement objectives. Shapiro (2000) refers to such difficulties as leaving an ‘involvement 
gap’. Shapiro (2000) found that despite the increased exposure of employee diversity that 
employee involvement programmes can lead to, firms have been slow to develop the skills 
and capabilities to manage diversity in a positive way, which supports the achievement of 
employee involvement and improvement objectives. In order to positively manage diversity 
and to ensure all employees are able to use their full skills and abilities, Shapiro (2000) argues 
that a change in the approach of management needs to occur, so that the current trend is 
reversed and employees know that they can and should bring their outside skills and identities 
into the workplace. Different voice mechanisms may enable that to take place to different 
degrees. 
Although in the past it was not always the case, the contemporary union policy 
position is for unions to support advocating and bargain for equality of marginalised groups 
(Kirton and Greene, 2016). The TUC recommends a model equality clause to its affiliates 
which over half have adopted. The model advocates the promotion of equality for all (Kirton 
and Greene, 2016). The way the TUC (2011) advocate this should be achieved is: 
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a. through: 
i. collective bargaining, publicity material and campaigning, representation, 
union organisation and structures, education and training, organising and 
recruitment, the provision of all other services and benefits and all other 
activities; 
ii. the union’s own employment practices. 
b. To oppose actively all forms of harassment, prejudice and unfair discrimination 
whether on the grounds of sex, race, ethnic or national origin, religion, colour, class, 
caring responsibility, marital status, sexuality, disability, age, or other status on 
personal characteristics. 
(TUC, 2011) (cited in Kirton and Greene 2016) 
The TUC’s model highlights, amongst other characteristics, sex, ethnic or national 
origin, and disability, these are the characteristics used to assess direct and indirect 
discrimination of various kinds in this research. This model suggests that indirect voice 
through unions is influential. This thesis will examine this possibility. Kirton and Greene 
(2016) also highlight that fact that special union equality representatives are receiving more 
attention as a means for unions to influence positively employer DM and EO policies as well 
as assisting members who experience discrimination. Union voice should have an impact on 
EO and DM policies within workplaces and establishment outcomes. This research will also 
examine this possibility. 
Kirton and Greene (2016) discuss how the diversity paradigm poses theoretical 
challenges for unions, which could result in there being less room for union involvement in 
equality and diversity policy making. The key features which threaten to marginalise unions 
and their concern from the processes and content of organisational EO and DM policies are 
the business case, the focus on the individual and the positioning that makes diversity a top-
down managerial activity. As far as the business case is concerned, unions are suspicious and 
sometimes hostile towards it. However, some union officers were found to believe it was 
possible to still push ‘old’ equality issues from within the diversity paradigm (Greene and 
Kirton, 2009; Kirton and Greene, 2006). Kirton and Greene (2016) point out that 
discrimination and harassment have a clear, detrimental impact on business. The focus on the 
individual is also a problem for unions who favour collective bargaining and standardised 
treatment of employees through common terms and condition. Issues, such as low pay and the 
position in the organisation of women and BME groups, is a long-standing concern for unions 
94 
 
who feel these issues can be solved through EO rather than DM (Kirton and Greene, 2016). If 
unions voice these concerns, union presence will lead workplaces to adopt EO and DM 
policies to a greater degree than would be the case in the absence of unions. This research 
examines this possibility. 
 
2.8 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This literature review began by introducing the voice framework by firstly discussing 
Hirschman’s framework, the exchange of information and voice and power and the concept of 
voice. The concept of voice and the forms that employee voice can take were then discussed, 
followed by a review of the empirical studies on different forms of voice and various 
performance measures. It then went on to set out an analytical framework that distinguishes 
between workplaces that have different voice mechanisms within them to enable the thesis to 
adopt a nuanced approach to the study of the links between voice and EO and DM policies. 
There is then a discussion on EO and DM policies and the similarities and differences 
between the two. The law, the Equal Opportunities Act 2010, that governs such policies is 
then discussed along with its potential benefits and weaknesses. The chapter then discussed 
the different approaches to EO and DM. The liberal approach focuses on the individual and 
sees equality existing when all individuals are enabled freely and equally to compete for 
social rewards (Jewson and Mason, 1986: 307). This approach sees sex equality being 
achieved when policies and procedures are identical for men and women. This approach sees 
‘sameness’ as being the correct approach; the idea that individuals have the right to be treated 
the same as another person of a different sex in the same circumstances (Liff and Wajcman, 
1996). The chapter then discussed the alternative to the liberal approach, the radical approach. 
In order to reduce inequalities, this approach involves recognising and building on differences 
between people, consequently, certain groups should be treated differently. The radical 
approach, therefore, not only recognises the need for EO, but also the need for equality of 
outcome. 
The theoretical base upon which to build policy that alleviates inequality and unfair 
discrimination was then discussed: the need for social justice (the moral case) or the needs of 
the organisation (the business case). The chapter examined the different arguments that have 
been put forward in the existing literature to support these two contrasting ways of 
approaching fairness for employees.  
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The discussion of the theoretical links between EO and DM policies and workplace 
performance was followed by a review of the empirical literature on EO and DM policies and 
workplace outcomes. The empirical literature on DM policies and workplace performance 
was reviewed. Finally, the chapter provided a review of the empirical studies on the links 
between voice and DM. 
This chapter has demonstrated that there is a further need to examine the links 
between voice and EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and EO and DM and workplace 
outcomes, on the other. Although much of the current research on voice concentrates on direct 
or indirect voice, this chapter, building on existing theoretical and empirical work, has shown 
that voice mechanisms should be viewed holistically and a range of them should be 
incorporated into the analysis (Bell et al., 2011; Greene, 2015; Holgate et al., 2008; Syed, 
2014; Tüselmann et al., 2007).  
This thesis incorporates four main types of voice workplace – minimal voice, dual 
voice, direct voice and indirect voice. It also disaggregates two of these four main types of 
voice workplace. Within the minimal voice category, this thesis distinguishes between the 
‘bleak house’ approach and the ‘limited approach’ and within the dual voice category, this 
research differentiates between the ‘co-existence approach’ and the ‘partnership approach’ 
(see chapter 3, for how these have been operationalised). This enables this thesis to take a fine 
grained analytical approach of the links between voice and EO and DM policies, as well as 
the links between EO and DM and workplace outcomes within the various types of voice. 
This is important as existing theoretical and empirical work suggests that voice may influence 
outcomes in workplaces with relatively low levels of direct voice compared to those with no 
(or next to no) direct voice mechanisms (Lavelle et al., 2010; Mowbray et al., 2015; 
Tüselmann et al., 2007). Similarly, how direct and indirect voice mechanisms are combined 
(either as substitutes or complements) can shape workplace outcomes (Lavelle et al., 2010; 
Mowbray et al., 2015; Tüselmann et al., 2007). 
The first stage of the analysis in this thesis examines the links between voice and EO 
and DM; the second stage of the analysis assesses the associations between the EO and DM 
policies and absenteeism and quits. By taking this approach, this thesis is able to draw on the 
largest data set of UK establishments and enables this thesis to build on recent developments 
in the literature that examine these links. This approach also enables this research to examine 
the links between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes within different types of 
voice workplace. The existing literature has not explored the potential for voice mechanisms 
to moderate these links between policies and outcomes. This research could, therefore, help to 
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specify the conditions under which EO and DM policies are linked to lower levels of 
absenteeism and quit rates and, thereby, potentially help to explain why different studies have 
revealed contrasting links between these policies and workplace outcomes (Armstrong et al., 
2010; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2011; Riley et al., 2008; Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007). The data and 
research methods employed in this thesis will now be outlined.   
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Chapter 3 - Data and Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the data that the thesis draws on, how the various variables have 
been operationalised and how the data has been analysed. It draws on the WERS 2011 
management survey; the series of WERS surveys represent the largest, most comprehensive 
studies of workplaces in the UK (Timming, 2009; Whitfield and Hoque, 2008; Whitfield and 
Huxley, 2007). In addition to questions about establishment characteristics, the survey also 
covers various aspects of EO and DM policies that are detailed below, making it a highly 
appropriate dataset to draw on for the purposes of this thesis. The WERS dataset, therefore, 
represents the largest, representative sample for UK establishments. It covers a range of issues 
that are pertinent to this thesis. It enables different measures of voice, establishment 
characteristics, and EO/DM policies to be combined within the same analysis. Self-collected 
data would not be as comprehensive or result in as large a sample as the WERS dataset. As 
the WERS survey covers a range of topics, common method bias is unlikely to arise, as the 
independent and dependent variables are separated in the questionnaire (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Avoiding such a bias is important in research in which respondents may wish to appear 
consistent in their behaviour on sensitive issues, such as EO and DM (Crowne and Marlowe, 
1964; Johns, 1994). 
The analysis of the data is performed in two stages. The first stage covers the links 
between the various forms of voice and EO and DM policies; the second, examines the 
associations, if any, between the presence of EO and DM policies and two establishment 
outcomes, absenteeism and quits, amongst the four distinct voice categories. In the first part 
of the analysis, all of the questions in the survey about EO and DM policies seek to find out if 
a particular policy, say, monitoring recruitment and selection for a gender bias, is present or 
absent; therefore, this thesis uses logistic regressions to analyse the data. In the second stage 
of the analysis, absenteeism and quits have been dichotomised in order to run single 
regressions of each of the EO/DM policies to avoid problems associated with 
multicollinearity. The absenteeism levels and quits rates in the sample are not normally 
distributed, making the use of ordinary least squares regressions problematic. Logistic 
regressions do not assume a normal distribution.  
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3.2 The Data: Workplace Employment Relations Study 2011 
 
The Workplace Employment Relations Study 2011 (WERS 2011) relies on data from 
a survey carried out at the workplace level. The most senior manager who was responsible for 
employment relations and personnel issues provided the responses in a face-to-face meeting 
to the survey questions. The interviews for WERS 2011 occurred between March 2011 and 
June 2012. In total, there were 2,680 interviews, lasting on average 90 minutes (van Wanrooy 
et al., 2013). Prior to the meeting, the manager completed a questionnaire on the basic 
characteristics of the workplace’s workforce (HM Government, 2013). Workplaces with four 
or fewer employees were excluded from the sampling frame. Overall, the sample for the 
WERS 2011 survey is representative of all British establishments with five or more 
employees, excluding the agriculture, forestry and fishing and mining and quarrying 
industries. The WERS 2011 population represents 35 per cent of all establishments and 90 per 
cent of all employees (van Wanrooy et al., 2013).  
 
3.2.1 The Use of WERS 2011 in this Thesis 
 
This thesis includes only those workplaces that answered all of the relevant questions 
and that have 10 or more employees, as small workplaces are unlikely to have union 
representation or joint consultative committees. This reduces the sample a little to around 
1946 for the regressions that involve the ‘full sample’. ‘Reduced samples’ are used to 
examine, within dual voice systems and minimalist voice systems, the associations between 
EO and DM, and higher compared to lower levels of voice. 
This thesis relies only on the management questionnaire, to have as large a sample as 
possible and to identify any associations between voice and EO and DM policies that can be 
examined in greater detail in future research. By relying solely on managers’ responses, a 
unitaristic bias, discussed in more detail in the conclusion, could enter into the analysis, 
raising possible questions about the validity of the research. For instance, managers may say a 
particular policy exists for legitimacy reasons in face-to-face meetings with researchers even 
when it does not. Lower-level workers may have a different opinion of whether or not a 
particular policy exists. In addition, how the policy is implemented may also vary 
significantly, and perspectives may vary between managers and employees. The concept of 
‘validity’ reflects the notion that a variable (or a set of variables) actually measures what it is 
supposed to be measuring (Bryman and Bell, 2008: 151; see also Timming, 2009 for a 
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discussion of some of the WERS data, notably the employee questionnaire). The use of 
managers’ responses could result in the research not really capturing the actual EO and DM 
situation in the establishment. However, the thesis relies on the management survey in order 
to capture as many workplaces as possible in the analysis and, thereby, contribute to the 
literature by incorporating small and medium-sized enterprises as well as large ones (Forth 
and Ricon-Aznar, 2008). There are 1946 workplaces in the complete sample used in this 
thesis. If I had used either the employee representative or the employee survey, the sample 
size would be much lower. Those surveys pose a different set of questions that do not address 
the specifics of EO and DM policies, making the assessment of the links between voice, EO 
and DM, and workplace outcomes and the use of regression analysis, impossible.  
This thesis draws on the management survey and uses it for cross-sectional purposes, 
enabling this research to explore the relationships between voice, EO and DM policies, and 
workplace outcomes amongst a large data set. Although it would be possible to use part of the 
WERS dataset as panel data – in which the same workplaces are asked the same questions 
over a number of years – this was not feasible for two reasons. Firstly, if the WERS data were 
used as panel data, the sample size would decrease considerably as not all establishments are 
retained in the survey from one year to the next. Indeed, only a small percentage of the 
workplaces remain in the survey over two or more iterations. This would potentially bias the 
results and mean that the results for the sample could not be generalised to the wider 
population (Field, 2009). Secondly, the number of workplaces that either start or stop any 
particular EO or DM policy is very small. Consequently, the results of any analysis that 
examines the links between EO and DM and workplace outcomes and that uses WERS as a 
panel data would be driven by this small number of establishments, which may or may not be 
representative of the broader population of workplaces (Field, 2009). Similarly, the number of 
workplaces that change their voice mechanisms over time is also very small, potentially 
leading to biased results. 
The questions relating to EO and DM policy are asked in an ‘active’ way. In other 
words, questions are posed that ask about the activities that are carried out within the 
workplace. They ask if, say, recruitment is monitored for gender discrimination. Questions do 
not, for example, focus on the presence or absence of a policy to review promotion procedures 
to identify indirect discrimination, but instead ask ‘Do you review promotion procedures to 
identify indirect discrimination’, enhancing the validity of the research. In other words, the 
survey does not ask ‘do you have a policy to review promotion procedures to identify indirect 
discrimination’. Such policies may exist, but may not be enforced. Conversely, some 
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workplaces may review their promotion procedures even though a formal policy to do so does 
not exist. 
 
3.3 Bias 
 
The use of a single respondent to all of the questions used to operationalise key 
concepts in this research also raises the potential of common method bias (Gerhart, 2007; 
Podsakoff et al., 2003). However, as the WERS questionnaire is very lengthy – it runs to 111 
pages – the likelihood that managers will make connections between the questions and the 
objectives of this study are unlikely (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In addition, the objective of this 
study was not known to the respondents, and the survey focuses on a broad range of issue 
beyond EO and DM policies, absenteeism and quit rates. It is, therefore, unlikely that 
respondents may wish to portray their establishment as having EO and DM policies that 
reduce absenteeism and quits, leading to common method bias. 
 
3.4 Data Set 
 
 The following section will outline the details of all of the variables used.  
 
 
3.4.1 The Dependent Variables 
 
This thesis analyses the data in two stages. The first stage examines the links, if any, 
between the presence of different voice mechanisms and the likelihood of the establishment 
having a range of EO and DM policies. A range of policies are used for two main reasons. 
Firstly, it is likely that many establishments have a general or broad formal written policy on 
EO and DM. This, as detailed below, can make analysis difficult if there is no (or very little) 
variation in the outcome variable. Secondly, the presence of a general policy may not signify 
an adherence in many areas to the principles of equal opportunities (Hoque and Noon, 1999). 
Therefore, it is necessary to dig a little deeper to assess the presence of policies that affect 
particular groups of employees (female workers, disabled people, and those from BME 
groups) in specific areas (recruitment, promotion, and remuneration) (Hoque and Noon, 
1999). The details of these policies and their operationalisation are provided below. In the 
second stage of the analysis, this thesis assesses the associations, if any, between the presence 
of the EO and DM policies and 1) absenteeism and 2) quit rates (voluntary labour turnover). 
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Once again, the justification and operationalisation of these variables are provided below. EO 
and DM policies, therefore, act as the outcome variables in the first stage of the analysis, and 
as independent variables in the second stage.  
 
3.4.1.1 Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies: Operationalisation 
 
As outlined above, in order to avoid the possibility of ‘empty shell’ EO and DM 
policies (Hoque and Noon, 1999, 2004; Liff and Dale, 1994; Young, 1987), this research 
draws on a range of EO and DM policies covered in the WERS survey. It, therefore, goes 
beyond merely examining a broad policy that does not relate to specific groups or operational 
activities to assess more fine grained areas. There are a number of questions in the WERS 
data that relate to EO and DM policies. Responses are, in essence, dichotomous. Respondents 
can also answer ‘do not know’ or refuse to answer. When respondents answered in this way, 
the workplace was excluded from the analysis. The following questions are the ones that this 
research draws on in its analysis of EO and DM policies. The ‘overarching’ question on EO 
and DM within the WERS data set is: 
 
Does this workplace have a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing 
diversity? 
 
As noted above, it is likely that nearly all workplaces have a broad policy on EO and 
DM; examining differences between workplaces on this policy is unlikely, therefore, to reveal 
important distinctions between establishments (please note EO and DM policies are examined 
together, as the WERS dataset puts them together and does not differentiate between them). 
To examine in more depth the differences between workplaces on EO and DM, this thesis 
also includes more precise questions. The included questions focus on different types of 
employees who are covered by the policy (women, BME, disabled people) and they address 
particular operational areas (recruitment and selection, promotions, relative pay rates). The 
included questions are also, therefore, used to analyse the links between voice and EO and 
DM. The thesis examines the three groups outlined above (women, BME, disabled people) in 
relation to all of the following questions: 
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1. Do you monitor recruitment and selection by any of the characteristics on this card?  
2. Do you review recruitment and selection procedures to identify indirect discrimination 
by any of these characteristics? 
3. Do you monitor promotions by any of these characteristics? 
4. Do you review promotion procedures to identify indirect discrimination by any of 
these characteristics? 
5. Do you review relative pay rates by any of these characteristics? 
 
This thesis focuses on three groups - women, BME, disabled people. In the WERS 
data set, the following terminology is used ‘gender’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘disability’. These 
represent very important groups who may be adversely affected by policies within 
workplaces. The policy areas chosen are also ones that are likely to be prominent potential 
areas for (would-be) employees. Women, BME and disabled people can face significant 
discrimination – both direct and indirect – in gaining employment (e.g. Dietz, 2010; Fevre et 
al., 2013) and in being promoted (e.g. Estevez-Abe, 2005; Heilman, 2012). Substantial pay 
differences exist between men and women (Chevalier, 2007; Lips, 2013; Manning and Saidi, 
2010). That is not to say that other groups are not at a disadvantage. Although the WERS 
survey lists a number of other ‘characteristics’ that could lead to discrimination, such as 
religion and belief, age, sexual orientation, the three chosen areas represent the ones most 
widely discussed in the EO and DM literature (Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Jones, 2016; 
Kirton and Greene, 2005, 2010; Kirton et al., 2007; Riley et al., 2008; cf. Kirton  and Greene, 
2015). 
It is important to note that this set of dependent variables become the independent 
variables in the second stage of the analysis, as outlined above. 
 
3.4.2 The Independent Variables 
 
 The independent variables in the first stage of the analysis are the four voice variables. 
 
3.4.2.1 Voice Variables: Classification and Operationalisation 
 
In order to classify the establishments analysed here into one of the four categories 
specified in chapter 2, the research had to draw on various responses to questions in the 
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WERS survey. The details of the questions that were used and how, specifically, the 
workplaces were categorised is provided below.  
 
I Indirect Voice 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, this study defines collective voice as ‘at least one union 
recognised for negotiating pay and conditions’ and/or the presence of both a joint consultative 
committee and a non-union employee representations (see also Benson 2000; Guest and 
Conway, 1999; Gunnigle et al., 1998). The question on unions is asked, as the EO/DM 
questions are - in an ‘active’ way. In other words, the questionnaire does not ask if unions are 
present, but asks if unions are ‘recognised for negotiating pay and conditions’. This study 
does not consider the presence of JCCs alone to be sufficient for inclusion under the 
‘collective voice’ label, as discussed above. They are a comparatively weak form of voice. In 
addition, they are typically a management-initiated mechanism that frequently lack a clear 
remit and do not participate in discussions over pay and conditions.  
 
II Direct Voice 
 
This study operationalised direct voice in the following way. Drawing on insights 
from Edwards and Wright (2001), this research combines a number of individual means of 
workplace communication to form a direct voice index (see also Ramsay et al., 2000; 
Tüselmann et al., 2007; Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005). This then determines whether 
establishments have or do not have ‘direct voice’. The individual means of communication 
cover ‘information-sharing schemes’, ‘consultation’ and ‘direct participation’. As there is no 
consensus in the literature on what does and what does not constitute direct voice, this thesis 
draws on relevant practices that associated studies include (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Gill 
and Krieger, 2000; Tüselmann et al., 2007). The questions on wider consultations measures 
are, as the union representation and EO/DM questions are, posed in an ‘active’ way. The 
relevant questions in the WERS survey are outlined below.  
 
Information sharing includes the use of notice board, the management chain, 
newsletters, emails and the intranet to convey information to employees within a workplace. 
The relevant question from the WERS survey reads: 
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Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which management 
communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? 
 
 Notice boards  
 Systematic use of management chain/cascading of information  
 Regular newsletters distributed to all employees  
 Regular use of email to all employees  
 Information posted on company intranet, accessible to all employees  
 Other ways of communicating (please specify)  
 None of these, no other ways  
 
Direct consultation covers attitude surveys, suggestion schemes and meetings with 
the workforce. The relevant questions from the WERS survey read: 
 
Have you or a third party conducted a formal survey of your employees’ views or opinions 
during the past two years? 1) Yes 2) No  
 
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which management 
communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? 
 
 Suggestion schemes 
Do you have meetings between senior managers and the whole workforce (either altogether or 
group by group)? 1) Yes  2) No  
 
Direct participation encompasses partly autonomous teamwork and quality 
circles/problem-solving groups. The relevant questions from the WERS survey read: 
 
Does the following statement apply to the way that team working operates among [the largest 
occupational group] at this workplace: teams are given responsibility for specific products or 
services? 1) Yes 2) No  
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Do you have groups of non-managerial employees at this workplace that solve specific 
problems or discuss aspects of performance or quality? They are sometimes known as 
problem-solving groups or continuous improvement groups. 1) Yes 2) No  
 
The practices vary in terms of the potential that employees can put their ideas forward 
(Delaney and Godard, 2001; Tüselmann et al., 2015). Indeed, more generally, the ability of 
workers to communicate with employers increases as the mechanisms change from 
information exchange through consultation to participation (Freeman and Lazear, 1995; 
Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Tüselmann et al., 2015). To capture the varying power of these 
direct voice mechanisms, this thesis uses a composite index. It was calculated as follows. 
Each participation practice received a score of 5; a consultation practice, a score of 2; an 
information practice, a score of 1. Consequently, if a workplace has all these direct voice 
measures in place, it would score 21. In order to differentiate between those workplaces that 
have direct voice and those that do not, this research uses the arithmetic mean. Those 
workplaces with an above-average score have direct voice; those with a below-average score 
do not and are, therefore, considered to be minimal voice workplaces (see section 3.4.1.4 
below). 
On the basis of this operationalisation, establishments were divided into four voice 
categories. The theoretical justification for these categories is provided in chapter 2. This 
typology allows this study to adopt a more nuanced approach compared to some other studies 
that tend to focus either on just unions (e.g. Freeman and Medoff, 1984) or direct voice alone 
(e.g. MacDuffie, 1995). 
 
III Dual Voice 
 
As outlined in chapter 2, this research also differentiates within those four categories. 
Within the dual voice category, a distinction is made between those workplaces that have a 
‘partnership approach’. There is no commonly agreed operationalisation of this term in the 
literature. In contrast to Tüselmann et al.’s (2015) distinction that is based on systematic 
involvement of labour representatives in the introduction and operation of direct employee 
involvement schemes, this study distinguishes between those workplaces with a favourable 
attitude towards unions and those that do not. The research operationalises this distinction 
based on management’s responses to the following statement in the WERS survey: 
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‘unions help find ways to improve workplace performance’. 
 
Those ‘dual voice’ establishments in which managers either ‘strongly agreed’ or 
‘agreed’ were classified for the purposes of this research as having a partnership. Those 
managers in ‘dual voice’ workplaces in which managers ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’, 
‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ were considered to have a ‘co-existence’ approach.  
 
IV Minimal Voice 
 
As discussed in the direct voice section above, those workplaces with an above-
average score on the composite index have direct voice; those with a below-average score do 
not and are, therefore, considered to be minimal voice workplaces. The minimal voice 
category, is divided up into sub-categories – ‘limited approach’ and ‘bleak house’. For a 
workplace within the minimal voice category to have a ‘limited approach’, the mean for those 
workplaces in this category, was calculated and all those workplaces with an above mean 
score were put into the ‘limited approach’ category and those with a below mean score were 
put into the ‘bleak house’ category.  
 
3.4.3  Control Variables 
 
Establishment performance is likely to be influenced by a number of different factors. 
Several control variables were used in the analysis to capture as many of these factors as 
possible. The research drew on existing research to select the control variables, including firm 
size; the percentage of the workforce that was female, had a disability, and that came from an 
ethnic community; and whether the establishment was in the public or private sector (for 
instance, Addison and Belfield, 2001; Addison et al., 2003; Guest et al., 2003; Tüselmann et 
al., 2015). The operationalisation of all of the control variables is provided in Table 3.1. 
Although some of the control variables could be construed as voice, they are not 
defined in this thesis as voice, as voice typically (but not always) involves communication 
between managers and employees that focuses on more strategic and company-wide 
operational issues than it does on matters that are directly or narrowly related to how 
employees perform their specific tasks (Addison, 2005; Lavelle et al., 2010; Marchington, 
2015; Tüselmann et al., 2015; cf. Dundon et al., 2004). This thesis does not, therefore, include 
the following variables as facets of employee voice: the extent to which workers have 
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discretion in their work, the extent to which workers have control over the pace of their work, 
and the extent to which workers are involved in deciding how their work is organised. These 
variables relate to the specific jobs that employees carry out rather than either the wider 
strategic activities or the general policies of the workplace.  
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Table 3.1 Operationalisation of the Control Variables 
Variable Description Operationalisation 
Total number of 
employees 
The natural log of the answer to the following question: 
‘Currently how many employees do you have on the payroll at 
this workplace?’ 
Percentage of the total 
workplace workforce 
who are women 
Calculated as a percentage using the responses to the following 
two questions: ‘How many male and female employees are in 
each of the following occupational groups?’ and ‘Currently how 
many employees do you have on the payroll at this workplace?’ 
Percentage of the total 
workplace workforce 
who have a disability 
Calculated as a percentage using the responses to the following 
two questions: ‘Enter estimated percentage of employees who 
have a long-term disability that affects the amount or type of 
work they can do?’ [A 'long-term disability' is an illness, health 
problem or disability that can be expected to last for more than 
one year]. (WERS2011: question ZDISAB) and ‘Currently how 
many employees do you have on the payroll at this workplace?’ 
Percentage of the total 
workplace workforce 
who are from an ethnic 
minority 
Calculated as a percentage using the responses to the following 
two questions: ‘Enter estimated percentage of employees who 
are from a non-white ethnic group’ and ‘Currently how many 
employees do you have on the payroll at this workplace?’ 
Private sector 
workplace 
Dummy variable based on responses to the question ‘How would 
you describe the formal status of this workplace (or the 
organisation of which it is a part)?’ Workplaces coded 1 if 
‘Public Limited Company (PLC)’,  ‘private limited company’, 
‘company limited by guarantee’, ‘partnership (including. 
Limited Liability Partnership) / Self-proprietorship’ and coded 0 
if ‘Trust / Charity’, ‘body established by Royal Charter’, ‘Co-
operative / Mutual / Friendly society’, ‘Government-owned 
limited company / Nationalised industry / Trading Public 
Corporation’, ‘Public service agency’, ‘Other non-trading public 
corporation’, ‘Quasi Autonomous National Government 
Organisation (QUANGO)’, and ‘Local/Central Government (inc. 
NHS and Local Education Authorities)’. 
Do workers have 
variety in their work? 
(Dichotomous) 
Dichotomous variables based on responses to the following 
question: ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers 
in the largest occupational group] here have variety in their 
work?’; coded 1 if respondent answered 'a lot’ or ‘some’, and 
coded 0 if response was ‘little’ or ‘none'. 
Do workers have 
discretion in their 
work? (Dichotomous)  
 
Dichotomous variables based on responses to the following 
question: ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers 
in the largest occupational group] here have discretion over how 
they do their work?’; coded 1 if respondent answered 'a lot’ or 
‘some’, and coded 0 if response was ‘little’ or ‘none'. 
Do workers have 
control over the pace of 
their work? 
(Dichotomous)  
 
Dichotomous variables based on responses to the following 
question: ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers 
in the largest occupational group] here have control over the 
pace at which they work?’; coded 1 if respondent answered 'a 
lot’ or ‘some’, and coded 0 if response was ‘little’ or ‘none'. 
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Are workers involved 
in deciding how work 
is organised? 
(Dichotomous) 
 
 
Dichotomous variables based on responses to the following 
question: ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers 
in the largest occupational group] here have involvement in 
decisions over how their work is organised?’; coded 1 if 
respondent answered 'a lot’ or ‘some’, and coded 0 if response 
was ‘little’ or ‘none’. 
Percentage of the 
workplace’s workforce 
that is highly skilled 
 
Percentage of total workforce who are employees in the 
following three categories: ‘managers and senior officials’, 
‘professional occupations’, and ‘associate professional and 
technical occupations’. The other categories of worker in the 
WERS survey are: ‘‘administrative and secretarial occupations’, 
‘skilled trades occupations’, ‘caring, leisure and other personal 
service occupations’, ‘sales and customer service occupations’, 
‘process, plant and machine operatives and drivers’, and ‘routine 
occupations’. 
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This research included the size of the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the 
total number of employees, to reflect the likelihood that larger workplaces will have more 
formal HR policies in place, including those on EO and DM (Huselid, 1995; Datta et al., 
2005; Guthrie et al., 2009). The presence of EO and DM policies is also likely to be linked to 
the percentage of the workforce that is female, are disabled, or comes from BME groups. The 
research, therefore, included these as controls in the analysis. Public-sector organisations have 
a greater tendency to implement EO and DM policies than private-sector ones, leading to the 
inclusion of a dummy variable in the regressions to capture this. Establishment strategy and 
the value of different groups of workers can be expected to lead to variation in HRM policies 
(Lepak and Snell, 1999). The research focuses on the largest occupational group within the 
establishment; and does not, therefore, examine the differences in HRM policies for various 
employee groups within the workplace. The research captures the extent to which strategy is 
likely to influence the presence of  EO and DM policies, using several variables. In broad 
terms, the variables capture how much the workplace is dependent upon highly skilled 
employees to achieve its objectives. All of the questions relating to the workplace’s strategy 
refer to the largest occupational group within the establishment, reflecting the main activities 
carried out in the unit.  
More specifically, the WERS 2011 survey asks questions on how much variety, 
discretion, control and work design that the employees in the largest occupational group have. 
The variety question is: ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers in the largest 
occupational group] here have variety in their work?’ The responses have been dichotomised. 
If the respondent answered ‘a lot’ or ‘some’, it was coded 1; if respondent answered ‘little’ or 
‘none’, it was coded 0. Workers who have some discretion over their work are more likely to 
be highly skilled; consequently, such workers are more likely to be difficult to replace. Hence, 
the workplace is likely to offer more extensive EO and DM policies to both recruit and retain 
such workers. 
The thesis also draws on the following question: ‘to what extent would you say that 
individual [workers in the largest occupational group] here have discretion over how they do 
their work?’ Responses were coded 1, if the respondent answered ‘a lot’ or ‘some’, and were 
coded 0, if the respondent answered a ‘little’ or ‘none’. Once again, workers with relatively 
high levels of discretion can be expected to use their judgement by drawing on tacit 
knowledge or experience-based skills. This implies that the workplace will see it as important 
to recruit and retain such workers. If workers do not use discretion, it suggests that they have 
skills that can be learnt relatively easily or do not face much variation in their work. 
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Consequently, those workplaces that rely on workers to exercise discretion can be expected to 
implement extensive EO and DM policies to aid retention and to bolster employee morale 
compared to those establishments in which workers have little or no discretion.  
The thesis draws on the following questions to form another control variable ‘to what 
extent would you say that individual [workers in the largest occupational group] here have 
control over the pace at which they work?’ The managers’ responses were coded 1, if the 
answer was ‘a lot’ or ‘some’, and coded 0, if response was ‘little’ or ‘none’. Once again, 
workers who have no control over the pace at which they work are likely to be performing 
relatively repetitive tasks that require more limited skills than those workers who have more 
control over the pace at which they work. The latter can therefore be expected to be more 
difficult to replace. Workplaces can, as a result, be expected to implement more extensive EO 
and DM policies in order to maintain employee satisfaction and to reduce absenteeism and 
quit rates.  
A yet further control variable relating to the workplace’s strategy was based on the 
following question: ‘to what extent would you say that individual [workers in the largest 
occupational group] here have involvement in decisions over how their work is organised?’ 
Those workers who are involved in how work is organised can be expected to have high skills 
than those who do not. Consequently, the workplace is more likely to implement extensive 
EO and DM policies in an attempt to maintain employee morale and to reduce labour 
turnover. Alternatively, the question could also indicate that workplace managers think that it 
is important to treat workers fairly and to give them some say over work design. Either way, a 
variable should be included in the analysis as the responses are likely to be positively 
associated with the use of EO and DM policies within the workplace.   
The final control variable that relates to the workplace’s strategy is the total number of 
highly skilled employees within the workplace. The previous questions that have been used to 
capture the establishment’s strategy all relate to the largest occupational group. This group is 
likely to provide a powerful indication of the primary set of activities that the workplace 
carries out. It was, therefore, important to use questions relating to the largest occupational 
group. However, the focus on this group may neglect other important activities that are 
carried out in the workplace by other groups of workplaces. There are no questions on worker 
discretion etc. for those employees outside the largest occupational group. In order to have an 
indication of broader activities within the workplace, a proxy based on the total percentage of 
high skilled workers is used. ‘High skilled workers’ are defined in this thesis as those that fall 
into the following three WERS categories: ‘managers and senior officials’, ‘professional 
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occupations’, and ‘associate professional and technical occupations’. Consequently, those 
workers within the following categories are not classed as highly skilled: ‘skilled trades 
occupations’, ‘caring, leisure and other personal service occupations’, ‘sales and customer 
service occupations’, ‘process, plant and machine operatives and drivers’, and ‘routine 
occupations’. In reality, of course, some employees in these latter categories will be highly 
skilled, have tacit knowledge, and learn through workplace experience. They, too, will, 
therefore, be difficult to recruit and retain. However, in general, it can be expected that 
employees in the former categories will be more highly skilled than those in the latter ones, 
increasing the likelihood that employers will implement comprehensive EO and DM policies 
(in an effort) to reduce absenteeism and quit rates.  
 
3.4.4 Dependent Variables, Second Stage of Analysis: Absenteeism and Labour Turnover 
Quits 
 
In the second stage of the analysis, this thesis examines the associations between EO 
and DM policies and two measures of establishment performance. Those two measures are 
absenteeism and labour turnover (or quits). The selection of these outcomes is a response to 
concerns expressed about the use of financial measures to capture establishment performance 
(Guest, 2011; Huselid, 1995; Richard and Johnson, 2001). Using such data also has benefits 
compared to the use of ‘objective’ financial measures (Machin and Stewart, 1996; Robinson 
and Pearce, 1988). For example, these measures relate more closely to HR practices than 
more ‘distal’ outcomes, such as profits, that can be affected by a range of factors that are not 
related to either HRM policies or EO or DM measures, including the establishments’ wider 
organisational context (Godard, 2004). Second, within both the HRM and industrial relations 
literatures, there is a concern to place worker-related outcomes, such as absenteeism and 
quits, centre stage (Addison and Belman, 2004; Arthur, 1994; Grund and Schmitt, 2013; 
Guest and Hoque, 1994; Guest, 2011; Guthrie, 2001; Hoque, 1999; Pfeifer, 2011; Ramsay et 
al., 2000; cf. Delery and Doty, 1996; Guest et al., 2003; Huselid, 1995; Wright et al., 1999). 
Finally, workplace profitability may improve when certain HR practices are implemented 
such HR practices, may not, however, increase the well-being of employees (Peccei, 2004) 
this may also be true for EO and DM policies. Absenteeism and quits are, therefore, more 
proximal indicators of the influences of HR policies, including EO and DM practices, on 
establishment performance. 
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I Absenteeism  
 
Employee absenteeism refers to ‘a temporary form of escape [by an employee] from a 
work situation that was viewed as stressful and unpleasant [by that employee]’ (Deery et al., 
2002). It can be proxied by the number of days that employees take unauthorised days off 
(Tüselmann et al., 2007). Although this measure will also capture days when employees are 
genuinely ill, it can be expected that those workplaces with less satisfied employees will have 
higher levels of ‘unwarranted’ absenteeism. In order to measure absenteeism, this research 
used the responses to the following question with the emphasis as it appears in the original 
questionnaire: 
 
Over the last 12 months what percentage of work days was lost through employee 
sickness or absence at this workplace [excluding authorised leave of absence, 
employees away on secondment or courses or days lost through industrial action]?  
 
II Quits or Voluntary Labour Turnover 
 
In line with the recommendations by Shaw et al. (1998) and Batt et al. (2002), this 
study distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary labour turnover. Although several 
factors will influence employee quit rates, such as the opportunities for appropriate work with 
other organisations, voluntary quits will, all other things being equal, reflect how satisfied 
employees are with their current employer. The quit rate (expressed as a percentage) was 
calculated using the responses to two questions from the WERS survey with the emphasis as 
it appears in the original: 
 
In total, how many employees (full- and part-time) were on the payroll at this 
workplace 12 months ago?   
 
And how many of these employees stopped working here, because they left or 
resigned voluntarily? 
 
Both the absenteeism variable and the quit rate variable are not normally distributed 
and are skewed, rendering the use of ordinary least squares inappropriate. This thesis, 
therefore, dichotomises both variables. It does so by taking the arithmetic mean of both 
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variables. Those establishment with an ‘above mean’ absenteeism rate (quit rate) are coded 1; 
those workplaces with a mean or below mean absenteeism rate (quit rate) are coded 0. This 
dichotomisation enables logistic regression to be used, as these do not rest on parametric 
assumption (Field, 2009). These outcomes are, then, in common with the analysis in the first 
stage of this thesis, analysed using logistic regressions. In the second stage of the analysis, in 
order to overcome the problem of multicollinearity between (or the ‘non independence’ of) 
the EO and DM variables, separate regressions are run for each EO and DM policy. All of the 
control variables, outlined above, are included in every one of the regressions. 
Table 3.2 provides the descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the analysis 
in this thesis. The descriptive statistics show the variables used in this research. It contains the 
individual as well as the aggregated measures for direct voice and collective voice.  
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Total number of employees within the workplace 10.00 20746.00 418 1141 
Total number of employees within the workplace (natural log) 2.30 9.94 4.5 1.6 
Percentage of female workers within workforce .00 100.00 52.4 27.9 
Percentage of workers with a disability within workforce .00 90.48 1.6 4.4 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority within workforce .00 100.00 8.5 15.2 
Percentage of total workforce who are employees in highly skilled roles .00 100.00 38.9 29.8 
To what extent would you say that individual workers in the largest occupational 
group here have variety in their work? (1 = ‘a lot’ or ‘some’; 0 = ‘a little’ or ‘none’) 
.00 1.00 .8556 .35159 
Extent to which staff in largest occupational group  have discretion over how they 
work (1 = ‘a lot’ or ‘some’; 0 = ‘a little’ or ‘none’) 
.00 1.00 .7021 .45744 
 Extent to which staff in largest occupational group have control over their pace of 
work (1 = ‘a lot’ or ‘some’; 0 = ‘a little’ or ‘none’) 
.00 1.00 .6322 .48233 
Extent to which staff in largest occupational group are involved in work 
organisation (1 = ‘a lot’ or ‘some’; 0 = ‘a little’ or ‘none’) 
.00 1.00 .7305 .44379 
Does this workplace have a formal written policy on equal opportunities or 
managing diversity (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .9212 .26942 
Does the policy explicitly mention equality of treatment or discrimination on any of 
the grounds Gender (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .8328 .37329 
Does the policy explicitly mention equality of treatment or discrimination on any of 
the grounds Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .8333 .37285 
Does the policy explicitly mention equality of treatment or discrimination on any of 
the grounds Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .8158 .38776 
Do you monitor recruitment and selection by Gender (1 = Yes; 0 = No) .00 1.00 .4479 .49740 
Do you monitor recruitment and selection by Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No) .00 1.00 .4513 .49775 
Do you monitor recruitment and selection by Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No) .00 1.00 .4290 .49506 
Do you review recruitment and selection procedures to identify indirect   
discrimination by Gender (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .3641 .48130 
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 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Do you review recruitment and selection procedures to identify indirect 
discrimination by Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .3621 .48072 
Do you review recruitment and selection procedures to identify indirect 
discrimination by Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .3561 .47896 
Do you monitor promotions by Gender (1 = Yes; 0 = No) .00 1.00 .2223 .41592 
Do you monitor promotions by Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No)  .00 1.00 .2123 .40905 
Do you monitor promotions by Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No) .00 1.00 .1978 .39844 
Do you review promotion procedures to identify indirect discrimination by Gender 
(1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .2245 .41736 
Do you review promotion procedures to identify indirect discrimination by 
Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .2175 .41263 
Do you review promotion procedures to identify indirect discrimination by 
Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .2059 .40448 
Do you review relative pay rates by Gender (1 = Yes; 0 = No) .00 1.00 .1967 .39759 
Do you review relative pay rates by Ethnicity (1 = Yes; 0 = No) .00 1.00 .1305 .33689 
Do you review relative pay rates by Disability (1 = Yes; 0 = No) .00 1.00 .1189 .32377 
Private sector = Public limited company, Private limited company, Company 
limited by guarantee and partnerships; Public sector = Trust/Charity, Body 
established by Royal Charter; Co-operative / Mutual / Friendly society, 
Government-owned limited company/Nationalised industry/Trading Public 
Corporation; Public service agency, Other non-trading public corporation, Quasi 
Autonomous National Government Organisation (QUANGO), Local/Central 
Government (including NHS and Local Education Authorities) 
.00 1.00 .5771 .49415 
Indirect voice: At least one union recognized for negotiating pay and conditions (1 
= Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .4914 .50005 
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which 
management communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? Notice 
Boards (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .7957 .40453 
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which 
management communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? 
Systematic use of management chain/cascading of information (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .7203 .44895 
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 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which 
management communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? Regular 
newsletters distributed to all employees (1 = Yes; 0 = No)  
.00 1.00 .5790 .49384 
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which 
management communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? Regular 
use of e-mail to all employees (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .6662 .47169 
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways in which 
management communicates or consults with employees at this workplace? 
Information posted on company intranet (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .5953 .49096 
Direct voice component ‘information sharing’: notice board + management chain 
+ newsletters + email + intranet 
.00 5.00 3.3565 1.42910 
Attitude Surveys: Have you or a third party conducted a formal survey of your 
employees’ views or opinions during the past two years? (1 = Yes; 0 = No)  
.00 1.00 .6425 .47937 
Besides the schemes we have discussed are there any other ways 3) Suggest 
Suggestion schemes 
.00 1.00 .3831 .48625 
Meetings: Do you have meetings between senior managers and the whole 
workforce (either altogether or group by group)? (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .8287 .37690 
Direct voice component ‘direct consultation’: attitude survey + suggestion schemes 
+ meetings 
.00 6.00 3.7085 1.74811 
Teams are given responsibility for specific products or services YES 1  No 0 .00 1.00 .8031 .39779 
Problem Solving Groups: Do you have groups of non-managerial employees at this 
workplace that solve specific problems or discuss aspects of performance or 
quality? (1 = Yes; 0 = No)   
.00 1.00 .3191 .46623 
Direct voice component ‘direct participation’: partly autonomous teamwork + 
quality circles/problem solving group 
.00 10.00 5.6105 3.26520 
Total direct voice measures in place: direct participation + direct consultation + 
information sharing 
.00 21.00 12.6755 4.93550 
Direct voice measures - dichotomous variable - 0 below mean - 1 above mean .00 1.00 .5204 .49971 
Preparation for bleak house analysis - only those with below mean DV measures 
included 
.00 12.00 8.5010 3.10645 
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 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Direct voice measures amongst establishments with below-mean direct voice 
measures - dichotomous variable - 0 below mean - 1 above mean 
.00 1.00 .5893 .49221 
Are there any committees of managers and employees at this workplace primarily 
concerned with consultation, rather than negotiation? These committees may be 
called joint consultative committees, works councils or representative forums (1 = 
Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .3752 .48429 
Apart from the union representatives or stewards, and apart from health and safety 
matters, are there any employees here who act as representatives of other employees 
in dealings with management? (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 
.00 1.00 .1659 .37211 
Joint consultative committees and non-union employee representation 2 BOTH 1 
ONE OR OTHER 0  NEITHER  
.00 2.00 .5411 .71518 
Non-union collective voice BOTH JCC and Non-union employee rep .00 1.00 .1315 .33799 
Union recognition or  non-union collective voice (JCC and non-union employee 
representation) 2 BOTH or ONE OR OTHER 1 EITHER UNIONS OR NER 
VOICE 0 NEITHER 
.00 2.00 .6228 .63133 
Dual voice DICHOTMOUS 1 dual voice 0 no dual voice system in place .00 1.00 .3781 .48504 
Unions help find ways to improve workplace performance 1 strongly agree or agree 
0 neither agree nor disagree or disagree or strongly disagree  
.00 1.00 .3732 .48378 
Partnership approach 1 dual voice and positive towards unions 0 dual voice but 
negative or indifferent towards unions 
.00 1.00 .5781 .49418 
Notes: N = 1946. Source: WERS 2011; own calculations. 
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3.5 Logistic Regressions 
 
This thesis uses logistic regressions in both stages of the analysis. The first stage, 
examines the links between voice and EO and DM; logistic regressions are necessary, as the 
responses to the relevant questions in the WERS survey are binary. In other words, 
respondents can answer yes or no. (Other responses, such as ‘don’t know’ or ‘refuse to 
answer’ have been excluded from the analysis. The majority of respondents answered the 
relevant questions with either a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’; only a few did not.) It is appropriate to use 
logistic regression, as other regression techniques effectively ignore the fact that the outcome 
cannot go below zero and above one, making the beta coefficients inaccurate (Field, 2009). 
As the dependent variable is dichotomous, several assumptions that underpin standard linear 
regressions will not hold. More specifically, with a binary outcome variable, assumptions of 
homoscedasticity, linearity, and normality will not be appropriate, leading to the estimates 
derived from ordinary least square regression being inefficient (Menard, 2002). 
In the second stage of the analysis, which examines the associations between the EO 
policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, the data are continuous, 
making the use of ordinary least squares regressions possible. However, an analysis of the 
absenteeism and quit data using SPSS revealed that both are not normally distributed. As 
noted above, this makes the use of ordinary least square regressions, which are based on 
parametric assumptions about the data, inappropriate in these circumstances (Pallant, 2010). 
The research, therefore, dichotomises these variables, making the use of logistic regressions 
possible and desirable (Menard, 2002). 
Logistic regressions are able to overcome the problems associated with the use of 
ordinary least square regressions for binary dependent variables. Logistic regressions do not 
rely on assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity and normality (Field, 2009). However, 
logistic regressions, in common with other regression techniques, rest on the assumption that 
the independent variables are independent from one another; that is, that the predictor 
variables do not suffer from multicollinearity. In order to check for this possibility in this 
research, tolerance values were checked in both stages of the research for this thesis. Two 
measures indicate if multicollinearity is a problem; they are tolerance and variance inflation 
factor (VIF). A tolerance value of less than 0.10 and a VIF value of more than 10 indicate that 
the data suffer from multicollinearity (Pallant, 2010). All of the regressions reported in this 
thesis are free from multicollinearity. All of the tolerance and VIF values were within 
acceptable limits. It should, however, be noted that when a logistic regression was run in the 
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second stage of the analysis that contained all of the EO/DM and control variables, the 
tolerance and VIF values indicated that multicollinearity was a problem. It was, therefore, 
decided to run separate logistic regressions in the second stage of the analysis to overcome 
this problem. By doing so, this analysis will also enable individual practices to be scrutinised, 
as some EO and DM policies may be more beneficial, in terms of being associated with lower 
absenteeism rates and labour turnover, than others.  
In the first stage of the analysis, the logistic regression is performed as a hierarchical 
model. In other words, the control variables are entered in a separate regression and then the 
control variables plus the voice variables were entered, enabling the analysis to examine the 
differences between the two models. The procedure, therefore, enables an examination of the 
change in the overall goodness of fit of the model. If the voice variables do not help to explain 
much more of the variation in the outcome variables, then their links to those outcome 
variables are marginal. Additionally, if the goodness of fit of the model with the control 
variables and the voice variables is not significantly improved than the model with just the 
control variables in it, then the voice variables have relatively limited explanatory power.  
This thesis examines the associations between the different voice types and EO and 
DM policies as well as between EO and DM policies and absenteeism and quits using two 
models for each regression. The first model contains only the control variables. The second 
model contains the control variables plus the ‘variables of interest’ (i.e. the voice categories, 
in the first stage, or the EO/DM policy, in the second stage of the analysis.) 
In logistic regressions, the goodness of fit can be measured by Omnibus Chi square 
tests and the Hosmer Lemeshow test. If the model fits the data well, the Chi squared test 
statistic should be less than 0.05, and the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic should be greater 
than 0.05 (Field, 2009). The thesis does not report the results of the Chi square tests, as these 
reveal if one of the variables that are added in the second model is statistically significant. As 
this research focuses on all of the variables added in the second model to see if each one is 
statistically significant, the Chi square measure is redundant.  
The amount of variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the model is 
captured by two measures in logistic regressions. These are Cox and Snell R square and 
Nagelkerke pseudo R square (Pallant, 2010; Field, 2009). The Nagelkerke pseudo R square 
result is based on the Cox and Snell R square measure; however, unlike the Cox and Snell 
indicator, the Nagelkerke result can vary along the whole scale of 0 to 1. If a score of 1 were 
to be obtained in the Nagelkerke pseudo R square measure, the model would explain 100 per 
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cent of the variation in the outcome variable. Conversely, a figure of 0 would indicate that the 
model explains none of the variation in the outcome.  
To calculate the statistical significance of the individual independent variables, SPSS 
uses the Wald statistic. There are two possible limitations to this statistic (Cohen et al., 2002). 
First, if the regression ß coefficient is large, the standard error of the coefficient is also usually 
large. This can result in type II errors (or when the null hypothesis is false, but is not rejected). 
Second, the Wald statistics can be biased if the data being analysed is ‘thin’. The second 
condition is not present in the analyses in this thesis as it draws on large sample sizes and the 
variables are always well ‘populated’. As will be seen, the first potential problem does not 
occur either.  
For the voice variables, the category ‘yes’ is always coded 1 – with the exception of 
the bleak house variable, where the ‘workplaces with above-mean direct voice mechanism in 
the minimalist voice category’ have a value of 1. Consequently, in the first stage of the 
analysis, ß coefficients with positive values mean that the voice category is associated with an 
increased likelihood, compared to workplaces in the reference category, that the establishment 
will have the relevant EO/DM policy. If it has a negative ß coefficient, the workplace is 
associated with a lower likelihood, when compared to the reference category, that the 
workplace will have the relevant EO/DM policy. Obviously, the statistical significance of 
these associations will depend on the Wald statistic. In the second stage of the analysis, 
positive ß coefficients indicate that the EO/DM policies are associated with above-mean 
absenteeism rates and quit rates. 
The ß coefficients in logistic regressions cannot be interpreted directly as they can in 
ordinary least square regressions. In other words, the amount by which the outcome increases 
when a particular voice category (or EO/DM policy in the second stage of the analysis) cannot 
be calculated by using the value of the ß coefficient. Instead, the ß coefficient refers to the 
change in odds ratio. The ratio indicates the change in odds of being in the higher outcome 
category (having a particular EO/DM policy in the first stage, and having above-mean 
absenteeism or quits in the second stage when the value of the predictor is in the higher 
category (Pallant, 2010; Field, 2009). 
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Chapter 4 - Voice and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies: An 
Empirical Analysis with Minimal Voice Workplaces as the Reference Category  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the likelihood that workplaces with different voice 
characteristics (direct voice, collective voice, and dual voice systems) are more likely than 
those with minimal voice to have different EO and DM policies in place (see Appendix A.1 
for summary of results). The reference category is the minimal voice category of workplace. 
Many of the establishments in the reference group do have some voice mechanisms in place – 
they are not completely ‘voice free’. They do not, however, have any collective voice 
mechanisms in place and they have a below-mean score on the direct voice index. Such 
workplaces may, therefore, have some direct-voice channels in place, including the use of 
newsletters or the intranet to communicate with employees. As noted above, it can be 
expected that all workplaces that fall into the direct voice, collective voice, or dual voice 
categories are more likely than those in the reference category to have EO and DM policies in 
place. This is because voice enables employees to raise concerns with employers. If workers 
are concerned about issues surrounding the equal treatment of workers, employees can be 
expected to raise these concerns using the voice mechanisms that are available to them. 
Managers, in general, can then be expected to respond to these demands by implementing 
various EO or DM policies to meet those concerns. Of course, causality may run from EO or 
DM policies to voice mechanisms. In other words, managers who introduce EO or DM 
policies within their workplaces may be more likely than those who do not, to introduce 
various voice mechanisms, such as having a relatively high number of direct voice channels. 
(It should be noted that the subsequent chapter examines the differences between different 
types of workplace that above-average levels of direct voice, collective voice, and dual-voice 
systems by using those establishments with direct voice mechanisms in place as the reference 
category.) 
Of course, the likelihood of any particular workplace having a specific EO and DM 
policy in place will not just depend upon the type of voice mechanisms that are in place. In 
particular, larger workplaces, as measured by the natural log of the total number of 
employees, are more likely than smaller workplace to have EO and DM policies in place as 
formal HRM policies in general are more common in such establishments (Budhwar and 
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Debrah, 2009; Nguyen and Bryant, 2004). Similarly, workplaces with a higher percentage of 
highly skilled employees can be expected to have a greater chance of having EO and DM 
policies in place than those workplaces with lower percentages of highly skilled employees, 
as EO and DM policy may be a way that senior managers can signal to all employees that 
they wish to treat them fairly.  
Please note, this thesis refers to BME employees as workers from an ethnic minority, 
DM as managing diversity, sex as gender and disabled people/employees as workers with a 
disability (WERS uses the word ‘disability’ to refer to handicaps, impairments, and long-term 
illnesses or health problems) in all the empirical chapters as this is the terminology used in the 
WERS data.  
 
4.2 The Results 
 
Table 4.1 shows the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is the 
presence or absence of a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity. 
Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 1779 establishments have such a policy, 157 do not. 
There is, therefore, relatively little variation in the outcome variable. Model 1 in the Table 
contains the control variables. Model 2 contains the control variable plus the explanatory 
voice variables. The significance of Hosmer Lemeshow test statistics for both models 
indicates that they are not a good fit for the data.  They are both less than 0.05. This is, 
perhaps, not surprising as the majority of establishments that are analysed have a formal equal 
opportunities or DM policy. Therefore, there is little variation in the outcome variable to 
explain. It also suggests that there is a need to examine more specific policies in order to 
ascertain how ‘embedded’ EO and DM policies are in workplaces: many places may have a 
generic formal policy, but may not implement more specific ones in key areas. The models 
do, however, suggest that some of the variation in the outcome variable can be explained by 
the models: the Cox and Snell R squared (0.102) and the Nagelkerke R squared (0.238) are 
relatively high for Model 1 and increase to 0.129 and 0.299 respectively for Model 2. The 
increase in the Nagelkerke R square between the two models of just over six percentage 
points indicates that the voice variables help to explain a reasonable amount of variation in the 
outcome variable (the presence of a formal EO and DM policy).  
As Model 2 for this particular logistic regression does not fit the data well, the results 
of the regression should be treated with caution. The analysis from Table 4.1 reveals that 
those workplaces that have above-mean number of direct-voice measures, that have 
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collective-voice measures only, and those that have dual-voice systems in place are more 
likely than those establishments with ‘minimalist voice systems’ in place to be associated 
with the workplace having a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing 
diversity. The associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level for the three 
voice categories (above-mean direct voice, collective voice only, dual-voice systems). This is, 
in many ways, unsurprising: those workplaces that provide minimal voice mechanisms to 
their employees are more likely to implement policies that do not hinder management’s 
prerogative. A written policy on equal opportunities or DM may do that. The results are also 
consistent with the descriptive statistics above: only a relatively small percentage of 
workplaces do not have a formal policy on equal opportunities or DM. Those that do not have 
such a policy can be expected to limit the voice that they provide to their employees. The 
concerns of employees would appear to be downplayed. 
What is more surprising, perhaps, is the lack of differences between the three voice 
categories against which establishments with minimalist voice systems are being compared. 
To be sure, a more robust comparison of any potential differences between establishments 
with direct-voice measures in place, on the one hand, and those with either collective voice 
only or dual-voice systems, on the other, will be carried out in the next chapter. The results 
here suggest that the presence of any of these voice categories is associated with an increased 
likelihood of the establishment having a written EO and DM policy in place.  
There are three other independent variables that are associated in a statistically 
significant way with a written equal-opportunity policy. The first is percentage of the 
establishment’s workforce that is female. It is positively related to the presence of a formal 
written EO or DM policy; it is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the 
percentage of women in a workplace, the more likely that workplace is to have a written EO 
or DM policy. This is in-line with expectations. Workplaces with a large percentage of female 
workers may be keen to ensure their fair treatment. A written policy on equal opportunities 
may help to achieve this. Alternatively, those workplaces with such policies in place may be a 
more attractive place to work. The natural log of the total number of employees is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. It is positively associated with the outcome. This is as 
expected: the larger the workplace, the more likely it is to have formal HR policies in place, 
including equal opportunities and DM. Another independent variable that is statistically 
significant is the extent to which employees within the largest occupational group in the 
establishment have a lot or some discretion over how they work. It is negatively linked to the 
presence of a written policy. This is a surprising result, even if it is statistically significant at 
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the ten-per-cent level. In other words, if staff in the largest occupational group have a lot or 
some discretion, the workplace is less likely to have a formal EO or DM policy in place. This 
is not as expected. Those workplaces that draw on the ideas and commitment of their 
employees – in other words, those that provide their workers with a high degree of discretion 
– can be expected to ensure that staff are treated fairly. It is, however, best to address the 
overall importance of this variable in explaining the likelihood of an establishment having a 
formal policy on equal opportunities in place until other more detailed aspects of this policy 
have been covered. As noted above, only a relatively small percentage of workplaces do not 
have a written EO or DM policy. It is, consequently, likely to be difficult to detect differences 
between workplaces that do and do not have EO or DM policies at this level of aggregation. 
More disaggregated analysis of different EO or DM policy is required. 
It is noteworthy that some of the other independent variables in Model 2 are not 
statistically significant. For instance, the percentage of the workforce that has a long-term 
disability that affects the amount or type of work that they can do or that comes from a non-
white ethnic group are not associated in a statistically significant way to the presence of a 
formal policy on EO or DM. There would also appear to be no differences between 
workplaces in the public sector and those in the private sector in terms of the likelihood of 
having an EO or DM policy. Increasing the amount of discretion that employees have is 
associated with a decreased likelihood of the workplace having a formal written policy on EO 
or DM.  
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Table 4.1 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Having a 
Formal Written Policy on Equal Opportunities or Managing Diversity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -1.246** .288 -1.031* .357 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.894*** 2.445 .623*** 1.864 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
.009*** 1.009 .009*** 1.009 
Percentage of workers with a 
disability within workforce 
.097** 1.101 .073 1.076 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
-.001 .999 -.002 .998 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 
1) 
-.879*** .415 -.392 .676 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.430* 1.537 .393 1.481 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.429* .651 -.446* .640 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.076 .927 -.084 .919 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.475** 1.608 .321 1.379 
Percentages of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.003 1.003 .000 1.000 
Direct voice only 
  
2.508*** 12.283 
Collective voice only   1.182*** 3.260 
Dual-voice system 
  
1.565*** 4.781 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .102, Nagelkerke R Square = .238; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .129, Nagelkerke R Square = .299, ‘*’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 10 % level; ‘**’, at the 5% level; and ‘***’ at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.2 shows the results of a logistic regression for which the outcome variable is 
the establishment monitors recruitment and selection by gender. Of the 1946 workplaces in 
the analysis, 847 monitor recruitment and selection based on gender; 1099 do not. Model 1 
contains the control variables; Model 2 contains the control variable plus the voice 
explanatory variables. Both models fit the data well, as the significance of Hosmer Lemeshow 
test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both models.  
The Cox and Snell R squared for Model 1 is 0.301; model 1 explains approximately 
40 per cent (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variation in the dependent variable. The Cox and 
Snell R squared for Model 2 increases to 0.314; the Nagelkerke R squared for Model 2 
increases to approximately 42 per cent. This is a relatively high figure compared to related 
results in other studies (e.g. Riley et al., 2008). The change in the chi-squared test for the 
model coefficients between Model 1 and Model 2 is statistically significant at the one-per-
cent level. This indicates that Model 2, which includes the voice variables, is better, in a 
statistically significant way, at explaining variation in the outcome variable than Model 1, 
which just contains the control variables. In all of the following regressions, Model 2 is better, 
in a statistically significant way, than Model 1 at explaining variation in the relevant outcome 
variable. 
Compared to workplaces with minimal voice mechanisms in place, those with direct-
voice measures, collective-voice measures or dual-voice systems are more likely to monitor 
recruitment and selection by gender. In all cases, the association is statistically significant at 
the one-per-cent level. Those workplaces that limit employee voice are more likely to adopt 
policies that do not constrain or impede management’s decision-making in any way. 
Monitoring recruitment and selection in this way could lead to management’s prerogative 
being restricted. The differences between the levels of statistical significance – if there are any 
– between the various voice variables and the relevant EO and DM policy will be explored in 
the next chapter. In that chapter, the same regressions are run; however, the reference 
category is the direct voice category rather than the minimal voice category. This will enable 
statistically significant differences between important voice categories to be identified.  
In Model 2, the variable that captures the percentage of the female employees in the 
establishment is statistically significant. This suggests that there is a link between the 
percentage of female employees in the workplace and the likelihood that the establishment 
monitors recruitment and selection by gender. This association is statistically significant at the 
five-per-cent level. There is also a statistically significant association between the percentage 
of the workforce that has a disability and monitoring recruitment and selection by gender. 
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This relationship is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The associations are 
positive. It is not clear why higher percentages of workers with a disability should be 
associated with this outcome; it could, however, reflect the fact that workplaces that do 
monitor recruitment and selection by gender are more attractive places to work for those with 
a disability. It can be expected that these relationships will hold when it comes to monitoring 
recruitment and selection by disability. These relationships do hold as will be shown in Table 
4.4. 
In Model 2, the natural log of the total number of employees is statistically significant 
at the one-per-cent level. It is positively associated with the outcome. This is as expected: the 
larger the workplace, the more likely it is to have formal HR policies in place, including equal 
opportunities and DM. Private sector establishments are less likely than those in the public 
sector to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. The link is statistically significant at 
the one-per-cent level. Those workplaces that have a higher percentage of skilled employees 
are more likely to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. The link is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. These results can be explained by the fact that such 
workplaces are likely to rely on committed employees. Treating all employees fairly and 
being seen to treat all employees fairly is likely to be important. Other independent variables, 
including those variables that capture some of the key characteristics of how employees 
within the largest occupation group work are treated, are not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.2 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Model and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Gender Bias 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.267*** .038 -3.439*** .032 
Total number of employees (natural log) .591*** 1.805 .492*** 1.636 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
.005** 1.005 .006** 1.006 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .055*** 1.056 .047*** 1.048 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.004 1.004 .004 1.004 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.298*** .273 -1.124*** .325 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.280 1.322 .238 1.268 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.008 .992 .028 1.028 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.093 .911 -.108 .897 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.088 1.092 -.007 .993 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.011*** 1.011 .010*** 1.010 
Direct voice only 
  
.951*** 2.590 
Collective voice only   .561*** 1.752 
Dual-voice system   .919*** 2.507 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Squared = 0.301; Nagelkerke R Squared = 0.403; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = 0.314; Nagelkerke R Square = 0.422; ‘*’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 10 % level; ‘**’, at the 5% level; and ‘***’ at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.3 shows the results of a logistic regression to assess the links between the 
independent variable and the workplace monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. Of the 
1946 workplaces in the analysis, 854 monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity; 1092 do 
not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 2, the control variables and the voice 
explanatory variables. Both models provide a good fit for the data (Hosmer Lemeshow test 
statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05 for both models). Model 1 can explain a relatively 
high degree of the variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 
approximately 0.415). Model 2 accounts for 43 per cent of the variation in the outcome 
variable (Nagelkerke R squared = 0.428), a slight increase in explaining the outcome variable 
(monitoring recruitment and selection by ethnicity).  
Compared to those workplaces with minimal levels of voice, those with direct-voice 
measures in places, with collective voice and with a dual-voice system are more likely to 
monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. For workplaces in the direct-voice category 
and for those with dual voice, this association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent 
level. For establishments in the collective-voice category, the association is statistically 
significant at the five-per-cent level. This is an interesting finding that will be explored in 
greater detail in the next chapter. It suggests that we can be more certain about the association 
between, first, direct voice and the outcome and, second, dual voice and the outcome than we 
can about the link between collective voice and the monitoring of recruitment and selection 
by ethnicity within workplaces. 
The natural log of the total number of employees is statistically significant at the one-
per-cent level. It is positively associated with the outcome. This is as expected the larger the 
workplace, the more likely it is to have formal HR policies in place, including equal 
opportunities and DM. 
The higher the percentage of female workers in the establishment’s workforce and the 
greater the proportion of the workforce who have a disability, the higher the likelihood that 
the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. Both associations are 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Once again, private sector workplaces are 
less likely than public sector ones to implement such a policy. The higher the percentage of 
highly skilled employees within a workplace, the greater the likelihood that the establishment 
will monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. This link is statistically significant at the 
one-per-cent level. It can be explained by the fact that those workplaces that rely on highly 
skilled employees are more likely to wish to retain those employees. Ensuring that 
recruitment is not biased by ethnicity may help to achieve that objective.    
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Table 4.3 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection Based on Ethnicity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B 
Exp(B
) 
Constant -3.184*** .041 -3.305*** .037 
Total number of employees (natural log) .588*** 1.800 .502*** 1.652 
Percentage of female workers  .005** 1.005 .006*** 1.006 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .057*** 1.059 .050*** 1.051 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.005 1.005 .005 1.005 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.373*** .253 -1.222*** .295 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.297* 1.346 .261 1.299 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
-.088 .915 -.060 .942 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.080 .923 -.092 .912 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.019 1.019 -.062 .939 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.012*** 1.012 .012*** 1.012 
Direct voice only 
  
.780*** 2.182 
Collective voice only   .455** 1.576 
Dual-voice system   .772*** 2.165 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = 0.310, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.415; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .319, Nagelkerke R Square =.428; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.4 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitors recruitment and selection by disability. Of 
the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 809 monitor recruitment and selection based on 
disability; 1137 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 2 encompasses 
these and the voice explanatory variables. Both models perform well and provide a good fit 
for the data (the Hosmer Lemeshow statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05 for both 
models). Model 1 accounts for a comparatively high proportion of the variability in the 
dependent variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.409). Model 2 accounts for a higher 
percentage (Nagelkerke R squared = 0.426). The increase in the Nagelkerke R square between 
the two models is approximately one-and-a half percentage points, which indicates that the 
voice variables help to explain some of the variation in the outcome variable (monitors 
recruitment and selection by disability).  
Once again, workplaces with direct-voice measures, those that have collective voice, 
and those that have dual-voice systems are all more likely than those with minimal levels of 
voice to monitor recruitment and selection based on disability. All associations are 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. These relationships conform to theoretical 
expectations that granting employees a voice, in whatever form, is likely to lead to policies 
that reflect employees’ preferences in an improved way.  
The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the number of employees, 
the more likely it is to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The greater the percentage of the workforce that is 
female, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. 
This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the proportion 
of workers with a disability within a workplace, the greater the chances of the workplace 
monitoring recruitment and selection by disability. This link is statistically significant at the 
one-per-cent level. This association may reflect the fact that workplaces with such policies are 
more attractive places to work or may reflect pressures from workers with a disability within a 
workplace pushing for such a policy. Once again, private sector organisations are less likely 
than publicsector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This negative 
relationship is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. 
Those workplaces where employees within the largest occupational group have a lot 
of, or some, discretion are more likely than those where staff have little or no discretion to 
monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This link is statistically significant at the one-
per-cent level. Similarly, the higher the proportion of employees who are highly skilled within 
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a workplace, the greater the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and 
selection by disability. The association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. 
These latter two associations may reflect the desire of workplaces that grant their employees 
some discretion or autonomy over how they carry out their work tasks and that have a high 
percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled to retain them. Having recruitment 
procedures in place that aim to ensure that a particular group is not discriminated against may 
help to achieve that objective. All other independent variables, including the percentage of the 
workforce with a disability, are not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.4 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection Based on Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.171*** .042 -3.353*** .035 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.527*** 1.694 .431*** 1.539 
Percentage of female workers  .005** 1.005 .005** 1.005 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .077*** 1.080 .069*** 1.071 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.003 1.003 .003 1.003 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 
1) 
-1.444*** .236 -1.275*** .279 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.436** 1.546 .395** 1.484 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.016 .984 .021 1.021 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.013 .987 -.028 .972 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.103 1.108 .011 1.011 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.010*** 1.011 .010*** 1.010 
Direct voice only 
  
.927*** 2.526 
Collective voice only   .547*** 1.728 
Dual-voice system   .916*** 2.499 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square =.304, Nagelkerke R Square =.409; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .317, Nagelkerke R Square =.426; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.5 shows the results of a logistic regression that assess the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitors recruitment and selection based for 
indirect gender discrimination. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 697 monitors 
recruitment and selection based for indirect gender discrimination 1249 do not. Model 1 
contains the control variables only; Model 2 encompasses these and the voice explanatory 
variables. Model 1 does not fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s 
significance is less than 0.05 (it equals .023). Model 2 performs better as its Hosmer 
Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05). Model 2 accounts for a 
comparatively high proportion of the variability in the dependent variable (Nagelkerke R 
squared = 0.314).  
Once again, workplaces with direct-voice measures, those that have collective voice, 
and those that have dual-voice systems are all more likely than those with minimal levels of 
voice to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender bias. All associations are 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. These relationships conform to theoretical 
expectations that granting employees a voice, in whatever form, is likely to lead to policies 
that reflect employees’ preferences in an improved way. 
The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the number of employees, 
the more likely it is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender bias. This is 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the proportion of workers with a 
disability within a workplace, the greater the chances of the workplace monitoring recruitment 
and selection for indirect discrimination against women. This link is statistically significant at 
the one-per-cent level. This association may reflect the fact that workplaces with such policies 
are more attractive places to work or may reflect pressures from workers with a disability 
within a workplace pushing for such a policy.  
Once again, private-sector organisations are less likely than public-sector ones to 
monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against women. This negative 
relationship is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Similarly, the higher the 
proportion of employees who are highly skilled within a workplace, the greater the likelihood 
that the establishment will monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination 
against women. The association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This latter 
association may reflect the desire of workplaces that have a high percentage of the workforce 
that is highly skilled to retain them. Having recruitment procedures in place that aim to ensure 
that a particular group is not discriminated against may help to achieve that objective. All 
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other independent variables, including the percentage of the workforce with a disability, are 
not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.5 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection Based on Indirect Gender Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.940*** .053 -3.146*** .043 
Total number of employees (natural log) .434*** 1.543 .336*** 1.400 
Percentage of female workers  .002 1.002 .003 1.003 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .049*** 1.050 .043*** 1.044 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority 
.000 1.000 .000 1.000 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.924*** .397 -.684*** .505 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.060 1.062 .023 1.023 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.127 1.136 .175 1.191 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.130 .878 -.153 .858 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.154 1.167 .076 1.079 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.012*** 1.012 .011*** 1.011 
Direct voice only   .605*** 1.831 
Collective voice only   .514*** 1.671 
Dual-voice system   .938*** 2.554 
Notes: N = 1946; Cox & Snell R Square = .217; Nagelkerke R Square = .298; Model 2: Cox 
& Snell R Square = .229; Nagelkerke R Square = .314; ‘***’ denotes statistical significance 
at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.6 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect 
discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. Of the 1946 workplaces in the 
regression, 694 monitor recruitment and selection in this way; 1252 do not. Model 1 contains 
the control variables; Model 2 the control and voice variables. The models fit the data well (in 
both cases, the Hosmer Lemeshow statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05). The amount of 
variation in the outcome variable explained by Model 2 is approximately 32 per cent 
(Nagelkerke R squared = 0.321). This compares favourably to related studies (Riley et al., 
2008).  
Those workplaces with direct-voice mechanisms in place, collective voice, and dual-
voice systems are more likely than those with minimal voice to monitor recruitment and 
selection for indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. The association 
between direct voice and the outcome policy, and the link between dual voice and the 
outcome are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The link between collective 
voice and the monitoring of recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against 
ethnic-minority workers is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. These results are 
in line with expectations: those workplaces that have above-mean scores for direct voice, 
those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely to 
have policies in place that ensure workers are treated the same as each other, than those 
establishments that have below-mean scores for direct-voice mechanisms. Employers in 
workplaces with no collective voice and below-mean scores for direct-voice measures are 
likely to be free from as many constraints on their decision-making abilities as possible. 
Consequently, having policies that monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
discrimination could act as impediments to their decision making if that information is used to 
achieve outcomes that they do not prioritise. However, the differences between the levels of 
statistical significance between, on the one hand, direct voice and dual voice, and collective 
voice, on the other, suggest that we can be more certain about the link between the former two 
voice categories and the outcome than we can about the link between collective voice and the 
outcome. This will be explored in more detail in the next chapter when the direct-voice 
category is used as the reference group in the logistic regressions.  
The larger the workplace, the more likely it is to monitor recruitment and selection for 
indirect discrimination against workers with an ethnic background. This link is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. This conforms to previous findings. The higher the 
percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the more likely the establishment is 
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to implement such a policy. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent 
level. There is no statistically significant link between this EO and DM policy and, first, the 
percentage of the workforce that is female and, second, the percentage of the workforce from 
an ethnic minority. Again, this is somewhat surprising. It suggests that it is the presence of a 
higher proportion of workers with a disability rather than those who are female or from an 
ethnic minority who account for the adoption of this policy. If causality runs in the opposite 
direction, it could be that workers with a disability are more aware of such policies than are 
workers from an ethnic minority.  
Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than their public-sector 
counterparts to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against those 
from an ethnic minority. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. 
The higher the percentage of skilled employees in the workforce, the more likely it is that the 
establishment will adopt this policy.  
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Table 4.6 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection Based on Indirect Discrimination based on Ethnicity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.993*** .050 -3.193*** .041 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.447*** 1.564 .352*** 1.422 
Percentage of female workers  .002 1.002 .003 1.003 
Percentage of workers with a 
disability  
.049*** 1.050 .042*** 1.043 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.000 1.000 .000 1.000 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 
1) 
-.940*** .391 -.710*** .492 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have variety in their work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ 
= 0) 
.018 1.018 -.020 .981 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have discretion over how they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ 
or ‘none’ = 0) 
.122 1.130 .168 1.183 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have control over the pace at 
which they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.126 .882 -.148 .863 
Workers in largest occupational 
group are involved in work design (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ 
= 0) 
.214 1.239 .136 1.145 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.011*** 1.011 .011*** 1.011 
Direct voice only 
  
.621*** 1.862 
Collective voice only   .502** 1.653 
Dual-voice system   .925*** 2.521 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .222; Nagelkerke R Square = .305; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .233; Nagelkerke R Square = .321; ‘*’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 10 % level; ‘**’, at the 5% level; and ‘***’ at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.7 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect 
discrimination against workers with a disability. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 
681 monitor recruitment in this way; 1265 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; 
Model 2 the control and voice variables. Model 1 does not fit the data well as the Hosmer 
Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is less than 0.05 (it equals .024). Model 2 performs 
better as its Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05. Model 2 
explains approximately 32 per cent of the variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R 
squared equals 0.319). This compares well to related studies (Riley et al., 2008).  
Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, 
and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of 
voice to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a 
disability. This conforms to the theoretical implications. Those workplaces with minimal 
voice can be expected to emphasise management’s prerogative and, therefore, employers will 
be less concerned with treating workers equitably than those establishments that offer workers 
some voice – either direct, collective, or both.  
The larger the establishment, the more likely it is to monitor recruitment and selection 
for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This relationship is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. This relationship is not a surprising result as larger 
workplaces tend to have more formal HRM policies and to implement what might be 
considered to be ‘best practices’ (Budwhar and Debrah, 2009; Nguyen and Bryant, 2004). The 
higher the percentage of women in the establishment’s workforce and the higher the 
percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the more likely the establishment is 
to monitor recruitment and selection in this way. The former relationship is statistically 
significant at the five-per-cent level; the latter, the one-per-cent level. Both of these findings 
suggest two possible explanations. First, higher percentages of female workers or employees 
with a disability lead to pressures within firms to implement policies that reflect the views of 
these groups in an improved way. For example, workplaces with a high percentage of 
employees with a disability may respond to the concerns of these workers and implement 
policies that aim to enhance the fair treatment of all employees. Alternatively, workplaces 
with these policies in place could be more attractive to such employees. The link between 
workers with a disability and all regressions that examine indirect discrimination suggests 
either that this group of employees is more able to encourage employers to monitor indirect 
forms of discrimination or that this group of workers is more aware and ‘sensitive’ to the 
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presence or absence of policies to monitor indirect discrimination than either female 
employees or those from an ethnic minority. 
Private sector organisations are, once again, less likely to monitor recruitment and 
selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability than their public-sector 
counterparts. This relationship is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher 
the percentage of highly skilled employees within a workplace, the more likely it is to monitor 
recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This 
link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more discretion that employees in 
the largest occupational group have, the more likely the establishment is to monitor 
recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This 
association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Again, these latter two 
associations are likely to arise because of the desire of employers who are more reliant on 
highly skilled employees than those who are not to attract and retain the most appropriately 
qualified staff. Having such policies in place could be one way to achieve this.  
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Table 4.7 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection Based on Indirect Discrimination based on Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.953*** .052 -3.169*** .042 
Total number of employees 
(natural log) 
.413*** 1.511 .315*** 1.370 
Percentage of female workers  .004* 1.004 .005** 1.005 
Percentage of workers with a 
disability  
.055*** 1.057 .048*** 1.049 
Percentage of workers from an 
ethnic minority  
.001 1.001 .001 1.001 
Private-sector dummy variable 
(yes = 1) 
-.959*** .383 -.726*** .484 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have variety in their work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.066 .936 -.111 .895 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have discretion over how 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.236 1.266 .288* 1.334 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have control over the pace 
at which they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
-.161 .851 -.185 .831 
Workers in largest occupational 
group are involved in work 
design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.216 1.241 .129 1.138 
Percentage of the workforce that 
is highly skilled 
.011*** 1.011 .010*** 1.011 
Direct voice only 
  
.691*** 1.995 
Collective voice only   .520*** 1.682 
Dual-voice system   .979*** 2.661 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .218; Nagelkerke R Square = .300; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .231; Nagelkerke R Square = .319; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.8 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for gender discrimination. 
Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 425 monitor recruitment in this way; 1521 do not. 
Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. The models 
fit the observed well (in both cases, the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is 
greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains approximately 36 per cent of the variation in the outcome 
variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.357).  
Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, 
and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of 
voice to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This conforms to the theoretical 
implications. Those workplaces with minimal voice can be expected to emphasise 
management’s prerogative and, therefore, employers will be less concerned with treating 
workers equitably than those establishments that offer workers some voice – either direct, 
collective, or both.  
The larger the workplace, the more likely it is to monitor promotions for gender 
discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the 
percentage of workers with a disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor 
promotions in this way. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. 
Public-sector workplaces are more likely than their private-sector counterparts to monitor 
promotions for gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent 
level. The higher the percentage of highly skilled employees in the establishment’s workforce, 
the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions in this way. These latter two 
associations are both statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more discretion 
that employees in the largest organisational group have over their work, the more likely the 
establishment is to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This link is statistically 
significant at the 10-per-cent level. None of the other variables in Model 2 is statistically 
significant. 
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Table 4.8 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Promotions for Gender Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -4.020*** .018 -4.796*** .008 
Total number of employees (natural log) .498*** 1.645 .369*** 1.446 
Percentage of female workers  -.004 .996 -.002 .998 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .028** 1.029 .024** 1.025 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority 
.005 1.005 .006 1.006 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.099*** .333 -.688*** .503 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.246 1.278 .213 1.237 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.263 1.301 .349* 1.417 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.168 .845 -.220 .803 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.144 1.155 .040 1.041 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.012*** 1.012 .012*** 1.012 
Direct voice only   .993*** 2.700 
Collective voice only   1.108*** 3.027 
Dual-voice system   1.691*** 5.427 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square= .211, Nagelkerke R Square = .325; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .232, Nagelkerke R Square= .357; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.9 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for ethnicity discrimination. 
Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 405 monitor recruitment in this way; 1541 do not. 
Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Although 
Model 1 fits the observed well (the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is 
greater than 0.05), Model 2 does not. Its Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is less 
than 0.05 (it is 0.027). Model 2 does, however, explains approximately 37 per cent of the 
variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.365). The reason why 
Model 2 does not fit the data well could be attributed, in part at least, to the relatively low 
number of workplaces that monitor promotions for ethnicity discrimination. This suggests that 
there is a limited amount of variation to explain in the outcome variable, and Model 2 does 
not fit what variation there is well.  
Despite the fact that Model 2 does not fit the data well, workplaces that have direct-
voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, and those that have dual-voice 
systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor promotions for 
ethnicity discrimination. This conforms to the theoretical implications. Those workplaces with 
minimal voice can be expected to emphasise management’s prerogative and, therefore, 
employers will be less concerned with treating workers equitably than those establishments 
that offer workers some voice – either direct, collective, or both.  
The larger the workplace, the more likely it is to monitor promotions for ethnicity 
discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the 
percentage of workers with a disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor 
promotions in this way. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. 
The higher the percentage of ethnic-minority workers in an establishment, the more likely the 
workplace is to monitor promotions for an ethnicity bias. This association is statistically 
significant at the 10-per-cent level. Public sector workplaces are more likely than their 
private-sector counterparts to monitor promotions for ethnicity discrimination. The higher the 
percentage of highly skilled employees in the establishment’s workplace, the more likely the 
workplace is to monitor promotions in this way. These latter two associations are both 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more variety that employees in the 
largest occupational group in the establishment have, the more likely the establishment is to 
monitor promotions for an ethnic bias. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent 
level. None of the other variables in Model 2 is statistically significant. 
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Table 4.9 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -4.089*** .017 -4.778*** .008 
Total number of employees (natural log) .475*** 1.607 .356*** 1.428 
Percentage of female workers  -.004 .996 -.003 .997 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .031** 1.032 .028** 1.028 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.007 1.007 .008* 1.008 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.310*** .270 -.928*** .395 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.456* 1.578 .426* 1.532 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.201 1.223 .274 1.316 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
-.069 .933 -.112 .894 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.122 1.129 .023 1.023 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.012*** 1.012 .011*** 1.011 
Direct voice only   .855*** 2.350 
Collective voice only   .970*** 2.637 
Dual-voice system   1.556*** 4.739 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .216, Nagelkerke R Square = .338; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .234, Nagelkerke R Square = .365; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.10 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for discrimination 
against workers with a disability. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 377 monitor 
recruitment in this way; 1569 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the 
control and voice variables. Model 1 and Model 2 fit the observed data well (the significance 
of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both). Model 2 explains 
approximately 35 per cent of the variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared 
equals 0.348). 
Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, 
and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of 
voice to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a 
disability. This conforms to the theoretical implications. Those workplaces with minimal 
voice can be expected to emphasise management’s prerogative and, therefore, employers will 
be less concerned with treating workers equitably than those establishments that offer workers 
some voice – either direct, collective, or both. For instance, employers in establishments with 
minimal voice are likely to be reluctant to implement policies that may restrict their 
prerogative. They do not offer employees any voice and they do not wish to implement 
policies that may inhibit their ability to promote their preferred employees. 
The larger the workplace, the more likely it is to monitor promotions for 
discrimination against workers with a disability. This link is statistically significant at the one-
per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability, the more likely the 
establishment is to monitor promotions in this way. This association is statistically significant 
at the 10-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of ethnic-minority workers in an 
establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for a bias against 
disabled workers. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Public-
sector workplaces are more likely than their private sector counterparts to monitor promotions 
for discrimination against workers with a disability. The higher the percentage of highly 
skilled employees in the establishment’s workforce, the more likely the workplace is to 
monitor promotions in this way. These latter two associations are both statistically significant 
at the one-per-cent level. The more discretion that employees in the largest occupational 
group in the establishment have, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions 
for discrimination against workers with a disability. This link is statistically significant at the 
10-per-cent level. These latter two links suggest that workers who are highly skilled and who 
are expected to exercise relatively high amounts of discretion at work may be difficult to 
149 
 
replace. As a result, employers may be keen to ensure that workers are treated fairly and are 
seen to be treated fairly and adopt a policy to monitor promotions for possible bias. None of 
the other variables in Model 2 is statistically significant. 
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Table 4.10 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Disability Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.889*** .020 -4.537*** .011 
Total number of employees (natural log) .411*** 1.508 .302*** 1.353 
Percentage of female workers  -.003 .997 -.001 .999 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .027** 1.027 .023* 1.023 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.006 1.006 .007* 1.007 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.472*** .229 -1.110*** .330 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.340 1.405 .303 1.354 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.309 1.361 .376* 1.457 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
-.041 .960 -.078 .925 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.232 1.261 .139 1.149 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.010*** 1.010 .010*** 1.010 
Direct voice only   .813*** 2.254 
Collective voice only   .904*** 2.470 
Dual-voice system   1.472*** 4.357 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .203, Nagelkerke R Square = .324; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .218, Nagelkerke R Square = .348; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.11 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 434 monitor recruitment in this way; 
1512 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 the control and voice variables. 
The models fit the data well (in both cases, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic’s 
significance is greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains a large amount of variation in the outcome 
variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.269). This is a relatively high degree of variation 
(Riley et al., 2008). The change in the chi-squared test for the model coefficients between 
Model 1 and Model 2 is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. 
Those workplaces that have direct-voice measures, collective voice, or dual-voice 
systems in place are more likely to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination 
than those workplaces with minimal voice. All of those associations are statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. This is, perhaps, not a surprising result as those 
workplaces that have minimal voice are likely to wish to maintain management’s 
prerogatives. Policies that may grant others a say in workplace decision making will, 
consequently, not be welcomed.  
The larger the workplace, the more likely it is that the establishment will monitor 
promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-
per-cent level. This finding confirms earlier ones, and is in line with expectations that larger 
workplaces are more likely to have a more formalised system of HR policies in place. The 
higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workforce, the more likely the 
establishment is to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This association is 
statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Interestingly, the percentage of female 
employees in the establishment’s workforce is not statistically significantly associated with 
this policy. This suggests that the presence of certain EO and DM policies, in this case 
monitoring promotions for indirect gender discrimination, may result from an awareness to 
treat a wide range of groups the same as each other and not just focus on gender, for instance.  
Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than their public-sector 
counterparts to monitor promotions for indirect gender bias. This relationship is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of skilled workers within an 
establishment, the more likely it is that the workplace will monitor promotions for indirect 
gender bias. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This can be 
explained by the need for workplaces that require highly skilled employees to place a great 
deal of emphasis on recruiting and retaining employees with the necessary capabilities. 
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Consequently, they are likely to implement policies that ensure employees are treated fairly 
and are seen to be treated fairly. All of the other variables (apart from the constant) are not 
statistically significant. Interestingly, the variables that capture the organisation of work for 
the largest occupational group (degree of discretion, control, etc.) are not statistically 
significant. This suggests then that it is not the way that employees work that matters for EO 
and DM policies, but their skill levels. 
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Table 4.11 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.361*** .035 -3.949*** .019 
Total number of employees (natural log) .382*** 1.465 .267*** 1.306 
Percentage of female workers  -.004 .996 -.002 .998 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .025** 1.026 .021* 1.021 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.003 1.003 .004 1.004 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.921*** .398 -.566*** .568 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.195 1.216 .168 1.183 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.210 1.234 .276 1.318 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.049 .952 -.085 .919 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.142 1.152 .050 1.051 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.010*** 1.010 .010*** 1.010 
Direct voice only   .911*** 2.486 
Collective voice only   .934*** 2.544 
Dual-voice system   1.418*** 4.131 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square =.157; Nagelkerke R Square = .240; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square =.176; Nagelkerke R Square =.269; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.12 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect ethnicity 
discrimination. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 420 monitor promotions for an 
ethnic bias and 1526 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and 
voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance 
is greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains a relatively high degree of variation in the outcome 
variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.267).  
Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, 
and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of 
voice to monitor promotions for an indirect bias against ethnic-minority workers. This 
conforms to theoretical expectations. However, there are some differences in the level of 
statistical significance between, on the one hand, the voice variable and, on the other, the 
outcome variable. The association between direct voice and the workplace monitoring 
promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination is statistically significant at the five-per-cent 
level. The links between collective voice and dual voice, on the one hand, and the monitoring 
of promotions for any discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority, on the other, 
are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. In other words, we can be more certain 
that a link exist between the latter two forms of voice and the policy than we can between 
direct voice and the policy. This relationship will be examined in greater detail in the next 
chapter. That chapter will, similarly, analyse the data using logistic regressions; however, the 
reference category for the voice variables will be direct voice. This will enable us to say with 
greater certainty if the association between collective voice and dual voice and the policy is 
statistically significantly different to the link between direct voice and the policy. 
The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of 
employees, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect ethnicity 
discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. As noted above, 
larger workplaces are more likely to have a wider range of formal HR policies than smaller 
establishments. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the 
more likely it is to monitor promotions in this way. This association is statistically significant 
at the five-per-cent level.  Public-sector workplaces are more likely than their private-sector 
counterparts to monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination. This association is 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the workforce 
that is highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect 
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ethnic discrimination. All of the other variables in the regression are not statistically 
significant. 
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Table 4.12 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.276*** .038 -3.753*** .023 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.353*** 1.423 .245*** 1.278 
Percentage of female workers  -.003 .997 -.002 .998 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .027** 1.028 .024** 1.024 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.004 1.004 .005 1.005 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 
1) 
-1.058*** .347 -.712*** .491 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.240 1.271 .212 1.237 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.168 1.182 .226 1.254 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.005 1.005 -.025 .975 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.134 1.143 .051 1.052 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.010*** 1.010 .010*** 1.010 
Direct voice only 
  
.645** 1.906 
Collective voice only   .768*** 2.156 
Dual-voice system 
  
1.264*** 3.541 
Notes: N = 1946: Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .157, Nagelkerke R Square = .243; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .173, Nagelkerke R Square = .267; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.13 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 397 monitor promotions for a 
disability bias and 1549 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control 
and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s 
significance is greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains a relatively high degree of variation in the 
outcome variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.255). 
Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, 
and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of 
voice to monitor promotions for indirect bias against workers with a disability. This conforms 
to theoretical expectations. However, there are some differences in the level of statistical 
significance between, on the one hand, the voice variable and, on the other, the outcome 
variable. The association between direct voice and the workplace monitoring promotions for 
indirect disability discrimination is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The links 
between collective voice and dual voice, on the one hand, and the monitoring of promotions 
for a bias against workers with a disability, on the other, are statistically significant at the one-
per-cent level. In other words, we can be more certain that a link exists between the latter two 
forms of voice and the policy than we can about the link between direct voice and the 
outcome. This relationship will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter. That chapter 
will, similarly, analyse the data using logistic regressions; however, the reference category for 
the voice variables will be direct voice. This will enable us to say with greater certainty if the 
association between collective voice and dual voice and the policy is statistically significantly 
different to the link between direct voice and the policy. 
The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of 
employees, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. As noted above, 
larger workplaces are more likely to have a wider range of formal HR policies than smaller 
establishments. Public-sector workplaces are more likely than their private-sector counterparts 
to monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination. This association is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination. This, too, is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more 
discretion workers in the largest occupational group have, the more likely the workplace is to 
monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This link is 
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statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. All of the other variables in the regression are 
not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.13 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.194*** .041 -3.636*** .026 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.319*** 1.375 .217*** 1.243 
Percentage of female workers  -.002 .998 -.001 .999 
Percentage of workers with a 
disability  
.023* 1.023 .019 1.019 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.003 1.003 .004 1.004 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 
1) 
-1.151*** .316 -.820*** .440 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have variety in their work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ 
= 0) 
.170 1.186 .139 1.149 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have discretion over how they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ 
or ‘none’ = 0) 
.250 1.284 .307* 1.359 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have control over the pace at 
which they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.019 1.020 -.008 .992 
Workers in largest occupational 
group are involved in work design (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ 
= 0) 
.219 1.245 .139 1.149 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.009*** 1.009 .008*** 1.008 
Direct voice only   .598** 1.818 
Collective voice only   .707*** 2.028 
Dual-voice system   1.201*** 3.322 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .149, Nagelkerke R Square = .233; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .162, Nagelkerke R Square = .255; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.14 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring pay rates by gender. There are 1946 
establishments in the analysis; 387 monitor pay rates for a possible gender bias and 1559 do 
not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both 
models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05). 
Model 2 explains a relatively high degree of variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke R 
squared equals 0.337).  
Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, 
and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of 
voice to monitor pay for a bias against female workers. This conforms to theoretical 
expectations. All of these associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.  
The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of 
employees, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by gender. This link is 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. As noted above, larger workplaces are more 
likely to have a wider range of formal HR policies than smaller establishments. Interestingly, 
the higher the percentage of women in the establishment’s workforce, the less likely the 
workplace is to monitor pay rates by gender. This association is statistically significant at the 
five-per-cent level. This could suggest that a bias against female workers exists. Adopting a 
policy to monitor any possible discrimination against female employees may reveal this 
discrepancy. Employers may, therefore, be reluctant to adopt a policy to monitor pay rates by 
gender as this could have far-reaching implications for pay levels in the workplace. By 
contrast, the higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the more 
likely the establishment is to monitor pay rates by gender. This association is statistically 
significant at the five-per-cent level. Public-sector workplaces are more likely than their 
private-sector counterparts to monitor pay rates by gender. This association is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The more discretion that employees in the largest 
occupational group have, the more likely the establishment is to monitor pay rates by gender. 
The higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the 
workplace is to monitor pay rates by gender. Both of these associations are statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. They suggest that workplaces that rely on skilled workers 
who exercise their judgement over how they work are keen to avoid discrimination against 
workers who may be difficult to replace. All of the other variables in the regression are not 
statistically significant. 
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Table 4.14 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Gender 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -4.901*** .007 -5.477*** .004 
Total number of employees (natural log) .569*** 1.767 .492*** 1.636 
Percentage of female workers  -.007** .993 -.006** .994 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .032*** 1.033 .029** 1.030 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
-.004 .996 -.003 .997 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.709*** .492 -.513*** .599 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.319 1.376 .301 1.352 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.474** 1.607 .526*** 1.692 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
.091 1.095 .056 1.057 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.213 1.237 .139 1.149 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.011*** 1.011 .011*** 1.011 
Direct voice only   1.131*** 3.099 
Collective voice only   .847*** 2.332 
Dual-voice system   1.161*** 3.192 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .202, Nagelkerke R Square = .320; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .213, Nagelkerke R Square = .337; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.15 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring pay rates by ethnicity. There are 
1946 establishments in the analysis; 256 monitor pay rates for a possible ethnicity bias and 
1690 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. 
Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is greater than 
0.05). Model 2 explains a relatively high degree of variation in the outcome variable 
(Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.320). 
Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place, those that have collective voice, 
and those that have dual-voice systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of 
voice to monitor pay for a bias against workers from an ethnic minority. However, there are 
differences in the levels of statistical significance of the various associations. The likelihood 
that workplaces with direct voice and will monitor pay rates by ethnicity is, when compared 
to workplaces with minimal voice, statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The 
likelihood that workplaces with collective voice will monitor pay by ethnicity is statistically 
significant at the 10-per-cent level. The likelihood that workplaces with dual voice will 
monitor pay in this way is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This raises 
interesting theoretical issues that will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. In that 
chapter workplaces with direct voice measures in place will be used as the reference category. 
The results here suggest that we can be more certain that workplaces with dual voice will 
monitor pay by ethnicity than all other types of workplace, that establishments with direct 
voice will monitor pay in this way than those with collective voice, and that workplaces with 
minimal voice will be the least likely to implement such a policy. 
The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of 
employees, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by ethnicity. This link is 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. As noted above, larger workplaces are more 
likely to have a wider range of formal HR policies than smaller establishments. The higher the 
percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the more likely the establishment is 
to monitor pay rates by ethnicity. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-
cent level. The higher the percentage of workers from an ethnic minority in the workforce, the 
more likely the establishment is to monitor pay by ethnicity. This relationship is statistically 
significant at the 10-per-cent level. In combination with the preceding result, this suggests that 
employers may have to implement such policies as a result of pressure from employees. There 
is no association between the percentage of ethnic-minority workers and the monitoring of 
pay by gender; there is, however, one – albeit a weak one – between the percentage of ethnic-
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minority workers and the monitoring of pay by ethnicity. Public-sector workplaces are more 
likely than their private-sector counterparts to monitor pay rates by ethnicity. This association 
is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the workforce 
that is highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by ethnicity. This 
association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. It suggests that workplaces that 
rely on skilled workers may be keen to avoid discrimination against workers who may be 
difficult to replace. All of the other variables in the regression are not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.15 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Ethnicity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -5.262*** .005 -5.845*** .003 
Total number of employees (natural log) .513*** 1.670 .422*** 1.525 
Percentage of female workers  -.004 .996 -.002 .998 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .031** 1.031 .029** 1.029 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.008 1.008 .009* 1.009 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.065*** .345 -.807*** .446 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.346 1.413 .321 1.378 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.299 1.349 .354 1.424 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.222 1.249 .189 1.208 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.175 1.191 .061 1.063 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.010*** 1.010 .009*** 1.009 
Direct voice only   .913** 2.491 
Collective voice only   .662* 1.939 
Dual-voice system   1.344*** 3.836 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .163, Nagelkerke R Square = .302; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .173, Nagelkerke R Square = .320; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 4.16 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring relative pay rates by disability. There 
are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 233 monitor pay rates for a possible disability bias 
and 1713 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice 
variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is 
greater than 0.05). Model 2 explains a relatively high degree of variation in the outcome 
variable (Nagelkerke R squared equals 0.306). 
Workplaces that have direct-voice measures in place and those that have dual-voice 
systems are more likely than those with minimal levels of voice to monitor relative pay rates 
for any bias against workers with a disability. However, there are differences in the levels of 
statistical significance of the various associations. The likelihood that workplaces with direct 
voice and will monitor pay rates by disability is, when compared to workplaces with minimal 
voice, statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The likelihood that workplaces with 
dual voice will monitor pay in this way is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. 
The likelihood that workplaces with collective voice will monitor pay by disability is not 
statistically significant. This suggests that there is no relationship between collective voice 
and the monitoring of relative pay rates by disability. This raises interesting theoretical issues 
that will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. In that chapter workplaces with direct-
voice measures in place will be used as the reference category. The results here suggest that 
workplaces with dual voice will monitor pay by disability more than all other types of 
workplace and that establishments with direct voice are more likely that those with collective 
voice to monitor pay in this way. 
The larger the workplace, as measured by the natural log of the total number of 
employees, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by disability. This link is 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. As noted above, larger workplaces are more 
likely to have a wider range of formal HR policies than smaller establishments. The higher the 
percentage of workers with a disability in the workplace, the more likely the establishment is 
to monitor pay rates by disability. This association is statistically significant at the five-per-
cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability in the workforce, the more 
likely the establishment is to monitor pay by disability. This relationship is statistically 
significant at the five-per-cent level. In combination with the preceding results, this suggests 
that employers may have to implement policies to monitor pay rates by gender, ethnicity, and 
disability as a result of pressure from employees with a disability. Public-sector workplaces 
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are more likely than their private-sector counterparts to monitor pay rates by disability. This 
association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The more discretion that 
employees in the largest occupational group have over their work, the more likely the 
workplace is to monitor pay by disability. The higher the percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to monitor pay rates by disability. Both of 
these latter associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. It suggests that 
workplaces that rely on skilled workers who exercise discretion at work may be keen to avoid 
discrimination against workers who may be difficult to replace. All of the other variables in 
the regression are not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.16 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -5.073*** .006 -5.594*** .004 
Total number of employees (natural log) .477*** 1.611 .395*** 1.485 
Percentage of female workers  -.004 .996 -.003 .997 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .034*** 1.035 .032** 1.033 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.004 1.004 .006 1.006 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.181*** .307 -.968*** .380 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.200 1.222 .168 1.183 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.624** 1.867 .677*** 1.968 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
.176 1.192 .143 1.154 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.058 1.060 -.060 .941 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.009*** 1.009 .008*** 1.008 
Direct voice only   .973** 2.646 
Collective voice only   .575 1.778 
Dual-voice system   1.266*** 3.545 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .150, Nagelkerke R Square = .289; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .159, Nagelkerke R Square = .306; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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4.3       Chapter Conclusion 
 
The results in this chapter demonstrate that, overall, workplaces in which any form of 
voice – be it direct voice, indirect voice, or dual voice – is present are more likely than those 
with minimal voice to have a range of EO and DM policies. The dummy variables for direct 
voice, indirect voice and dual voice show that these workplaces are, with one exception, 
statistically significantly different to those with minimal voice. In most instances, this 
difference is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level, indicating a strong association 
between the voice variables and the EO and DM policy. This relationship holds after 
controlling for the size and composition of the workforce as well as controlling for how work 
is organised within the establishment. 
The results are consistent with various theories that voice is likely to lead to the 
adoption of policies within workplaces that reflect employees’ preferences in an improved 
way. In some respects, the results are not surprising, as those workplaces that afford their 
employees little or no voice (either direct or indirect) are unlikely to adopt policies that may 
constrain managers’ prerogatives. What is, perhaps, of more theoretical and empirical interest 
are the differences between workplaces with direct voice, those with indirect voice and those 
with dual voice. The next chapter examines these differences. 
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Chapter 5 - Voice and Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies: An 
Empirical Analysis with Direct Voice Workplaces as the Reference Category 
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter examines the links between various voice categories and different EO 
and DM policies (see Appendix A.2 for summary of results). The models are the same as 
those in the preceding chapter. This chapter uses direct voice as the reference category. It does 
so in order to examine any differences between the likelihood of direct voice workplaces, on 
the one hand, and collective voice workplaces and dual voice establishments, on the other, 
having particular EO and DM policies in place. This comparison is important as different 
analysts emphasise the likely advantages of direct, collective, and dual voice to varying 
degrees. The chapter, therefore, aims to shed light on the type of voice mechanisms that are 
more likely to lead to EO and DM policies being adopted in workplaces. The previous chapter 
showed, in effect, that any form of voice was likely to increase the chances of workplaces 
having EO and DM policies in place. This chapter asks, for instance, are direct voice 
workplaces more or less likely than collective voice ones to have EO and DM policies in 
place.  
As the regression models in this chapter are – with the exception of the reference 
category – the same as those in the preceding chapter, the ‘fitness’ of the various models used 
will not be mentioned, unless they are not a good fit. Similarly, the Nagelkerke R squared will 
not be commented upon in this chapter as they are the same as those in the preceding chapter. 
They will, however, be reported in the notes under each regression table. The statistical 
significance of the control variables will not be discussed, but will be indicated in the tables. 
This is because these items do not differ to the results in the preceding chapter. This chapter 
will, however, use the ‘direct voice’ category as the reference category. This will enable 
comparisons to be made directly between important categories and the likelihood of 
establishments having particular EO and DM policies in place. 
As the differences between workplaces with minimalist voice and those with direct 
voice, on the one hand, and the likelihood of implementing various EO and DM policies and 
practices has already been discussed in the preceding chapter, this chapter will focus on the 
similarities and differences of workplaces with direct voice, collective voice, and dual voice, 
on the one hand, and the likelihood of having a particular EO and DM policy or practice in 
place, on the other. For all of the regressions in this chapter, establishments with direct voice 
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are the reference category. The results in the preceding chapter did not provide a direct 
examination of any differences between these latter three types of workplace. It is important, 
however, to examine any differences, as they have important implications for theory. Whilst 
some focus more on direct voice, others emphasise collective voice, and yet others stress the 
potential benefits of combining both collective and direct voice in dual systems. 
 
5.2 The Results 
 
Table 5.1 shows the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is the 
presence or absence of a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity. 
Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 1779 establishments have such a policy, 157 do not. 
There is, therefore, relatively little variation in the outcome variable. Model 1 in the Table 
contains the control variables. Model 2 contains the control variable plus the explanatory 
voice variables. The significance of Hosmer Lemeshow test statistics for both models 
indicates that they are not a good fit for the data. They are both less than 0.05. 
Despite the fact that the model is not a good fit for the data, the table shows that those 
workplaces with collective voice measures are less likely to have a formal EO or DM policy 
in place than are those establishments that have adopted direct-voice mechanisms. This can be 
interpreted in one of two ways. It suggests either that collective-voice mechanisms hinder the 
adoption of a formal EO or DM policy in some way or that those workplaces that do not have 
such a formal policy in place encourage the formation of collective voice. In the case of the 
latter, employees may feel the need to seek union representation. There is no statistically 
significant difference between workplaces with direct voice and those with dual-voice 
systems in terms of the likelihood of adopting a formal policy on equal opportunities and DM. 
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Table 5.1 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Having a 
Formal Written Policy on Equal Opportunities or Managing Diversity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -1.246** .288 1.477* 4.379 
Total number of employees (natural log) .894*** 2.445 .623*** 1.864 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
.009*** 1.009 .009*** 1.009 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.097** 1.101 .073 1.076 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
-.001 .999 -.002 .998 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.879*** .415 -.392 .676 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.430* 1.537 .393 1.481 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
-.429* .651 -.446* .640 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.076 .927 -.084 .919 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.475** 1.608 .321 1.379 
Percentages of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.003 1.003 .000 1.000 
Minimalist voice    -2.508*** .081 
Collective voice only   -1.327** .265 
Dual-voice system   -.944 .389 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .102, Nagelkerke R Square = .238; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .129, Nagelkerke R Square = .299, ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
  
172 
 
Table 5.2 shows the results of a logistic regression for which the outcome 
variable is the establishment monitors recruitment and selection by gender. Of the 1946 
workplaces in the analysis, 847 monitor recruitment and selection based on gender; 1099 
do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 contains the control variable 
plus the voice explanatory variables. Both models fit the data well, as the significance of 
Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both models.  
Workplaces that have collective voice mechanisms in place are less likely than those 
with direct voice to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. This association is 
statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. This suggests either that direct-voice 
mechanisms are more effective than collective ones in encouraging employers to monitor 
recruitment and selection in this way or that employees seek union representation rather than 
direct-voice mechanisms when recruitment and selection are not monitored by gender. There 
is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice and those with 
dual voice systems in terms of the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment 
and selection by gender. 
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Table 5.2 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection by Gender 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.267*** .038 -2.488*** .083 
Total number of employees (natural log) .591*** 1.805 .492*** 1.636 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
  .005** 1.005 .006** 1.006 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.055*** 1.056 .047*** 1.048 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
   .004 1.004 .004 1.004 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.298*** .273 -1.124*** .325 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.280 1.322       .238 1.268 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.008 .992       .028 1.028 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
-.093 .911      -.108 .897 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.088 1.092       -.007 .993 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.011*** 1.011 .010*** 1.010 
Minimalist voice    -.951*** .386 
Collective voice only      -.391** .676 
Dual-voice system        -.032 .968 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Squared = 0.301; Nagelkerke R Squared = 0.403; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Squared = 0.314; Nagelkerke R Squared = 0.422; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.3 shows the results of a logistic regression to assess the links between the 
independent variable and the workplace monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. Of the 
1946 workplaces in the analysis, 854 monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity; 1092 do 
not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 2, the control variables and the voice 
explanatory variables. Both models provide a good fit for the data (Hosmer Lemeshow test 
statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05 for both models). 
There are no statistically significant differences between the workplaces with direct 
voice, collective voice, and a dual-voice system in terms of the likelihood that the 
establishment will monitor recruitment and selection based on ethnicity. As noted above, 
workplaces with any form of voice are more likely than those without any form of voice to 
monitor recruitment in this way. This suggests that any form of voice promotes this policy 
more than no (or minimal) voice. Alternatively, employers who do not promote voice within 
their establishments are less likely to implement a policy to monitor recruitment and selection 
than those with any form of voice. 
  
175 
 
Table 5.3 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Ethnicity 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.184*** .041 -2.524*** .080 
Total number of employees (natural log) .588*** 1.800 .502*** 1.652 
Percentage of female workers  .005** 1.005 .006*** 1.006 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .057*** 1.059 .050*** 1.051 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority  .005 1.005 .005 1.005 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.373*** .253 -1.222*** .295 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.297* 1.346 .261 1.299 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.088 .915 -.060 .942 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.080 .923 -.092 .912 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.019 1.019 -.062 .939 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.012*** 1.012 .012*** 1.012 
Minimalist voice    -.780*** .458 
Collective voice only   -.325 .722 
Dual-voice system   -.008 .992 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = 0.310, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.415; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .319, Nagelkerke R Square =.428; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.4 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitors recruitment and selection by disability. Of 
the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 809 monitor recruitment and selection based on 
disability; 1137 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 2 encompasses 
these and the voice explanatory variables. Both models perform well and provide a good fit 
for the data (the Hosmer Lemeshow statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05 for both 
models).  
Those workplaces with collective voice mechanisms in place are less likely than those 
with direct voice to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This association is 
statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. There is no statistically significantly 
difference between those workplaces with dual voice and those with direct voice in terms of 
the likelihood of monitoring recruitment and selection by gender. 
Collectively, the results from the preceding three tables (Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4) 
suggest that there is very little statistically significant difference in those workplaces with 
some form of meaningful voice in terms of their monitoring of recruitment and selection for 
different forms of discrimination. What differences there are indicate that those workplaces 
with collective forms of voice are less likely than those with direct voice and dual-voice 
systems to monitor recruitment and selection for discrimination. In short, any form of voice is 
an improvement on none, but workplaces that have direct voice (either alone or as part of a 
dual-voice system) are more likely than those with collective voice to monitor recruitment and 
selection for different biases. 
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Table 5.4 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection by Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.171*** .042 -2.426*** .088 
Total number of employees (natural log) .527***  .431*** 1.539 
Percentage of female workers  .005** 1.005 .005** 1.005 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .077*** 1.080 .069*** 1.071 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.003 1.003 .003 1.003 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.444*** .236 -1.275*** .279 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.436** 1.546 .395** 1.484 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.016 .984 .021 1.021 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.013 .987 -.028 .972 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.103 1.108 .011 1.011 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.010*** 1.011 .010*** 1.010 
Direct voice only   -.927*** .396 
Collective voice only   -.379* .684 
Dual-voice system   -.010 .990 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .304, Nagelkerke R Square = .409; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .317, Nagelkerke R Square = .426; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
  
178 
 
Table 5.5 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitors recruitment and selection for indirect 
gender discrimination. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 697 monitor recruitment and 
selection based on disability; 1249 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables only; Model 
2 encompasses these and the voice explanatory variables. Model 1 does not fit the data well as 
the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is less than 0.05 (it equals .023). Model 2 
performs better as its Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05). 
There is no statistically significantly difference between those workplaces with direct 
voice and those with collective voice, in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor 
recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination. There is a weakly statistically 
significant relationship between dual voice and the workplace monitoring recruitment and 
selection for indirect gender discrimination, suggesting that dual voice workplaces are more 
likely than those with direct voice to implement this policy. The relationship is, however, 
statistically significant at the ten-per-cent level only. 
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Table 5.5 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Gender Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.940*** .053 -2.541*** .079 
Total number of employees (natural log) .434*** 1.543 .336*** 1.400 
Percentage of female workers  .002 1.002 .003 1.003 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .049*** 1.050 .043*** 1.044 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.000 1.000 .000 1.000 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.924*** .397 -.684*** .505 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.060 1.062 .023 1.023 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.127 1.136 .175 1.191 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
-.130 .878 -.153 .858 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.154 1.167 .076 1.079 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.012*** 1.012 .011*** 1.011 
Minimalist voice    -.605*** .546 
Collective voice only   -.091 .913 
Dual-voice system   .333* 1.395 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .217, Nagelkerke R Square = .298; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .229, Nagelkerke R Square = .314; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.6 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect 
discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. Of the 1946 workplaces in the 
regression, 694 monitor recruitment and selection in this way; 1252 do not. Model 1 contains 
the control variables; Model 2 the control and voice variables. The models fit the data well (in 
both cases, the Hosmer Lemeshow statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05).  
There is no statistically significantly difference between those workplaces with direct 
voice, those with collective voice, in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor recruitment 
and selection for indirect discrimination against (potential) employees from ethnic monitories. 
There is a statistically significant relationship between dual voice and the workplace 
monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect ethnic discrimination, suggesting that dual 
voice workplaces are more likely than those with direct voice to implement this policy. The 
relationship is, however, statistically significant at the ten-per-cent level only. 
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Table 5.6 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.993*** .050 -2.572*** .076 
Total number of employees (natural log) .447*** 1.564 .352*** 1.422 
Percentage of female workers  .002 1.002 .003 1.003 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .049*** 1.050 .042*** 1.043 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.000 1.000 .000 1.000 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.940*** .391 -.710*** .492 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.018 1.018 -.020 .981 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.122 1.130 .168 1.183 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
-.126 .882 -.148 .863 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.214 1.239 .136 1.145 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.011*** 1.011 .011*** 1.011 
Minimalist voice    -.621*** .537 
Collective voice only   -.119 .888 
Dual-voice system   .303* 1.354 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .222, Nagelkerke R Square= .305; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .233, Nagelkerke R Square = .321; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.7 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect 
discrimination against workers with a disability. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 
681 monitor recruitment in this way; 1265 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; 
Model 2 the control and voice variables. Model 1 does not fit the data well as the Hosmer 
Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is less than 0.05 (it equals .024). Model 2 performs 
better as its Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05.  
There is no statistically significantly difference between those workplaces with direct 
voice, those with collective voice, and those with dual voice systems in terms of the 
likelihood that they will monitor recruitment and selection for indirect disability 
discrimination. 
Collectively, the preceding three tables (Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6) suggest that there are 
no differences between establishments with direct voice, those with collective voice, and 
those with dual voice systems in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor recruitment 
and selection for various forms of indirect discrimination. Any form of voice is an 
improvement on none. Causality could run ‘in either direction’. In other words, all forms of 
voice are equally effective in encouraging employers to monitor recruitment and selection for 
indirect discrimination. Alternatively, those employers who do not monitor recruitment and 
selection for indirect discrimination may not wish to countenance any form of voice in their 
workplaces. 
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Table 5.7 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Discrimination against Workers with a Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.953*** .052 -2.478*** .084 
Total number of employees (natural log) .413*** 1.511 .315*** 1.370 
Percentage of female workers  .004* 1.004 .005** 1.005 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .055*** 1.057 .048*** 1.049 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.001 1.001 .001 1.001 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.959*** .383 -.726*** .484 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.066 .936 -.111 .895 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.236 1.266 .288* 1.334 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
-.161 .851 -.185 .831 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.216 1.241 .129 1.138 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.011*** 1.011 .010*** 1.011 
Minimalist voice    -.691*** .501 
Collective voice only   -.170 .843 
Dual-voice system   .288 1.334 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .218, Nagelkerke R Square= .300; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .231, Nagelkerke R Square = .319; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.8 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for gender discrimination. 
Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 425 monitor recruitment in this way; 1521 do not. 
Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. The models 
fit the observed data well (in both cases, the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is 
greater than 0.05). 
The table shows that there is no statistically significant difference between workplaces 
with direct voice and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that they will 
monitor promotions for gender discrimination. However, there is a statistically significant 
difference between those workplaces with dual-voice systems and those with direct voice 
measures in place. The former are more likely to monitor promotions for gender 
discrimination than the latter. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent 
level. This suggests that it is the combination of direct voice and collective voice that fosters 
to the adoption of this policy amongst workplaces.  
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Table 5.8 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Promotions for Gender Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -4.020*** .018 -3.802*** .022 
Total number of employees (natural log) .498*** 1.645 .369*** 1.446 
Percentage of female workers  -.004 .996 -.002 .998 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .028** 1.029 .024** 1.025 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority  .005 1.005 .006 1.006 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.099*** .333 -.688*** .503 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.246 1.278 .213 1.237 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.263 1.301 .349* 1.417 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.168 .845 -.220 .803 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.144 1.155 .040 1.041 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.012*** 1.012 .012*** 1.012 
Minimalist voice    -.993*** .370 
Collective voice only   .114 1.121 
Dual-voice system   .698*** 2.010 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .211, Nagelkerke R Square= .325; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .232, Nagelkerke R Square = .357; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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The Table 5.9 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links 
between the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for ethnicity 
discrimination. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 405 monitor recruitment in this 
way; 1541 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice 
variables. Although Model 1 fits the observed data well (the significance of the Hosmer 
Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05), Model 2 does not. Its Hosmer Lemeshow test 
statistic’s significance is less than 0.05 (it is 0.027). 
The table shows that there is no statistically significant difference between workplaces 
with direct voice and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that they will 
monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination. However, there is a statistically significant 
difference between those workplaces with dual-voice systems and those with direct voice 
measures in place. The former are more likely to monitor promotions for ethnic 
discrimination than the latter. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent 
level. This suggests that it is the combination of direct voice and collective voice that fosters 
to the adoption of this policy amongst workplaces.  
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Table 5.9 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -4.089*** .017 -3.924*** .020 
Total number of employees (natural log) .475*** 1.607 .356*** 1.428 
Percentage of female workers  -.004 .996 -.003 .997 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .031** 1.032 .028** 1.028 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority  .007 1.007 .008* 1.008 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.310*** .270 -.928*** .395 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.456* 1.578 .426* 1.532 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.201 1.223 .274 1.316 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a lot’ 
or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.069 .933 -.112 .894 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.122 1.129 .023 1.023 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled .012*** 1.012 .011*** 1.011 
Minimalist voice    -.855*** .425 
Collective voice only   .115 1.122 
Dual-voice system   .701*** 2.016 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .216; Nagelkerke R Square = .338; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .234, Nagelkerke R Square = .365; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.10 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for discrimination 
against workers with a disability. Of the 1946 workplaces in the regressions, 377 monitor 
recruitment in this way; 1569 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the 
control and voice variables. Model 1 and Model 2 fit the observed data well (the significance 
of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both).  
The Table 5.10 shows that there is no statistically significant difference between 
workplaces with direct voice and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that 
they will monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. However, 
there is a statistically significant difference between those workplaces with dual-voice 
systems and those with direct voice measures in place. The former are more likely to monitor 
promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability than the latter. This 
association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This suggests that it is the 
combination of direct voice and collective voice that fosters to the adoption of this policy 
amongst workplaces.  
The likelihood that workplaces will monitor promotions for various forms of 
discrimination is higher for those establishments with dual-voice systems in place than it is 
for those with direct voice is consistent across the preceding three tables (Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 
5.9). This indicates that it is the combination of direct and collective voice that is associated 
with the monitoring of promotions for potential discrimination. The two forms of voice may 
well complement one another. The following chapter examines this relationship in more 
detail. It assesses whether the attitude towards unions helps to explain such outcomes. In other 
words, it examines whether or not the association between dual-voice systems and, amongst 
others, the monitoring of promotions for discriminations depends upon employers having a 
favourable attitude towards unions.  
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Table 5.10 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Discrimination Against Workers with a Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.889*** .020 -3.724*** .024 
Total number of employees (natural log) .411*** 1.508 .302*** 1.353 
Percentage of female workers  -.003 .997 -.001 .999 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .027** 1.027 .023* 1.023 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority  .006 1.006 .007* 1.007 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.472*** .229 -1.110*** .330 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.340 1.405 .303 1.354 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.309 1.361 .376* 1.457 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.041 .960 -.078 .925 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.232 1.261 .139 1.149 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.010*** 1.010 .010*** 1.010 
Minimalist voice    -.813*** .444 
Collective voice only   .091 1.096 
Dual-voice system   .659*** 1.933 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .203, Nagelkerke R Square = .324; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .218, Nagelkerke R Square = .348; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.11 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination. Of the 1946 workplaces in the analysis, 434 monitor recruitment in this way; 
1512 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 the control and voice variables. 
The models fit the data well (in both cases, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test statistic’s 
significance is greater than 0.05). 
There is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice 
and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor promotions 
for indirect gender discrimination. There is, however, a statistically significant difference 
between those with dual voice and those with direct voice. The former are more likely than 
the latter to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This link is statistically 
significant at the five-per-cent level.  
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Table 5.11 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.361*** .035 -3.038*** .048 
Total number of employees (natural log) .382*** 1.465 .267*** 1.306 
Percentage of female workers  -.004 .996 -.002 .998 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .025** 1.026 .021* 1.021 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority  .003 1.003 .004 1.004 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.921*** .398 -.566*** .568 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.195 1.216 .168 1.183 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.210 1.234 .276 1.318 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.049 .952 -.085 .919 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.142 1.152 .050 1.051 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.010*** 1.010 .010*** 1.010 
Minimalist voice    -.911*** .402 
Collective voice only   .023 1.023 
Dual-voice system   .508** 1.661 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .157, Nagelkerke R Square = .240; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .176, Nagelkerke R Square = .269; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.12 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect ethnicity 
discrimination. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 420 monitor promotions for an 
ethnic bias and 1526 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and 
voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance 
is greater than 0.05). 
There is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice 
and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor promotions 
for indirect ethnic discrimination. There is, however, a statistically significant difference 
between those with dual voice and those with direct voice. The former are more likely than 
the latter to monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination. This link is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level.  
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Table 5.12 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.276*** .038 -3.108*** .045 
Total number of employees (natural log) .353*** 1.423 .245*** 1.278 
Percentage of female workers  -.003 .997 -.002 .998 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .027** 1.028 .024** 1.024 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority  .004 1.004 .005 1.005 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.058*** .347 -.712*** .491 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.240 1.271 .212 1.237 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.168 1.182 .226 1.254 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.005 1.005 -.025 .975 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.134 1.143 .051 1.052 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.010*** 1.010 .010*** 1.010 
Minimalist voice    -.645** .525 
Collective voice only   .123 1.131 
Dual-voice system   .619*** 1.858 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .157, Nagelkerke R Square = .243; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .173, Nagelkerke R Square = .267; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.13 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination. There are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 397 monitor promotions for a 
disability bias and 1549 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control 
and voice variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s 
significance is greater than 0.05). 
There is no statistically significant difference between workplaces with direct voice 
and those with collective voice in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor promotions 
for indirect disability discrimination. There is, however, a statistically significant difference 
between those with dual voice and those with direct voice. The former are more likely than 
the latter to monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination. This link is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level.  
Collectively, the preceding three tables indicate that the combination of direct and 
collective voice within a dual-voice system is more likely to be associated with workplaces 
monitoring promotions for different forms of indirect discrimination than direct voice alone 
is. It suggests that it is the combination of the two that is important. Of course, the dual-voice 
system covers those workplaces that have a favourable attitude towards unions and those that 
do not. The relationship that has been found here could conceal important differences between 
those two types of workplace in terms of the likelihood of the workplace monitoring 
promotions for indirect discrimination. The following chapter will compare these two types of 
workplace to see if the attitude towards unions alters the likelihood of the workplace 
monitoring promotions in this way. 
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Table 5.13 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.194*** .041 -3.038*** .048 
Total number of employees (natural log) .319*** 1.375 .217*** 1.243 
Percentage of female workers  -.002 .998 -.001 .999 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .023* 1.023 .019 1.019 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority  .003 1.003 .004 1.004 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.151*** .316 -.820*** .440 
Workers in largest occupational group have variety 
in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
.170 1.186 .139 1.149 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.250 1.284 .307* 1.359 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.019 1.020 -.008 .992 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.219 1.245 .139 1.149 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled .009*** 1.009 .008*** 1.008 
Minimalist voice    -.598** .550 
Collective voice only   .109 1.116 
Dual-voice system   .603*** 1.828 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .149, Nagelkerke R Square = .233; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .162, Nagelkerke R Square = .255; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.14 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring pay rates by gender. There are 1946 
establishments in the analysis; 387 monitor pay rates for a possible gender bias and 1559 do 
not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. Both 
models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is greater than 0.05). 
There is no statistically significantly difference between those workplaces with direct 
voice, those with collective voice, and those with dual voice systems in terms of the 
likelihood that they will monitor relative pay rates by gender. 
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Table 5.14 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Gender 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -4.901*** .007 -4.346*** .013 
Total number of employees (natural log) .569*** 1.767 .492*** 1.636 
Percentage of female workers  -.007** .993 -.006** .994 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .032*** 1.033 .029** 1.030 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
-.004 .996 -.003 .997 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.709*** .492 -.513*** .599 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.319 1.376 .301 1.352 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.474** 1.607 .526*** 1.692 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.091 1.095 .056 1.057 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.213 1.237 .139 1.149 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.011*** 1.011 .011*** 1.011 
Minimalist voice    -1.131*** .323 
Collective voice only   -.284 .753 
Dual-voice system   .030 1.030 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .202, Nagelkerke R Square = .320; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .213, Nagelkerke R Square = .337; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.15 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring pay rates by ethnicity. There are 
1946 establishments in the analysis; 256 monitor pay rates for a possible ethnicity bias and 
1690 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice variables. 
Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is greater than 
0.05). 
There is no statistically significantly difference between those workplaces with direct 
voice, those with collective voice, and those with dual voice systems in terms of the 
likelihood that they will monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. 
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Table 5.15 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Ethnicity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -5.262*** .005 -4.932*** .007 
Total number of employees (natural log) .513*** 1.670 .422*** 1.525 
Percentage of female workers  -.004 .996 -.002 .998 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .031** 1.031 .029** 1.029 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.008 1.008 .009* 1.009 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.065*** .345 -.807*** .446 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.346 1.413 .321 1.378 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.299 1.349 .354 1.424 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.222 1.249 .189 1.208 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.175 1.191 .061 1.063 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.010*** 1.010 .009*** 1.009 
Minimalist voice    -.913** .402 
Collective voice only   -.250 .778 
Dual-voice system   .432 1.540 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .163, Nagelkerke R Square = .302; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square = .173, Nagelkerke R Square = .320; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 5.16 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring relative pay rates by disability. There 
are 1946 establishments in the analysis; 233 monitor pay rates for a possible disability bias 
and 1713 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control and voice 
variables. Both models fit the data well (Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance is 
greater than 0.05). 
There is no statistically significantly difference between those workplaces with direct 
voice, those with collective voice, and those with dual voice systems in terms of the 
likelihood that they will monitor relative pay rates by disability. 
The preceding three tables indicate that there is no difference between establishments 
with some form of meaningful voice in terms of the likelihood that they will monitor pay rates 
for biases. In short, any form of voice is an in improvement on none. Causality could run ‘in 
either direction’. In other words, all forms of voice are equally effective in encouraging 
employers to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination. Alternatively, 
those employers who do not monitor relative pay rates by disability may not wish to 
countenance any form of voice in their workplaces.  
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Table 5.16 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -5.073*** .006 -4.621*** .010 
Total number of employees (natural log) .477*** 1.611 .395*** 1.485 
Percentage of female workers  -.004 .996 -.003 .997 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .034*** 1.035 .032** 1.033 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority  .004 1.004 .006 1.006 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.181*** .307 -.968*** .380 
Workers in largest occupational group have variety 
in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
.200 1.222 .168 1.183 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.624** 1.867 .677*** 1.968 
Workers in largest occupational group have control 
over the pace at which they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.176 1.192 .143 1.154 
Workers in largest occupational group are involved 
in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
.058 1.060 -.060 .941 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly skilled .009*** 1.009 .008*** 1.008 
Minimalist voice    -.973** .378 
Collective voice only   -.398 .672 
Dual-voice system   .292 1.340 
Notes: N = 1946; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .150, Nagelkerke R Square = .289; 
Model 2: Cox & Snell R Square=. 159, Nagelkerke R Square = .306; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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5.3       Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined those workplaces ‘with voice’ in order to determine if there 
are any differences amongst them in terms of the likelihood of those workplaces having EO or 
DM policies in place. Any differences between ‘workplaces with voice’ will have important 
implications for theory, as analyses often emphasise one form of voice over another. 
Overall, the results suggest that there is very little difference in the likelihood of 
workplaces with direct voice and those with indirect voice having various EO and DM 
policies in place. In the majority of regression in this chapter, there are no statistically 
significant differences between these two groups of workplace, suggesting that the two forms 
of voice can convey the wishes of employees to managers to the same extent. The only 
statistically significant differences between these two groups arise in terms of the workplace 
monitoring recruitment and selection by gender and by disability. Establishments with 
indirect voice are less likely than those with direct voice to monitor recruitment and selection 
in this way, potentially indicating a bias amongst unions to implement policies that benefit 
their existing members. However, these are the only differences between these two groups of 
workplace. This, in turn, indicates that unions do not engage in rent-seeking behaviour to 
promote the interests of their members at the expense of those of the workplace. Similarly, the 
results suggest that the added degree of protection that unions can, theoretically, afford to 
employees is not required in terms of workers who call for the implementation of EO and DM 
policies within their workplaces. 
In the majority of regressions in this chapter – except those on the likelihood of the 
workplace monitoring recruitment and selection as well as the workplace monitoring pay rates 
– dual voice establishments are more likely than direct voice ones to implement EO and DM 
policies, suggesting that the presence of direct and indirect voice can complement one another 
to help promote the adoption of EO and DM policies within establishments. However, this 
level of aggregation may mask important differences amongst dual voice workplaces between 
those that view unions favourably and those that do not. The next chapter examines this 
possibility. Similarly, differences amongst minimal voice workplaces may exist between 
those that have (within the minimal voice category) above-mean levels of direct voice and 
those that have below-mean levels of direct voice. Of course, it should not be assumed that 
the adoption of a greater range of EO and DM policies by a workplace will be associated with 
superior workplace outcomes, such as absenteeism and quit rates. The associations between 
EO and DM policies and these outcomes will be examined in subsequent chapters.  
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Chapter 6 - The Links between ‘Partnership Workplaces’ and Equal Opportunity and 
Diversity Management Policies: An Empirical Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines how variation in one of the workplace categories influences the 
likelihood of workplaces having the EO and DM policies that this thesis examines. More 
specifically, it examines if those workplaces within the dual voice category that have a 
positive attitude towards unions, are more likely than those establishments that are also within 
the dual voice category, but that do not have a positive attitude towards unions, are more 
likely to have EO and DM policies in place (see Appendix A.3 for summary of results). As 
noted above, a positive attitude towards unions is measured by surveyed manager’s response 
to the statement: 'unions help find ways to improve workplace performance’. Those ‘dual 
voice’ establishments in which managers either strongly agreed or agreed were classified for 
the purposes of this research as having a partnership. Those managers in ‘dual voice’ 
workplaces in which managers ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’, ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly 
disagreed’ were considered to have a ‘co-existence’ approach. 
 
6.2  The Results 
 
 Table 6.1 shows the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is the 
presence or absence of a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity. 
Of the 717 workplaces in the analysis, 707 have a formal written policy on equal 
opportunities or managing diversity, 10 do not.  There is, therefore, very little variation in the 
outcome variable, resulting in very high beta values for the constant in both models. The 
Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic’s significance for Model 1 and Model 2 indicates that both 
models are not a good fit for the data (Model 2: significance of test statistic = 0.005). Given 
the limited amount of variation in the outcome variable, this is, perhaps, not surprising. Any 
model is unlikely to enhance the ability to predict the outcome as there is so little variation to 
explain. Not one of the independent variables, including the partnership variable, is 
statistically significant. 
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Table 6.1 Logistic Regression for ‘Does this workplace have a formal written policy on equal 
opportunities or managing diversity’ 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant 21.273 1733187000.314 20.839 1122661342.449 
Total number of employees 
(natural log) 
-.077 .926 -.098 .907 
Percentage of female workers 
within workforce 
-.001 .999 .000 1.000 
Percentage of workers with a 
disability within workforce 
.125 1.133 .129 1.138 
Percentage of workers from an 
ethnic minority within workforce 
.073 1.076 .078 1.081 
Private-sector dummy variable 
(yes = 1) 
-.353 .702 -.189 .828 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have variety in their work 
(‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-17.016 .000 -16.995 .000 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have discretion over how 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.039 1.040 .083 1.086 
Workers in largest occupational 
group have control over the pace 
at which they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
-.731 .481 -.839 .432 
Workers in largest occupational 
group are involved in work 
design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.312 1.366 .374 1.454 
Percentages of the workforce that 
is highly skilled 
.003 1.003 .003 1.003 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .863 2.371 
Notes: N = 717; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .010, Nagelkerke R Square = .076; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .013, Nagelkerke R Square = .093; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ the 5% level, and ‘*’ the 10% level. 
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Table 6.2 shows the results of a logistic regression for which the outcome variable is 
the establishment monitors recruitment and selection by gender. Of the 718 workplaces in the 
analysis, 488 monitor recruitment and selection based on gender, 230 do not. Model 1 
contains the control variables only; Model 2 the control variables and the dichotomous 
‘partnership’ variable. This captures the employer’s attitude towards unions within the 
establishment. It is measured by the respondent’s answer to the following statement: ‘Unions 
help find ways to improve workplace performance’. ‘Partnership’ establishments are those 
where the respondent strongly agreed or agreed with this statement and where a dual voice 
system operated. Such establishments were given a score of 1. A score of 0 was given to those 
establishments with a dual-voice system and whose respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. Both models provide a good fit for the 
data. The significance of Hosmer Lemeshow test statistics for both models indicates that they 
are a good fit for the data.  They are both greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level, indicating 
that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are 
more likely to monitor recruitment and selection based on gender than those workplaces with 
a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence 
of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will 
monitor recruitment and selection based on gender. 
Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the 
total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the 
higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is 
to monitor recruitment and selection based on gender. These associations are statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability 
within the establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and 
selection in this way. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. By 
contrast, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor 
recruitment and selection for a gender bias. This association is statistically significant at the 
one-per-cent level. 
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Table 6.2 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection by Gender 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.439*** .087 -2.811*** .060 
Total number of employees (natural log) .465*** 1.593 .456*** 1.578 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
.001 1.001 .002 1.002 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.062** 1.064 .065** 1.067 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
.002 1.002 .004 1.004 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.272*** .280 -1.156*** .315 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.321 1.378 .314 1.369 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.010 1.010 .030 1.030 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.005 .995 -.064 .938 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.147 1.158 .127 1.135 
Percentages of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.013*** 1.013 .013*** 1.014 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .576*** 1.779 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .203, Nagelkerke R Square = .284; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .214, Nagelkerke R Square = .299; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.3 shows the results of a logistic regression to assess the links between the 
independent variable and the workplace monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. Of the 
718 workplaces in the analysis, 489 monitor recruitment and selection based on ethnicity, 229 
do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables 
and the dichotomous control variable. Both models fit the data well as the significance of the 
Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05. They are both greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating 
that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are 
more likely to monitor recruitment and selection based on ethnicity than those workplaces 
with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The 
presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace 
will monitor recruitment and selection based on gender. 
Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the 
total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the 
higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is 
to monitor recruitment and selection based on ethnicity. These associations are statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability 
within the establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and 
selection in this way. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. By 
contrast, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor 
recruitment and selection for an ethnicity bias. This association is statistically significant at 
the one-per-cent level. 
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Table 6.3 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Ethnicity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.516*** .081 -2.788*** .062 
Total number of employees (natural log) .476*** 1.610 .469*** 1.598 
Percentage of female workers  .003 1.003 .004 1.004 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .058** 1.060 .060** 1.062 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.003 1.003 .005 1.005 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.346*** .260 -1.258*** .284 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.294 1.342 .287 1.332 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.004 .996 .012 1.012 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.027 1.027 -.016 .984 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.088 1.092 .073 1.076 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.013*** 1.013 .013*** 1.013 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .425** 1.529 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .211, Nagelkerke R Square = .296; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .217, Nagelkerke R Square = .303; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.4 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitors recruitment and selection by disability. 
Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 473 monitor recruitment and selection based on 
disability, 245 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables 
and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the 
Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is not significant for both models.  
The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating 
that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are 
more likely to monitor recruitment and selection based on disability than those workplaces 
with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The 
presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace 
will monitor recruitment and selection based on disability. 
Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the 
total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log; the higher 
the percentage of the workforce who have a disability; and the higher the percentage of the 
workforce that is highly skilled; the more likely the workforce is to monitor recruitment and 
selection based on disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent 
level. In contrast to the preceding regressions, then, the variable that measures the percentage 
of the establishment’s workforce who have a disability is statistically significant at a higher 
level. We can, correspondingly, be more confident that an association exists between this 
variable and the outcome (monitoring recruitment and selection for a disability bias) when the 
establishment has more workers with a disability. This conforms to ‘common sense’ 
expectations that this relationship is more likely to be present when the establishment has a 
higher percentage of workers with a disability, highlighting the robustness of the results. If 
workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work, the 
more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection for any bias against workers 
with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. It may 
indicate that workplaces that follow strategies that do not depend upon workers carrying out 
the same procedures whilst at work wish to ensure that they are recruiting the most suitable 
candidates compared to workplaces in which many workers have little or no variety in their 
work. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor 
recruitment and selection for a disability bias. This association is statistically significant at the 
one-per-cent level.  
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Table 6.4 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection by Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.431*** .088 -2.696*** .067 
Total number of employees (natural log) .401*** 1.494 .392*** 1.480 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
.001 1.001 .002 1.002 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.104*** 1.110 .108*** 1.114 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
.000 1.000 .002 1.002 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 
1) 
-1.502*** .223 -1.414*** .243 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.526* 1.693 .521* 1.684 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.152 1.164 .168 1.183 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.026 1.027 -.014 .986 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.104 1.110 .090 1.094 
Percentages of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.012*** 1.012 .012*** 1.012 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .424** 1.528 
Notes: N = 718; Cox & Snell R Square = .234, Nagelkerke R Square = .324; Model 2: Cox & 
Snell R Square = .239, Nagelkerke R Square = .331; ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 
the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.5 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitors recruitment and selection for indirect 
gender discrimination. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 412 monitor recruitment and 
selection based on indirect gender discrimination, 306 do not. Model 1 contains the control 
variables; Model 2 contains the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. 
Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating 
that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are 
more likely to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on gender 
than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude 
towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the 
likelihood that the workplace will monitor recruitment and selection indirect discrimination 
based on gender. 
Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the 
total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the 
higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is 
to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on gender. These 
associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of 
workers with a disability within the establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor 
recruitment and selection in this way. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent 
level. By contrast, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor 
recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on gender. This association is 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. 
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Table 6.5 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Gender Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -1.975*** .139 -2.209*** .110 
Total number of employees (natural log) .307*** 1.360 .299*** 1.348 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
.000 1.000 .001 1.001 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.054** 1.056 .057** 1.058 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
-.002 .998 -.001 .999 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.734*** .480 -.651*** .522 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.027 1.027 .020 1.020 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.243 1.275 .256 1.292 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.223 .800 -.261 .771 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.011 1.011 -.003 .997 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.015*** 1.015 .015*** 1.015 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .384** 1.468 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .148, Nagelkerke R Square = .198; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .154, Nagelkerke R Square = .206; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.6 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect 
discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. Of the 718 workplaces in the 
analysis, 412 monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers 
from an ethnic minority, 306 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 contains 
the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Model 1 does not fit the data 
well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05. Model 2 fits the data well as the 
Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating 
that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are 
more likely to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on ethnicity 
than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude 
towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the 
likelihood that the workplace will monitor recruitment and selection indirect discrimination 
based on ethnicity. 
Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the 
total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the 
higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is 
to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on ethnicity. These 
associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of 
workers with a disability within the establishment, the more likely the workplace is to monitor 
recruitment and selection in this way. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent 
level. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor 
recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination based on ethnicity. This association is 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. 
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Table 6.6 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.142*** .117 -2.359*** .095 
Total number of employees (natural log) .340*** 1.405 .332*** 1.394 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
-.001 .999 .000 1.000 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.051** 1.053 .053** 1.055 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
-.001 .999 .000 1.000 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.853*** .426 -.776*** .460 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.002 1.002 -.005 .995 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.209 1.232 .221 1.247 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.136 .873 -.171 .843 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.076 1.079 .063 1.066 
Percentages of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.015*** 1.015 .015*** 1.015 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .356** 1.428 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .162, Nagelkerke R Square = .218; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .167, Nagelkerke R Square = .224; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.7 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect 
discrimination against workers with a disability. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 405 
monitor recruitment and selection indirect discrimination against workers with a disability, 
313 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 contains the control variables and 
the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow 
test statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating 
that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are 
more likely to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers 
with a disability than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a 
favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers 
increases the likelihood that the workplace will monitor recruitment and selection indirect 
discrimination against workers with a disability. 
Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the 
total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the 
higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is 
to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination against workers with a 
disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher 
the percentage of workers with a disability within the establishment, the more likely the 
workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection in this way. This link is statistically 
significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely 
than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination 
against workers with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-
cent level. 
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Table 6.7 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Discrimination Against Workers with a Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.042*** .130 -2.301*** .100 
Total number of employees (natural log) .309*** 1.361 .300*** 1.350 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
.001 1.001 .002 1.002 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.047** 1.048 .049** 1.051 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
.000 1.000 .001 1.001 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.946*** .388 -.858*** .424 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.063 .939 -.074 .928 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.346 1.413 .361 1.435 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.203 .816 -.244 .783 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.125 1.133 .111 1.117 
Percentages of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.013*** 1.013 .013*** 1.013 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .420** 1.521 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .162, Nagelkerke R Square = .218; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .169, Nagelkerke R Square = .227; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
  
217 
 
Table 6.8 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for gender discrimination. 
Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 300 monitor promotions for gender discrimination; 418 
do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables 
and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer 
Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating 
that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are 
more likely to monitor promotions for gender discrimination than those workplaces with a 
dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of 
pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace will 
monitor promotions for gender discrimination. 
Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the 
total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the 
higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is 
to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. These associations are statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers with a disability 
within the workers, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for gender 
discrimination. This relationship is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. This 
contrasts with previous regressions in which the association was not statistically significant, 
indicating potentially that promotions are viewed differently within firms compared to 
recruitment and selection. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-
sector ones to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This association is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. If workers in largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ control over the pace at which they work, the establishment is less likely to monitor 
promotions for a gender bias. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. It 
suggests that there might be a tension between delegating some decision-making powers to 
lower-level employees with workplaces and the use of policies that cover all workplace 
employees. 
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Table 6.8 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Promotions for Gender Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.093*** .045 -3.347*** .035 
Total number of employees (natural log) .390*** 1.477 .383*** 1.467 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
-.005 .995 -.004 .996 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.037* 1.038 .039* 1.039 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
.008 1.008 .009 1.010 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.979*** .376 -.896*** .408 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.297 1.346 .291 1.338 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.235 1.266 .244 1.276 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.336* .715 -.372* .689 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.023 1.023 .007 1.007 
Percentages of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.015*** 1.015 .015*** 1.015 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .394** 1.483 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .184, Nagelkerke R Square = .248; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .190, Nagelkerke R Square = .255; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.9 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for ethnicity discrimination. 
Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 289 monitor promotions of discrimination against 
workers from an ethnic minority; 419 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 
encompasses the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit 
the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating 
that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are 
more likely to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority 
than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude 
towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the 
likelihood that the workplace will monitor promotions for discrimination against workers 
from an ethnic minority. 
Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the 
total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the 
higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is 
to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. These 
associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of 
workers with a disability within the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to monitor 
promotions for discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This relationship is 
statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. This contrasts with previous regressions in 
which the association was not statistically significant, indicating potentially that promotions 
are viewed differently within firms compared to recruitment and selection. The results suggest 
that the  percentage of workers with a disability in the establishment’s workforce is an 
indicator that the establishment monitors promotions for different kinds of discrimination. If 
workers in the largest occupational group within the establishment have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
variety in their work, the establishment is more likely to monitor promotions for 
discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This association is statistically 
significant at the 10-per-cent level. This suggests that workplaces that require their employees 
to carry out a range of activities are likely to implement policies that ensure employees are 
treated fairly. The link is, however, only weakly significant, and it is not present in the other 
two regressions that measure the same EO and DM policy. Once again, private-sector 
workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for gender 
discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. If workers 
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in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ control over the pace at which they 
work, the establishment is less likely to monitor promotions for discrimination against 
workers from an ethnic minority. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. 
It suggests that there might be a tension between delegating some decision-making powers to 
lower-level employees with workplaces and the use of policies that cover all workplace 
employees. 
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Table 6.9 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.173*** .042 -3.450*** .032 
Total number of employees (natural log) .369*** 1.446 .361*** 1.435 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
-.006 .994 -.005 .995 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.047** 1.049 .049** 1.051 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
.010 1.010 .011* 1.011 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 
1) 
-1.252*** .286 -1.165*** .312 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.565* 1.760 .562* 1.754 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.151 1.163 .155 1.168 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.229 .795 -.266 .767 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.054 .947 -.070 .933 
Percentages of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.015*** 1.015 .015*** 1.015 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .423** 1.526 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .199, Nagelkerke R Square = .268; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .205, Nagelkerke R Square = .277; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.10 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for discrimination 
against workers with a disability. Of the 718 establishments in the analysis, 269 monitor 
promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability, 449 do not. Model 1 contains 
the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables and the dichotomous 
partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is 
greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating 
that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are 
more likely to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability than 
those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards 
unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that 
the workplace will monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. 
Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the 
total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the 
higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is 
to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. These associations 
are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector workplaces are 
less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for discrimination against workers 
with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. 
In contrast to previous regressions, the variable that measures the percentage of 
workers with a disability within the establishment is not statistically significant, indicating 
potentially that promotions are viewed differently within firms compared to recruitment and 
selection. 
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Table 6.10 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Discrimination Against Workers with a Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.077*** .046 -3.338*** .035 
Total number of employees (natural log) .324*** 1.383 .317*** 1.373 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
-.004 .996 -.003 .997 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.032 1.033 .034 1.034 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
.009 1.009 .010 1.010 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.572*** .208 -1.493*** .225 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.506 1.659 .501 1.651 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.158 1.171 .158 1.171 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.143 .867 -.175 .839 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.085 1.089 .075 1.078 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.013*** 1.013 .013*** 1.013 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .401** 1.494 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .198, Nagelkerke R Square = .270; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .203, Nagelkerke R Square = .277; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.11 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination. Of the 718 establishments in the analysis, 285 monitor promotions for indirect 
gender discrimination, 433 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 
encompasses the control variables and the dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit 
the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level, indicating 
that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are 
more likely to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination than those workplaces 
with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The 
presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace 
will monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This relationship is, however, 
only weakly statistically significant.  
Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the 
total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the 
higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is 
to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. These associations are statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent 
level. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor 
promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at 
the one-per-cent level. Interestingly, the higher the percentage of the establishment’s 
workforce that is female, the less likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect 
gender discrimination. This relationship is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. It, 
potentially, indicates that workplaces do not wish to draw attention to potential discrimination 
if they have a large percentage of female workers. 
In contrast to previous regressions, the variable that measures the percentage of 
workers with a disability within the establishment is not statistically significant, indicating 
potentially that promotions are viewed differently within firms compared to recruitment and 
selection. 
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Table 6.11 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.149*** .117 -2.336*** .097 
Total number of employees (natural log) .260*** 1.297 .253*** 1.288 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
-.008** .992 -.007* .993 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.031 1.032 .032 1.033 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
.003 1.003 .004 1.004 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.804*** .448 -.736*** .479 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.119 1.126 .111 1.118 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.361 1.435 .369 1.446 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.145 .865 -.168 .845 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.096 1.101 .086 1.090 
Percentages of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.010*** 1.010 .010*** 1.010 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .304* 1.355 
Notes: N = 718; Model1: Cox & Snell R Square = .110, Nagelkerke R Square = .149; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square =.114, Nagelkerke R Square = .154; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.12 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect ethnicity 
discrimination. Of the 718 workplaces in the establishment, 278 monitor promotions for 
indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority, 440 do not. Model 1 contains 
the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables and the dichotomous 
partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is 
greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level, indicating 
that those workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are 
more likely to monitor promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination than those workplaces 
with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The 
presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers increases the likelihood that the workplace 
will monitor promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination.  
Several other independent variables are also statistically significant. The higher the 
total number of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the 
higher the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is 
to monitor promotions for indirect ethnicity discrimination. These associations are statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The percentage of workers with a disability within the 
establishment is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of 
workers with a disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for 
indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. Once again, private-sector 
workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for indirect ethnicity 
discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.  
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Table 6.12 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -2.061*** .127 -2.284*** .102 
Total number of employees (natural log) .228*** 1.256 .220*** 1.246 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
-.007* .993 -.006 .994 
Percentage of workers with a disability within 
workforce 
.034* 1.034 .035* 1.036 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority 
within workforce 
.005 1.005 .006 1.006 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.984*** .374 -.906*** .404 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.199 1.220 .190 1.210 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.283 1.327 .289 1.336 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.078 .925 -.104 .901 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.039 1.039 .027 1.027 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.010*** 1.010 .010*** 1.010 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .358** 1.431 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .114, Nagelkerke R Square = .155; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .120, Nagelkerke R Square = .163; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.13 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination. Of the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 263 monitor promotions for indirect 
discrimination against workers with a disability, 455 do not. Model 1 contains the control 
variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables plus the dichotomous partnership 
variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 
0.05.  
The partnership variable is not statistically significant, indicating that those 
workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are no more 
likely to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability than 
those workplaces with a dual-voice system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards 
unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes amongst employers does not change the 
likelihood that the workplace will monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against 
workers with a disability.  
A few independent variables are statistically significant. The higher the total number 
of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the 
percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor 
promotions for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. These associations 
are statistically significant at the one-per-cent and five-per-cent levels, respectively. Once 
again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions 
for indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This association is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level.  
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Table 6.13 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -1.982*** .138 -2.155*** .116 
Total number of employees (natural log) .208*** 1.231 .202*** 1.223 
Percentage of female workers  -.006 .994 -.006 .994 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .021 1.021 .022 1.022 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic minority  .003 1.003 .003 1.003 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.212*** .298 -1.152*** .316 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.239 1.270 .232 1.261 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.249 1.282 .251 1.285 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.019 .981 -.038 .963 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.159 1.172 .152 1.164 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.007** 1.007 .007** 1.007 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .280 1.324 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .111, Nagelkerke R Square = .152; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .114, Nagelkerke R Square = .156; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.14 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring pay rates by gender. Of the 718 
workplaces in the analysis, 257 monitor relative pay rates by gender, 461 do not. Model 1 
contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables plus the 
dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test 
statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is not statistically significant, indicating that those 
workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are no more 
likely to monitor relative pay rates by gender than those workplaces with a dual-voice system, 
but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union attitudes 
amongst employers does not change the likelihood that the workplace will monitor relative 
pay rates by gender.  
A few independent variables are statistically significant. The higher the total number 
of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the 
percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor 
relative pay rates by gender. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent 
level. The higher the percentage of workers who have a disability within the workforce, the 
more likely the establishment is to monitor relative pay rates by gender. This link is 
statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector workplaces are 
less likely than public-sector ones to monitor relative pay rates by gender. This association is 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.  
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Table 6.14 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Gender 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.881*** .021 -3.937*** .020 
Total number of employees (natural log) .457*** 1.580 .455*** 1.576 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
-.005 .995 -.005 .995 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.047** 1.049 .048** 1.049 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
-.002 .998 -.002 .998 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -.844*** .430 -.822*** .440 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.483 1.621 .481 1.618 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.294 1.342 .295 1.343 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.250 1.284 .244 1.276 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.289 .749 -.293 .746 
Percentages of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.011*** 1.011 .011*** 1.011 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .096 1.101 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .178, Nagelkerke R Square = .244; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .178, Nagelkerke R Square = .245; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.15 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring pay rates by ethnicity. Of the 718 
establishments in the analysis, 191 monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity, 527 do not. Model 
1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables plus the 
dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test 
statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is not statistically significant, indicating that those 
workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are no more 
likely to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity than those workplaces with a dual-voice 
system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union 
attitudes amongst employers does not change the likelihood that the workplace will monitor 
relative pay rates by ethnicity.  
A few independent variables are statistically significant. The higher the total number 
of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the 
percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor 
relative pay rates by ethnicity. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-
cent level. The higher the percentage of workers who have a disability within the workforce, 
the more likely the establishment is to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. This link is 
statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of workers who 
come from an ethnic minority within the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to 
monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent 
level. This variable was not statistically significant in preceding regressions. Although it is 
only statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level, it does indicate the robustness of the 
results as establishments with higher percentages of workers from an ethnic minority can be 
expected to monitor pay rates by ethnicity. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less 
likely than public-sector ones to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. This association is 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.  
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Table 6.15 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Ethnicity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.996*** .018 -4.141*** .016 
Total number of employees (natural log) .399*** 1.490 .394*** 1.483 
Percentage of female workers within 
workforce 
-.001 .999 .000 1.000 
Percentage of workers with a disability 
within workforce 
.038* 1.039 .039** 1.040 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority within workforce 
.010 1.010 .011* 1.011 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.088*** .337 -1.037*** .355 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.325 1.384 .320 1.377 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.171 1.187 .169 1.184 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
.197 1.217 .185 1.203 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.349 .706 -.359 .699 
Percentages of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.010*** 1.010 .010*** 1.010 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .232 1.261 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .152, Nagelkerke R Square = .221; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .153, Nagelkerke R Square = .224; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.16 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring relative pay rates by disability. Of 
the 718 workplaces in the analysis, 173 monitor relative pay rates by disability, 545 do not. 
Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2 encompasses the control variables and the 
dichotomous partnership variable. Both models fit the data well as the Hosmer Lemeshow test 
statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The partnership variable is not statistically significant, indicating that those 
workplaces with a dual-voice system in place and that view unions favourably are no more 
likely to monitor relative pay rates by disability than those workplaces with a dual-voice 
system, but that do not have a favourable attitude towards unions. The presence of pro-union 
attitudes amongst employers does not change the likelihood that the workplace will monitor 
relative pay rates by disability.  
A few independent variables are statistically significant. The higher the total number 
of employees within the workplace, measured using the natural log, and the higher the 
percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled, the more likely the workforce is to monitor 
relative pay rates by disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-
cent and five-per-cent levels, respectively. The higher the percentage of workers who have a 
disability within the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to monitor relative pay 
rates by disability. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. This 
association highlights the robustness of the results as it can be expected establishments with a 
higher percentage of workers with a disability are likely to create policies to monitor potential 
sources of bias against them. Once again, private-sector workplaces are less likely than 
public-sector ones to monitor relative pay rates by disability. This association is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The variable that captures the extent to which the largest 
occupational group is involved in work design is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent 
level. It is negatively associated with the likelihood that the workplace will monitor relative 
pay rates by disability. Although this link is only weakly statistically significant, it suggests a 
possible tension between providing employees with some decision-making powers and the 
implementation of broader policies that affect employees. The data do not allow for firm 
conclusions to be drawn. It would, for instance, be beneficial to know what aspects of ‘work 
design’ are delegated to workers in the largest occupational group. 
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Table 6.16 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.859*** .021 -4.024*** .018 
Total number of employees (natural log) .378*** 1.459 .373*** 1.452 
Percentage of female workers  .000 1.000 .000 1.000 
Percentage of workers with a disability  .041** 1.042 .042** 1.043 
Percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority  
.005 1.005 .005 1.005 
Private-sector dummy variable (yes = 1) -1.301*** .272 -1.242*** .289 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.158 1.171 .149 1.161 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.491 1.634 .487 1.628 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which they 
work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
.176 1.192 .164 1.178 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.518* .596 -.528* .590 
Percentages of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.009** 1.009 .009** 1.009 
Partnership (1 = yes; 0 = no)   .264 1.302 
Notes: N = 718; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .148, Nagelkerke R Square = .222; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .150, Nagelkerke R Square = .225; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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6.3       Chapter Conclusion 
 
The results in this chapter reveal that the presence of a partnership within a workplace 
is associated with a higher likelihood of the workplace having a range of EO and DM policies 
in place. In other words, a favourable attitude towards unions amongst those workplaces that 
have both direct and indirect voice measures in place is linked to a higher likelihood of the 
workplace adopting EO and DM policies. This finding may result from a greater willingness 
amongst managers who have a favourable attitude towards unions to listen to their concerns. 
An alternative explanation is that those workplaces that adopt a more extensive range of EO 
and DM measures in order to promote co-operative employment relations are also those that 
have a favourable attitude towards unions for the same reasons.  
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Chapter 7 - The Links between ‘Bleak Houses’ and Equal Opportunity and Diversity 
Management Policies: An Empirical Analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter examines how variation in one of the workplace categories influences the 
likelihood of workplaces having the EO and DM policies that this thesis examines. More 
specifically, it examines if those workplace within the minimal voice category that have 
below mean number on the direct voice index ‘bleak houses’ and those that have an above 
mean ‘limited approach’ towards unions, are more likely to have EO and DM policies in place 
(see Appendix A.4 for summary of results). Bleak houses are those establishments that do not 
have collective voice and that have a below-mean score for the direct-voice measure amongst 
workplaces within ‘minimal’ voice. In other words, they have no indirect voice and fall within 
the lowest quartile on the direct-voice measure. For ease of interpretation, such workplaces 
are given a value of ‘0’ on the ‘bleak house’ dummy variable. Those workplaces that also 
have no collective voice, but that have an above-mean score on the direct-voice measure 
amongst ‘minimalist’ workplaces have a value of ‘1’. This aids interpretation, as it indicates if 
some, very limited direct voice is more likely to be associated with EO and DM outcomes 
than no or ‘next to no’ direct voice. 
 
7.2 The Results 
 
Table 7.1 shows the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is the 
presence or absence of a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity. 
Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 797 have a formal written policy on equal 
opportunities or managing diversity, 143 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; 
Model 2 contains the control variables and the ‘bleak house’ dichotomous variable.   
The statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow statistics indicates that Model 1 
and Model 2 do not provide a good fit for the data; it is less than 0.05 for both models (0.014 
for Model 1 and 0.011 for Model 2). This is not surprising given the relatively limited amount 
of variation on the outcome variable. A model with just a constant in it would already account 
for much of the variation in the outcome; adding variables does not help to explain that small 
number of workplaces that do not have a formal written EO or DM policy.  
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The ‘bleak house’ dummy variable that differentiates between those minimalist 
workplaces that have below-mean direct voice (value = 0) and those that have above-mean 
values of direct voice within the minimalist group of establishments (value = 1) indicates that 
those with more voice are more likely to have a formal written policy on equal opportunities 
or managing diversity. This indicates that, even within the minimalist voice category, there is 
an association between voice and an EO and DM policy.  This association is statistically 
significant at the 1-per-cent level. The model is, however, not a good fit for the data overall. 
Several other variables are statistically significant. The larger the workplace, as 
measured by the natural log of the total number of employees, and the higher the percentage 
of the female employees within the workforce, the more likely the establishment is to have a 
formal written EO or DM policy. These associations are statistically significant at the 1-per-
cent level. Private-sector establishments are less likely to have a formal written EO or DM 
policy than those in the public sector. This association is statistically significant at the 5-per-
cent level. If workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discretion over 
how they work, the establishment is less likely to have a formal written policy. This 
association is statistically significant at the 5-per-cent level. This link suggests that there may 
be a tension between granting employees discretion over how they work and implementing 
policies that affect all establishment employees. 
  
239 
 
Table 7.1 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Having a 
Formal Written Policy on Equal Opportunities or Managing Diversity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -1.504** .222 -1.305** .271 
Total number of employees (natural log) .898*** 2.455 .758*** 2.134 
Percentage of the total workforce who are 
female 
.009*** 1.010 .009*** 1.009 
Percentage of the total workforce who have 
a disability 
.077 1.080 .079 1.082 
Percentage of the total workforce who are 
from an ethnic minority 
-.004 .996 -.005 .995 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -.853*** .426 -.761** .467 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.515** 1.673 .418 1.518 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.504** .604 -.493** .611 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.051 1.053 -.050 .952 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.301 1.352 .229 1.257 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.001 1.001 -.001 .999 
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-
mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; 
above-mean =1) 
  1.052*** 2.863 
Notes: N = 940; Model 1: Cox & Snell R Square = .120, Nagelkerke R Square = .208; Model 
2: Cox & Snell R Square = .143; Nagelkerke R Square = .249; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.2 shows the results of a logistic regression for which the outcome variable is 
the establishment monitors recruitment and selection by gender. Of the 947 workplaces in the 
analysis, 245 monitor recruitment and selection based on gender, 702 do not. Model 1 
contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In 
order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in 
the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice 
measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half  of the workplaces. None of 
the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Model 1 provides a 
good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 
0.05. Model 2 does not, however, provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the 
Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05.  
 The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This 
indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level 
of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice 
workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and 
selection based on gender. It is, however, important to remember that Model 2 does not 
provide a good fit for the data, overall. 
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the 
establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the 
workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. 
This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage 
of employees who are female, who have a disability, and who are highly skilled, the more 
likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection by gender. All three 
associations are statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. If a workplace has a high 
number of female employees, the likelihood that recruitment and selection will be monitored 
in this way could be interpreted as a reflection of pressure on managers to ensure that they are 
treated fairly. Alternatively, it may indicate that the workplaces that monitor recruitment and 
selection by gender are more attractive places for women to work, resulting in more women 
working in the establishment. Similarly, the higher the percentage of workers with a 
disability, the greater the pressure on managers to ensure that recruitment and selection is 
‘fair’. Alternatively, if a workplace monitors recruitment and selection by gender, this could 
be a signal to those with a disability, that the workplace is an attractive place to work. The 
higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to 
monitor recruitment and selection by gender. This could reflect the fact that finding such 
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workers is difficult, resulting in recruitment and selection practices that are designed to 
highlight any bias. Private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to 
monitor recruitment and selection by gender. This association is statistically significant at the 
one-per-cent level.  
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Table 7.2 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection by Gender 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.440*** .032 -3.488*** .031 
Total number of employees (natural log) .585*** 1.795 .536*** 1.710 
Percentage of the total workforce who are 
female 
.007** 1.007 .007** 1.007 
Percentage of the total workforce who have a 
disability 
.057** 1.059 .057** 1.059 
Percentage of the total workforce who are from 
an ethnic minority 
.004 1.004 .004 1.004 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -1.311*** .270 -1.272*** .280 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.342 1.407 .279 1.321 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.045 1.046 .064 1.066 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a lot’ 
or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.085 .918 -.111 .895 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.161 .851 -.216 .806 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.007** 1.007 .006** 1.006 
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean 
direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean 
=1) 
  .535*** 1.707 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.211, Nagelkerke R square = 0.309; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.217, Nagelkerke R square = 0.319; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.3 shows the results of a logistic regression to assess the links between the 
independent variable and the workplace monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. Of the 
947 workplaces in the analysis, 255 monitor recruitment and selection based on ethnicity, 692 
do not. Model 1 contains the control variables: Model 2, the control variables and a bleak 
house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the 
workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the 
direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half of the 
workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis has collective voice measures in place. 
Model 1 provides a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test 
statistic is greater than 0.05. Model 2 does not provide a good fit for the data, as the 
significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05.  
The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This 
indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level 
of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice 
workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and 
selection based on ethnicity. It is, however, important to remember that Model 2 does not 
provide a good fit for the data, overall. 
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the 
establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the 
workplace, and the higher the percentage of workers who are highly skilled, the more likely 
the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. These associations are 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who 
are female and the higher the percentage of employees who have a disability, the more likely 
the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. The former association 
is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level; the latter, at the five-per-cent level. If a 
workplace has a high number of female employees, the likelihood that recruitment and 
selection will be monitored in this way could be interpreted as a reflection of pressure on 
managers to ensure that all potential employees are treated fairly. Alternatively, it may 
indicate that the workplaces that monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity are more 
attractive places for women to work, resulting in more women working in the establishment. 
This link is, however, only weakly statistically significant. Similarly, the higher the 
percentage of workers with a disability, the greater the pressure on managers to ensure that 
recruitment and selection is ‘fair’. Alternatively, if a workplace monitors recruitment and 
selection by ethnicity, this could be a signal to those with a disability that the workplace is an 
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attractive place to work. The higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the 
more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. This could 
reflect the fact that finding such workers is difficult, resulting in recruitment and selection 
practices that are designed to highlight any bias. Private-sector establishments are less likely 
than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity. This association is 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.  
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Table 7.3 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Ethnicity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.438*** .032 -3.497*** .030 
Total number of employees (natural log) .601*** 1.823 .543*** 1.721 
Percentage of the total workforce who are female .006** 1.006 .005* 1.005 
Percentage of the total workforce who have a 
disability 
.067** 1.069 .067** 1.069 
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an 
ethnic minority 
.005 1.005 .006 1.006 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -1.341*** .262 -1.299*** .273 
Workers in largest occupational group have variety 
in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
.405 1.499 .331 1.393 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.076 .927 -.055 .947 
Workers in largest occupational group have control 
over the pace at which they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.034 .967 -.067 .935 
Workers in largest occupational group are involved 
in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.226 .798 -.292 .746 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled .009*** 1.009 .009*** 1.009 
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean 
direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean =1) 
  .638*** 1.893 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.226, Nagelkerke R square = 0.328; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.234, Nagelkerke R square = 0.341; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.4 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitors recruitment and selection by disability. Of 
the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 231 monitor recruitment and selection based on disability, 
716 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak 
house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the 
workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the 
direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half  of the 
workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. 
Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test 
statistic is greater than 0.05 for both.  
The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This 
indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level 
of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice 
workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and 
selection based on disability.  
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the 
establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the 
workplace, and the higher the percentage of workers who have a disability, the more likely the 
workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. These associations are 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who 
are highly skilled, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection by 
disability. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. This could reflect the 
fact that finding such workers is difficult, resulting in recruitment and selection practices that 
are designed to highlight any bias. Private-sector establishments are less likely than public-
sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by disability. This association is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level.  
Unlike previous regressions that assess the likelihood that, within minimalist 
workplaces, establishments will monitor recruitment and selection by gender or ethnicity, the 
percentage of female employees within the establishment is not statistically associated with 
the likelihood that the workplace will monitor recruitment and selection by disability.  
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Table 7.4 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection by Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.367*** .034 -3.429*** .032 
Total number of employees (natural log) .544*** 1.722 .497*** 1.644 
Percentage of the total workforce who are female .006* 1.006 .005 1.005 
Percentage of the total workforce who have a 
disability 
.077*** 1.080 .076*** 1.079 
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an 
ethnic minority 
.003 1.003 .003 1.003 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -1.411*** .244 -1.374*** .253 
Workers in largest occupational group have variety in 
their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.445* 1.561 .383 1.466 
Workers in largest occupational group have discretion 
over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.022 .978 -.003 .997 
Workers in largest occupational group have control 
over the pace at which they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.102 1.108 .079 1.082 
Workers in largest occupational group are involved in 
work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ 
= 0) 
-.223 .800 -.276 .759 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled .007** 1.007 .006** 1.006 
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean direct 
voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean =1) 
  .540*** 1.716 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.209, Nagelkerke R square = 0.312; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.216, Nagelkerke = 0.321; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.5 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitors recruitment and selection for indirect 
gender discrimination. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 202 monitor recruitment and 
selection based on indirect gender discrimination, 745 do not. Model 1 contains the control 
variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid 
interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half 
of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a 
value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half  of the workplaces. None of the workplaces 
in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Both models provide a good fit for the 
data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both.  
The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This 
indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level 
of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice 
workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and 
selection based on indirect gender discrimination. This suggests that direct voice can still 
influence important outcomes amongst those workplaces that have very little direct voice. 
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the 
establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the 
workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect 
gender discrimination. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. 
The higher the percentage of employees who have a disability, the more likely the 
establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection for indirect gender discrimination. This 
link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of 
employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment 
and selection by indirect gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the five-
per-cent level. This could reflect the fact that finding such workers is difficult, resulting in 
recruitment and selection practices that are designed to highlight any bias. Private-sector 
establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by 
indirect gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent 
level.  
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Table 7.5 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Gender Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.450*** .032 -3.562*** .028 
Total number of employees (natural log) .466*** 1.594 .418*** 1.519 
Percentage of the total workforce who are female .005 1.005 .004 1.004 
Percentage of the total workforce who have a 
disability 
.053** 1.055 .054** 1.056 
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an 
ethnic minority 
-.001 .999 -.001 .999 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -.888*** .412 -.843*** .430 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.338 1.402 .270 1.310 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.019 .981 -.001 .999 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a lot’ 
or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.109 1.115 .085 1.089 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.053 .948 -.113 .894 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled .006** 1.006 .006** 1.006 
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean 
direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean 
=1) 
  .629*** 1.876 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.133, Nagelkerke R square = 0.206; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.142, Nagelkerke R square = 0.220; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.6 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect 
discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. Of the 947 workplaces in the 
analysis, 199 monitor recruitment and selection based on indirect discrimination against 
workers from an ethnic minority, 748 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, 
the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house 
variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the 
minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in 
the bottom half  of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective 
voice measures in place. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the 
Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both.  
The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This 
indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level 
of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice 
workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and 
selection based on indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This 
suggests that direct voice can still influence important outcomes amongst those workplaces 
that have very little direct voice. 
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the 
establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the 
workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect 
discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This association is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who have a 
disability, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection for 
indirect discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This link is statistically 
significant at the five-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of employees who are highly 
skilled, the more likely the establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect 
discrimination against workers from an ethnic minority. This link, too, is statistically 
significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely 
than public-sector ones to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect discrimination against 
workers from an ethnic minority. This association is, as before, statistically significant at the 
one-per-cent level.  
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Table 7.6 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.427*** .032 -3.533*** .029 
Total number of employees (natural log) .471*** 1.601 .424*** 1.529 
Percentage of the total workforce who are female .003 1.003 .003 1.003 
Percentage of the total workforce who have a 
disability 
.055** 1.056 .055** 1.057 
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an 
ethnic minority 
.000 1.000 .000 1.000 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -.837*** .433 -.794*** .452 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.263 1.301 .198 1.219 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.016 .985 .001 1.001 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a lot’ 
or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.072 1.074 .049 1.051 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.021 .979 -.080 .923 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled .007** 1.007 .007** 1.007 
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean 
direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean 
=1) 
  .608*** 1.837 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.129, Nagelkerke R square = 0.201; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.138, Nagelkerke R square 0.215; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.7 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring recruitment and selection for indirect 
discrimination against workers with a disability. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 193 
monitor recruitment and selection based on indirect discrimination against workers with a 
disability, 754 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables 
and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value 
of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice 
category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half  
of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in 
place. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer 
Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both.  
The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. This 
indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level 
of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice 
workplaces increases the likelihood that the establishment will monitor recruitment and 
selection based on indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This suggests that 
direct voice can still influence important outcomes amongst those workplaces that have very 
little direct voice. 
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the 
establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the 
workplace and the higher the percentage of employees who have a disability, the more likely 
the workplace is to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect discrimination against 
workers with a disability. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent 
level. The higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the 
establishment is to monitor recruitment and selection by indirect discrimination against 
workers with a disability. This link, too, is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. 
Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor 
recruitment and selection by indirect discrimination against workers with a disability. This 
association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.  
 
 
 
 
253 
 
Table 7.7 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Recruitment and Selection for Indirect Discrimination Against Workers with a Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -3.437*** .032 -3.547*** .029 
Total number of employees (natural log) .436*** 1.547 .391*** 1.478 
Percentage of the total workforce who are 
female 
.006* 1.006 .005 1.005 
Percentage of the total workforce who have a 
disability 
.074*** 1.077 .075*** 1.077 
Percentage of the total workforce who are from 
an ethnic minority 
-.001 .999 -.001 .999 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -.811*** .444 -.766*** .465 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.117 1.125 .047 1.049 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.120 1.127 .139 1.149 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.108 1.114 .087 1.091 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.073 .930 -.130 .878 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.007** 1.007 .006** 1.006 
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-
mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; 
above-mean =1) 
  .603*** 1.828 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.126, Nagelkerke R square = 0.199; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.135, Nagelkerke R square = 0.212; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.8 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for gender discrimination. 
Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 88 monitor promotions for gender discrimination, 859 
do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak 
house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the 
workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the 
direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half  of the 
workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. 
Model 1 does not provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow 
test statistic is less than 0.05. Model 2 does, however, provide a good fit for the data, as the 
statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant. This indicates that, amongst 
those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the 
presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is not 
associated with an increase or a decrease in the likelihood that the establishment will monitor 
promotions for gender discrimination compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-
mean direct voice.  
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The 
larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in 
the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for gender 
discrimination. These associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The 
higher the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the establishment 
is to monitor promotions for gender discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the 
five-per-cent level. If workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
discretion over how they work, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for 
gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level, 
indicating potentially that, amongst ‘minimalist voice’ workplaces, those that pursue a 
strategy based, in part, on granting some employees a degree of decision-making powers are 
more likely to implement policies that check for gender bias in promotions. Once again, 
private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for 
gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.  
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Table 7.8 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Promotions for Gender Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -4.990*** .007 -5.095*** .006 
Total number of employees (natural log) .547*** 1.728 .530*** 1.698 
Percentage of the total workforce who are female -.003 .997 -.003 .997 
Percentage of the total workforce who have a 
disability 
.026 1.026 .027 1.027 
Percentage of the total workforce who are from an 
ethnic minority 
-.004 .996 -.004 .996 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -1.038*** .354 -1.019*** .361 
Workers in largest occupational group have variety 
in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
.370 1.448 .338 1.402 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 
1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.637* 1.890 .643* 1.903 
Workers in largest occupational group have control 
over the pace at which they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
= 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.055 1.057 .056 1.057 
Workers in largest occupational group are involved 
in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or 
‘none’ = 0) 
-.027 .973 -.061 .941 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled .009** 1.009 .008** 1.008 
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-mean 
direct voice within minimalist = 0; above-mean =1) 
  .351 1.420 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.107, Nagelkerke R square = 0.232; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.108, Nagelkerke = 0.235; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.9 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for ethnicity discrimination. 
Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 84 monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination, 863 
do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak 
house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the 
workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the 
direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half  of the 
workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. 
Model 1 does not provide a good fit for the data, as the significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow 
test statistic is less than 0.05. Model 2 does, however, provide a good fit for the data, as the 
statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant in the logistic regression. This 
indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level 
of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice 
workplaces is not associated with an increase or a decrease in the likelihood that the 
establishment will monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination compared to those 
‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.  
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The 
larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in 
the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for ethnic 
discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher 
the percentage of employees who are highly skilled, the more likely the establishment is to 
monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination. This link is statistically significant at the 10-
per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector 
ones to monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination. This association is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level.  
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Table 7.9 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace Monitoring 
Promotions for Ethnicity Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -5.081*** .006 -5.221*** .005 
Total number of employees (natural log) .530*** 1.699 .511*** 1.666 
Percentage of the total workforce who are 
female 
-.004 .996 -.004 .996 
Percentage of the total workforce who have a 
disability 
.024 1.024 .025 1.025 
Percentage of the total workforce who are 
from an ethnic minority 
-.001 .999 -.001 .999 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -1.205*** .300 -1.182*** .307 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
variety in their work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.626 1.870 .588 1.801 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
discretion over how they work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.501 1.650 .510 1.665 
Workers in largest occupational group have 
control over the pace at which they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.225 1.253 .226 1.254 
Workers in largest occupational group are 
involved in work design (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; 
‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.027 .973 -.062 .940 
Percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled 
.008* 1.008 .008* 1.008 
Bleak house dichotomous variable (below-
mean direct voice within minimalist = 0; 
above-mean =1) 
  .419 1.521 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.109, Nagelkerke R square = 0.243; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.111, Nagelkerke R square = 0.247; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.10 shows the results of a logistic regression that examines the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for discrimination 
against workers with a disability. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 79 monitor 
promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability, 868 do not. Model 1 contains 
the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid 
interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half 
of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a 
value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half  of the workplaces. None of the workplaces 
in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Both models provide a good fit for the 
data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 
for Model 1 and Model 2.  
The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant in the logistic regression. This 
indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level 
of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice 
workplaces is not associated with an increase or a decrease in the likelihood that the 
establishment will monitor promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability 
compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.  
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The 
larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in 
the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for discrimination 
against workers with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-
cent level. If workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discretion over 
how they work, the more likely the establishment is to monitor promotions for discrimination 
against workers with a disability. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. 
Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor 
promotions for discrimination against workers with a disability. This association is 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. 
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Table 7.10 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Discrimination Against Workers with a Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -5.038*** .006 -5.176*** .006 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.487*** 1.628 .467*** 1.596 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are female 
-.003 .997 -.004 .996 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
have a disability 
.026 1.026 .026 1.027 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are from an ethnic minority 
-.004 .996 -.004 .996 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -1.201*** .301 -1.180*** .307 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.412 1.510 .372 1.451 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.851** 2.342 .862** 2.367 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.223 1.250 .225 1.253 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.001 .999 -.035 .965 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.007 1.007 .007 1.007 
Bleak house dichotomous variable 
(below-mean direct voice within 
minimalist = 0; above-mean =1) 
  .428 1.534 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.100, Nagelkerke R square = 0.229; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.102, Nagelkerke R square = 0.233; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.11 shows the results of a logistic regression that assesses the links between the 
independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 103 monitor promotions for indirect 
gender discrimination, 844 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the 
control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house 
variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the 
minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in 
the bottom half  of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective 
voice measures in place. Model 1 does not provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical 
significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05. Model 2 does, however, 
provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test 
statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level in the 
logistic regression. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and 
with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice 
amongst minimalist voice workplaces is associated with an increased likelihood that the 
establishment will monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination compared to those 
‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.  
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the 
establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the 
workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. If workers 
in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discretion over how they work, the 
establishment is more likely to monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination. This 
link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector 
establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for indirect 
gender discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. 
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Table 7.11 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Gender Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -4.575*** .010 -4.765*** .009 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.449*** 1.566 .417*** 1.517 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are female 
.003 1.003 .002 1.002 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
have a disability 
.022 1.022 .023 1.023 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are from an ethnic minority 
-.001 .999 -.001 .999 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -.897*** .408 -.856*** .425 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.546 1.726 .488 1.629 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.144 1.155 .155 1.168 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.266 1.305 .255 1.291 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.136 .873 -.181 .834 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.008** 1.008 .008** 1.008 
Bleak house dichotomous variable 
(below-mean direct voice within 
minimalist = 0; above-mean =1) 
  .600** 1.823 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.092, Nagelkerke R square = 0.185; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.097, Nagelkerke R square = 0.195; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.12 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect ethnicity 
discrimination. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 103 monitor promotions for indirect 
ethnic discrimination, 844 do not. Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the 
control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid interpretation, the bleak house 
variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half of those workplaces within the 
minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in 
the bottom half  of the workplaces. None of the workplaces in the analysis have collective 
voice measures in place. Model 1 does not provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical 
significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is less than 0.05. Model 2 does, however, 
provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test 
statistic is greater than 0.05.  
The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level in the 
logistic regression. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and 
with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice 
amongst minimalist voice workplaces is associated with an increased likelihood that the 
establishment will monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination compared to those 
‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.  
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the 
establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the 
workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect ethnic 
discrimination. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher 
the percentage of the establishment’s workforce who are highly skilled, the more likely the 
workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discriminations. This link is 
statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are 
less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination. 
This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level.  
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Table 7.12 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Ethnicity Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -4.603*** .010 -4.794*** .008 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.450*** 1.569 .417*** 1.518 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are female 
.003 1.003 .003 1.003 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
have a disability 
.023 1.023 .024 1.025 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are from an ethnic minority 
.000 1.000 .000 1.000 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -.863*** .422 -.822*** .439 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.573 1.773 .514 1.672 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.049 1.051 .062 1.064 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.351 1.421 .338 1.402 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.122 .885 -.167 .847 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.007* 1.007 .007* 1.007 
Bleak house dichotomous variable 
(below-mean direct voice within 
minimalist = 0; above-mean =1) 
  .608** 1.836 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.089, Nagelkerke R square = 0.178; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.094, Nagelkerke = 0.188; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.13 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination. Of the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 98 monitor promotions for indirect 
discrimination against those with a disability, 849 do not. Model 1 contains the control 
variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In order to aid 
interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in the top half 
of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice measure; it has a 
value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half  of the workplaces. None of the workplaces 
in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Both models provide a good fit for the 
data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 
for both Model 1 and Model 2.  
The bleak house dummy is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level in the 
logistic regression. This indicates that, amongst those workplaces without collective voice and 
with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the presence of an above-mean level of direct voice 
amongst minimalist voice workplaces is associated with an increased likelihood that the 
establishment will monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against those with a 
disability compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.  
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are also statistically significant. The larger the 
establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in the 
workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination 
against those with a disability. This association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent 
level. The higher the percentage of the establishment’s workforce who are highly skilled, the 
more likely the workplace is to monitor promotions for indirect discrimination against those 
with a disability. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Once again, 
private-sector establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor promotions for 
indirect discrimination against those with a disability. This association is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level.  
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Table 7.13 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Promotions for Indirect Disability Discrimination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -4.565*** .010 -4.790*** .008 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.403*** 1.496 .365*** 1.441 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are female 
.004 1.004 .003 1.003 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
have a disability 
.024 1.025 .026 1.026 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are from an ethnic minority 
-.001 .999 -.001 .999 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -.820*** .441 -.775*** .461 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.367 1.443 .299 1.349 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.327 1.387 .343 1.409 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.317 1.373 .305 1.357 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
-.055 .946 -.105 .900 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.007* 1.007 .007* 1.007 
Bleak house dichotomous variable 
(below-mean direct voice within 
minimalist = 0; above-mean =1) 
  .694** 2.003 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.079, Nagelkerke = 0.163; Model 2: 
Cox and Snell R square = 0.085, Nagelkerke R square = 0.176; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.14 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring pay rates by gender. Of the 947 
workplaces in the analysis, 83 monitor relative pay rates by gender, 864 do not. Model 1 
contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. In 
order to aid interpretation, the bleak house variable has a value of 1 if the workplace scores in 
the top half of those workplaces within the minimal voice category on the direct voice 
measure; it has a value of 0, if the workplace is in the bottom half  of the workplaces. None of 
the workplaces in the analysis have collective voice measures in place. Both models provide a 
good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is 
greater than 0.05 for both Model 1 and Model 2.  
The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant. This indicates that, amongst 
those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the 
presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is 
associated neither with an increase nor with a decrease in the likelihood that the establishment 
will monitor relative pay rates by gender compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with 
below-mean direct voice.  
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The 
larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in 
the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates by gender. This 
association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of 
the establishment’s workforce who are highly skilled, the more likely the workplace is to 
monitor relative pay rates by gender. This link is statistically significant at the one-per-cent 
level. The higher the percentage of the workforce who have a disability, the more likely the 
establishment is to monitor relative pay rates in this way. This association is statistically 
significant at the 10-per-cent level. Once again, private-sector establishments are less likely 
than public-sector ones to monitor relative pay rates by gender. This association is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of female employees within 
the establishment’s workforce, the less likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates by 
gender. This link is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level, potentially indicating a 
reluctance on the part of managers to implement such a policy for fear of revealing 
inconsistencies in the pay system. 
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Table 7.14 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Gender 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -6.447*** .002 -6.509*** .001 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.676*** 1.965 .661*** 1.936 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are female 
-.008 .992 -.009* .991 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
have a disability 
.032* 1.033 .033* 1.033 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are from an ethnic minority 
-.004 .996 -.004 .996 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -.597** .550 -.592** .553 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.207 1.231 .190 1.209 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
1.099*** 3.000 1.101*** 3.006 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.170 1.185 .171 1.187 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.504 1.655 .473 1.605 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.012*** 1.012 .012*** 1.012 
Bleak house dichotomous variable 
(below-mean direct voice within 
minimalist = 0; above-mean =1) 
  .258 1.295 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.123, Nagelkerke R square = 0.274; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.123,Nagelkerke R square = 0.275; ‘***’ denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.15 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring pay rates by ethnicity. Of the 947 
workplaces in the analysis, 44 monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity, 903 do not. As there is 
relatively little variation in the outcome variable, the results of this particular regression 
should be treated tentatively. Ideally, at least 10 per cent of the cases should fall into any one 
category in regressions. For this regression, just under five per cent fall into the category of 
establishments that monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. Model 1 contains the control 
variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house dummy. Both models provide a 
good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is 
greater than 0.05 for both Model 1 and Model 2.  
The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant. This indicates that, amongst 
those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the 
presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is 
associated neither with an increase nor with a decrease in the likelihood that the establishment 
will monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity compared to those ‘minimalist’ workplaces with 
below-mean direct voice.  
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The 
larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in 
the workplace, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. This 
association is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of 
the establishment’s workforce who have a disability, who are highly skilled, and if employees 
in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ control over the pace at which they 
work, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. These links 
are statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Unlike previous regressions, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the private-sector and public-sector organisations 
in terms of the likelihood that the workplace will monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity. 
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Table 7.15 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Ethnicity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -8.328*** .000 -8.337*** .000 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.600*** 1.823 .599*** 1.819 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are female 
-.005 .995 -.005 .995 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
have a disability 
.045** 1.046 .045** 1.046 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are from an ethnic minority 
.007 1.007 .007 1.007 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -.616 .540 -.616 .540 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.651 1.918 .649 1.914 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
.922 2.515 .923 2.516 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.991** 2.695 .992** 2.696 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.841 2.318 .838 2.312 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.011** 1.011 .011** 1.011 
Bleak house dichotomous variable 
(below-mean direct voice within 
minimalist = 0; above-mean =1) 
  .035 1.036 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.087, Nagelkerke R square = 0.277; 
Model 2 Cox and Snell = 0.87, Nagelkerke = 0.277; ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at 
the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.16 shows the results for a logistic regression that assesses the links between 
the independent variables and the workplace monitoring relative pay rates by disability. Of 
the 947 workplaces in the analysis, 40 monitor relative pay rates for workers with and without 
a disability, 907 do not. As there is relatively little variation in the outcome variable, the 
results of this particular regression should be treated tentatively. Ideally, at least 10 per cent of 
the cases should fall into any one category in regressions. For this regression, just under five 
per cent fall into the category of establishments that monitor relative pay rates by disability.  
Model 1 contains the control variables; Model 2, the control variables and a bleak house 
dummy. Both models provide a good fit for the data, as the statistical significance of the 
Hosmer Lemeshow test statistic is greater than 0.05 for both Model 1 and Model 2.  
The bleak house dummy is not statistically significant. This indicates that, amongst 
those workplaces without collective voice and with a ‘minimal’ level of direct voice, the 
presence of an above-mean level of direct voice amongst minimalist voice workplaces is 
associated neither with an increase nor with a decrease in the likelihood that the establishment 
will monitor relative pay rates for workers with and without a disability compared to those 
‘minimalist’ workplaces with below-mean direct voice.  
Some of the other variables in Model 2 are, however, statistically significant. The 
larger the establishment, as measured by the natural log of the total number of employees in 
the workplace, and if employees in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
discretion over how they work, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates 
for workers with and without a disability. These associations are statistically significant at the 
one-per-cent level. The higher the percentage of the establishment’s workforce who have a 
disability, the more likely the workplace is to monitor relative pay rates for workers with and 
without a disability. This link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The higher 
the percentage of employees within the establishment’s largest occupational group who have 
‘a lot’ or ‘some’ control over the pace at which they work, the more likely the workplace is to 
monitor relative pay rates by disability. This association is statistically significant at the 10-
per-cent level. Taken together, these results indicate that the establishment’s strategy 
influences the likelihood that the workplace will monitor pay rates in this way: the more 
discretion and the more control workers in the largest occupational group have, the more 
likely it is that the establishment will monitor relative pay rates by disability. As noted above, 
however, the limited variation in the outcome variable means that the results should be treated 
with caution.  
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As in the majority of previous the ‘bleak house’ regressions, private-sector 
establishments are less likely than public-sector ones to monitor relative pay rates by 
disability. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. 
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Table 7.16 Logistic Regression Results: Links between Models and the Workplace 
Monitoring Pay Rates by Disability 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Constant -8.338*** .000 -8.371*** .000 
Total number of employees (natural 
log) 
.516*** 1.676 .511*** 1.667 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are female 
-.007 .993 -.007 .993 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
have a disability 
.054** 1.056 .054** 1.056 
Percentage of the total workforce who 
are from an ethnic minority 
.007 1.007 .007 1.007 
Private sector (1 = Yes; 0 = No) -.750* .472 -.751* .472 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have variety in their work (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.431 1.538 .421 1.523 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have discretion over how they work (‘a 
lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 
0) 
1.805** 6.083 1.809** 6.104 
Workers in largest occupational group 
have control over the pace at which 
they work (‘a lot’ or ‘some’ = 1; ‘a 
little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.883* 2.417 .885* 2.422 
Workers in largest occupational group 
are involved in work design (‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ = 1; ‘a little’ or ‘none’ = 0) 
.873 2.393 .868 2.382 
Percentage of the workforce that is 
highly skilled 
.009 1.009 .009 1.009 
Bleak house dichotomous variable 
(below-mean direct voice within 
minimalist = 0; above-mean =1) 
  .110 1.116 
Notes: N = 947; Model 1: Cox and Snell R square = 0.078, Nagelkerke R square = 0.263; 
Model 2: Cox and Snell R square = 0.078, Nagelkerke = 0.264; ‘***’ denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
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7.3  Chapter Conclusion 
The results of this chapter reveal that, amongst minimal voice workplaces, those with 
an above-mean level of direct voice are more likely than those with below-mean levels of 
direct voice to implement EO and DM policies. Even amongst workplaces with limited levels 
of direct voice, there is an association between workplaces with higher levels of voice 
compared to those with lower levels of voice. This is based on the finding that in around half 
of the regressions in this chapter, there is a statistically significant difference between the two 
groups. This difference is often statistically significant at the one-per-cent level, suggesting a 
strong link between higher levels of voice and some of the EO and DM policies examined 
here.  
This supports the theoretical arguments in favour of direct voice, as, put simply, some 
direct voice is an improvement on none or very little. The presence of some direct voice 
mechanisms within workplaces, even if these are relatively few in number or limited in the 
degree of influence that they have, may enable employees to convey their wishes to managers 
within the workplace. Of course, an alternative explanation is that, amongst minimal voice 
workplaces, there may be differences in the degree to which managers seek to establish co-
operative employee relations, leading to a greater emphasis on both EO and DM policies and 
direct voice mechanisms within workplaces. 
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Chapter 8 - The Links between Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies 
and Absenteeism: An Empirical Analysis 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the links between the various EO and DM policies and 
absenteeism for the different categories of workplaces (direct, dual, partnership and 
minimalist) in order to establish if these policies are, in general, associated with an increase or 
a decrease in absenteeism or if they ‘only’ have links to higher or lower absenteeism rates for 
different types of workplace. Higher rates of absenteeism are likely to reflect higher levels of 
employee dissatisfaction within any particular workplaces, as disgruntled employees may be 
unable or unwilling to leave a firm, but may be prepared to call in sick even though they are 
not (Deery et al., 2002; Tüselmann et al. 2007). In addition, the HRM and industrial relations 
literatures have emphasized the importance of placing worker-related outcomes, such as 
absenteeism, at the centre of the analysis (Addison and Belman, 2004; Arthur, 1994; Grund 
and Schmitt, 2013; Guest and Hoque, 1994; Guest, 2011; Guthrie, 2001; Hoque, 1999; 
Pfeifer, 2011; Ramsay et al., 2000). The question in the WERS survey asks for the 
‘percentage of work days lost through sickness or absence in the last year’; it is, therefore, 
assumed here that higher levels of absenteeism reflect greater dissatisfaction amongst 
employees rather than more pronounced levels of sickness amongst a particular workforce 
(Deery et al., 2002; Tüselmann et al. 2007).Other factors will, of course, play a role in 
shaping absenteeism, including workers’ responsibilities to look after children or elderly 
relatives and the percentage of the workers who are highly skilled. A greater percentage of 
highly skilled employees in a workforce is likely to result in more employees having 
stimulating and interesting jobs, potentially leading to lower levels of absenteeism. Relatedly, 
greater variation in the work of the largest group of workers as well as employees in the 
largest occupational group having greater control over their work are likely to lead to lower 
levels of absenteeism, as employees in that group will have more satisfying jobs.  
The absenteeism rates are not normally distributed and are skewed, rendering the use 
of ordinary least squares inappropriate. This thesis, therefore, dichotomises this variable. It 
does so by taking the arithmetic mean of the absenteeism rate. Those establishment with an 
‘above mean’ absenteeism rate are coded 1; those workplaces with a mean or below mean 
absenteeism rate are coded 0. This dichotomisation enables logistic regression to be used, as 
these do not rest on parametric assumptions (Field, 2009). These outcomes are, then, in 
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common with the analysis in the first stage of this thesis, analysed using logistic regressions. 
In the second stage of the analysis, in order to overcome the problem of multicollinearity 
between (or the ‘non independence’ of) the EO and DM variables, separate regressions are 
run for each EO and DM policy.  
All of the control variables, outlined above, are included in every one of the 
regressions. The control variables are the size of the workplace (as measured by the natural 
log of the total number of employees), the percentage of workforce that is female, the 
percentage of the workforce that has a disability, the percentage of workers from an ethnic 
minority in the workplace, whether the workplace is in the private or public sector, whether or 
not workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work, 
whether or not workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discretion in 
their work, whether or not workers in the largest occupation group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ 
control over their work, whether or not workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ 
or ‘some’ say in the design of their work, the total percentage of the workplace that is highly 
skilled.  
Overall, the results for the logistic regressions that examine the links between 
absenteeism and the individual EO and DM policies within the individual categories of each 
type of workplace indicate no statistically significant links. In other words, most of the EO 
and DM policies have no association – either positive or negative – with absenteeism. There 
are a few exceptions to this general rule that are discussed below.  
 
8.2 Minimalist Voice Workplaces 
 
The results for the regressions that examine the links between equal opportunities and 
absenteeism in Minimal Voice workplaces are shown in Table 8.1. Within this group of 
workplaces, not one of the equal opportunities policies is statistically significantly related to 
absenteeism. Equal opportunities do not, therefore, seem to influence absenteeism – either to 
increase or decrease it. Amongst this group of workplaces, then, attempts to increase EO and 
DM policies may not result in a decrease in absenteeism. Such workplaces may exhibit other 
characteristics that limit any influence that such policies may have. For instance, other 
policies pursued by the workplace, such as how employees are generally treated, their pay, 
and the amount of effort they must invest in work, may diminish any potentially beneficial 
effects of EO and DM policies.  
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Indeed, it is interesting to note that the variable that captures if employees in the 
largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work is associated with an 
increase in absenteeism for all of the EO and DM policies. (Please see Appendix Table B.1 
for a summary of the regression results for ‘minimalist voice’ workplaces that also identifies 
any of the control variables that are statistically different as well as the level at which they are 
statistically significant.) This link is statistically significant at the 10 per-cent level. One 
interpretation of this is that enhanced ‘work variety’ within ‘minimalist voice’ workplaces 
could conceal work intensification, as employees are asked to take on additional 
responsibilities without any commensurate increase in pay, leading to higher workloads, 
increased employee dissatisfaction, and greater levels of employee absenteeism. The only 
other variable that is statistically significant in all of the separate logistic regressions for the 
EO and DM policies is ‘the percentage of the workforce that is female’. The association in all 
of the regressions is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. In other words, the 
higher the percentage of female workers in the workforce, the more likely it is that the 
absenteeism rate within the workforce will be higher. This could reflect women’s increased 
likelihood that they will perform child-care responsibilities.  
It should also be noted that the Nagelkerke R squared is relatively low for all of the 
regressions, never exceeding four per cent. This indicates that the model accounts for only a 
small amount of the variation in the outcome variable, absenteeism. This supports the 
argument that other factors are likely to influence absenteeism in minimalist voice 
workplaces. Indeed, one factor that may shape absenteeism in these workplaces is the use of 
agency staff, who do not have the ability to be absent from work without jeopardizing future 
work with the agency. Such factors have not been included in this research, as the aim of this 
research is to trace the links between different forms of voice, equal opportunities, two key 
organisational outcomes; the aim is not to assess all of the factors that could influence 
absenteeism and quits within workplaces. However, overall, the findings for the links between 
equal opportunities policies and absenteeism within minimalist workplaces should assess 
other possible sources for variation in absenteeism besides equal opportunities. 
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Table 8.1 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity 
and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Minimal Voice’ Workplaces 
 
Equal Opportunity Policy Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender N 0.399 0.034 
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity N 0.275 0.031 
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability N 0.466 0.032 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
gender discrimination 
N 0.605 0.034 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
ethnic  discrimination 
N 0.629 0.032 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
disability discrimination 
N 0.056 0.031 
Monitor promotions by gender N 0.076 0.036 
Monitor promotions by ethnicity N 0.710 0.036 
Monitor promotions by disability N 0.079 0.035 
Monitor promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination 
N 0.194 0.031 
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
N 0.077 0.032 
Monitor promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination 
N 0.161 0.031 
Monitor relative pay rates by gender N 0.059 0.031 
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity N 0.214 0.031 
Monitor relative pay rates by disability N 0.100 0.031 
Notes: N = 516. 
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8.3 Direct Voice Workplaces 
 
The results for the associations between the various EO and DM policies examined in 
this research and absenteeism for ‘direct voice only’ workplaces show a similar pattern to 
minimalist voice workplaces. The results are shown in Table 8.2. In none of the regressions is 
the EO and DM policies related to absenteeism in a statistically significant way. Amongst this 
group of workplaces, attempts to increase equal opportunities policies may not result in a 
decrease in absenteeism. Such workplaces may exhibit other characteristics that limit any 
influence that such policies may have. For instance, other policies pursued by the workplace, 
such as how employees are generally treated, their pay, and the amount of effort they must 
invest in work, may diminish any potentially beneficial effects of EO and DM policies.  
Unlike minimalist voice workplaces, however, the only variable that is statistically 
significant in most of the regressions for ‘direct voice’ workplaces is the ‘percentage of the 
workforce that is highly skilled’. (Please see Appendix Table B.2 for a summary of the 
statistical significance of the control variables.) The association between this variable and 
absenteeism is negative and statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. It is present in all 
of the regressions for the ‘direct voice only’ workplaces except for the ‘monitor recruitment 
and selection by gender’ and ‘monitor relative pay rates by gender’ regressions. In other 
words, in general, the higher the percentage of highly skilled employees within the workforce, 
the lower the absenteeism rate is likely to be; this link is only weakly significant, however. It 
suggests that more highly skilled employees have more rewarding jobs than those who are 
less skilled, and are, therefore, less likely to take unofficial absences from work.  
Once again, the Nagelkerke R squared is relatively low for all of the regressions, only 
once slightly exceeding five per cent. This indicates that the model accounts for only a small 
amount of the variation in the outcome variable, absenteeism. This supports the argument that 
other factors are likely to influence absenteeism in direct voice only workplaces. In such 
workplaces, the use of agency staff may be less than it is in minimalist voice workplaces; 
however, other factors, such as pay and bonus schemes, promotional possibilities, alternative 
employment opportunities, may play a greater role in shaping absenteeism in these 
workplaces. Once again, these factors have not been included here, as the purpose of this 
research is not to assess all of the factors that may influence absenteeism, but to examine the 
links between different forms of voice, EO and DM policies, and organisational outcomes.  
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Table 8.2 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity 
and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Direct Voice’ Workplaces 
 
Equal Opportunity Policy Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender N 0.010 0.044 
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity N 0.401 0.045 
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability N 0.141 0.044 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
gender discrimination 
N 0.261 0.044 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
ethnic discrimination 
N 0.260 0.044 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
disability discrimination 
N 0.230 0.044 
Monitor promotions for gender discrimination   N 0.012 0.044 
Monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination N 0.020 0.044 
Monitor promotions for disability discrimination N 0.026 0.045 
Monitor promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination 
N 0.021 0.044 
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic 
discrimination 
N 0.087 0.046 
Monitor promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination 
N 0.031 0.045 
Monitor relative pay rates by gender N 0.132 0.051 
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity N 0.088 0.048 
Monitor relative pay rates by disability N 0.102 0.047 
Notes: N = 245. 
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8.4 Indirect Voice Workplaces 
 
The associations between the various EO and DM policies and absenteeism are 
slightly different amongst workplaces with ‘collective voice only’ compared to minimalist 
and ‘direct voice only’ workplaces. Table 8.3 shows the results of the regressions for the EO 
and DM policies and absenteeism amongst ‘collective voice only’ workplaces. Although, 
once again, the associations between the policies and absenteeism are, in general, not 
statistically significant, they are in a few cases. For those regressions in which the EO and 
DM policy is statistically significant, the association is negative. In other words, the presence 
of the particular (statistically significant) EO and DM policy within collective voice only 
workplaces is likely to lower the level of absenteeism. This supports the view that unions can 
help to introduce policies that can be beneficial to the workplace. The lack of any regressions 
in which the EO and DM policy is statistically significant and positively associated with 
absenteeism buttresses this view: unions (and other forms of collective voice) do not appear to 
push for higher levels of equal opportunities in order to promote their own interests at the 
expense of the performance of the workplace. This is an important finding and serves as a 
corrective to overly negative portrayals of unions within workplaces. The EO and DM policy 
that is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level is: ‘monitor relative pay rates by 
gender’. The EO and DM policies that are statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level are: 
‘monitor promotions by gender’ and ‘monitor promotions by ethnicity’. Two of these policies 
relate to gender and the presence of such policies may help to reduce overall absenteeism in 
the firm. 
Some of the control variables are statistically significant in all of the regressions. 
(Please see Appendix Table B.3 for a summary of the statistical significance of the control 
variables.) Two of these variables are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. They 
are: the dummy that captures ‘private sector workplaces’, where private sector establishments 
equal one and those in the public sector have a value of 0, and the ‘percentage of the 
workforce that is highly skilled’. Both associations are negative. In other words, public sector 
workplaces are more likely than private sector ones to have higher levels of absenteeism, and 
the more highly skilled the workforce, the lower the level of absenteeism is likely to be. The 
first of these suggests that, within collective voice only workplaces, private sector workplaces 
may be able to work with unions and other forms of collective voice to lower absenteeism 
rates than public sector workplaces can. The only other variable that is statistically significant 
in all of the regressions is the ‘percentage of the workforce that is female’. It is statistically 
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significant at the 10-per-cent level and the association is positive. In other words, the more 
women who work within an establishment as a percentage of the workforce, the higher the 
absenteeism rate is likely to be. This may indicate, as noted above, that women are more 
likely to take ‘unofficial’ absences for, say, child-care reasons than men are. An alternative 
interpretation is that women are more likely to be aggrieved by possible discrimination within 
workplaces, leading to a greater prevalence of absenteeism amongst women compared to 
men. It is noteworthy that two of the EO and DM policies that are associated with lower 
levels of absenteeism relate to possible discrimination against women. Having policies to 
address this possible discrimination may, therefore, help to reduce absenteeism amongst 
women, but will not eliminate it entirely. There is one other variable that is statistically 
significant, at the 10-per-cent level, in one of the regressions. The variable is ‘workers in the 
“largest occupational group” have “a lot” or “some” variety in their work’. It is significant in 
the regression that assesses whether monitoring ‘promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination’ is associated with absenteeism. 
The performance of the model is improved for the workplaces with collective voice 
only than for those workplaces with minimalist voice and for those with direct voice only, 
accounting for more of the variation in the absenteeism rate than it has previously. For all of 
the regressions, the Nagelkerke R squared is approximately 15 per cent. This is a reasonable 
percentage. It helps to support the approach taken in this thesis to examine EO and DM 
policies and organisational outcomes within different types of ‘voice workplace’; however, it 
indicates that there is likely to be a number of other factors that are not included in the model 
that help to explain absenteeism rates in workplaces with collective voice only. Once again, 
those factors could include pay and bonus schemes, other types of workers who are present 
within workplaces, the availability of other jobs, and the opportunity to be promoted within 
the establishment. 
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Table 8.3 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity 
and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Collective Voice’ Workplaces 
 
Equal Opportunity Policy Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender N 0.062 0.142 
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity N 0.052 0.142 
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability N 0.063 0.142 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
gender discrimination 
N 0.157 0.142 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
ethnic  discrimination 
N 0.349 0.142 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
disability discrimination 
N 0.097 0.142 
Monitor promotions by gender Y – 10%; 
negative  
0.471 0.159 
Monitor promotions by ethnicity Y – 10%; 
negative  
0.296 0.158 
Monitor promotions by disability N 0.099 0.152 
Monitor promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination 
N 0.363 0.152 
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic 
discrimination 
N 0.179 0.147 
Monitor promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination 
N 0.289 0.143 
Monitor relative pay rates by gender Y – 5%; 
negative  
0.277 0.171 
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity N 0.638 0.145 
Monitor relative pay rates by disability N 0.329 0.144 
Notes: N = 250. 
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8.5 Dual Voice Workplaces 
 
The dual voice workplaces are relatively distinct from the other type of ‘voice’ 
workplaces in terms of the number of EO and DM policies that are statistically significantly 
associated with absenteeism. Table 8.4 shows the results of the regressions that examine the 
links between the EO and DM policies and absenteeism. Whilst most of the EO and DM 
policies are not statistically significant, seven policies are statistically significant. Four EO 
and DM policies are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. They are: ‘monitor 
promotions by gender’, ‘monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination’, ‘monitor 
promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination’, and ‘monitor relative pay rates by gender’. 
They are all negatively associated with absenteeism. In other words, the presence of any one 
of these policies is associated with lower levels of absenteeism. One policy is statistically 
significant at the five-per-cent level. It is ‘monitor promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination’. The link between the policy and absenteeism is negative. Finally, two 
policies, ‘monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity’ and ‘monitor relative pay rates by 
disability’, are statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. They, too, are negative linked 
to absenteeism. Overall, then, EO and DM policies are more frequently associated with lower 
levels of absenteeism in dual voice workplaces than they are in other types of ‘voice 
workplace’. This suggests that such workplaces differ in some important way to the other 
types of workplace. The presence of these policies as a means, potentially, to lower 
absenteeism indicates that employees in such workplaces are sensitive to issues of ‘equality’ 
and wish to see policies in place that explicitly address issues of discrimination in various 
guises.   
For most of the regressions for dual voice workplaces, the percentage of the workforce 
that is female as well as the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled are both 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. (Please see Appendix Table B.4 for 
summaries of the control variables that are statistically significant in the regressions for 
individual EO and DM policies and absenteeism.) However, the former is positively related to 
absenteeism, whilst the latter is negative related to absenteeism. In other words, the higher the 
percentage of female workers within a workforce, the higher the absentee rate is likely to be. 
The higher the percentage of highly skilled workers within a workforce, the lower the 
absentee rate is likely to be. The former suggests that within dual workplaces either that 
women are, on the whole, more disgruntled than men, or that women are expected to 
undertake unplanned child-care responsibilities etc. The finding on highly skilled workers 
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suggests that highly skilled workers have more interesting or intellectually rewarding jobs that 
means that they are less likely to be absent from work than less skilled employees. Another 
variable, the total number of employees (as a natural log) is statistically significant too. It is 
statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. It is negatively associated with absenteeism, 
meaning that the larger the workplace, the lower the absentee rate is likely to be. This could 
indicate that larger workplaces offer more interesting work; it could also be interpreted to 
mean that employees in larger workplaces are reluctant to be absent as this may have a more 
detrimental effect on their future career prospects.  
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Table 8.4 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity 
and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Dual Voice’ Workplaces 
 
Equal Opportunity Policy Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender N 0.028 0.123 
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity N 0.180 0.124 
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability N 0.055 0.122 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
gender discrimination 
N 0.142 0.124 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
ethnic  discrimination 
N 0.056 0.126 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
disability discrimination 
N 0.247 0.123 
Monitor promotions by gender Y – 1%, 
negative  
0.002 0.139  
Monitor promotions by ethnicity N 0.076 0.129 
Monitor promotions by disability N 0.084 0.127 
Monitor promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination 
Y – 1%; 
negative  
0.002 0.139 
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
Y – 1%; 
negative  
0.009 0.137  
Monitor promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination 
Y – 5%; 
negative  
0.019 0.132 
Monitor relative pay rates by gender Y – 1%; 
negative 
0.149 0.142 
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity Y – 10%; 
negative 
0.240 0.129 
Monitor relative pay rates by disability Y – 10%; 
negative 
0.207 0.130 
Notes: N = 616. 
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8.6 Chapter Conclusion 
 
Overall, the results suggest that EO and DM policies are generally not associated with 
levels of establishment absenteeism. Some of the polices are, however, more likely to be 
linked with lower levels of absenteeism in workplaces that either have ‘collective voice only’ 
or that have ‘dual voice’ systems in place. For those ‘collective voice only’ establishments, 
the finding that some EO and DM policies are associated with lower levels of absenteeism 
and none is linked to higher levels of absenteeism is, itself, an important finding, indicating 
that unions (and other forms of collective voice) do not push for EO and DM policies to be 
implemented within workplaces in order to bolster their own credentials and ability to attract 
members at the expense of the performance of the workplace. 
Other findings from the analysis in this chapter are also important. For instance, in 
general, the higher the percentage of female workers within any particular workforce, the 
higher the level of absenteeism is likely to be. A probable explanation for this finding is that 
women are more likely to have unplanned time off work to care for children and relatives. 
Another possible explanation is that women suffer discrimination at work, leading to greater 
levels of dissatisfaction and higher levels of absenteeism. Some of the evidence in this chapter 
supports this latter explanation. For example, amongst workplaces with ‘collective voice 
only’ and ‘dual voice’, amongst those EO and DM polices that are statistically significant, all 
or at least a large proportion relate to potential gender discrimination. These policies are 
associated with lower levels of absenteeism, suggesting that attempts to address 
discrimination against women may help to lower levels of dissatisfaction. The finding that 
higher percentages of the workforce that is female are linked to heightened levels of 
absenteeism suggests that attempts to address potential discrimination against women by 
introducing policies that, for instance, monitor promotions for gender discrimination may help 
to lower absenteeism rates, but not fully overcome dissatisfaction amongst female workers.  
Absenteeism is only one important workplace outcome; quit rates are another. The 
next chapter analyses the links between EO and DM policies and quit rates within each type 
of ‘voice workplace’. It provides a conclusion to the second stage of the analysis within this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 9 - The Links between Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Policies 
and Quit Rates: An Empirical Analysis 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the links between the various EO and DM policies and quit rates 
to establish if these policies are, in general, associated with an increase or a decrease in quits 
or if they ‘only’ have links to higher or lower quit rates for different types of voice workplace. 
Higher quit rates are likely to reflect higher levels of employee dissatisfaction within any 
particular workplace, as disgruntled employees are more likely to leave a workplace than 
those who are satisfied (Tüselmann et al. 2007). The question in the WERS survey asks ‘And 
how many of these employees [who were here one year ago] stopped working here, because 
they left or resigned voluntarily?’ This is converted into a percentage of the total workforce. 
This thesis, therefore, assumes that higher quit rates reflect greater dissatisfaction amongst 
employees rather than, say, greater employment opportunities for workplace employees at 
other companies. Other factors will, of course, play a role in shaping an establishment’s quit 
rates, potentially including workers leaving to look after young children as well as the 
proportion of workforce who are highly skilled, as such workers are likely to have more 
employment opportunities at other establishments. Similarly, if workers have more varied 
work, then, they are less likely to quit, leaving for a job elsewhere.  
The quit rate is not normally distributed and skewed, rendering the use of ordinary 
least squares inappropriate. This thesis, therefore, dichotomises this variable. It does so by 
taking the arithmetic mean of the quit rate. Those establishment with an ‘above mean’ quit 
rate are coded 1; those workplaces with a mean or below mean quit rate are coded 0. This 
dichotomisation enables logistic regression to be used, as these do not rest on parametric 
assumptions (Field, 2009). These outcomes are, then, in common with the analysis in the first 
stage of this thesis, analysed using logistic regressions. In the second stage of the analysis, in 
order to overcome the problem of multicollinearity between (or the ‘non independence’ of) 
the EO and DM variables, separate regressions are run for each EO and DM policy.  
The control variables are the size of the workplace (as measured by the natural log of 
the total number of employees), the percentage of the workforce that is female, the percentage 
of the workforce that has a disability, the percentage of workers from an ethnic minority in the 
workplace, whether the workplace is in the private or public sector, whether or not workers in 
the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work, whether or not 
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workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discretion in their work, 
whether or not workers in the largest occupation group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ control over 
their work, whether or not workers in the largest occupational group have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ say 
in the design of their work, and the total percentage of the workplace that is highly skilled. As 
noted above, such factors are likely to have an influence over workplace quit rates. 
Overall, the results for the logistic regressions that examine the links between quit 
rates and the individual equal opportunities policies within the individual categories of each 
type of workplace indicate that a relatively limited number of the EO and DM policies are 
statistically significantly linked to quit rates. The associations between those equal 
opportunities that are statistically significant and quit rates are sometimes positive and 
sometimes negative, indicating a complex situation of the ways in which EO and DM policies 
are linked to quit rates. The specific associations are discussed below.  
 
9.2 Minimalist Voice Workplaces 
 
The logistic regressions for the individual EO and DM policies and the quit rates are 
shown in Table 9.1. Several of the individual EO and DM polices are statistically significant 
within the group of workplaces with ‘minimal voice’. When the policy is statistically 
significantly associated with quits, the relationship is positive. In other words, the presence of 
the policy is likely to be linked with a higher quit level.  
More specifically, the following policies are statistically significant at the 10-per-cent 
level: ‘monitor recruitment and selection by gender’, ‘monitor promotions by disability’, 
‘monitor promotions by disability’, ‘monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination’, 
‘monitor relative pay rates by gender’, and ‘monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity’. The 
following policies are statistically significant at the 5-per-cent level, ‘monitor recruitment and 
selection by ethnicity’, ‘monitor recruitment and selection by disability’, ‘monitor promotions 
by gender’, and ‘monitor promotions by ethnicity’. Overall, then, policies relating to the 
monitoring recruitment and selection, and monitoring promotions are the most likely to be 
associated with increased levels of quits in workplaces with minimal voice. One interpretation 
of this is that these policies are likely to increase quit rates. An alternative explanation is that 
the policies are introduced in an attempt to reduce quit rates in those workplaces with 
comparatively high labour turnover rates, but have had either a limited or no effect. The 
minimal levels of voice within this group of workplaces may also mean that policies to tackle 
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various forms of discrimination do not have the desired effect as a result of insufficient trust 
by employees of employers. 
Other variables in the models are always or frequently statistically significant for the 
group of ‘minimal voice’ workplaces. (Appendix Table C.1 summarises the results of the 
individual regressions and shows any statistically significant control variables as well as the 
level at which they are significant.) The variable for the percentage of the workforce that is 
female is statistically significant at the one-per-cent level in all of the regressions for 
workplaces with minimal voice. It is positively associated with quits. In other words, the more 
employees within an establishment of a particular size who are women, the more likely it is 
the workplace will have an above-mean quit rate rather than a quit rate that is at or below the 
mean. This could indicate that women are more likely, in general, to leave jobs in order to 
care for relatives. The variable that captures the percentage of the workforce that is highly 
skilled is also statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. However, it is significant in 
most, not all, regressions, and it is negatively associated with quit rates. In other words, the 
more highly skilled workers a minimal voice establishment of a given size has, the more 
likely it is that the workplace will have a quit rate at or below the mean rather than one is 
above the mean. This is a somewhat surprising finding, as minimal voice workplaces suggest 
that employees, of all kinds, have limited scope to influence workplace decisions, leading to 
an expectation that those who are dissatisfied with current practices will tend to leave the 
organisation (Hirschman, 1970). In addition, highly skilled workers can be expected to have 
improved job opportunities, in general, than less skilled employees, suggesting that they are 
more likely to leave the workplace if they are dissatisfied with current policies. However, this 
is not the case. Indeed, the reverse is true: a higher percentage of highly skilled employees 
within a workplace, the lower, in general, the quit rate. This could indicate a number of 
things. First, as already noted, omitted factors, such as remuneration schemes, have not been 
included in the analysis, as the focus is on the link between EO and DM policies and quits. 
There may be substantial bonuses for certain groups with these workplaces. Second, the 
research captures more formal measures of voice within workplaces; it does not capture more 
informal ones that are likely to be difficult to capture within a large-N study. However, these 
informal voice measures may provide employees, especially highly skilled ones perhaps, with 
means by which to raise any concerns they may have. Finally, this research does not examine 
the ownership, including the shares held by employees. Unfortunately, this is not possible 
given the limitations of the database; however, if highly skilled employees are encouraged to 
purchase shares within the firm that the workplace is a part of and if that possibility depends 
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on job tenure, such employees may be reluctant to leave the establishment in comparison to 
less skilled employees who do not have such share options. 
One variable, the ‘private sector’ dummy (private-sector workplaces = 1, public-sector 
ones = 0) is statistically significant in the three regressions that relate to policies that monitor 
recruitment and selection by gender, ethnicity, and disability. In all three regressions, it is 
statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level, indicating that, in some instances, private-
sector minimal workplaces are likely to have lower quit rates than public sector ones.  
It should, however, be noted that the Nagelkerke R squared value ranges from just 
under seven to around eight per cent in all of the regressions for minimal workplaces, 
indicating that much of the variation in the dichotomous outcome variable (above-mean or 
‘mean or below-mean’ quit rates) is not explained by the model for those workplaces with 
minimal voice. This is a relatively low value and suggests that other factors that are not 
included in the model may well account for the observed outcomes. As this group of 
workplaces have minimal voice, it can be expected that pay and general working conditions 
are likely to play an important role. The workplaces are likely to rely on relatively low skilled 
staff, as, unlike other workplaces, EO and DM policies do not enable workplaces to lower quit 
rates, indicating that policies that help to address certain forms of workplace discrimination 
are ineffectual. 
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Table 9.1 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity 
and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Minimal Voice’ Workplaces 
 
Equal Opportunity Policy Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender Y – 10%; 
positive  
0.288 0.074 
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity Y – 5%; 
positive  
0.173 0.078 
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability Y - 5%; 
positive  
0.073 0.080 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
gender discrimination 
N 0.628 0.068 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
ethnic  discrimination 
N 0.733 0.067 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
disability discrimination 
N 0.466 0.070 
Monitor promotions by gender Y – 5%; 
positive 
0.021 0.080 
Monitor promotions by ethnicity Y – 5%; 
positive 
0.335 0.077 
Monitor promotions by disability Y – 10 pc; 
positive  
0.117 0.074 
Monitor promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination 
N 0.479 0.069 
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic 
discrimination 
Y – 10%; 
positive 
0.330 0.073 
Monitor promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination 
N 0.671 0.069 
Monitor relative pay rates by gender Y – 10%; 
positive  
0.065 0.075 
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity Y – 10%; 
positive 
0.279 0.075 
Monitor relative pay rates by disability N 0.391 0.071 
Notes: N = 516. 
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9.3 Direct Voice Workplaces 
 
Out of all the regressions for those workplaces with direct-voice only, there is only 
one EO and DM policy that is statistically significant. That policy is the establishment 
monitors ‘promotions for ethnic discrimination’ and it is statistically significant at the 10-per-
cent level. Table 9.2 summarises the results of the logistic regressions for all of the EO and 
DM policies. It provides details of the level of statistical significance (if any) of the EO and 
DM policy as well as the significance of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic and the 
Nagelkerke R-squared figure. (Table C.2 in the Appendix provides details of the statistical 
significance of the control variables.) The link between the policy and quits is negative. In 
other words, the presence of the policy is associated with a below-mean quit level within the 
workplace. Overall, then, there is very limited evidence to indicate that EO and DM policies 
are associated with above or below mean quit rates amongst workplaces with direct voice 
mechanisms only. The relative lack of importance of the EO and DM policies is also 
underlined by other findings from the regressions that are discussed below. Compared to 
those workplaces with minimal voice, the models fit the data well. The Nagelkerke R squared 
values range from around 15 per cent up to 17 per cent, indicating that a reasonable amount of 
the variation in the outcome is explained by the model. 
There are several other variables that are statistically significant in many of the logistic 
regressions for workplaces with direct voice mechanisms in place. For all but one of the EO 
and DM policies (which is the policy that ‘the establishment monitors recruitment and 
selection and gender’), the percentage of the workforce that is female is statistically 
significant at the one-per-cent level. The association is positive in all cases. In other words, 
the higher the number of females within a workforce of any given size, the higher the 
likelihood that the workplace will have an above-average level of quits, suggesting either that 
women are more dissatisfied than men with their present working conditions or that women 
leave work more frequently than men to look after children or relatives or that women have 
greater employment opportunities elsewhere than men.  
In the majority of the regressions, the private-sector dummy (private-sector 
workplaces = 1; public sector = 0) is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. The link 
is positive. In other words, private-sector establishments are more likely than comparable 
public-sector ones to have above-average quit rates, suggesting either that greater 
opportunities exist for employees in the private sector or that employees in private-sector 
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establishments are more disgruntled than those in the public sector, leading to a higher quit 
rate.  
The variable that measures the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled is 
statistically significant at the five-per-cent level in all of the regressions. It is negatively 
associated, meaning that, in general, workplaces with a high proportion of highly skilled 
employees will have a lower quit rate than those with fewer highly skilled employees. This 
finding could reflect the improved treatment of workers who are more highly skilled than 
those who are less skilled even though, presumably, the former have more employment 
opportunities, in general, elsewhere than the latter group of employees.  
Finally, if workers in the largest occupational group are involved in work design ‘a 
lot’ or ‘to some extent’, the workplace is likely to have an above-mean quit rate. This 
association is statistically significant in all of the regressions at the 10-per-cent level, possibly 
indicating that the workers’ involvement in work design leads to work intensification and 
decreased employee morale. This finding is in line with other ones in the previous chapter, 
indicating that a measure that, at face value, appears to be beneficial may have a detrimental 
effect on employees. An alternative explanation is that causality flows from quit rates to 
workers’ involvement in work design rather than from workers’ involvement in work design 
to quit rates, meaning that workplaces with above-mean quit rates may involve workers in 
work design in an effort to reduce quit rates. These quit rates may have been reduced, but they 
remain at levels that are higher than the mean for comparable establishments. 
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Table 9.2 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity 
and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Direct Voice’ Workplaces 
 
Equal Opportunity Policy Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender N 0.236 0.149 
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity N 0.324 0.153 
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability N 0.477 0.156 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
gender discrimination 
N 0.981 0.149 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
ethnic discrimination 
N 0.992 0.150 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
disability discrimination 
N 0.944 0.151 
Monitor promotions for gender discrimination   N 0.591 0.159 
Monitor promotions for ethnic discrimination Y – 10%; 
negative 
0.457 0.167 
Monitor promotions for disability discrimination N 0.806 0.160 
Monitor promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination 
N 0.906 0.150 
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic 
discrimination 
N 0.794 0.149 
Monitor promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination 
N 0.881 0.150 
Monitor relative pay rates by gender N 0.978 0.150 
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity N 0.997 0.149 
Monitor relative pay rates by disability N 0.975 0.148 
Notes: N = 245. 
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9.4 Collective Voice Workplaces 
 
As the results in Table 9.3 show, for those workplaces with collective voice 
mechanisms only, none of the EO and DM policies in the logistic regressions is statistically 
significant, indicating that, for this group of workplaces, EO and DM policies do not play a 
role in either increasing or decreasing quit rates. This, in turn, suggests that unions and other 
forms of collective representation are not abusing their power to push for EO and DM policies 
in their own interests at the expense of the establishment’s performance. This is an important 
finding as it suggests that criticisms of unions that focus on a purported ability to influence 
workplace policies in their favour are not accurate. The finding also indicates that unions that 
may press for equal opportunities do not help to improve workplace outcomes, raising an 
important issue for unions. If the presence of forms of collective voice, including unions, are 
associated with an increased likelihood of the workplace having equal opportunities and if 
those policies do not help to reduce quit rates, then it suggests that unions may not themselves 
gain from being associated with those policies. 
Some of the other variables in the regressions are, however, statistically significant. 
Once again, the percentage of the workforce that is female is statistically significant at the 
one-per-cent level in all of the regressions for the workplaces with collective voice only. It is 
positively associated with quits. In other words, the more employees within an establishment 
of a given size who are women, the more likely it is the workplace will have an above-mean 
quit rate rather than a quit rate that is at or below the mean. This could indicate that women 
are more likely, in general, to leave jobs in order to care for relatives or for childcare reasons 
than men or that they have better employment elsewhere than men. In one of the regressions, 
for the ‘monitor recruitment and selection by disability’ policy, the private sector dummy 
variable is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. It is positively associated with 
quits, providing a limited amount of evidence to indicate that quit rates are, in general, higher 
in private-sector workplaces that they are in public-sector ones amongst those workplaces 
with ‘collective voice only’.  
By contrast, the variable that measures if workers in the largest occupational group 
have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ variety in their work is statistically significant in all of the regressions 
for the collective voice only workplaces. It is significant at the 10-per-cent level and the 
association with quits is positive, indicating that providing workers with increased variety in 
their work is linked to higher quit rates rather than lower ones. One explanation for this is that 
increased variety is a means to intensify work, leading to higher levels of employee 
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dissatisfaction and quits. An alternative explanation is that causality runs the other way; that 
is, higher quit rates have led managers to increase the variety of the work for employees in the 
largest occupational group. Such policies may have helped to reduce quits, but they have 
remained at above average levels.  
The variable that captures the total number of employees (as a natural log) is 
statistically significant in five of the regressions. It is significant at the 10-per-cent level and is 
positively associated with quits, meaning larger establishments, in general, have higher quit 
rates than smaller ones. This is an unexpected finding, as larger workplaces can, in general, 
offer employees greater employment prospects and employment stability. This relationship is, 
however, only weakly significant and is not significant in the majority of the regressions. It 
would seem reasonable, therefore, to be cautious about this finding.  
Finally, the variable that captures the percentage of the workforce that is highly skilled 
is statistically significant in approximately half of the regressions for the workplaces with 
collective voice mechanisms only. The association is significant at the 10-per-cent level and 
the link is negative. In other words, the more highly skilled the workforce, the lower, in 
general, the quit rate is likely to be. Again, this is an unexpected finding as highly skilled 
employees are likely to have greater employment opportunities compared to those with lower 
levels of skills. The association could be explained by more highly skilled workers being 
offered greater remuneration and improved working conditions compared to employees with 
lower skill levels in order to aid retention of the former. 
Overall, the models for the regressions amongst workplaces with collective-voice 
mechanisms only perform reasonably well and account for approximately 17 per cent of the 
variation in the outcome variable. This also indicates, however, that a lot of variation in the 
outcome variable is not explained by the model, highlighting that other factors that are not 
included in the model are related to the outcome. These other variables could include the 
overall level of pay and bonus schemes that the workplace has in place. Similarly, the overall 
prospects for the company may also influence workers’ decisions to leave.  
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Table 9.3 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity 
and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Collective Voice’ Workplaces 
 
Equal Opportunity Policy Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender N 0.141 0.171 
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity N 0.202 0.170 
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability N 0.072 0.171 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
gender discrimination 
N 0.506 0.174 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
ethnic  discrimination 
N 0.249 0.172 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
disability discrimination 
N 0.071 0.171 
Monitor promotions by gender N 0.255 0.170 
Monitor promotions by ethnicity N 0.002 0.171 
Monitor promotions by disability N 0.008 0.171 
Monitor promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination 
N  0.011 0.172 
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic 
discrimination 
N 0.030 0.173 
Monitor promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination 
N 0.029 0.173 
Monitor relative pay rates by gender N 0.305 0.170 
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity N 0.304 0.170 
Monitor relative pay rates by disability N 0.276 0.170 
Notes: N = 250  
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9.5 Dual Voice Workplaces 
 
Amongst those workplaces with dual voice, five of the equal opportunities policies 
are, as is shown in Table 9.4, statistically significant. This is a high number compared to the 
regressions for the other workplace categories. When a particular policy is statistically 
significant the association is negative, indicating that the presence of the policy is linked to 
lower quit levels, in general. This suggests that EO and DM policies are particularly important 
within dual-voice workplaces, potentially reflecting the objective amongst senior managers 
within such workplaces to lower the quit rate by implementing policies that are likely to 
ensure the a more equal treatment of all employees. More specifically, workplaces that 
monitor promotions for indirect gender discrimination and those that monitor promotions for 
indirect ethnic discrimination are likely to have lower quit rates than those that do not. These 
associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. Those establishments that 
monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination are also likely to have lower quit 
rates; this link is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Those establishments that 
monitor promotions by gender and those that do so for ethnicity are also likely to have lower 
quit rates. This association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. Taken together, 
these results suggest that the issue of promotions within dual-voice workplaces is a sensitive 
subject that managers can address by checking for either direct or indirect discrimination. The 
results do not tell us the outcomes of this monitoring of promotions, but the act itself could be 
a relatively strong signal to employees that the company wishes to treat all employees the 
same. 
In all of the regressions, the percentage of the workforce that is female and the private-
sector status of a workplace are both statistically significant at the 1-per-cent level. In other 
words, the more female employees within a workplace of any given size and if the workplace 
is in the private sector, the more likely the establishment is to have an above-mean quit rate. 
The former suggests that women may have to leave work for child care responsibilities or to 
look after relatives, for instance, than men. The latter indicates that employees in the private 
sector either have greater employment opportunities than those in the public sector or that 
they are, in general, more dissatisfied with their current employer than workers in the public 
sector. In all of the regressions, the variable that captures the percentage of the workforce that 
has a disability is statistically significant at the 5-per-cent level. This suggests that employees 
with a disability are, in general, more dissatisfied with their employers in dual-voice 
workplaces than those workers without a disability, potentially reflecting a real or perceived 
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discrimination against this group that the EO and DM policies seek to address, but that do not 
fully remedy the situation. Similarly, in five of the regressions, the variable that measures the 
percentage of the workforce that is from an ethnic minority is statistically significant at the 
five-per-cent level and is positively linked to quits. Again, this could reflect greater 
dissatisfaction amongst this group and create the conditions for the managers in the workplace 
to implement policies to target this issue. In one of the regressions, the size of the workforce 
as measured by the natural log of the total number employees is statistically significant at the 
five-per-cent level and associated with higher quit levels.  
In approximately half of the regressions, the variable that measure the percentage of 
the workforce that is from an ethnic minority and the (natural log) size of the workforce are 
statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level and are positively associated with higher quit 
levels. Again, this could help to explain the presence of some EO and DM policies within 
some of the dual-voice workplaces that seek to address potential dissatisfaction amongst 
ethnic-minority workers. Whilst some of those policies may help to reduce the quit rate, they 
may not resolve the issue entirely.  
Overall, the model performs reasonably well, explaining around 17 per cent of the 
variation in the outcome variable. Once again, it also raises the possibility that other factors 
that are not included in the models here help to explain much of the remaining variation. 
Those variables could include general pay and conditions as well as the general prospects for 
the workplace (is the establishment growing, remaining steady, or declining). 
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Table 9.4 Summary Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity 
and Diversity Management Policies amongst ‘Dual Voice’ Workplaces 
 
Equal Opportunity Policy Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor recruitment and selection by gender N 0.794 0.164 
Monitor recruitment and selection by ethnicity N 0.638 0.164 
Monitor recruitment and selection by disability N 0.648 0.164 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
gender discrimination 
N 0.613 0.166 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
ethnic  discrimination 
N 0.558 0.168 
Monitor recruitment and selection for indirect 
disability discrimination 
N 0.746 0.164 
Monitor promotions by gender Y – 10%; 
negative  
0.444 0.170 
Monitor promotions by ethnicity Y – 10%; 
negative 
0.422 0.169 
Monitor promotions by disability N 0.430 0.167 
Monitor promotions for indirect gender 
discrimination 
Y – 1%; 
negative 
0.205 0.180 
Monitor promotions for indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
Y – 1%; 
negative  
0.584 0.182 
Monitor promotions for indirect disability 
discrimination 
Y – 5%; 
negative  
0.492 0.174 
Monitor relative pay rates by gender N 0.301 0.168 
Monitor relative pay rates by ethnicity N 0.163 0.166 
Monitor relative pay rates by disability N 0.191 0.164 
Notes: N = 616. 
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9.6 Chapter Conclusion 
 
Overall, the results generally suggest that EO and DM policies are associated neither 
with higher quit rates nor with lower ones. Although EO and DM policies are associated with 
higher quit rates amongst workplaces with minimal voice, this link is frequently only weakly 
significant. In the majority of the logistic regressions for the individual EO and DM policies 
for the other types of workplace, the policies are generally not statistically significant. The 
main exceptions to this ‘non significance’ rule are for EO and DM policies amongst dual 
voice workplaces. For that group of workplaces, five EO and DM policies are statistically 
significant and all are associated with below-mean quit rates. Two of these (‘monitor 
promotions by gender’ and ‘monitor promotions by ethnicity’) are statistically significant at 
the 10-per-cent level. One (‘monitor promotions for indirect disability discrimination’ is 
statistically significant at the five-per-cent level. Two (‘monitor promotions for indirect 
gender discrimination’ and ‘monitor promotions for indirect ethnic discrimination’) are 
statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. These result suggest that EO and DM 
policies are particularly important amongst dual-voice workplaces, not only supporting the 
analytical approach adopted here of differentiation between various types of workplace, but 
also indicating that policies that address indirect forms of discrimination are especially 
beneficial for workplaces. Policies that seek to address different forms of indirect 
discrimination within workplaces may send out a particularly powerful message from the 
employer to employees that the issue of discrimination is being taken seriously, leading to 
more satisfied employees and lowering quit rates.  
However, the finding that for most of the regressions across direct voice only, 
collective voice only, and dual voice workplaces that EO and DM policies are not statistically 
significant suggests that these policies are not adequate predictors of the likelihood of any 
particular workplace having a below-mean quit rate. In other words, other factors play a more 
important role in helping to explain variation in quit rates than EO and DM policies do. For 
instance, the percentage of the workforce that is female and the percentage of the workforce 
that is highly skilled are consistently statistically significant for the individual logistic 
regression across all types of ‘voice workplace’. Although the statistical significance varies, 
this is an important finding and helps to relativise the associations between EO and DM 
policies and quit rates. 
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Chapter 10 – Conclusion 
 
This thesis has investigated the links between voice, EO and DM policies and 
workplace outcomes. It is the first study to do this, filling important gaps in the literature by 
examining not only the associations of different forms of employee voice with the presence of 
EO and DM policies within workplaces, but also the associations of EO and DM policies with 
workplace outcomes, specifically voluntary labour turnover (quits) and absenteeism, within 
different types of voice workplace. It has applied a novel analytical framework that adopts a 
holistic approach to voice in order to adopt a nuanced approach to EO and DM policies, 
leading to important insights. In addition, this research has analysed more EO and DM 
policies than the existing literature, enabling deeper insights into them and their links to 
workplace outcomes. More specifically, this research has examined whether firms had a 
general EO or DM policy and whether they had a number of individual EO and DM policies. 
These individual policies were monitoring recruitment and selection for gender 
discrimination, monitoring recruitment and selection for discrimination on the grounds of 
ethnicity and monitoring recruitment and selection for discrimination by disability. The 
research also examined the monitoring of recruitment and selection for indirect gender 
discrimination, the monitoring of recruitment and selection for indirect discrimination of the 
grounds of ethnicity and the monitoring of recruitment and selection for indirect 
discrimination on the ground of disability. It also sought to establish whether workplaces 
monitor pay and promotions for discrimination on the grounds of gender, disability and 
ethnicity.  
The thesis did not differentiate, in terms of the empirical analysis, between EO and 
DM for reasons that have already been outlined. This research has examined the links 
between voice, EO and DM policies, and measures of workplace outcomes, namely voluntary 
labour turnover and absenteeism. This has not been done before. This research used a large 
sample of 1946 workplaces. Having such as large sample has allowed this thesis to reveal 
important associations between voice and EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and EO and 
DM policies, on the other. Existing research has not examined these relationships using a 
large dataset. The findings of this thesis have important implications for theory and policy. 
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10.1 Findings 
 
10.1.1 Voice Mechanisms and EO and DM Policies 
 
Existing research has shown that voice can influence workplace policies (e.g. Bryson, 
2004); however, there are a limited number of existing studies that examine links between 
voice and EO and DM. The first key finding from this research is that voice is associated with 
EO and DM policy. In short, the more voice a workplace has, the more likely it is to have any 
one of a range of EO and DM policies. In other words, direct voice workplaces, indirect voice 
workplaces, and dual voice workplaces are all more likely to have the individual EO and DM 
policies examined here than workplaces with minimal voice (the type of workplace with the 
least voice in the analytical framework). Therefore, in general, more voice is associated with a 
higher likelihood that the workplace will have any one of a range of EO and DM policies. 
Moreover, dual voice workplaces are more likely, in general, to have any one of a range of 
EO and DM policies than minimal workplaces. These differences are statistically significant 
at the one-per-cent level. Voice, therefore, increases the likelihood that workplaces will have 
EO and DM policies. The link between voice and EO and DM policies is strongest for dual 
voice. 
 
I Direct Voice Workplaces 
 
Direct voice involves employees expressing their views to managers directly 
themselves and does not involve employee representatives. High-performance workplace 
systems – or high-involvement or high-commitment workplace practices, as they are 
sometimes known (Wall and Wood, 2005; Wilkinson et al., 2010) – incorporate direct voice 
into their models. This thesis, therefore, incorporated direct voice mechanisms commonly 
found in high-performance workplace systems studies, into the analysis. 
Evidence from the USA and the UK suggests that direct-voice mechanisms can help to 
improve organisational performance (Becker and Huselid, 2009; Huselid, 1995; Patterson et 
al., 1998; Wood, 1999) and despite evidence not always being clear-cut, findings often show 
a link between direct-voice practices and superior organisational outcomes (Banker et al., 
1996; Batt, 2004; Cordery et al., 1991; Guthrie, 2001; Hunter et al., 2002; Vandenberg et al., 
1999).  
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The findings of this thesis buttress these findings: direct voice has, compared to 
minimal voice, a positive and statistically significant association with EO and DM policies. 
As the regressions show, direct voice workplaces are more likely to have any one of a range 
of EO and DM policies than workplaces with minimal voice. The differences for individual 
EO and DM policies are typically statistically significant at the one per-cent level when direct 
workplaces are compared to minimal workplaces. Direct voice mechanisms may, therefore, be 
able to offer individual workers the possibility to convey their preferences to managers that 
are then acted upon by those managers. As is discussed in more detail below, this thesis 
cannot determine the ‘direction of causality’ because of the statistical technique used to 
analyse the data. The evidence here is, however, in line with theoretical expectations that 
direct voice will enable workers to convey ideas to managers (Lawler, 1986; Wood and Wall, 
2005). This finding also buttresses the approach adopted here to focus on the links between 
voice and EO and DM policies. At present, research on these links is relatively scarce, but 
focusing on these links may help to open up the ‘black box’ of how HRM policies influence 
workplace performance outcomes. 
The findings also show that there are few statistically significant differences between 
direct voice and indirect voice in their associations with EO and DM policies. This finding 
suggests that workers may not necessarily feel that they need to join a union to have a voice 
on EO and DM policies; voicing their concerns or preferences on an individual basis may be 
as likely to be associated to particular EO and DM policies as doing so through a union. 
However, as will be discussed below, future research could examine if direct and indirect 
voice mechanisms can substitute for one another. There may be contexts in which direct (or 
indirect) voice mechanisms are more likely to associated with EO and DM policies than 
indirect (or direct) ones. Conversely, because there are few statistically significant differences 
between direct voice and indirect voice and their associations with EO and DM policies, this 
finding also suggests that unions, by aggregating the preferences of individual workers, do not 
ignore the preferences of certain workers. This contradictions expectations in some of the 
literature that unions will seek to encourage managers to implement policies within 
workplaces that are in the union’s interests, but that are not, necessarily, beneficial for the 
company (Hirsch and Addison, 1986; Delaney and Godard, 2001; Tüselmann et al., 2007). 
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II Indirect Voice Workplaces 
 
Indirect or collective voice is provided through trade unions as well as joint 
consultative committees and a non-union workplace employee representation. Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) described collective voice as a vehicle for workers, as a group, to 
communicate with management. A large body of literature exists on the links between trade 
unions and various performance outcomes. For example, trade unions are associated with 
lower profitability (Clark, 1984; Freeman, 1983; Karier, 1985; Voos and Mishel, 1986). The 
findings on the links between unions and productivity vary: some studies show small negative 
effects (Addison and Hirsch, 1989), whilst others demonstrate a small positive effect (Brown 
and Medoff, 1978; Clark, 1984). This thesis found that indirect voice is positively associated 
with EO and DM policies. The individual associations are typically statistically significant at 
the one-per-cent level when indirect workplaces are compared to direct workplaces.  
As already outlined, both direct and indirect voice are associated with an increased 
likelihood of the workplace having the individual EO and DM policies analysed here. This 
implies that employees do not need to join a union to ensure their workplace has the 
individual EO and DM policies analysed here, as this association is just as likely to be 
achieved through direct voice. Therefore, as stated above, direct voice workplaces are, in 
general, no more and no less likely as indirect voice workplaces to have the EO and DM 
policies assessed here; union recognition may not, therefore, be necessary for workers to 
convey their preferences to managers and for managers to change policies within the 
workplace.  
However, this finding also demonstrates that a unionised workplace is not a threat to 
workplace managers: indirect workplaces are not more likely than direct voice workplaces to 
introduce any one of the individual EO and DM policies assessed here. This suggests that 
unions are not linked to a greater prevalence of EO and DM policies to increase their 
membership amongst certain groups. 
As discussed in chapter 2, there are some major differences between analysts on the 
effectiveness of different forms of voice (Benson, 2000; Dundon et al., 2004; Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984; Hirsch and Addison, 1986; Delaney and Godard, 2001; Tüselmann et al., 
2007; Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005). The first is between indirect and direct voice. In 
some of the work on unions, there is a theoretical expectation that unions will seek to pursue 
the interests of union members/the union at the expense of other groups, including non-union 
members and the company for which the union members work (Hirsch and Addison, 1986). 
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The findings in this thesis are not consistent with this theoretical expectation.  Despite the 
varying emphases on direct and indirect voice within much of the literature, this research has 
found that at a broad level there are relatively few differences between workplaces with direct 
and indirect voice in terms of their adoption of EO and DM policies. In the majority of 
regressions that compared the incidence of policies between workplaces with direct and 
indirect voice, there was no statistically significant difference between them in terms of their 
associations with EO and DM policies. In a few instances, direct voice workplaces were more 
likely to be associated with a particular EO and DM policy than indirect voice workplaces. 
Theoretically, this may suggest that direct and indirect voice may act, if used alone, as 
substitutes for one another: both may be equally likely to convey the preferences of workers 
on EO and DM to managers and help to shape the adoption of appropriate policies within 
workplaces.  
Importantly, as unions are no more likely to be associated with EO and DM than direct 
voice mechanisms are, this suggests that unions do not push for the adoption of such measures 
in order to bolster recruitment amongst women, BME employees or disabled workers in order 
to boost recruitment amongst these groups. This, in turn, suggests that concerns about unions 
introducing policies that serve their own interests, should not be of too much concern (Hirsch, 
2004). 
 
III Dual Voice Workplaces, including ‘Partnerships’  
 
A dual-voice system combines direct and indirect voice mechanisms. Direct and 
indirect forms of voice are not mutually exclusive: both can be used within the same 
workplace and their combined use could lead to ‘mutual gains’ (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). 
In other words, one form of voice may complement – or make up for any deficiencies in – the 
other form of voice. 
This research has found that dual voice workplaces (those workplace with both direct 
and indirect voice) are more likely to adopt EO and DM policies compared to all other types 
of workplace – making dual voice workplaces more likely than any other type of workplace in 
the analytical framework used in this research to adopt EO and DM policies. To be sure, there 
are no statistically significant differences between direct voice workplaces and dual 
workplaces for some of the EO and DM policies; however, for others, there are statistically 
significant differences that indicate that dual voice workplaces are more likely to be 
associated with the presence of these policies compared to direct voice workplaces. This 
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research, therefore, indicates that the type of workplace that is most likely to be associated 
with EO and DM policies is dual voice workplaces that combine direct and indirect voice. 
This is an important finding as it suggests that research that focuses on just one form of voice 
downplay the possibility for direct and indirect voice mechanisms to be present within the 
same workplace and for these two separate forms of voice to complement one another. 
Within this category of workplace, this thesis also distinguishes between partnership 
workplaces and co-existence workplaces. In the former, senior managers have a positive 
attitude towards unions; in the latter, they do not. Partnership approaches are more likely to be 
associated with most, but not all, of the EO and DM policies examined here than are ‘co-
existence’ workplaces. These relationships are typically statistically significant at the five-per-
cent level. This suggests that the presence of both forms of voice channel and a positive 
attitude towards unions increases the chances of a number of EO and DM policies being 
adopted within workplaces. Much of the existing literature has tended to downplay the 
possibility that direct and indirect voice mechanisms can be combined within one workplace 
and, if they are, that managers may vary in their views on unions, resulting in differences in 
workplace outcomes (Tüselmann et al., 2007). The findings here support a nuanced approach 
to voice in order to identify key factors that help to shape important workplace outcomes: a 
positive attitude amongst managers to unions in dual voice workplaces is associated with an 
increased likelihood that the workplace will have EO and DM policies compared to dual voice 
workplaces in which managers have a neutral or negative view of unions. 
 
IV Minimal Voice Workplaces, including ‘Bleak Houses’ 
 
As noted above, workplaces in the minimal voice category are the least likely to adopt 
any of the EO and DM policies examined here. This is, perhaps, not surprising as the absence 
of any substantive voice mechanisms may signal a general neglect of HRM policies within 
such workplaces, leading to the comparable lack of EO and EM policies within these 
workplaces. Workplaces in the minimal voice category are those workplaces with a below 
average score on the direct voice index. (Please see chapter 3 for details of how this is 
calculated.) These workplaces are less likely to be associated with EO and DM policies than 
any of the other voice workplaces analysed in this thesis. 
This thesis extends the analysis within minimal voice workplaces to assess if, within 
this group of workplaces, the presence of some direct voice mechanisms is likely to increase 
the chances of workplaces adopting some EO and DM policies,  Within the minimal voice 
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category, bleak house workplaces – which are establishments that fall into the below-average 
category within the group of minimal voice workplaces – are less likely than those 
workplaces with above-average voice mechanisms within the minimal voice category (limited 
voice workplaces) to be associated with approximately half of the EO and DM policies 
examined here. When these relationships are statistically significant, they are so at the one- or 
five-per-cent level. This reveals that even when low levels of direct voice are present, some 
direct voice (limited voice) is more likely to be associated with some EO and DM policies 
than no or very low levels of direct voice (bleak houses). This is an important finding and 
highlights how voice may help to shape EO and DM policies even within those workplaces 
that have few if any direct voice measures in place and no indirect voice mechanisms. 
 
10.1.2 Voice and Workplace Performance 
 
This research has shown that, in general, the more voice a workplace has, whether it 
be direct, indirect, or dual voice, the more likely it is to have a range of EO and DM policies. 
Even within the minimal voice category, the more voice, the more likely the workplace is to 
have any one of the EO and DM policies. EO and DM policies are underpinned by two 
different rationales. Miller (1996) observes that the diversity approach has an emphasis on the 
‘business case’ which is in contrast to the ‘equal opportunity’ approach that emphasises social 
justice and fairness. The concept of diversity was originally created to justify more inclusion 
of people who were traditionally excluded from organisations (Herring, 2009). However, it is 
also linked to positive outcomes, because by bringing previously excluded groups into the 
organisation it may enhance creativity, problem-solving, and performance (Herring, 2009).  
The empirical evidence on different forms of voice and its effect on performance 
varies. Some types of voice have a positive effect on financial performance and productivity, 
some have a negative effect. For example, a lot of the evidence that exists on dual voice and 
firm performance relates to financial performance or productivity and is mostly positive 
(McNabb and Whitfield, 1997; Bryson et al, 2005). The business case argument suggests DM 
enhances performance. Therefore if, as this research suggests, more voice means workplaces 
are likely to adopt the EO and DM policies and if the business case for DM policies is correct 
(Cornelius, Gooch and Todd, 2001; Gagnon and Cornelius, 2000; Liff and Wajcman, 1996; 
Miller, 1996), we can expect to see a positive association between voice, EO and DM 
policies, and workplace performance, measured by quits and absenteeism.  
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10.1.2.1EO and DM Policies and Absenteeism and Quits 
 
The second key finding of this research is that EO and DM policies are, on the whole, 
not associated with higher or lower levels of absenteeism and quits. This is an important 
finding as this potential link has received relatively limited attention in the literature. The 
existing research that examines the links between EO and DM policies and workplace 
outcomes, such as quits and absenteeism, largely focuses on one type of voice (e.g. Guest et 
al., 2003; Guthrie, 2001). However, this thesis examines various types of voice workplace. 
This is important, as this research has revealed that there are important nuances between the 
different types of voice workplace examined here, highlighting the importance of adopting a 
holistic and nuanced approach to voice as this thesis has done and suggesting areas, that 
future research could examine. Existing work that assesses the links between EO and DM 
policies and workplace outcomes, such as quits and absenteeism, largely focuses on one type 
of voice (e.g. Guest et al., 2003; Guthrie, 2001). The findings for each type of voice 
workplace are as follows. 
 
I Direct Voice 
 
None of the EO and DM policies is statistically significantly associated with higher or 
lower levels of absenteeism in direct voice workplaces. The only EO and DM policy that is 
statistically significantly with quit rates is the monitoring of promotions for ethnicity 
discrimination. The association is negative and statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level. 
This is a relatively weak association. Overall, EO and DM policies within direct voice 
workplaces are not linked to the outcomes examined in this thesis. This is an important 
finding for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it could suggest that EO and DM policies are not 
implemented in an attempt to reduce these outcomes, but are introduced for normative 
reasons. Secondly, it could suggest that the way in which these policies are implemented 
influences how employees will respond to them: even if any particular EO and DM policy is 
in place, it may not be implemented in a way that encourages employees to stay within an 
organisation. Finally, it could suggest that ‘stronger’ forms of voice are necessary in order to 
increase EO and DM policies to a level that is associated with lower levels of absenteeism and 
quit rates.    
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II Indirect Voice 
 
Whilst it might be assumed that indirect voice would be associated with lower 
absenteeism and quit rates, as employees may be more satisfied and, hence, less likely to 
engage in activities that have a detrimental impact on the workplace (Addison, 2005), this 
thesis has found only limited evidence to support this potential outcome. For instance, 
monitoring pay rates by gender is associated in a statistically significant way with lower 
levels of absenteeism in indirect voice workplaces. Indeed, one the EO and DM policies are 
associated with higher levels of absenteeism: monitoring promotions by gender and ethnicity 
amongst indirect voice workplaces is associated with higher levels of absenteeism; however, 
this association is statistically significant at the 10-per-cent level only. There are no 
statistically significant associations between the EO and DM policies and quits in indirect 
voice workplaces. Once again, the evidence suggests that, overall, there are no statistically 
significant associations between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and 
quits, on the other. As with direct voice workplaces, these findings in indirect workplaces 
may suggest that the EO and DM policies are not intended to reduce absenteeism and quit 
rates. Alternatively, it may suggest that the ways in which these policies are implemented may 
influence these outcomes, or that these policies are only associated with lower levels of 
absenteeism and quits in other forms of voice workplace. 
 
III Dual Voice Workplaces, including ‘Partnerships’  
 
The associations between most of the EO and DM policies examined here and 
absenteeism within dual voice workplaces are, on the whole, statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that the presence of these policies within workplaces is neither no more nor no less 
likely to be associated with lower absenteeism than the absence of these policies. There are 
only a few relationships that are statistically significant within dual voice workplaces between 
EO and DM, on the one hand, and lower absenteeism, on the other. The EO and DM policies 
are: the monitoring of promotions, separately, by gender, and for indirect gender 
discrimination, and indirect ethnic discrimination; and the monitoring of relative pay rates by 
gender. All of these links are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level and the 
relationships are negative. Monitoring promotions for indirect discrimination against disabled 
workers is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level; again the relationship is negative. 
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Monitoring relative pay rates by ethnicity and disability are statistically significant at the 10-
per-cent level; these links are also negative. 
Most of the relationships between EO and DM, on the one hand, and quit rates, on the 
other are also not statistically significant within dual voice workplaces. Five polices in total 
are statistically significant. Two are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level; they are 
the monitoring of promotion ‘indirect gender discrimination’ and ‘for indirect ethnic 
discrimination’. One policy is statistically significant at the five-per-cent level; it is the 
monitoring of ‘promotions for indirect disability discrimination’. Two are statistically 
significant at the 10-per-cent level. In all of these statistically significant relationships, the 
link between the policy and quits is negative. In other words, the policy is linked in a 
statistically significant way with lower quits.  
Taken together, the evidence suggests that there is a relatively small amount of 
evidence that links EO and DM policies to lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates in dual 
voice workplaces. There is no evidence to suggest that these policies are associated in a 
statistically significant way with higher levels of absenteeism or quit rates. This is a relatively 
surprising result, as the presence of EO and DM policies could, first, reflect the wishes of 
employees and, second, help to increase employee morale, which is likely to be reflected in 
lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates. Although the majority of EO and DM policies are 
not statistically significantly associated with either lower levels of absenteeism or quit rates, 
dual voice workplaces exhibit the greatest number of statistically significant relationships 
between EO and DM policies and lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates.  
These results suggest that a combination of voice mechanisms is needed to enable EO 
and DM policies to be associated with lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates. This not 
only vindicates the approach taken here to examine the links between EO and DM policies 
and workplace performance within different types of workplace, but results also suggest that 
direct and indirect voice mechanisms may be able to complement one another and convey 
different preferences to managers.  
 
IV Minimal Voice Workplaces, including ‘Bleak Houses’ 
 
Within minimal voice workplaces, none of the relationships between the EO and DM policies 
and absenteeism are statistically significant. In other words, the EO and DM policies neither 
increase nor decrease absenteeism in a statistically significant way. This is an important 
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finding as theoretically these policies are expected to improve employee morale and, hence, 
lower absenteeism.  
Within minimal voice workplaces, approximately half of the EO and DM policies 
examined here are statistically significantly associated with quit rates, and the association is 
positive. In other words, the presence of these policies is linked to higher quit rates. This is an 
important finding, as it indicates that the relationship between EO and DM policies and 
workplace performance is moderated by the type of voice workplace that the policies are 
implemented within. The relationships between some of EO and DM policies and workplace 
performance are only positive and statistically significant within minimal voice workplaces. A 
second important implication of this finding is that the relationship between some EO and 
DM policies and quit rates within minimal voice workplaces is not as anticipated within EO 
and DM theories (Deery et al, 2002). One possible explanation for the relationship between 
these policies and quits is that these policies are introduced to reduce relatively high quit rates 
within workplaces, but are not able to achieve that. 
 
10.2 Implications 
 
Direct voice workplaces, indirect voice workplaces, and dual voice workplaces are all 
more likely to have the individual EO and DM policies examined here than workplaces with 
minimal voice (the type of workplace with the least voice in the analytical framework). 
Therefore, in general, more voice is associated with a higher likelihood that the workplace 
will have any one of a range of EO and DM policies. Moreover, dual voice workplaces are 
more likely, in general, to have any one of the EO and DM policies than the three other types 
of voice workplace. In addition, ‘partnership’ voice workplaces are, in some instances, more 
likely than workplaces within which direct and indirect voice ‘co-exist’ to have the EO and 
DM policies examined in this thesis. In general, therefore, higher levels of voice (dual voice 
and partnership approaches) increase the likelihood that workplaces will have EO and DM 
policies and the link between voice and EO and DM policies is strongest for dual voice and 
partnership workplaces. The finding that EO and DM policies are, on the whole, not 
associated with higher or lower levels of absenteeism and quits, indicates that, in most 
instances, EO and DM policies neither help nor harm establishments to any great degree. 
These findings have implications for theory and practice.  
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10.2.1 Implications for theory  
 
This research has highlighted important variation in the associations between different 
types of voice workplace and the presence of a range of EO and DM policies. In general, dual 
voice workplaces are more likely to have some the EO and DM policies examined here than 
all three of the other voice workplaces. (They are as likely as direct and indirect voice 
workplaces to have some of the other policies.) Minimal voice workplaces are the least likely 
to have the individual EO and DM policies than all of the other three types of voice 
workplace. This finding underlines the importance of adopting a holistic theoretical approach 
to voice: voice mechanisms can encompass different forms and can be combined with one 
another within the same workplace. Some existing studies focus on one form of voice, thereby 
implicitly assuming that voice can only take one form and cannot be combined with other 
forms of voice (Lavelle et al., 2010; Tüselmann, et al., 2007). Theoretical and analytical 
frameworks, therefore, need to be able to incorporate a range of voice mechanisms.  
Overall, the results from this research offer some tentative evidence that indicates that 
voice mechanisms are additive. In broad terms, the more mechanisms a workplace has, the 
more likely it is to have the individual EO and DM policies. Future work could explore this 
issue theoretically to assess any limits to combining different forms of voice and how 
workplaces can integrate different voice mechanisms. At present, much of the literature 
assesses voice mechanisms are alternatives or substitutes for one another (Barry and 
Wilkinson, forthcoming; Benson, 2000; Delaney and Godard, 2001; Dundon et al., 2004; 
Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Hirsch and Addison, 1986; Ichniowski et al., 1996; Wood and 
Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005).  
In addition, it is also important to differentiate, as this research has done, within the 
different types of voice category. For instance, within the minimal voice category, ‘bleak 
houses’ are less likely than those workplaces with limited direct voice mechanisms in place to 
adopt EO and DM policies. Within dual voice workplaces, establishments that combine direct 
and indirect voice mechanisms in a ‘partnership’ approach are more likely than those in which 
these mechanisms ‘co-exist’ to have some of the EO and DM policies. This demonstrates, 
firstly, that a theoretical and analytical focus on voice is warranted, and, secondly, that how 
voice mechanisms are combined matters (Dundon et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2010; Kochan and 
Osterman, 1994; Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005). Managers’ attitudes to unions within 
dual voice workplaces shape the prevalence of EO and DM policies. Theory should reflect 
this finding. 
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The finding that EO and DM policies are, on the whole, not associated with higher or 
lower levels of absenteeism and quits, indicates that, in most instances, EO and DM policies 
neither help nor harm establishments to any great degree. This is in line with findings from 
Riley et al. (2008) who found that there was no definitive link between EO and company 
performance, as measured by managers’ assessment of productivity and profitability. If there 
was a positive association, this tended to be in larger organisations (Riley et al., 2008). In 
related research, Kochan et al. (2003) and Richard (2000) found that there were few direct 
effects of diversity on performance; either positive or negative. Armstrong et al. (2010) do, 
however, detect some evidence that links EO and DM policies, on the one hand, to workplace 
performance, as measured by higher productivity and lower quit rates, on the other. In related 
research, Ng and Tung (1998) found that culturally heterogeneous branches in the banking 
industry experienced lower levels of absenteeism and achieved higher productivity.   
This suggests that the theory linking EO and DM policies to should be re-examined. 
The results from this research have important theoretical implications in this regard. Firstly, 
they suggest that the links between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and higher 
employee morale and job satisfaction, on the other, are not as strong as some theories 
anticipate (Forth et al., 2008; Riley et al., 2008): any direct and negative association between 
EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, are very 
limited. Secondly, this research suggests that the links between EO and DM policies and key 
workplace outcomes need to be specified in greater detail. In other words, the conditions 
under which, for instance, a policy to monitor relative pay rates will be associated with lower 
quit rates needs to be set out.   
The second important finding is that any statistically significant associations between 
EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and absenteeism and quits, on the other, depend upon 
the type of voice workplace within which the policies operate. For instance, the relationship 
between policies and outcomes is sometimes positive and statistically significant (albeit often 
only at the 10-per-cent level) amongst minimal voice workplaces. It is occasionally negative 
and statistically significant (at the one-per-cent level) amongst dual voice workplaces. The 
relationship is, in nearly all cases, not statistically significant amongst direct and indirect 
voice workplaces and if it is statistically significant, it is only weakly so. Therefore, if EO and 
DM policies do influence absenteeism and quits, the nature of that relationship would appear 
to be contingent upon the type of voice workplace.  
This finding highlights a contribution to theory that this thesis has made: by using a 
novel analytical framework based on voice and that builds on the work of others (Lavelle et 
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al., 2010; Tüselmann et al., 2007), this research has revealed key differences amongst 
workplaces according to the type of voice mechanisms that are present within the workplace. 
In other words, the links between the EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and levels of 
absenteeism and quit rates are moderated by different types of voice workplace. Future 
research needs to take this into consideration and assess how voice moderates these 
associations. At present, much of the existing theoretical and empirical work treats voice (if it 
is incorporated into the analysis of the links between EO and DM policies, on the one hand, 
and workplace outcomes, on the other) as an independent variable that has a direct link to 
outcomes rather than as a moderating variable that potentially has a direct and indirect link to 
outcomes, potentially leading to inaccurate results (Armstrong et al., 2010; Forth et al., 2008; 
Lavelle et al., 2010; Riley et al., 2008; Tüselmann et al. 2007). To be sure, there is an 
alternative possibility that this thesis has not examined, but that future research could assess; 
that is, that it is the EO and DM policies that moderate the links between voice mechanisms 
and absenteeism and quit rates.  
 The third key finding of this research is that there is a connection between high levels 
of labour turnover, amongst minimal voice workplaces, and the use of EO and DM policies. It 
is only in minimal voice workplaces that any of the links between EO and DM and quit rates 
are positive and statistically significant: when the policies are statistically significant, the 
policies are linked to higher quit rates. (In other types of voice workplace, when the EO and 
DM policy is statistically significantly related to quit rates, the relationship is negative; in 
other words, the presence of the policy is linked to lower quit rates.) This finding underlines 
the importance of differentiating, as this thesis has done, between types of voice workplace. 
There are two ways to interpret this finding. Firstly, EO and DM policies may lead to higher 
quit rates within minimal voice workplaces. Secondly and more plausibly, higher labour 
turnover may lead managers to implement EO and DM policies, even amongst minimal voice 
workplaces that are likely to emphasise management’s prerogative, to reduce the level of 
quits, suggesting that rationale for introducing EO and DM policies may depend not just on 
the type of voice workplace, but also on the immediate objectives of managers. Either way, 
this research has contributed to the theoretical literature by identifying this variation and 
highlighting how voice moderates the associations between EO and DM policies and 
workplace outcomes. Theory needs, therefore, to take into consideration this potential 
moderation and to model it as positive (potentially increasing the quit rate) at low levels of 
voice and negative (possibly reducing the quit rate) at high levels of voice. 
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 Relatedly, the findings from the second stage of analysis in this thesis suggest that 
existing theoretical frameworks, such as Armstrong et al. (2010) and Kandola and Fullerton, 
(1998), need to be more nuanced. This research has examined absenteeism and quit rates for 
all employees within the workplace, this may overlook important differences between 
employee groups; in other words, the findings here may mask important variation amongst 
different groups within the workforce in terms of their reactions to EO and DM policies. 
Whilst some groups may view them favourably and stay, others may not and leave. An 
important contribution of this research has, therefore, been to identify the need for theoretical 
and empirical work to specify which groups of employees EO and DM policies are likely to 
influence. Some of the existing literature on the links between EO and DM policies and 
workplace performance treats employees implicitly as a relatively homogeneous (Armstrong 
et al., 2010; Riley et al., 2008; cf. Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; William, forthcoming). 
This research suggests that, for instance, workforce characteristics, such as the percentage of 
employees who are female, are from a BME background, have a disability, or are highly 
skilled, need to be incorporated into theoretical and analytical frameworks. For instance, in 
general, the higher the percentage of highly skilled employees within an establishment’s 
workplace, the lower the levels of absenteeism and quit rates are likely to be. These 
relationships depend, however, on the types of voice mechanisms present within the 
workplace. This thesis found that the higher the percentage of highly skilled employees within 
a workforce the lower the levels of absenteeism in direct, collective, and dual voice 
workplaces. The levels of statistical significance vary, but the relationship is always a 
negative correlation in all of the regressions or the EO and DM policies. The higher the 
percentage of employees within a workforce, the lower the quit rate in minimal voice 
workplace and direct voice workplaces for all of the EO and DM regressions. 
 
10.2.2 Implications for Practitioners 
 
This research has important implications for practitioners. The findings here reveal that the 
presence of EO and DM policies is not associated with lower levels of absenteeism or quit 
rates, on the whole. One explanation for this may lie in how the policies are implemented. It is 
interesting to note that the strongest relationships between EO and DM policies and 
workplace outcomes are in dual voice workplace. The presence of both direct and indirect 
voice could act as complements to one another, potentially providing workers with ample 
opportunity to express their concerns to managers. It is possible that dual voice workplaces 
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might also enable managers to establish a more co-operative employment relations climate, 
enabling them to create a high-trust environment for both employees and employers 
(Timming, 2012), and enabling information about the outcomes of any ‘monitoring’ policies 
to be communicated and discussed widely within the workplace. Other workplaces might, 
therefore, be able to learn from the ways in which dual voice workplaces operate their EO and 
DM policies.  
This has broader implications for practitioners and policy makers. The introduction of 
‘Equal Pay Transparency’, making employers with more than 250 employees disclose how 
much they pay in salaries and bonuses to male and female employees in an attempt to 
eradicate the gender pay gap, illustrates the political salience of this issue. The findings from 
this research suggest that this political emphasis on pay and bonuses may not lead to the 
desired changes in how workplaces treat women, BME workers and disabled employees, and, 
hence, result in decreased levels of absenteeism and lower quit rates. Monitoring and 
disclosing pay differentials may not be sufficient to lead to a change in the relative 
remuneration of men and women within workplaces. Other factors within the workplace are 
likely to influence how managers respond to pay disparities between men and women. The 
research here tentatively indicates that the presence of both direct and indirect voice 
mechanisms within workplace are more likely than any other forms of voice to influence how 
managers respond to reduce pay differentials between men and women. 
The results from the research here suggest, at the very least, then, that future research 
could examine how managers implement EO and DM policies. For instance, if a workplace 
does monitor recruitment and selection for a possible gender bias, what happens to the 
information that is created? Is it shared with employees or employee representatives? Do 
managers use that information to change recruitment and selection procedures? If the 
information is not shared and/or if workplace practices do not change (when monitoring 
reveals a bias in recruitment towards, say, white men), workplace outcomes, such as 
absenteeism and quit rates, may not change.  
This research also has implications for unions and employee representatives. 
Workplaces that have direct and indirect voice mechanisms in place and in which managers 
have a positive attitude towards unions are more likely than all of the other types of voice 
workplace to implement the individual EO and DM policies examined here. These other types 
of workplace include those establishments in which direct and indirect voice mechanisms ‘co-
exist’ with one another and managers do not have a positive attitude towards unions. Research 
could be conducted to help union officials better understand why some managers view unions 
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positively, while others do not. Helping union officials understand managers’ attitudes and 
likely response to unions might enable them to increase the prevalence of EO and DM 
policies within workplaces that might, potentially, improve employees’ working conditions. 
 
10.3 Weaknesses and Limitations of this Research 
 
This research has drawn on a larger sample than many previous studies have done and 
incorporates important employee management practices that the existing literature often 
neglects. It has, therefore, been able to provide the most comprehensive assessment of the 
links between various voice mechanisms and EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and EO 
and DM policies and workplace outcomes, on the other. The findings, as noted above, have 
important theoretical, analytical, and practical implications. 
The research suffers, however, from the usual limitations associated with cross-
sectional data. As indicated in the reporting of the findings, this thesis cannot say anything 
about the ‘direction of causality’. In other words, it is not possible to say if the different voice 
mechanisms lead to or cause the differences in EO and DM policies that are observed. 
Therefore, it is not possible to say with complete certainty that, for instance, dual voice 
mechanisms are more influential than other forms of voice in increasing the number of EO 
and DM policies that workplaces adopt. Causality might ‘run’ in the opposite direction. It is, 
for instance, equally plausible to argue that those workplaces that adopt a higher number of 
EO and DM policies, potentially in order to create a co-operative employment relations 
climate within the workplace, are also likely to be those workplaces that implement direct 
voice mechanisms or that view indirect voice favourably in order, once again, to foster a 
collaborative working environment.  
Similarly, it is not possible for this thesis to argue definitively that, where relevant 
associations exist, individual EO and DM policies reduce rates of absenteeism or lower quit 
rates. Once again, causality could run in the opposite direction. When lower rates of 
absenteeism or quits are associated with a particular EO and DM policy, lower quits could 
‘cause’ the workplace to implement the policy by, for instance, enabling employees with long 
tenure to push for the adoption of that practice. Alternatively, lower levels of absenteeism and 
quits could enable HRM departments to focus on implementing EO and DM policies rather 
than trying to rectify high rates of absenteeism or recruiting employees to replace those who 
have left the organisation. By focusing on the cross-sectional element within WERS, this 
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thesis has, however, been able to draw on a very large sample and to highlight patterns in the 
association between, firstly, different voice mechanisms and EO and DM policies and, 
secondly, EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes that future research could build upon. 
This thesis draws on the management survey; it does not use either the employee 
representative or employee survey within WERS. This maximises the sample size used in the 
analysis and also enables an analysis of a greater range of EO and DM policies compared to 
previous research. Questions in the employee and employee representative surveys do not ask 
if policies are implemented to monitor recruitment by gender, ethnicity, or disability, etc. It 
would not, therefore, have been possible to tackle EO and DM policies within workplaces in 
the same level of detail had this thesis used the employee and/or employee representative 
surveys.  
As mentioned in the introduction, by relying on managers’ responses by solely using 
the management survey, a unitaristic bias could enter into the analysis. Lower-level workers 
may have a different opinion of whether or not a particular policy exists. Reliance on the 
management survey alone downplays the views of employees and their representatives. These 
latter two groups may have very different views to managers about the policies that have been 
implemented. For example, whilst a policy to monitor relative pay rates by gender may exist, 
the views of managers and employees about how the policy operates in practice may differ 
considerably, as the results of the monitoring may not be made known to the workforce and 
little action may be taken within the firm despite evidence to suggest that, for instance, 
women are not paid as much as men performing the same or similar roles (Berthoud and 
Blekesaune, 2006; Platt, 2011).  
However, the use of the management questionnaire is justified on the grounds that the 
research has helped to reveal areas where such policies do appear to influence outcomes 
within certain groups of workplace, specifically those that have dual voice. Indeed, the 
finding that, for most types of workplace and for most of the EO and DM policies examined 
in this thesis, there is no statistically significant association between policies and outcomes 
tentatively suggests that these policies  do not help to lower absenteeism or quit rates. This, in 
turn, suggests that future research could focus on understanding why workplaces have these 
policies, but fail to achieve desirable outcomes with them.   
This thesis has used the WERS database in cross-sectional form. As a result, as noted 
above, it is not possible to say anything about the direction of causality about the relationships 
between, say, voice and EO and DM policies. Although it is possible to use the WERS 
database as a panel dataset in which the same establishments are asked the same questions in 
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each round of the survey, this would not have been an option for this thesis for two reasons. 
First, only a relatively small percentage of workplaces are retained within the survey from one 
round to the next. This would have reduced the sample size considerably. Second, the number 
of workplaces that change either the voice mechanisms or EO and DM policies is relatively 
small. The results of any analysis would, as a result, be driven by these workplaces, 
potentially leading to biased findings, as these workplaces may not be representative of the 
population as a whole. Indeed, the fact that there are only a few workplaces that have changed 
their voice mechanisms and/or EO and DM policies suggests that they are not typical. The 
approach adopted in this thesis, therefore, has the advantage of identifying the broad patterns, 
if any, of the links between 1) voice and EO and DM polices and 2) EO and DM policies, on 
the one hand, and absenteeism and quit rates, on the other, within various types of voice 
workplace. By doing so, it has highlighted areas that future research could fruitfully examine. 
 
10.4 Future Research 
  
Future research could overcome this shortcoming by adopting a qualitative and 
longitudinal research design in order to ascertain why certain policies have been implemented 
and what the effects of adopting a particular EO and DM policy have been. Such research 
would deepen yet further our understanding of how voice, EO and DM policies and important 
workplace outcomes are related to one another.  
Such research would also help to highlight what the effects of particular EO and DM 
policies are on groups of employees (Timming, 2015). As a novel, large-scale study, this 
research has not been able to examine how the various policies that this thesis analyses 
influence absenteeism and quit rates for the workers who are affected by the policy. For 
instance, it has not been possible to examine how a policy to monitor promotions for indirect 
discrimination against women, those from an ethnic minority and those with a disability 
influences absenteeism and quit rates amongst those groups. Importantly, however, this 
research has clearly demonstrated that, amongst dual voice workplaces, this policy is linked to 
lower levels of absenteeism and quits. This relationship is statistically significant at the one-
per-cent level for indirect discrimination against women and those from an ethnic minority 
and at the five-per-cent level for those with a disability. In other types of ‘voice workplace’, 
there is, by and large, no statistically significant relationship between these policies and 
absenteeism and quits. This research has, therefore, highlighted where future research to 
assess the impact of EO and DM policies on particular groups could focus and has highlighted 
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the importance of differentiating between workplaces according to the type of voice practices 
that are present. If future research does not disaggregate the data by voice, any links between 
EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes may well be masked by a general effect that 
results in policies not affecting outcomes. 
This research combines EO and DM policies, as the WERS dataset, which is the 
largest survey of UK establishments, combines these two types of policy. However, there are 
differences between the two types of policy in the literature (Jewson and Mason, 1986). 
Future research could disaggregate these policies and test them individually rather than 
together. By disaggregating these policies future research may produce different associations, 
from this thesis, between, first, various voice mechanisms and EO and DM policies, 
individually, and, second, EO and DM policies, individually, on the one hand, and 
absenteeism and quit rates, on the other. Future research could examine these relationships by 
drawing on case study work. 
Other disadvantaged groups could be examined in future research. The groups this 
thesis has examined were women, BME workers and disabled peopled. These three groups 
were chosen as they represent areas that are highly important in the EO and DM literature 
(Forth and Rincon-Aznar, 2008; Jones, 2016; Kirton and Greene, 2005, 2010; Kirton et al., 
2007; Riley et al., 2008; cf. Kirton  and Greene, 2015). The WERS data also covers potential 
discrimination on the following grounds: religion and belief, age, sexual orientation. 
Examining the links between voice and EO and DM policies, on the one hand, and EO and 
DM policies and workplace outcomes (absenteeism and quits), on the other, in these 
alternative groups, may reveal different associations. 
Changing the performance measure should shed further light on the associations 
between voice workplaces, EO and DM policies and performance. The performance measures 
used in this thesis are voluntary labour turnover and absenteeism. Using alternative 
performance measures (e.g. employee satisfaction) my reveal different associations. This 
thesis reveals that, on the whole, EO and DM policies, are not associated with lower levels of 
absenteeism and lower quit rates. However, by changing the performance measure to say, 
employee satisfaction, different associations may potentially be revealed, leading to further 
insights into the associations between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes. The 
WERS database does not, unfortunately, cover employee satisfaction. Case study research 
could perhaps focus on minimal and dual workplaces, as this thesis has revealed that there are 
different association between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes in these types of 
workplaces. 
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The WERS dataset has enabled this thesis to examine relationships between voice, EO 
and DM policies, and workplace outcomes in the largest survey of UK workplaces. As 
explained above, this thesis uses the WERS dataset in a cross-sectional way. For instance, 
future research could focus on the factors, including various voice variables that lead to the 
introduction of EO and DM policies. Future research could examine the views managers, 
employee representatives, and employees, on what led to the introduction of these policies. 
This could possibly be done using a case study methodology. 
As already mentioned, one of the limitations of this thesis is the use of the 
management survey alone. This approach is justified, as, by using the management survey 
alone it enabled this thesis to capture as many workplaces as possible in the analysis and, 
thereby, contributing to the literature by incorporating small and medium-sized enterprises as 
well as large ones (Forth and Ricon-Aznar, 2008). Using only the management survey, the 
complete sampled used in this thesis has 1946 workplaces. If the employee representative or 
the employee survey had been used, the sample size would be much lower. Having such as 
large sample has allowed this thesis to reveal associations that were not previously known.  
Moreover, the employee representative and employee surveys do not cover EO and DM 
policies. However, future research could perhaps gather contributions from employees and 
employee representatives about the use of EO and DM policies within workplaces. This 
would result in a much smaller survey, but may reveal more details about how employees feel 
about the adoption of EO and DM policies and possibly reveal information about why these 
policies do not appear to result in lower labour turnover and absenteeism.  
A longitudinal survey was not used in this research for the reasons already 
outlined. Relatedly, Guest (2011) acknowledges that the limited amount of research on HRM 
and performance that is longitudinal may contribute to the lack of understanding of linkages 
between HRM and performance. Therefore, future research may want to examine, over time, 
the links between, various voice mechanisms and EO and DM policies, and EO and DM 
policies and workplace outcomes. This thesis has revealed interesting associations. In 
particular, the links between EO and DM policies and workplace outcomes vary in minimal 
and dual voice workplace. Future qualitative research could examine this variation. The 
collection of data over time may reveal why EO and DM policies are introduced and how 
these policies are implemented within different types of voice workplaces. This, as already 
stated, would be difficult using the WERS data; however, other data could be collected 
overtime to give a more detailed understanding of these links. This would be important as 
dual voice workplaces are more likely to have individual EO and DM policies and, in some 
323 
 
cases, these policies are associated with lower levels of absenteeism and quit rates. Legal 
changes to force large companies to reveal the remuneration levels of male and female 
employees highlights the practical salience of this research area. More research needs to be 
done to assess how those legal changes are likely to influence workplace outcomes.
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APPENDIX A  – Summary Tables 
A.1 Summary of Minimal Voice as Reference Category 
Policy Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Statistical Significance*10%; 
**5%; ***1%  
 Hosmer Lemeshow Cox and Snell R Square Nagelkerke R 
Square 
Direct 
Voice 
Collective 
Voice  
Dual 
Voice 
Formal written 
policy on 
Equal 
Opportunities 
or Managing 
Diversity 
Less than 
0.05 
Less than 
0.05 
0.102 0.129 0.238 0.299 1% 1% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Gender 
Bias 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.301 0.314 0.403 0.422 1% 1% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
by Ethnicity 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.310 0.319 0.415 0.428 1% 5% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
by Disability 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.304 0.317 0.409 0.426 1% 1% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
Less than 
0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.217 0.229 0.298 0.314 1% 1% 1% 
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for Indirect 
Gender 
Discrimination 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Indirect 
Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.222 0.233 0.305 0.321 1% 5% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Indirect 
Disability 
Discrimination 
Less than 
0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.218 0.231 0.300 0.319 1% 1% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Gender 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.211 0.232 0.325 0.357 1% 1% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Less than 
0.05 
0.216 0.234 0.338 0.365 1% 1% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Disability 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.203 0.218 0.324 0.348 1% 1% 1% 
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Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Gender 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.157 0.176 0.240 0.269 1% 1% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.157 0.173 0.243 0.267 5% 1% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Disability 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.149 0.162 0.233 0.255 5% 1% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Gender  
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.202 0.213 0.320 0.337 1% 1% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Ethnicity 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.163 0.173 0.302 0.320 5% 10% 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Disability 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.150 0.159 0.289 0.306 5%  1% 
Number of cases: 1946 
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A.2 Summary of Direct Voice as Reference Category 
Policy Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Statistical Significance*10%; 
**5%; ***1%  
 Hosmer Lemeshow Cox and Snell R Square Nagelkerke R 
Square 
Minimalist  
Voice 
Collective 
Voice  
Dual 
Voice 
Formal written 
policy on 
Equal 
Opportunities 
or Managing 
Diversity 
Less than 
0.05 
Less than 
0.05 
0.102 0.129 0.238 0.299 (1%) (5%)  
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Gender 
Bias 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.301 0.314 0.403 0.422 (1%) (5%)  
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
by Ethnicity 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.310 0.319 0.415 0.428 (1%)   
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
by Disability 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.304 0.317 0.409 0.426 (1%) (10%)  
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Indirect 
Less than 
0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.217 0.229 0.298 0.314 (1%)  10% 
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Gender 
Discrimination 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Indirect 
Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.222 0.233 0.305 0.321 (1%)  10% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Indirect 
Disability 
Discrimination 
Less than 
0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.218 0.231 0.300 0.319 (1%)   
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Gender 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.211 0.232 0.325 0.357 (1%)  1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Less than 
0.05 
0.216 0.234 0.338 0.365 (1%)  1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Disability 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.203 0.218 0.324 0.348 (1%)  1% 
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Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Gender 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.157 0.176 0.240 0.269 (1%)  5% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.157 0.173 0.243 0.267 (5%)  1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Disability 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.149 0.162 0.233 0.255 (5%)  1% 
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Gender  
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.202 0.213 0.320 0.337 (1%)   
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Ethnicity 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.163 0.173 0.302 0.320 (5%)   
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Disability 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.150 0.159 0.289 0.306 (5%)   
Number of cases: 1946 
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A.3 Summary of Dual Voice Workplaces 
Policy Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Statistical 
Significance*10%; 
**5%; ***1% 
 Hosmer Lemeshow Cox and Snell R Square Nagelkerke R 
Square 
Partnership 
Formal written 
policy on 
Equal 
Opportunities 
or Managing 
Diversity 
Less than 
0.05 
Less than 
0.05 
0.010 0.013 0.076 0.093  
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Gender 
Bias 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.203 0.214 0.284 0.299 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
by Ethnicity 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.211 0.217 0.296 0.303 5% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
by Disability 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.234 0.239 0.324 0.331 5% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.148 0.154 0.198 0.206 5% 
 354 
for Indirect 
Gender 
Discrimination 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Indirect 
Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Less than 
0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.162 0.167 0.218 0.224 5% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Indirect 
Disability 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.162 0.169 0.218 0.227 5% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Gender 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.184 0.190 0.248 0.255 5% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.199 0.205 0.268 0.277 5% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Disability 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.198 0.203 0.270 0.277 5% 
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Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Gender 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.110 0.114 0.149 0.154 10% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.114 0.120 0.155 0.163 5% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Disability 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.111 0.114 0.152 0.156  
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Gender  
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.178 0.178 0.244 0.245  
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Ethnicity 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.152 0.153 0.221 0.224  
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Disability 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.148 0.150 0.222 0.225  
Number of cases: 718 
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A.4 Summary of Minimalist Voice Workplaces 
Policy Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Statistical 
Significance*10%; 
**5%; ***1% 
 Hosmer Lemeshow Cox and Snell R Square Nagelkerke R 
Square 
Partnership 
Formal written 
policy on 
Equal 
Opportunities 
or Managing 
Diversity 
Less than 
0.05 
Less than 
0.05 
0.120 0.143 0.208 0.249 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Gender 
Bias 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Less than 
0.05 
0.211 0.217 0.309 0.319 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
by Ethnicity 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Less than 
0.05 
0.226 0.234 0.328 0.341 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
by Disability 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.209 0.216 0.312 0.321 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.133 0.142 0.206 0.220 1% 
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for Indirect 
Gender 
Discrimination 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Indirect 
Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.129 0.138 0.201 0.215 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Recruitment 
and Selection 
for Indirect 
Disability 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.126 0.135 0.199 0.212 1% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Gender 
Discrimination 
Less than 
0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.107 0.108 0.232 0.235  
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Less than 
0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.109 0.111 0.243 0.247  
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Disability 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.100 0.102 0.229 0.233  
 358 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Gender 
Discrimination 
Less than 
0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.092 0.097 0.185 0.195 5% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Ethnicity 
Discrimination 
Less than 
0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.089 0.094 0.178 0.188 5% 
Workplace 
Monitors 
Promotions 
for Indirect 
Disability 
Discrimination 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.079 0.085 0.163 0.176 5% 
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Gender  
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.123 0.123 0.274 0.275  
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Ethnicity 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.087 0.87 0.277 0.277  
Workplace 
Monitors Pay 
Rates by 
Disability 
Greater 
than 0.05 
Greater 
than 0.05 
0.078 0.078 0.263 0.264  
Number of cases: 947 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst  
‘Minimal Voice’ Workplaces 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by gender 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.399 0.024 0.034 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
ethnicity 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.275 0.022 0.031 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
disability 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.466 0.022 0.032 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.605 0.024 0.034 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.629 0.022 0.032 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.056 0.022 0.031 
Monitor 
promotions by 
gender 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.076 0.025 0.036 
Monitor 
promotions by 
ethnicity 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.710 0.025 0.036 
Monitor 
promotions by 
disability 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.079 0.024 0.035 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.194 0.022 0.031 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.077 0.022 0.032 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.161 0.022 0.031 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by gender 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.059 0.022 0.031 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
ethnicity 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.214 0.022 0.031 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
disability 
N  Percentage 
of female 
workers 
‘A lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work 
0.100 0.022 0.031 
Notes: N = 516: variables in bold indicate a negative association. 
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Table B.2 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst  
‘Direct Voice’ Workplaces 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by gender 
N    0.010 0.027 0.044 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
ethnicity 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.401 0.028 0.045 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
disability 
 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.141 0.027 0.044 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.261 0.028 0.044 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect ethnic 
discrimination 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.260 0.027 0.044 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.230 0.027 0.044 
Monitor 
promotions for 
gender 
discrimination   
 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.012 0.027 0.044 
Monitor 
promotions for 
ethnic 
discrimination 
 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.020 0.027 0.044 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
promotions for 
disability 
discrimination 
 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.026 0.028 0.045 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.021 0.027 0.044 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect ethnic 
discrimination 
 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.087 0.029 0.046 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.031 0.028 0.045 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by gender 
N    0.132 0.032 0.051 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
ethnicity 
 
 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.088 0.030 0.048 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
disability 
 
 
 
N   %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
0.102 0.029 0.047 
Notes: N = 245: variables in bold indicate a negative association. 
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Table B.3 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst  
‘Collective Voice’ Workplaces 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by gender 
N %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers 
0.062 0.098 0.142 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
ethnicity 
 
 
N Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers 
0.052 0.098 0.142 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
disability 
 
N Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers 
0.0 
63 
0.098 0.142 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
 
 
N Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers 
0.157 0.098 0.142 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
 
 
N Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers 
0.349 0.098 0.142 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
 
N Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers 
0.097 0.098 0.142 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
promotions by 
gender 
  
Y – 10 per 
cent; 
negative 
association 
Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers; 
‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work  
0.471 0.110 0.159 
Monitor 
promotions by 
ethnicity 
 
Y – 10 per 
cent; 
negative 
association 
Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers; 
‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
work  
0.296 0.109 0.158 
Monitor 
promotions by 
disability 
 
 
N Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers 
0.099 0.105 0.152 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
 
 
N Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers; 
workers in 
the ‘LOG’ 
have a ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work 
0.363 0.105 0.152 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect ethnic 
discrimination 
 
N Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers 
0.179 0.101 0.147 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
N Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers 
0.289 0.099 0.143 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by gender 
 
 
 
Y – 5 pc; 
negative 
association  
Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
  0.277 0.118 0.171 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
ethnicity 
 
 
 
N Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers 
0.638 0.100 0.145 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
disability 
 
 
N Private 
sector 
workplac
es; %age 
of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
 %age of 
female 
workers 
0.329 0.099 0.144 
Notes: N = 250: variables in bold indicate a negative association. 
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Table B.4 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Absenteeism and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst 
 ‘Dual Voice’ Workplaces 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by gender 
 
 
N Percentage 
of female 
workers; 
percentag
e of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employees 
 0.028 0.082 0.123 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
ethnicity 
 
 
N Percentage 
of female 
workers; 
percentag
e of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employees 
 0.180 0.082 0.124 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
disability 
 
 
N Percentage 
of female 
workers; 
percentag
e of the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employees 
 0.055 0.081 0.122 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
 
N %age of 
female 
workers; 
%age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employees 
 0.142 0.083 0.124 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
 
 
N %age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employees
; %age of 
female 
workers 
 0.056 0.084 0.126 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
N %age of 
female 
workers; 
%age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employees 
 0.247 0.082 0.123 
Monitor 
promotions by 
gender 
 
 
Y – 1 per 
cent, 
negative 
link 
%age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employee; 
%age of 
female 
workers 
 0.002 0.093 0.139  
Monitor 
promotions by 
ethnicity 
 
 
N %age of 
female 
workers; 
%age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employees 
 0.076 0.081 0.129 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
promotions by 
disability 
 
 
 
N %age of 
female 
workers; 
%age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employees 
 0.084 0.084 0.127 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
 
 
Y – one per 
cent; 
negative 
association 
%age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
Total 
number 
of 
employee; 
%age of 
female 
workers  
 0.002 0.093 0.139 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
 
Y – 1 per 
cent; 
negative 
association 
%age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employee 
(natural 
log); %age 
of female 
workers; 
 0.009 0.091 0.137  
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
 
Yes – 5 per 
cent; 
negative 
association 
%age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employee 
(natural 
log) ; 
%age of 
female 
workers 
 0.019 0.088 0.132 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by gender 
 
 
Y – one per 
cent; 
negative 
%age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employee 
(natural 
log) ; 
%age of 
female 
workers 
 0.149 0.095 0.142 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
ethnicity 
 
Y - 10 
percentage; 
negative 
%age of 
female 
workers;  
%age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled  
Total 
number 
of 
employee 
(natural 
log) 
 0.240 0.086 0.129 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
disability 
 
 
Y - 10 
percentage; 
negative 
%age of 
female 
workers;  
%age of 
the 
workforce 
that is 
highly 
skilled 
Total 
number 
of 
employee 
(natural 
log) 
 0.207 0.086 0.130 
Notes: N = 616: variables in bold indicate a negative association. 
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Appendix C 
Table C.1 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst 
 ‘Minimal Voice’ Workplaces 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by gender 
 
 
Y – 10%; 
positive 
%age 
workforce 
female; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 Private 
sector 
0.288 0.054 0.074 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
ethnicity 
 
 
 
Y – 5%; 
positive 
%age 
workforce 
female; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 Private 
sector 
0.173 0.057 0.078 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
disability 
 
 
Y - 5%; 
positive 
%age 
workforce 
female; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 Private 
sector 
0.073 0.058 0.080 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
  0.628 0.050 0.068 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
  0.733 0.049 0.067 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
  0.466 0.051 0.070 
Monitor 
promotions by 
gender 
Y – 5%; 
positive 
%age 
workforce 
female 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 0.021 0.058 0.080 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
promotions by 
ethnicity 
Y – 5%; 
positive 
%age 
workforce 
female 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 0.335 0.056 0.077 
Monitor 
promotions by 
disability 
 
Y – 10%; 
positive  
%age 
workforce 
female;  
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 0.117 0.054 0.074 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
N %age 
workforce 
female  
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 0.479 0.050 0.069 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
Y – 10%; 
positive 
%age 
workforce 
female  
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 0.330 0.053 0.073 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
N %age 
workforce 
female  
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 0.671 0.050 0.069 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by gender 
 
Y – 10%; 
positive  
%age 
workforce 
female  
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 0.065 0.054 0.075 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
ethnicity 
 
Y – 10%; 
positive 
%age 
workforce 
female  
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 0.279 0.054 0.075 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
disability 
N %age 
workforce 
female  
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
 0.391 0.052 0.071 
Notes: N = 516: variables in bold indicate a negative association. 
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Table C.2 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst  
‘Direct Voice’ Workplaces 
  Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by gender 
 
 
N  %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
ethnicity 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.324 0.112 0.153 
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  Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
disability 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.477 0.114 0.156 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.981 0.109 0.149 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect ethnic 
discrimination 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.992 0.110 0.150 
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  Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.944 0.110 0.151 
Monitor 
promotions for 
gender 
discrimination   
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.591 0.116 0.159 
Monitor 
promotions for 
ethnic 
discrimination 
 
 
Y – 10 per 
cent; 
negative 
%age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.457 0.122 0.167 
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  Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
promotions for 
disability 
discrimination 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.806 0.117 0.160 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.906 0.110 0.150 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect ethnic 
discrimination 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.794 0.109 0.149 
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  Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.881 0.109 0.150 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by gender 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.978 0.110 0.150 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
ethnicity 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.997 0.108 0.149 
 387 
  Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
disability 
 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
private 
sector; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
Workers 
in LOG 
are 
involved 
in work 
design ‘a 
lot’ or to  
‘some’ 
extent 
0.975 0.108 0.148 
Notes: N = 245: variables in bold indicate a negative association. 
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Table C.3 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst 
 ‘Collective Voice’ Workplaces 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by gender 
 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female;  
private 
sector 
 Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
0.141 0.123 0.171 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
ethnicity 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female;  
private 
sector 
 Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
0.202 0.122 0.170 
 389 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
disability 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female 
Private 
sector 
Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work 
0.072 0.123 0.171 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
0.506 0.125 0.174 
 390 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
0.249 0.123 0.172 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
0.071 0.123 0.171 
 391 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
promotions by 
gender 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
0.255 0.122 0.170 
Monitor 
promotions by 
ethnicity 
 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Total 
number 
employees 
(natural 
log); 
Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work 
0.002 0.123 0.171 
 392 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
promotions by 
disability 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Total 
number 
employees 
(natural 
log); 
Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work 
0.008 0.123 0.171 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
 
 
N  %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Total 
number 
employees 
(natural 
log); 
Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work 
0.011 0.124 0.172 
 393 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect ethnic 
discrimination 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Total 
number 
employees 
(natural 
log); 
Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work 
0.030 0.124 0.173 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Total 
number 
employees 
(natural 
log); 
Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work 
0.029 0.125 0.173 
 394 
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor relative 
pay rates by gender 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
0.305 0.122 0.170 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
ethnicity 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
0.304 0.123 0.170 
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Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
  1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cent Level 
   
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
disability 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
 Workers 
in LOG 
have ‘a 
lot’ or 
‘some’ 
variety in 
their work; 
%age 
workforce 
highly 
skilled 
0.276 0.122 0.170 
Notes: N = 250: variables in bold indicate negative association. 
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Table C.4 Extended Results of Multivariate Regression: Quit Rates and Equal Opportunity Policies amongst 
‘Dual Voice’ Workplaces 
  Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cen                    
t Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by gender 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability  
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority  
0.794 0.119 0.164 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
ethnicity 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability  
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority  
0.638 0.120 0.164 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection by 
disability 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability  
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority  
0.648 0.119 0.164 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability  
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority  
0.613 0.121 0.166 
 397 
  Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cen                    
t Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability  
Total 
number of 
employee 
(natural 
log);  
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority  
0.558 0.123 0.168 
Monitor 
recruitment and 
selection for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability  
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority  
0.746 0.120 0.164 
Monitor 
promotions by 
gender 
 
 
Y – 10 per 
cent; 
negative 
association 
%age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability; 
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority 
Total 
number of 
employee 
(natural 
log) 
0.444 0.124 0.170 
 398 
  Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cen                    
t Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
promotions by 
ethnicity 
 
 
Y – 10 per 
cent; 
negative 
association 
%age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability; 
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority 
Total 
number of 
employee 
(natural 
log) 
0.422 0.124 0.169 
Monitor 
promotions by 
disability 
 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability; 
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority 
Total 
number of 
employee 
(natural 
log) 
0.430 0.122 0.167 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect gender 
discrimination 
 
 
Y – 1 per 
cent; 
negative 
association 
%age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
Total 
number of 
employees 
(natural 
log); %age 
workforce 
disability; 
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority 
 0.205 0.131 0.180 
 399 
  Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cen                    
t Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect ethnic  
discrimination 
 
Y – 1 per 
cent; 
negative 
association 
%age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability; 
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority 
Total 
number of 
employees 
(natural 
log) 
0.584 0.132 0.182 
Monitor 
promotions for 
indirect disability 
discrimination 
 
Y – 5 per 
cent; 
negative 
association 
%age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability 
Total 
number of 
employees 
(natural 
log) ; 
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority 
0.492 0.127 0.174 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by gender 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability 
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority 
0.301 0.122 0.168 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
ethnicity 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability 
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority 
0.163 0.121 0.166 
 400 
  Statistically Significant Control 
Variables 
   
Equal Opportunity 
Policy 
Statistical 
Significance 
Y/N – Level 
1 Per Cent 
Level 
5 Per Cent 
Level 
10 Per 
Cen                    
t Level 
Hosmer 
Lemeshow 
Cox and 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Monitor relative 
pay rates by 
disability 
 
N %age 
workforce 
female; 
private 
sector 
%age 
workforce 
disability 
%age 
workforce 
ethnic 
minority 
0.191 0.120 0.164 
Notes: N = 616: variables in bold indicate a negative association. 
 
